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During the course of the thesis, over 500 people made contact with the 
'Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder Research Project'. Many wrote moving letters, 
volunteering to help in researching this disabling and distressing condition. 
Throughout the thesis, there are quotes from some of the letters and comments of 
subjects so that clinical experience can be used to illustrate theoretical discussion. 
The quote which opens the chapter and the thesis serves as a reminder of the distress 
and fear experienced by people, and the need for research into the disorder. 
xix 
ABSTRACT 
In the past decade, there has been a resurgence of interest in Obsessive-compulsive 
disorder (OCD). This dissertation concentrates on the investigation of the cognitive- 
behavioural model of OCD proposed by Salkovskis (1985,1989). The model is described, 
and relevant data reviewed. Empirical investigations are conducted into the nature of anxiety 
in OCD, the role of guilt and religion, and the importance of perceived responsibility for 
threat. The cognitive bias of M ought-Action Fusion' is illustrated using two cases, and is 
explored by means of a questionnaire study. The findings from the investigation and 
development of the cognitive-behavioural model are summarised. 
Recently, models which conceptualise OCD as a neurological disorder have gained 
popularity. However, there has been little attempt to integrate the neurological model with 
the cognitive-behavioural model. There appears to be support for both models, and 
throughout the thesis, data are generated to test the hypothesis that OCD is heterogeneous. 
In particular, it is suggested that some patients may have OCD which is characterised by 
excessive anxiety, responsibility and guilt, as suggested by the cognitive-behavioural model, 
whilst others show neurological deficits of the type suggested by the neurological model. The 
hypothesis that these two groups are mutually exclusive is tested. 
The neurological deficit model is described, and two studies are reported, the primary 
aim of which is to generate data to test the heterogeneity hypothesis. The first study is on 
neurological soft signs in people with OCD, and the other investigates their 
neuropsychological test performance. The studies are also of intrinsic interest and are 
considered within the relevant literature. 
The criteria needed to be able to test the heterogeneity hypothesis are considered and 
analyses are conducted to determine whether the data generated throughout the thesis fulfill 
these criteria. Based on these results, the heterogeneity hypothesis is revised and tested. 
The findings from the thesis are drawn together and summarised in the final chapter. 
The current status of the cognitive-behavioural and neurological models is considered. 





"1 could not tell anybody about it, as I thought they would probably put me in a nutters 
home or something" (SJ). 
1.1. General Overview 
Research in Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) has been revitalised in the last 
decade. According to a 'Psychological literature' search, articles with ' OCD' in the title grew 
from 50 in 1983 to 183 in 1993. This renewal of interest can be attributed to three major 
developments in the field. First, the large Epidemiological Catchment Area study gave an 
indication that the prevalence of the disorder may be between 1.2% and 2.4% of the general 
population (Karno, 1988). If this is a true reflection of the prevalence of the disorder, OCD 
is the fourth most common psychiatric disorder after phobias, substance abuse and depression. 
Second, the successful application of cognitive-behavioural theories to the treatment of panic 
has inspired the extension of those principles to other psychological disorders (Clark 1986; 
Salkovskis 1985,1989). Third, the development of new scanning techniques such as nuclear 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (nMRI) has enabled the functioning of the brain to be examined 
much more closely and accurately than ever before. The close investigation of brain 
functioning in OCD has led to models in which the disorder is characterised as primarily one 
of neurological (basal ganglia) dysfunction (Baxter, 1990; Rapoport and Wise, 1989). 
Much of the dissertation concentrates on the investigation of the cognitive-behavioural 
model of OCD proposed by Salkovskis (1985,1989). However, one of the difficulties in the 
field of OCD research is that proponents of the neurological models of the disorder, and 
2 
those of cognitive-behavioural models, rarely address each other. There appears to be 
support for both models, and it is possible that OCD is a heterogeneous disorder. In 
particular, it is suggested that some patients may have OCD which is characterised by 
excessive anxiety, responsibility and guilt, as suggested by the cognitive-behavioural model, 
whilst others show neurological deficits of the type suggested by the neurological model, and 
that these two groups of patients are mutually exclusive. Throughout the thesis, this 
suggestion will be referred to as 'the heterogeneity hypothesis'. 
1.2. Aims 
The thesis has two aims. 
1) To investigate and develop the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD. 
2) To investigate whether the cognitive-behavioural model can be reconciled with the 
neurological model of OCD by means of the 'heterogeneity hypothesis'. 
1.2.1. The 'Heterogeneity Hypothesis' 
This hypothesis states: 
patients. One Of these groups will 
'espornsibility, 
In order to test the heterogeneity hypothesis, it is first necessary to determine whether 
there are two groups which are themselves homogeneous. For the groups to be 
homogeneous, the following criteria must be met: - 
3 
GROUP 1 
Subjects in this group must show neuropsychological test performance deficits and an 
abnormally high number of neurological soft signs. It is expected that neuropsychological test 
performance deficits and the number of neurological soft signs will be postively correlated. 
GROUP 2 
Subjects in this group must show higher levels of anxiety, responsibility and guilt than 
the normal population. It is therefore expected that these variables will be inter-correlated. 
1.3. Thesis Contents 
This introductory chapter starts by providing an overview of the state of current 
research in OCD and the relationship between neurological and psychological approaches is 
discussed. The aims of the thesis are stated, and the structure of the thesis is documented 
referring to these aims. A brief historical overview of psychological and neurological 
approaches to OCD provides a context in which to view the current investigations. Chapter 
2 sets out the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD that is to be investigated in the thesis. The 
third chapter investigates the role of anxiety in OCD, using measures of anxiety that have not 
been widely administered to an obsessional population. In particular, the 'four systems' 
measure of anxiety is investigated with a view to refining the type of anxiety that may be 
characteristic of OCD. Data generated in this study are used to test the heterogeneity 
hypothesis. Chapter 4 uses questionnaires to investigate the role of religion and guilt in OCD. 
Excessive religiosity has often been clinically observed in OCD, yet few empirical studies have 
been carried out. Similarly, guilt has been considered a core feature of OCD, although 
studies on the normal population have produced conflicting and confusing results. As in 
chapter 3, there are two aims of the study. The first is to investigate the role of religiosity 
J 
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and guilt in OCD and to consider the findings within the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD. 
The second is to generate data to test the 'heterogeneity' hypothesis. The fifth chapter 
comprises a series of investigations examining the role of responsibility in OCD. Salkovskis's 
re-emphasis on the importance of personal responsibility in the aetiology and maintenance of 
the disorder has been one of the most exciting developments of the cognitive-behavioural 
model and has stimulated a considerable amount of interest. The first of the studies describes 
the development of a questionnaire to assess responsibility in general. The second reports the 
results of a study looking at specific responsibility in OCD, and its association with measures 
such as guilt, depression and anxiety. The final study details an experimental manipulation of 
responsibility, and the associated effects on obsessional symptoms. The aim of the studies in 
this chapter is primarily to test the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD. The subsequent 
chapter aims to develop the cognitive-behavioural model further, by considering the role of 
a particular cognition in which thoughts and actions are fused. A study investigating this 
cognitive bias is reported. The chapter concludes by summarising the investigation and 
development of the cognitive-behavioural model, based on the work of the thesis. 
The emphasis changes in the seventh chapter to the examination of the neurological 
model of OCD. This model is described and the differences between neurological and 
cognitive-models are considered. One possible resolution of the conflict between the two 
models is that OCD is heterogeneous and this hypothesis is detailed. The second half of the 
chapter reports a study of neurological soft signs in OCD patients. The aim of this study was 
primarily to generate data to test the heterogeneity hypothesis, but a secondary aim was to 
investigate neurological soft-signs in OCD. Similarly, the eighth chapter reports on a study 
of the neuropsychological aspects of OCD, with the dual aims of generating data to test the 
heterogeneity hypothesis, but also to determine the nature of any neuropsychological deficits 
5 
in OCD patients. The ninth chapter reviews the literature on heterogeneity within OCD more 
fully, and the heterogeneity hypothesis that is being tested is fully explained. As stated above, 
a condition necessary to test this hypothesis is that two homogeneous sub-groups must exist. 
Analyses are reported to determine whether the data generated throughout the thesis support 
the suggestion that homogeneous sub-groups are present. Based on these analyses, the 
heterogeneity hypothesis is revised and tested using cluster analysis. The final chapter draws 
together the findings from the thesis and comments on the current status of the cognitive- 
behavioural and neurological models of OCD, and the hypothesis that different sub-groups 
may exist. Future research based on the thesis is suggested by means of a conclusion. 
1.4. Limits to the thesis 
Owing to limitations of time, and space, this thesis does not address the following 
issues which are acknowledged to be important and interesting. 
0 The Serotonin Model' of OCD. The'serotonin' model of OCD is widely considered 
to provide the best account of the disorder. In brief, this model considers OCD to 
be the result of a downregulation of the serotonergic system. This model derives from 
the effectiveness of serotonin re-uptake inhibitors in the amelioration of symptoms of 
OCD. This model was not investigated as part of the thesis for the following reasons: - 
0 The reasoning behind this model is flawed. It is not possible to infer the cause 
of an abnormality by retrospective reasoning from one (of several) treatment 
effects. Aspirin may cure a headache yet it does not mean that lack of aspirin 
was the cause of the headache. No more do the therapeutic effects of 
serotonin medications reveal the cause of OCD. 
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0 Studies of this nature are invasive 
" The model is exclusively pharmacological. 
0 The role of memory in OCD. 
0 The role of personality in OCD 
0 The effects of thought suppression on OCD 
" Tourette's Syndrome, tics and OCD 
0 Gray's model of the Behavioural Inhibition System and its role in OCD (Gray, 1982) 
" Reed's cognitive deficit model of OCD (Reed, 1985). 
1.5. The Relationship between Neurology and Psychology 
Obsessive-compulsive phenomena have been documented for over 400 years and have 
stimulated debate about the nosology of the disorder for much of that time. Throughout 
history, the competing theories concerning the aetiology of OCD have primarily been 
psychological in orientation with views that it is a disorder of intellect (e. g. Westphal, 1877), 
volition (e. g. Esquirol, 1838) or emotion (e. g. Morel, 1866; Janet, 1903). The psychoanalytic 
theory of OCD (e. g. Freud, 1926) predominated during the early 20th century. 
Biological/neurological theories such as those of Luys (1881) and Schilder (1938) were often 
proposed within the framework of one of these psychological theories, as evidenced by the 
search for a neurological substrate for 'the will' . 
The search for a neurological substrate 
underlying obsessional symptoms by Schilder did not challenge the view that the disorder is 
primarily psychological. Rather, Schilder accepted that psychological phenomena had 
neurological substrates and that both psychology and neurology could inform about the 
disorder, providing explanations at different 'levels'. 
However, in the latter half of the twentieth century, the compatibility between 
7 
neurological and psychological aspects of OCD has been reduced. Those who adopt a 
cognitive-behavioural model to conceptualise the disorder do not deny that there are 
neurological substrates at the basis of all behaviour (Salkovskis, 1995). However, blood 
flows through neurological substrates are presumed to reflect psychological phenomena, as 
well as contributing to them. The view taken by these theorists is that it is the psychological 
processes that are critical to understanding the disorder, and that neurological substrates may 
reflect these processes but do not cause them. 
Recently, with technological developments such as functional brain imaging, there has 
been a solid basis of support for theories which conceptualise OCD as a neurological 
disorder rather than a psychological problem. Instead of regarding neurological and 
psychological explanations as compatible but at different levels, neurological theorists have 
argued that the disorder has been misconceived and miscategorised and is more akin to a 
motor disorder resulting from structural and functional abnormalities in the basal ganglia 
rather than a psychological disorder (e. g. Rapoport, 1990). Advocates of a 'neurological' 
deficit approach to OCD believe that compulsive behaviours are a direct reflection of a 
primary neurological deficit. The view of OCD as a neurological disorder is reflected by the 
inclusion of OCD in a book entitled 'Motor Disorder in Psychiatry' (Rogers, 1992). 
The relationships between brain and behaviour are extremely complex, and it is 
possible that the neurological and psychological approaches are at different 'levels'. Both 
neurology and psychology are concerned with the organisation and control of behaviour 
(Gray, 1985). There is, nonetheless, a distinction between mental categories such as 'thoughts' 
and the neurological processes that may underlie certain 'cognitive' operations (Hallam, 
1985a). Similarities at a conceptual level do not amount to identity at a neurological level 
(Hallam, 1985a). A fundamental difference between 'neurological' and 'psychological' 
8 
perspectives on OCD is that the former views OCD as a'deficit; the neurologists suggest that 
there is a 1: 1 relationship between a dysfunction in a particular brain region, such as the basal 
ganglia, and that this is manifest directly as obsessional behaviour (Wise and Rapoport, 1989). 
The cognitive-behavioural approach acknowledges that anxiety, guilt, intrusive thoughts and 
motor behaviour could, perhaps, be served by different brain regions and that blood flow in 
one region may change if, for example, anxiety levels change. However, the approach 
emphasizes that cognitive-behavioural phenomena are fundamental to the disorder, are on a 
continuum with normal behaviour, and are not the manifestation of an underlying brain 
abnormality. 
1.6. Historical Overview 
This section reviews the documentation of obsessional phenomena, and provides a 
historical context of neurological and psychological approaches to OCD in which to consider 
the current theories and debates. 
1.6.1. Phenomenology of OCD 
'7t felt to me that there was a breakdown in communication between my eyes and my brain. 
I could see that I had done everything correctly but my brain couldn't accept it on just one 
checking. " (AC). 
Obsessive-compulsive phenomena have been documented throughout history with 
three main types of account: - religious, medical and psychological. Each account is reflective 
of the particular historical period (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). With respect to the religious 
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period, doubts and impulses were reported to beset Martin Luther in 1517 while celebrating 
mass. He was overwhelmed with 'scruples' and felt the need to confess daily; he was tortured 
by blasphemous thoughts which rendered him 'bitterly disquieted' (see Lewis, 1965). The case 
of William of Oseney (described by Jeremy Taylor in 1660 and reported in Hunter and 
MacAlpine, 1963) was also religious in nature and was considered as a'religious melancholy' 
in which his devotion to study became 'vexatious and intolerable' until his studying grew from 
three hours to twelve, repeatedly reading the same books. An obsession (or 'scruple' as it was 
termed) was 'a doubt when doubts are resolved'. The obsession with religious duties was 
described by John Moore (1692, in Hunter and MacAlpine, 1963) as a condition in which 
people were troubled by 'naughty and sometimes Blasphemous Thoughts' which start in their 
minds despite 'all their endeavours to stifle and suppress them' (p. 252). The indecisiveness 
which characterises obsessive-compulsive phenomena was identified even before 1660 by 
Richard Younge (quoted by Hunter and MacAlpine, 1963) and was described as 'an empty 
Balance with no waight of Judgement to incline him to either scale.. he does nothing 
readily.. when he begins to deliberate, never makes an end'. 
Progressing from a background of medical theories which presumed obsessional 
phenomena to be the result of fevers and disordered imaginations to an era in which 
psychological interpretations of behaviour were prominent, Esquirol (183 8) described the case 
of his patient, Mademoiselle F. This lady described her thoughts as unwanted and yet 
irresistible, which allowed Esquirol to suppose that this was a disorder in which there was 
insight. Legrand du Saulle consolidated the clinical description of Obsessive-compulsive 
disorder by detailing 27 cases in 1875 and outlining the natural history of the disorder. 
The cases of Legrand du Saulle had prominent symptoms of depression and psychosis. 
Characteristics of the disorder, such as the 'waxing and waning' over time, the rigid personality 
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of the patient and the replacement of one obsession/compulsion with another over time, led 
du Saulle to classify the disorder as one of 'insanity with insight'. He recorded the presence 
of fears and anxieties arising from unwanted thoughts and images, suicidal brooding and 
% obsessional paralysis' (Berrios, 1989). However, his case descriptions included analysis of 
phobias and epileptic states (behaviours that were not considered to be those of a'neurosis' 
at the time) and led directly to the over-inclusive nature of Janet's category 'Psychasthenia', 
to which OCD was considered to belong. 
The descriptions of over 300 cases by Pierre Janet (1903) which led to the 
establishment of the category 'psychasthenia', are considered among the greatest clinical 
descriptions of obsessive-compulsive phenomena written (Slater and Roth, 1977; Pitman, 
1987). The classification of obsessive-compulsive phenomenology within the category of 
'psychasthenia' did not draw a distinction between obsessive-compulsive phenomenology and 
other disorders that were also included within the same category such as panic disorder, 
phobias, tic disorders, hypochondriacal and confusional states and some forms of epilepsy 
(Berrios, 1989). 
The isolation of OCD as a distinct concept arose from the introduction of the central 
role of resistance in obsessive-compulsive phenomena as documented by Lewis (1936) (see 
later). From the date of the publication of'Obsessional Problems' (Lewis, 1936), consensus 
grew as to the composition of the clinical phenomena of obsessions and compulsions, with 
Lewis later noting that 'it is seldom difficult to recognize an obsession' (Lewis, 1938). 
However, he also noted that 'to be sure of an obsessional state calls for careful psychiatric 
examination and judgement' (Lewis, 1938). It appeared that everyone knew what obsessive- 
compulsive phenomena looked like, but there was little consensus as to a theoretical 
framework within which they might be considered. The majority of conceptualisations were 
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based on psychological interpretations of the phenomena, and the history of the psychological 
theories of obsessive-compulsive disorder is documented below. 
1.6.2. History of Psychological Approaches 
The classification of OCD within a psychological framework has long stimulated 
debate and controversy. Esquirol (1838) considered the obsessive-compulsive phenomena of 
We. F. (see p. 9) to exemplify a weakness in her 'volitional faculty'. At that time, obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms would likely have been classified within the category folie 
raisonnante ,, which was used to describe insanity without delusions. Esquirol argued for the 
classification of the illness as a form of volitional monomania in which there was a 'disease 
of the will' ('delire partiel; Esquirol, 1838). This disease was characterised by 'involuntary, 
irresistible, and instinctive activity and the patient is 'chained to actions that neither his reason 
nor emotion have originated, that his conscience rejects and his will cannot suppress' (see 
Berrios, 1989 for further detail). The introduction of a 'disease of the will' by Esquirol was 
not a new idea, and had been in circulation in European Psychiatry since 1810 (Berrios, 1989). 
Included in the domain of a 'disease of the will' were impulsions, a class of symptoms which 
included all paroxysmal, stereotyped and involuntary actions. Hence obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena were categorised with epileptic seizures, phobias, homicidal and suicidal 
tendencies, manic behaviours and hypochondriacal preoccupations (Dagonet, 1870). The 
extent of the similarity between impulsions and compulsions is an issue which arose in the 
work of Janet (1903) and is cause for debate even today (see Pitman, 1987). 
Esquirol's concept of monomania met with opposition and was criticised on several 
grounds, not least of which was that subjective symptomatology, which had become important 
in defining a mental disorder, was poorly acknowledged within this classification category. 
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With decline of the concept of monomania, OCD was re-classified under the new category 
of 'folie avec conscience' or insanity with insight (Societe Medico"Psychologique, Paris, 
1875). 
The demise of the category of'volitional monomania' was accompanied by the demise 
of the view of OCD as a disorder of volition and the rise of the view that OCD was an 
emotional disorder. The most influential proponent of this view was Morel (1866), another 
Frenchman, who argued convincingly for consideration of the disorder as one of emotional 
dysfunction rather than intellectual or volitional incapacitation. His argument was based on 
analysis of seven cases and he classified OCD under the category of 'delire emotif . 
This 
category included phobias, fixed ideas, impulsions, dysphoria, unmotivated fears and 
vasomotor and digestive symptomatology. This classification of OCD as a neurosis was 
popular but did not exlcude the possibility of a neurological basis for the emotional 
disturbance. 
The astute clinical observations made by Legrand du Saulle (1875) included the 
observation that fear and anxiety resulted from unwanted thoughts/images and consolidated 
the view that this was a disturbance of emotion. During this period in history psychological 
explanations of disorders were favoured within a context which was emotivite. Other schools 
of thought did, nevertheless, counter the conceptualisation of obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena as arising from emotional dysfunction. 
One counter-theory was that of Westphal (1877), working in parallel with Morel 
(1866), who took the view that the disorder was 'intellectual' in origin (Berrios, 1989). 
Westphal believed obsessions to be ego-dystonic variants of fixed ideas and did not adhere 
to the view that insight was critical in distinguishing obsessions from delusions; in particular 
he did not consider lack of insight to be a necessary criterion for a delusion. Instead he argued 
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that obsessional presentations (Zwangvorstellungen) resulted from a primary dysfunction of 
'intellect' 
. 
Although supported by Haskovec (1901), the 'intellectual dysfunction' view of 
obsessive-compulsive phenomena was a minority view. Some, e. g. Ribot (1904), still 
subscribed to the view of Esquirol that obsessive-compulsive phenomena are 'a disease of the 
will resulting from weakness of character and accompanied by pathology of the intellect'. 
However, conceptualisation of obsessive-compulsive phenomena as reflective of a 
disorder of emotion came to dominate the international forum, with clinicians such as Paulhan 
(1897), Fere (1902), and Pitres and Regis (1902) all supporting this view (see Berrios, 1989 
for further details). The emotive view was established as the primary theory of the time with 
the work of Pierre Janet in 'L'Automatisme Psychologique' (1889), and 'Les Obsessions ei 
la Psychiasthenie' (1903). Janet's work owes much to his predecessors and his belief was that 
psychasthenic illness may be divided into three stages: the psychasthenic state in which there 
is a sense of incompleteness or imperfection, which is followed by the stage of forced 
agitations in which excessive, repetitive and useless manias, ruminations, tics, agitation, 
phobias and anxiety occur. The final stage of obsessions and compulsions is reserved for ideas 
that are provoked easily, generalise and dominate the mind of the patient. A particular type 
of personality, in which social withdrawal and inertia were prominent, was thought to be 
associated with the psychasthenic illness. 
The concept of OCD underwent further refinement after Schneider (1938) defined 
obsessions as the 'contents of consciousness which, when they occur, are accompanied by the 
experience of subjective compulsion, and which, when they cannot be got rid of, though on 
quiet reflection they are recognised as senseless'. This definition was amended by Aubrey 
Lewis in his seminal paper 'Problems of Obsessional Illness' (1936). In this work, the 
importance of resistance in obsessive-compulsive phenomena was emphasized and was 
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considered to be more important than the patient acknowledging the disorder to be senseless. 
Lewis argued that there must be "mention of the feeling that one must resist the obsession. 
This resistance is experienced as that of one's free will'. The importance of resistance was 
illustrated with cases to enable obsessive-compulsive phenomena to be distinguished from 
other psychiatric phenomena such as occur with schizophrenia and encephalitis lethargica. The 
influence of Lewis is reflected in the DSM-IV criteria for OCD within the category of anxiety 
disorders (APA, 1994) (see figure 1). The amendment of the criteria of 'senselessness' in 
DSM IV indicates that the psychiatric establishment of the last decade of the 20th Century has 
acknowledged that this is not essential, more than 50 years after Aubrey Lewis made his 
observations. 
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Figure 1. DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA FOR OBSESSIVE-COMPULSIVE DISORDER (DSM IV, APA). 
A Either Obsessions or Compulsions: 
Obsessions as defined by: (1), (2), (3), and (4): 
(1) recurrent and persistent ideas, thoughts, impulses, or images that are experienced, at some time during the disturbance, as intrusive and 
inappropriate and that cause marked anxiety and distress 
(2) the thoughts, impulses or images are not simply excessive worries about real-life problems. 
(3) the person attempts to ignore or suppress such thoughts, impulses or images, or to neutralise them with some other thought or action 
(4) the person recognises that the obsessions are the product of his or her own mind, not imposed from without (as in thought insertion) 
Compulsions as defined by (1) and (2): 
(1) repetitive behaviours (e. g., hand washing, ordering, checking) or mental acts (e. g., praying, counting. repeating words silently) that the 
person feels driven to perform in response to an obsession, or according to certain rules that must be applied rigidly. 
(2) the behaviours or mental acts are aimed at preventing or reducing distress or preventing some dreaded event or situation; however, these 
behaviours or mental acts are either not connected in a realistic way with what they are designed to neutralize or prevent, or are clearly 
excessive. 
B. At some point during the course of the disorder, the person has recognised that the obsessions or compulsions are excessive or 
unreasonable. Note: This may not apply to children. 
C. The obsessions or compulsions cause marked distress, are time-consuming (take more than an hour a day), or significantly interfere with 
the person's normal routine, occupational (or academic) functioning, or usual social activities or relationships. 
D. If another Axis I disorder is present, the content of the obsessions or compulsions is not restricted to it (e. g. preoccupation with food in the 
presence of an Eating Disorder, hair pulling in the presence of trichotillomania; concern with appearance in the presence of Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder; preoccupation with drugs in the presence of a Substance Use Disorder, preoccupation with having a serious illness in 
the presence of Hypochondriasis; preoccupation with sexual urges or fantasies in the presence of a Paraphilia; or guilty ruminations in the 
presence of Major Depressive Disorder. 
E. The disturbance is not due to the direct physiological effects of a substance (e. g., a drug abuse, a medication ) or a general medical 
condition. 
Specify if 
With Poor Insight: iC for the most time during the current episode, the person does not recognise that the obsessions and 
compulsions are excessive or unreasonable 
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Whilst Lewis pleaded for attention to be paid to the patient's subjective experience of 
the symptoms, psychoanalytic theorists suggested that the basis of the disorder could be found 
in the patient's subconscious. The psychoanalytic theories of Obsessive-compulsive disorder 
proposed by Freud (1955, published 1909) suggested that obsessions were defensive 
psychological responses to unconscious impulses to harm one's parents. The anal-sadistic 
stage of development was thought to be important in the development of the disorder and the 
patient with obsessive-compulsive phenomena was thought to regress to this earlier stage with 
the resultant ego, superego and id all functioning at that level (Jenike, 1990). A personality 
characteristic was thought to be associated with the disorder and Freud described the 
personality of the patient as` anal-erotic', in which order, cleanliness and rigidity are 
conspicuous. His description of the personality which accompanies the obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena led to the comment by Lewis (1936, p. 326) that 'much that is summed up in the 
concept of an anal-erotic character will remain unproven'. Later Lewis wrote a paper 
emphasizing the contrasts between the personality associated with obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena in the conceptualisation by Freud and Janet. He wrote 'It is an error to suppose 
that only one type of personality is significantly associated with the development of 
obsessional illness. The' anal-erotic' and the 'psychasthenic' concepts indicate the extreme 
divergence that can exist in the approach to this problem' (Lewis, 1965, p. 304) 
If personality is considered to be important in determining obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena, it is assumed that this would be considered under the rubric of a psychological 
approach to obsessive-compulsive disorder, rather than a neurological one. Even though 
personality is considered to have neurological substrates, as evidenced e. g. by the search for 
the biological basis of Eysenck's dimensions of introversion-extraversion (Eysenck, 1952; 
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Gray, 1970), personality is still considered to be within the domain of psychology rather than 
neurology. 
Also within the domain of psychology, but not excluding the important role of 
neurological substrates which underlie the mechanism, is the learning/behavioural theory of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder. This theory is based on the work of Mowrer (1939; 1960), 
in which a two-factor model suggested that classical conditioning as described by Pavlov 
(1928) could explain how fears are acquired. Moreover Year is a decisive and causal factor 
in avoidance' (Mowrer, 1960, p. 97). Escape and avoidance of the feared stimuli would then 
serve to reduce its aversiveness by a process of operant conditioning. The following 
observations were made from experiments using dogs, and provided support for the learning 
model of OCD: - 
" it was hard to extinguish an avoidance response to a stimulus that had become 
classically conditioned by a paired association with a strongly aversive stimulus 
" the avoidance behaviour tended to become stereotypical 
" inability to avoid the stimulus led to the reappearance of anxiety (Solomon, Kamin and 
Wynne, 1953) 
Wolpe (1958) also emphasised the role of anxiety and commented that 'it may be 
stated as a dogma that the strength and frequency of evocation of obsessional behaviour is 
directly related to the amount of anxiety being evoked in the patient' (p. 90). If one considers 
obsessions and compulsions as a form of avoidance behaviour (which in 1980 Rachman and 
Hodgson believed most theorists to do, p. 169), 'it follows that fear is a decisive causal factor 
in compulsive behaviour'. Learning theory or behaviour theory suggested that the acquired 
fear response leads to avoidance behaviour in the form of compulsions, designed to avoid the 
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feared consequence of the obsession and reduce the associated anxiety (Gray. 1971; Rachman 
and Hodgson, 1980). 
A series of experiments supported much but not all of the anxiety-reduction 
explanation of obsessive-compulsive phenomena (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). This 
explanation was more successful in accounting for compulsive behaviour than obsessions. In 
particular, the explanation failed to account for the origins of the obsessions. Not all 
obsessions can be traced back to the association between an unconditioned stimulus and an 
aversive stimulus. The critical findings are reviewed in Rachman and Hodgson (1980) and 
include the success of behaviour therapy for OCD (see Abel, 1993 for an updated review). 
One of the greatest powers of the theory is that the therapy which derived from the theory has 
been found to be effective for many people and that it was the theory which gave rise to the 
treatment rather than the other way round. The limitations of behavioural therapy, such as 
the drop-out rate and the extent to which patients are completely well at the end of treatment, 
has led to the a cognitive elaboration of the behavioural approach by Salkovskis. This 
approach is described in chapter 2. 
At the time that the book 'Obsessions and Compulsions' was written (Rachman and 
Hodgson, 1980) the statement that most theorists regard obsessions and compulsions as a 
form of avoidance behaviour may not have been controversial. However, nowadays 
obsessions and compulsions are considered by many to be manifestations of chemical and 
structural abnormalities in the brain. How is it that the pendulum in the conceptualisation of 
OCD has swung so far in the direction of neurology compared to psychology? It now seems 
that the search for a neurological basis of anxiety to assist in the elucidation of obsessive- 
compulsive phenomena has been supplanted by the search for a direct neurological basis for 
the symptoms. The following section outlines the history of the concept of OCD as a 
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neurological disorder in order that current theories can be placed in historical context. 
1.6.3. History of the Neurological Perspective on OCD 
The second half of the 19th century was a period of revival for all aspects of emotion, 
including the search to elucidate the relationship between emotions and the autonomic 
nervous system. Morel (1866) believed that all emotional disorders, among which he included 
OCD, were localised in the ganglionic system; this was the first suggestion of the role of 
ganglionic dysfunction in OCD. 
Although Luys (1881) took issue with Morel's view that all vegetative functions were 
localised in the ganglionic system, he closely related the phenomenology of OCD to 
underlying cortical functions; in particular he suggested that nervous excitation of the separate 
cortical areas underlying ideas, emotions and actions would give rise to strange ideas, 
involuntary emotions, or compulsive behaviours. The close association between neuroses and 
underlying cortical structures was taken for granted at this stage of history. 
However, investigation into biological bases for obsessive-compulsive disorder was 
not conducted with much enthusiasm or rigour during the following decades as psychological 
theories began to take hold. Exceptions to this included the passing mention of the role of 
impaired brain circulation by Ball (1892), Magnan's view that obsessions and compulsions 
represented brain degeneration (1890) and the suggestion by Ameline (1901) that cerebral 
disease may contribute to the aetiology of the disorder. Meige and Feindei (see Lewis, 1957) 
continued to examine the organic basis of obsessional troubles, but the area lay dormant in 
the early 20th Century as psychological theories gained momentum. The interest in post- 
encephalitic obsessional behaviour was revitalised in the German literature between 1921 and 
1930, in particular as researchers searched for the psychopathology which would link an 
20 
organic basis for the symptoms with its psychological aspects, such as the 'anal-erotic 
character'. Schilder (1938) rose to the challenge. 
Working within a psychoanalytic context, neurological changes resulting from the 
encephalitis were suggested by Schilder (1938) to cause changes in the chemical structure 
of the brain which, in turn, released hostile impulses which the patient tried to control by 
compulsive behaviour. Schilder suggested that patients 'with a partially organic origin of the 
increase in aggressive impulses... react very well to psychoanalysis as well as to group 
psychotherapy'. Schilder estimated 'about 1/3 of the obsessive and the compulsive cases 
show organic signs pointing to pathology with the same localization as that found in 
encephalitis. These changes may be constitutional, or they may be due to lesions in foetal life, 
to birth traumas or to toxic and infectious processes of unknown origins'. However, this 
estimate was based on evidence which Aubrey Lewis was later to describe as 'highly 
disputable' (Lewis, 1957), and has not been supported by further investigation (e. g., 
Grimshaw, 1964). 
In his analysis of the neurological histories of 103 obsessional patients compared with 
105 non-obsessional neurotic patients, Grimshaw (1964) found three cases of encephalitis 
among the obsessionals and none among the controls. Nineteen percent of the obsessional 
group had a history of neurological illness, compared with 7.6% in the neurotic control 
group. Although this study was reliant on patient reports to obtain the history of neurological 
illness none of the signs outlined by Schilder were found in the sample. However, six of the 
obsessional patients were likely to be suffering from Sydenham's chorea. This is interesting 
given more recent findings of a high prevalence of obsessive-compulsive symptoms in 
individuals with Sydenham's Chorea (Swedo, 1989). 
Grimshaw's study was unique at the time, and for subsequent decades, in that it was 
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an investigation of the hypothesis that neurological impairment causes OCD. This differs from 
a search for a neurological substrate which may underlie OCD. This distinction between the 
search for a neurological substrate of OCD and a direct organic cause of the disorder is not 
made in many studies conducted during the 1960s which examined the use of psychosurgery 
to alleviate OCD. The effects of leucotomy on obsessional symptoms was investigated in a 
series of studies by Kelly and colleagues (e. g. Kelly et al., 1966; Kelly et al., 1972). The aim 
of the leucotomy operation was to disconnect the orbital and medial frontal cortex from the 
limbic system, which had long been acknowledged as the anatomical site for emotional 
behaviour (Papez, 1937). The role of the limbic system , 
in particular the hippocampal 
formation, was also examined in the work of Gray (1982). He suggested that OCD may arise 
from an oversensitive septo-hippocampal system in which too many stimuli are being 
designated as 'important', leading to searching, checking and ritualising. Implicit in this 
research was that OCD was still considered to be a disorder of anxiety and emotion and the 
aim was to identify the mechanism by which this disorder may develop. 
Studies of electroencephalogram (EEG) recordings conducted on anxiety patients 
during the 1960s and 1970s were aiming to identify whether patients with anxiety disorders 
(including OCD) had cerebral dysfunction. Turner et al., (1985) have reviewed these findings 
and concluded that there was 'some evidence for abnormal EEG patterns in obsessive- 
compulsive patients. The abnormalities are inconsistent and do not present a clear indication 
of the location of the disturbance'. Disturbances were considered to potentially 'implicate a 
dysfunction in one of the known arousal systems'. Although these studies were not designed 
to address the issue of whether the disorder is primarily psychological or neurological in 
origin, it is not unreasonable to suppose that a consistent neurological structural abnormality 
would give rise to consistent and recognisable patterns of abnormality on an EEG (as in the 
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case of epilepsy). 
The genetic and family studies of the 1970s also did not specifically address the issue 
of whether the disorder was one of neurology or psychology. Details of these studies will not 
be included as they have been reviewed elsewhere (Turner et al., 1985; MacDonald et al., 
1992; Rasmussen, 1993). Turner et al. 's review concluded that 'the studies reviewed thus far 
present some basis for hypothesizing a biological predisposition for the development of OCD. 
This predisposition may take the form of a genetic aberration or some type of structural 
weakness' (Turner et al.,, 1985). However, the review by MacDonald indicated that there was 
very little evidence for a genetic basis for the disorder, but rather a general vulnerability to 
anxiety disorders could be heritable. 
The differing conclusions of the two groups - Turner et al. 's review can be seen as 
supporting the conceptualisation of OCD as a neurological disorder whereas that of 
MacDonald and colleagues is more consistent with a psychological model - was perhaps an 
early indication of the way that the neurological/psychological debate regarding the nature of 
OCD would be activated in future years. The advent of modern brain scanning techniques has 
revitalised the debate as to whether OCD is best conceptualised as a neurological or 




The Cognitive-Behavioural Model of OCD: A review of the model and a study of 
anxiety. 
"[I'm] fearful of being responsible for an accident, death, suicide, miscarriage of justice, 
failure to catch a criminal, Also [I have] fear of this fear - [I'm] frightened of [the] guilt 
I would feel if I ever felt responsible for any of the above" (J. K. ) 
2.1. General Introduction 
In the introductory chapter, reference was made to the 'cognitive-behavioural' model 
of OCD. The first half of this chapter describes and reviews the behavioural model of OCD. 
Evidence in support of the model is described, and the limitations which led to the 
incorporation of a cognitive component are discussed. The reformulated cognitive- 
behavioural model is detailed, and evidence for this model is critically reviewed. This model 
places anxiety at the core of OCD, and the second half of the chapter reports on a 
questionnaire-based study to investigate the type of anxiety that may characterise the disorder. 
2.2. Behavioural Approaches in General 
In the early 20th century, psychologists believed that the nature of mental functioning 
was best studied by introspection. However, this method of analysis was found to be limited 
and John Watson (1878-1958) changed the focus from introspection to the study of behaviour 
e. g. 'Psychology as the behaviorist views it, is a purely objective experimental branch of 
natural science. Its theoretical goal is the prediction and control of behavior'. (p. 158). 
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The strong belief in the importance of replicable, objective observation as the basis for an 
empirical science can be traced back to behaviourism (Hallam, 1985b). Experimental 
procedures investigating learning in animals were conducted to determine which direct 
observable responses could be reliably elicited by stimuli. The premise was that information 
about stimulus-response associations would enable human behaviour to be predicted and 
controlled. Thus the behavioural approach focuses on the behaviour of living organisms and 
how those organisms respond to events. Internal mechanisms such as cognitions, are largely 
ignored (Hirschorn, 1993). 
Much of the behavioural approach concentrates on how a person is shaped through 
his/her constant interactions with the environment. Three types of learning were identified by 
behaviourists - classical conditioning, operant conditioning and modelling (see Hirschorn, 
1993). 
The behavioural approach assumes that abnormal behaviour, including obsessional 
compulsive behaviour, is learned in the same manner as other, normal, human behaviours. 
According to this approach, all behaviours can be modified using counter-conditioning. 
2.3. The Behavioural Approach to OCD: The key role of anxiety. 
Mowrer (1939,1950,1960) suggested that anxiety formation was a two-stage process 
of fear and avoidance. Mowrer proposed that classical conditioning was responsible for the 
formation of fear of specific stimuli and anxiety; maintenance of the fear was due to operant 
conditioning processes as the organism learns to reduce aversive stimuli by firstly escaping 
and then avoiding the fear-associated conditioned stimuli. Hence in this second phase, 
anxiety/discomfort is strengthened negatively by the termination of an unpleasant event. 
Data from animal experiments by Solomon, Kamin and Wynne (1953) showed that 
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avoidance responses to highly aversive classically conditioned stimuli were extremely resistant 
to extinction. Not only did the avoidance behaviour continue in the absence of the 
conditioned stimuli, but it became stereotypical in nature, persistent, and high levels of anxiety 
re-appeared when such behaviour was prevented. 
Eysenck and Rachman (1965) developed Mowrer's two-stage model, but it was later 
rejected following failure of attempts to condition fear in the laboratory, failure to observe 
the acquisition of fear in natural circumstances when it might have been expected, and the 
frequent absence of identifiable frightening and/or painful events at the time of onset of clinical 
phobias (Rachman, 1976a). Owing to these difficulties, Rachman and Hodgson (1980) 
revised the two-stage theory and proposed a three stage analysis of the kind introduced by 
Peter Lang (1970). The revised model incorporated cognitive features and behavioural- 
cognitive responses in addition to psycho-physiological reactions. They also distinguished 
between active and passive avoidance. Stimuli that may elicit anxiety/discomfort are avoided 
(passive avoidance) whilst active avoidance such as checking, washing and mental rituals, 
serve to 'put matters right' and will take place if the passive avoidance fails. These three major 
components are summarised in Figure 2.1. 
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igure 2.1. An Anatomy of Obsessions. The 3 major components - cognitive, ps 
hysiological and behavioural-cognitive - are said to be loosely coupled. The major fe; 
f each component are also illustrated. From Rachman and Hodgson (1980, p. 266). 
The role of anxiety is central to the formulation proposed by Rachman and Hodgson. 
Anxiety is elicited by exposure to the feared stimulus, and 'the essence of the theory is that 
compulsions reduce anxiety. ' (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980, p. 167). Compulsive behaviours, 
both external behaviours such as checking, washing etc and internal behaviours such as 
counting or mental neutralising, are active 'neutralising' strategies taken to 'put matters right' 
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and reduce/avoid anxiety. In turn, completion of the compulsive rituals maintains the disorder 
as the 'reduction in fear will reinforce the immediately preceding response, ' and hence'any 
response that produces successful avoidance.. will be learned as a strong habit'. (Dollard and 
Miller, 1950, p. 158 quoted in Rachman and Hodgson, 1980, p169). Furthermore 'the 
compulsive act produces only a temporary reduction in the anxiety.. after a relatively short 
time, the anxiety starts to increase again so that the patient is motivated to repeat the 
compulsive act' (quoted p. 169) and if a compulsive act is 'interrupted by a command or 
physical restraint, the subject experiences marked increases in anxiety.. As soon as the 
compulsion is resumed, the anxiety disappears' (quoted p. 169). 
Thus the behavioural model proposes that the core of obsessional behaviour is anxiety 
- the stimuli that trigger obsessions elicit anxiety and compulsions serve to avoid and alleviate 
it. 'It may be stated as a dogma that the strength and frequency of evocation of obsessional 
behaviour is directly related to the amount of anxiety being evoked in the patient' (Wolpe, 
1958, p. 90). Anxiety itself has fear-evoking properties, and the compulsive behaviours will 
be elicited not just from the fear evoked by the obsessional stimuli, but that the fear of the 
anxiety elicited by the stimuli serves to motivate avoidance behaviours (Rachman, 1989). 
Behaviour therapy, based on this model, exposes the patient to the feared stimulus, and 
curtails the avoidance ie the compulsive acts. The anxiety declines naturally over the course 
of approximately an hour (in theory but not always in practice! ) and the motivation to avoid 
anxiety in future is weakened (Meyer, 1966). 
2.4. Evidence for the behavioural model. 
There is much evidence to support the behavioural model which places anxiety at the 
core of the disorder. Since most of the evidence before 1980 has been reviewed in Rachman 
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and Hodgson (1980), attention will be concentrated on data since 1980. For the purposes of 
the current discussion, the terms 'feat' and 'anxiety will be used interchangeably. It should 
also be noted that some patients refer to feelings of 'discomfort' rather than anxiety and hence, 
where appropriate, data referring to anxiety/discomfort are described. 
2.4.1. Descriptive and Epidemiological Data 
Although the first descriptions of obsessions were placed within the remit of 
melancholia, the important role of anxiety/fear was apparent in the clinical manifestation of 
the disorder, e. g., '.. the cause of the affliction is a morbid impulse to utter a bad word or to 
do an ill deed. The impulse is bad enough, but the essence of the misery is not always so 
much the fear of actually yielding to it as the haunting nature of the fear of the fear. It is that 
which is the perpetual torture, an acute agony when active, a quivering apprehension of 
recurrence when quiescent. ' (Maudsley, 1895, p. 170). 
The other early cases also described fear as a characteristic of the disorder, e. g. 'A 
woman of 38 had since childhood been abnormally clean and afraid of contamination' , 'A 
boy 
of 18.. suffered much from fears of death' and 'A chorus girl of 22.. was afraid she had harmed 
a baby by looking at it and touching it' (Lewis 1936, emphasis added). OCD has always been 
classified as a disorder of anxiety in systems such as the diagnostic and statistical manuals 
(American Psychiatric Association) and one of the criteria for diagnosis is that the 'obsessions 
or compulsions cause marked distress' (DSM IV, p423). The fear/anxiety experienced by an 
obsessional patient on the occurrence of an intrusion has been likened to a mother watching 
her child run out in front of an on-coming car (Salkovskis, 1989). 
It may be that anxiety plays a greater role in some forms of OCD than in other forms 
of the disorder. It is argued that 'most forms of phobia are best construed as instances of 
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passive avoidance; hence one would expect to find an affinity between phobias and 
compulsive cleaning-They might also show evidence of a wider range of ordinary fears and 
perhaps at a more intense level than is encountered in the general population.. It is predicted 
that they are more fearful than compulsive checkers' (Rachman, 1976b, p. 271-272). Later, 
it was suggested that 'there are certain respects in which compulsive cleaning rituals are closer 
to circumscribed phobias than to other obsessional problems, such as checking rituals'. 
(Rachman and Hodgson, 1980, p. 3). 
There is also a strong co-morbidity between OCD and other anxiety disorders, 
although there is considerable overlap between depression and OCD as well with 80% of 
patients reaching the clinical cut-off on the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al., 1961) and 
32% meeting current diagnostic criteria for a major depressive episode (Karno et al., 1988). 
The most recent prevalence data for the co-morbidity between OCD and other anxiety 
disorders is provided by the Epidemiological Catchment Area Study in the United States 
(Karno et al., 1988). This study was the largest of its kind and interviewed a randomly 
selected sample of 18,500 probands over a 7-year period in five sites across the U. S. A. It 
utilized a structured interview, the DIS, coded for DSM-III diagnoses; one of the most 
striking findings was that OCD was 50 to 100 times more common than the earliest estimation 
of Rudin (1953), which has since been found to be cited erroneously (MacDonald, 1994; 
personal communication). Approximately 2.5% of the population surveyed had a history of 
obsessive-compulsive symptoms in their lifetime that met diagnostic criteria for OCD, and 
1.6% had had the disorder within the 6 months prior to the interview. It is notable that this 
places OCD as the fourth most common disorder after phobias, substance abuse and major 
depressive disorder. However, these findings must be regarded with caution, as lay 
interviewers were used to 'diagnose' OCD, and the interview schedule based on DSM III (the 
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DIS'; Robins et al., 1981) had lenient criteria for the threshold of severity. In addition, the 
characteristics of the sample were different to that of a clinical sample in that (1) OCD rates 
were higher in women than men, (2) the majority of those identified had either obsessions or 
compulsions, not both and (3) rates of OCD were not exclusively associated with any level 
of educational attainment or marital status. Furthermore, when subjects from one site in the 
USA were re-interviewed by psychiatrists using the Present State Examination (Anthony et 
al., 1985), the original estimate for 1-month prevalence decreased from 1.3% to 0.3%. 
Whilst bearing in mind the methodological problems outlined above, this study was 
the largest of its kind and its findings are worth reporting. In this study, 46.5% also had a 
lifetime diagnosis of a phobia, and 13.8% had met criteria for panic disorder during their 
lifetime (Karno et al., 1988). The co-morbidity between OCD and an anxiety disorder was 
greater than that of lifetime depression (31.7%), schizophrenia (12.2%) or alcohol 
abuse/dependence (24.1%). The results are comparable with the epidemiological study of 
Rasmussen and Eisen (1990), who found that 40% had a lifetime diagnosis of a phobia (simple 
or social) and 12% had a lifetime diagnosis of panic disorder. In this study, 67% had had a 
lifetime diagnosis of major depressive disorder. 
These data were used by the the Cross National Collaborative Group led by Myrna 
Weissman (1994) to compare OCD (as assessed by the DIS) in seven countries: the United 
States, Canada, Puerto Rico, Germany, Taiwan, Korea, and New Zealand. The OCD annual 
prevalence rates were remarkably consistent among these countries, ranging from 1.1/100 in 
Korea and New Zealand to 1.8/100 in Puerto Rico. The only exceptionwas Taiwan (0.4/100), 
which had the lowest prevalence rates for all psychiatric disorders. Lifetime prevalence rates 
were between 1.9/100 (Korea) and 2.5/100 (Puerto Rico) with the exception of Taiwan 
(0.7/100). The mean age of onset ranged from 21.9 years (Edmonton) to 35.5 (Puerto Rico). 
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The percentage of subjects with OCD who had both obsessions and compulsions ranged from 
13% in New Zealand to 57% in Munich (16% in the USA). Co-morbidity between OCD and 
Major Depression ranged from 12.4 % (Korea) to 60.3% (Munich; 27% in the USA), and 
comorbidity between OCD and another anxiety disorder ranged from 24.5% (Taiwan) to 
69.6% (Munich; 14.3% in USA). 
In summary, anxiety has always been considered as a part of the clinical manifestation 
of OCD, and there is evidence that there is a high degree of overlap between both OCD and 
depression, and OCD and disorders of anxiety. 
2.4.2. The Normal-Abnormal Continuum 
Central to the behavioural model is the suggestion that the same learning mechanisms 
produce normal and abnormal intrusions. The nature of obsessional symptoms within a 
normal population was first investigated in the late 1970s, and it was found that 84 % of the 
normal population experienced obsessions (Rachman and de Silva, 1978). The conclusion 
was that 'Obsessions, in the form of thoughts and/or impulses, are a common experience. A 
large majority of people report experiencing obsessions; it is unknown why the small minority 
fail to do so' (p. 247). Furthermore: - 
"The form, and to some extent the content as well, of obsessions reported by 
non-psychiatric respondents and by obsessional patients are similar. 
So called 'normal' obsessions are also similar to 'abnormal' obsessions in their 
expressed relation to mood and in their meaningfulness to the respondent'. 
(p. 247). 
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Despite the similarities of form and content, abnormal obsessions were found to differ 
from normal obsessions in frequency, intensity and their consequences, in that abnormal 
obsessions (but not normal obsessions) provoked the urge to neutralize. It was concluded 
that obsessions are a normal phenomenon and the distinction between obsessions experienced 
in a psychiatric population and those experienced in the non-psychiatric population was 
quantitative in nature, rather than qualitative. This study provided support for one of the most 
critical tenets of the behavioural model of OCD. The findings were replicated by Salkovskis 
and Harrison (1984). 
2.4.3. Psychometric Measures 
Psychometric measures of OCD have been extensively reviewed by several different 
authors and the reader is referred to these papers for details regarding the psychometric 
properties of different methods of assessment of obsessional symptoms. These include the 
Leyton-Obsessional Inventory (LOI; Snowden, 1980), the Maudsley Obsessive-compulsive 
Inventory (MOCI; Hodgson and Rachman, 1977), the Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988), the 
Compulsive Activities Checklist (CAC; Philpott, 1975; Marks et at., 1977) and the Yale- 
Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (Y-BOCS; Goodman et al., 1989a, 1989b). Recent 
reviews include those by Goodman and Price (1990), Pato et al., (1994), Taylor (1995) and 
Tallis (1995). 
All of the assessments incorporate some elements of the behavioural model with its 
focus on the fear-evoking properties of the stimulus and subsequent avoidant and/or 
neutralising response. Examples of the questions in the different assessments which reflect the 
behavioural model are given below: 
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" The LOI asks whether 'unpleasant or frightening thoughts or words ever keep going 
over and over in your mind' (Qu. 2) and whether the person tries to 'avoid changes in 
your house or work in the way you do things' (Qu. 58) 
0 The MOCI asks for a TRUE/FALSE response to 'I avoid using public telephones 
because of possible contamination' 
The Padua Inventory asks for an endorsement of the statements Z get upset and 
worried at the sight of knives, daggers and other pointed objects' and 'I avoid using 
public toilets because I am afraid of disease and contamination' 
" The Y-BOCS takes into account the distress caused by obsessions and compulsions 
and notes that 'in most cases, distress is equated with anxiety'. 
" The CAC rates activities such as dressing, washing etc on a 4-point scale according 
to four criteria, one of which is avoidance. 
On all of these measures, people with OCD score significantly higher than healthy or 
anxious controls (Goodman and Price, 1990; van Oppen, 1994; Tallis, 1995); this is consistent 
with the behavioural view that anxiety and avoidance are important components of OCD. 
However, it should be noted whilst scores on these indices correlate highly with measure of 
anxiety, these are not solely measures of anxiety since they have criterion validity. 
2.4.4. Experimental analyses 
Rachman and Hodgson (1980) conducted a series of experiments to test the 
behavioural theory. They found that, in general: 
0 Eliciting the obsession led to an increase in anxiety/discomfort . 
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" Compulsions decreased the anxiety/discomfort. 
" Delaying the compulsions led to a 'spontaneous decay' of anxiety/discomfort over a 
longer period of an hour. 
" Interruption of the checking ritual did not provoke a significant change in 
anxiety/discomfort. 
" Delaying the compulsions led to a 'spontaneous decay' of anxiety/discomfort over a 
longer period of an hour. 
" Both checking and washing led to a significant reduction of anxiety/discomfort 
although on 7 of 36 occasions, a group of checkers indicated increased discomfort 
after checking. 
(Rachman and Hodgson, 1980, p. 177; Roper et a1., 1973, p. 275; Roper and Rachman, 1976). 
These results are mainly consistent with the behavioural theory, although the 
hypothesis that interruption of the compulsion would lead to an increase in anxiety/discomfort 
was not supported. More recently, S alkovskis et al. (1991) found that neutralizing increased 
the salience of intrusive thoughts in a non-clinical sample of people reporting compulsive 
behaviours. 
Of note is the observation that, after the compulsion is performed, 'anxiety elevation 
occurs in a minority of instances' (Rachman and Hodgson, p. 193, emphasis added) . 
In some 
patients, compulsions were not followed by a reduction in anxiety/discomfort. In other 
patients, the same compulsion was sometimes followed by an increase in anxiety and at other 
times followed by a decrease. Some compulsions persisted regardless of the level of anxiety 
before or after the completion of the compulsion. (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980, p. 191). 
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It was suggested that in these cases compulsions persisted because they alleviated guilt 
or remote worries or else, in the case of patients whose compulsions sometimes alleviate 
anxiety but at other times increase it, it may be as though they delay the probability of some 
remote unpleasantness i. e. 'the person purchases longer term 'safety' at the expense of short- 
term increments in anxiety/discomfort' (p. 192). This explanation may, perhaps, be served by 
a cognitive bias in that patients may interpret their anxiety/discomfort as confirmation that 
their compulsions are having some real-world effect, i. e. preventing harm. The rationale may 
be 'I am feeling something in response to performing my compulsions and therefore my 
compulsions are doing something'. It is also possible that the individuals whose anxiety 
increases or is irregular on performing the compulsion are more depressed than individuals 
whose compulsions serve to alleviate anxiety, they may believe themselves to be worthless and 
therefore that they 'deserve' to feel anxious or upset. These sorts of cognitive distortions may 
serve to maintain the compulsive behaviours in the absence of the reduction of anxiety. At 
present, there is no evidence to support this hypothesis. Alternatively, it may be that 
inappropriate triggering of the striatum gives rise to the motor behaviour which is, for some 
patients, completely devoid of a consistent association with anxiety. 
2.4.5. Genetic 
'I am now 49, but at age about 9 started having problems with OCD... My son also 
showed symptoms at age 9, worsening throughout adolescence, but now aged 22, 
seems free of it (relatively). My daughter (20) has never shown any signs of the 
problem. My father was a sufferer, but not my mother or sister' (JK). 
The association between OCD and other anxiety disorders has also been examined by 
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means of genetic studies. These have recently been reviewed (MacDonald et al., 1992; 
Rasmussen, 1993; Rasmussen, 1994). In summary, 'the twin data support the existence of a 
heritable factor for neurotic anxiety. Some studies support the hypothesis that there is a 
heritable factor for OCD, while others do not' (Rasmussen, 1994, p106). Despite some 
inconsistencies in the family studies, the consensus is that the rates of anxiety disorders are 
significantly higher among relatives of obsessional probands compared with the relatives of 
controls (Black et al., 1992; McKeon and Murray, 1987). These results are consistent with 
the behavioural model, which emphasises the key role of anxiety in OCD. 
2.4.6. Treatment 
One of the tests of the behavioural model is whether treatment is effective when based 
on the model. The treatment is 'exposure and response prevention' (ERP) in which patients 
are exposed to the feared stimuli and prevented from carrying out their compulsions. This 
therapy focuses on a) reducing the association between the feared stimuli and anxiety and b) 
the association between carrying out the compulsions and a reduction in anxiety. This method 
is thought to be effective through mechanisms of habituation and extinction (Grayson et at., 
1986; Kozak et al., 1988). A recent review of the literature (Abel, 1993) made the following 
conclusions (p. 464): - 
0 Exposure with response prevention has been effective in alleviating the symptoms of 
OCD in clinical trials and more recently in at least 10 studies investigating the various 
factors expected to enhance the effects of ERP'. 
0 'The efficacy of ERP has been supported by empirical investigations that have 
compared it to non-pharmacological treatments'. 
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'Comparisons of response prevention vs exposure indicate that exposure is more 
useful in treating anxiety in the presence of feared stimuli and response prevention is 
more useful in arresting rituals'. 
However, the limitations of behavioural treatment were a driving force in the development of 
a cognitive component to add to the model, since the treatment is only effective for 75% of 
patients that undergo it, and drop-out rates can be high (Foa, 1979). 
2.4.7. Summary and Conclusion 
The behavioural model of OCD considers anxiety to be a fundamental part of the 
maintenance of the disorder. Descriptive and epidemiological data support the suggestion that 
anxiety is a central feature of OCD. Data on normal and abnormal obsessions indicate that 
differences are primarily quantitative as opposed to qualitative and it is plausible that the same 
learning mechanism gives rise to both. Psychometric measures of OCD all incorporate 
assessments of anxiety or anxiety responses such as avoidance. Experimental studies of the 
late 1970s manipulated anxiety levels by eliciting obsessions and delaying compulsive activity 
(for example) and the majority of the predictions made by the behavioural model were 
supported. Interestingly, there was a sub-group of patients for whom anxiety was not 
alleviated by compulsions as predicted by the theory but for whom anxiety was elevated. 
Possible explanations for this, such as cognitive distortions, were suggested. Genetic studies 
appear to confirm that some general aspect of 'anxiety is heritable. Finally, the effectiveness 
of behavioural therapy supports the behavioural model, although its limitations are the spur 
for cognitive developments of the model. It is concluded from the above review of the 
literature that there is strong evidence for the behavioural model of OCD, which places 
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anxiety at its core, but that there is room for further development of the model by 
incorporating a cognitive component. 
2.5. Limitations to the behavioural model. 
The cognitive element of the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD was introduced 
to overcome some of the limitations of the behavioural theory. The greatest limitation of 
the theory is that behavioural treatment is not always effective, and therefore other factors 
are thought to be important. Behavioural treatments usually results in a success rate of 
75% or more (see Abel, 1993 for a review), but as with drug treatments, the patient is not 
'cured'. Rather, the patient is better able to resist the compulsions and the unwanted 
intrusive thoughts become less intense and less frequent compared with before treatment. 
Furthermore, many patients are unable to undertake behavioural therapy (Foa, 1979). 
Clearly there is room for the development of a theory and corresponding treatment which 
increases both compliance and success rate. 
2.6. Development of the Cognitive Component 
The cognitive development of the behavioural theory was partly inspired by the 
cognitive nature of the disorder. Of all the psychological disorders, OCD begs 
consideration of cognitive factors as the phenomenology of the disorder incorporates 
obvious cognitive distortions concerning risk appraisal and responsibility (Carr, 1974; 
Rachman, 1976b). Cognitive accounts, such as Reed's (1985), which suggest a, cognitive 
deficit, are inadequate since OC phenomena are not abnormal experiences at all, but are 
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more intense, more frequent, harder to dismiss and more distressing than the intrusive 
thoughts that occur to non-OCD patients. However, the difference is quantitative rather 
than qualitative (Rachman and de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis and Harrison, 1984). 
Explanations in terms of cognitions have long been offered by patients who report feeling 
compelled to wash their hands because of beliefs about contamination. The cognitive- 
behavioural formulation of OCD offered by Salkovsk:. is built on the earlier work to 
propose an account of the disorder which had all of the benefits of the behavioural 
approach (including relatively successful treatment) but which incorporated a cognitive 
element. 
Lazarus (1964,1966) was among the first to identify the important role of 
conscious cognitions in the mediation of anxiety. He suggested that the experience of 
threat, which leads to anxiety, is mediated by cognitive processes. Two types of appraisal 
were identified as important in the experience of threat. The first, 'primary' appraisal, 
estimates the danger of an event relative to his/her perceived resources to cope with it. 
After the primary appraisal has been estimated, emotional reactions and behavioural 
responses are initiated on the basis of the person's 'secondary appraisal' of the likely 
consequences of his efforts to cope with the threat (see McFall and Wollersheim, 1979). 
In a review of the literature, Carr (1974) suggested that this primary appraisal of personal 
danger was distorted in patients with OCD who tended to exaggerate the danger relative 
to their ability to cope with it. 
However, Carr (1974) noted the need to identify factors which may influence 
unrealistic subjective estimates of negative outcomes and the cognitive processes mediating 
the attempts to cope with the perceived threat (in OCD by carrying out a compulsion). 
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McFall and Wollersheim (1979) attempted to identify these factors and cognitive processes. 
They suggested that 'several unreasonable beliefs or assumptions have been learned by 
obsessive-compulsive individuals that heighten their tendency to overevaluate the 
dangerousness of events and thus experience threat'. Among the beliefs that were 
suggested were: 'Certain thoughts and feelings are unacceptable, having them could lead to 
catastrophe (e. g. anger will result in homicide), and one should be punished for having them', 
and 'One is powerful enough to initiate or prevent the occurrence of disastrous outcomes by 
magical rituals or obsessive ruminating' (p. 335). 
The authors go on to discuss deficits in secondary appraisals that result in 
underestimates of coping resources. Issues of personal control, low tolerance for 
uncertainty and anxiety are all brought into play. McFall and Wollersheim (1979) 
attempted to integrate their theory with psychoanalytic concepts, but the model lacked 
specificity and the psychological processes involved in intrusive phenomena were not 
elaborated. 
Salkovskis (1985,1989) attempted to elaborate these processes by conceptualising 
obsessions within the hypothesised framework of cognitive phenomena proposed by Beck 
(Beck et al., 1983). The basic assumptions behind the formulation are the same as those 
adopted by Beck (1976) and other cognitive theorists such as Rachman (1983) and Teasdale 
(1983). These assumptions are: 
0 emotions arise from the appraisal of thoughts and events rather than directly from 
those events 
0 pre-existing cognitive structures and processes influence appraisal 
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0 appraisal and emotional responses tend to have a reciprocal relationship 
a persons behaviour affects appraisal and vice versa. 
In the cognitive approach to psychological problems such as depression, the outcome 
of appraisal has been termed 'negative automatic thoughts' (Beck, 1976). In Salkovskis's 
cognitive-behavioural formulation, obsessions were clearly distinguished from negative 
automatic thoughts on the basis of differences in the perceived intrusiveness, immediate 
accessibility to consciousness and the ego-dystonic nature of the intrusion. The appraisal of 
the cognition was considered to be the negative automatic thought. Obsessions were 
placed within the domain of cognitive psychopathology by developing the suggestion of 
Rachman (1971,1978) that they function as stimuli which provoke a particular type of 
negative automatic thought or appraisal. In particular, it was suggested that in some " 
obsessional individuals, unwanted intrusions interact with an individual's belief system leading 
to a negative automatic thought concerning some adverse evaluation of responsibility such as 
('this is a bad thing to be thinking or 'something bad will happen and it is up to me to prevent 
it'). Throughout this thesis the term 'responsibility' is used to mean the person's subjective, 
PERCEIVED responsibility for an event, as opposed to an objective, actual responsibility 
for an event. 
Distress is suggested to result when the intrusions have some personal meaning or 
salience, perhaps by activating pre-existing dysfunctional schemata. 'Such automatic 
thoughts in response to intrusions appear to relate specifically to ideas of being responsible 
for damage or harm coming to oneself or to others, or associated imagery of a similar 
nature... That is, obsession-provoked automatic thoughts or images revolve around 
personal responsibility, the possibility that if things go wrong, it might well be the persons 
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own fault. Such responsibility may be indirect as well as direct, so that the possibility of 
preventing harm caused by external agents is equally potent' (Salkovskis, 1985, p. 574). 
Such dysfunctional schemata may exist in people of 'tender moral conscience' who 
are inclined to place special significance on their thoughts, perhaps owing to religious 
instruction (see chapter 4). The dysfunctional assumptions which are suggested to interact 
with the intrusion to produce the negative automatic thoughts were suggested to include (i) 
'Having a thought about an action is like performing the action' and (ii) 'responsibility is 
not attenuated by other factors (e. g. low probability of occurrence)'. Therefore, the 
cognitive distortion in OCD is suggested to relate to 'an inflated belief in the probability 
of bein the can .. of serious harm to others or self, or failing to avert harm where this may 
have been possible rather than an increased belief in the probability of harm per se' (p. 575; 
original emphasis). 
The appraisal of the intrusion in terms of responsibility for harm, leads to attempts 
to neutralise and suppress the thought, image or impulse. In this context, 'neutralisation' 
either as compulsive behaviour or cognitive strategies was considered to be 'attempts to 
avoid or reduce the possibility of being responsible for harm to oneself or others' (p. 575). 
The neutralising usually leads to a reduction in discomfort and the behaviour is reinforced, 
becoming a strategy for coping with stress (Hodgson and Rachman, 1972; Röper, Rachman 
and Hodgson, 1973). In accordance with the learning processes hypothesised to underlie 
behaviour, the probability of subsequent neutralising behaviour is increased and may 
generalise to other situations. Since neutralising will, almost invariably, be followed by non- 
punishment (i. e., the feared event did not occur), this would reinforce the validity of the 
beliefs according to behavioural principles (Gray, 1975), e. g., 'I acted on my belief and felt 
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better, therefore the belief must have some basis in truth', or 'The disaster I attempted to 
forestall has not come about, which may mean that my neutralization was a reasonable and 
effective thing to do'. Neutralisation can also be seen as an attempt avoid or reduce the 
possibility of feeling guilty for the occurrence of negative events (see Chapter 4 ). 
Salkovskis also suggested that completion of the neutralising would be a powerful and 
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Figure 2.2. Salkovskis's Cognitive-Behavioural Model of OCD (Salkovskis, 1985; 1995). 
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Although not specified, guilt can be considered as an integral part of this model. 
Guilt may result from the appraisal of both the occurrence of a negative thought (e. g. 'I 
am a wicked person for having such nasty thoughts'), and also from the appraisal of the 
negative thought in terms of responsiblility for action. If the person appraises the thought 
in terms that he/she may be responsible for disaster, guilt may ensue. Furthermore, such 
people may expect their guilt levels to rocket if they choose to ignore their intrusive 
thoughts and the threat does occur. In some way, the guilt that may result from failing to 
act on the intrusive thought may be the same as if they had actually carried out the act 
themselves (the Omission-Commission Bias; Salkovskis, 1995). 
The reformulated cognitive-behavioural model was criticised on the grounds that 
there was 'theoretical confusion' in the model between negative automatic thoughts and 
dysfunctional assumptions (Jakes, 1989). In responding to these criticisms, which were 
argued to result from a failure to consider the key role proposed for neutralising and the 
significance of the appraisal of responsibility, the model was explored further (Salkovskis, 
1989). In particular it was stated that 'It is hypothesised that clinical nhcecsions are 
intrusive cngnitinns, the occurrence and content of wih patients interpret as an indication 
Drevent it (p. 678, original emphasis). 
The model has recently been elaborated, particularly with regard to the importance 
of beliefs relating to responsibility and inaction. Salkovskis identifies 'thinking errors', 
which are characteristic distortions that influence whole classes of reactions (Beck, 1976). 
Although not intrinsically pathological, it is suggested that obsessionals show a number of 
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thinking errors which are associated with their difficulties. Of these thinking errors, the 
most typical and important is suggested to be 'any influence over outcome= responsibility 
for outcome'. It is suggested that, unlike the majority of the normal population, obsessional 
patients hold themselves equally responsible for what they do actively, and also what they 
fail to do (the omission bias). 
Specific aspects of the model (such as the role of religion and guilt) are reviewed 
in the relevant chapters. 
2.7. Evidence for the Cognitive-behavioural reformulation. 
Evidence from studies investigating the role of responsibility in OCD, clinical 
observations, studies from the normal population, studies on thought suppression and 
cognitive-therapy for OCD is now critically evaluated. 
2.7.1. The role of responsibility. 
The study by Lopatka and Rachman (1995) provided support for the importance of 
responsibility in patients with OCD. More detail is given of the experimental design in 
chapter 5. Lopatka manipulated responsibility in 30 patients with obsessive-compulsive 
disorder. These patients were predominantly distressed by checking compulsions. Lopatka " 
and colleagues used a within-subjects design and demonstrated that, when subjects were 
given a high degree of responsibility for their own specific feared negative outcome (e. g. 
their house would catch fire), then the urge to check, discomfort and anxiety all increased 
correspondingly. In the condition where the experimenter took responsibility for the feared 
outcome, the urge to check, discomfort and anxiety were significantly lower than in the 
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high responsibility condition. In both groups the urge to check, discomfort and anxiety 
were significantly different from the control condition. One of the major difficulties with 
this study is the separation of the role of responsibility from that of anxiety, although the 
possibility that the results can be accounted for in terms of anxiety has now been ruled out 
(Rachman, 1995; personal communication). Also, whether these findings generalise to 
other sorts of obsessional behaviour needs to be established. More details can be found in 
chapter 3. 
Psychometric studies have shown responsibility (as measured by the Responsibility 
questionnaire of Rheume et al., 1995) to be related specifically to measures of obsessive- 
compulsive phenomenology (Rheume et al., 1995). Although this would be consistent with 
the reformulated model of OCD, the study was confounded by the fact that the 
responsibility questionnaire asks questions about responsibility in obsessional situations. 
It is circular to conclude that people who score highly on this questionnaire have more 
obsessional symptoms because of increased responsibility, as the only individuals who are 
likely to perceive any responsibility in these situations are obsessional! The question of the 
measurement of responsibility is dealt with in more detail in chapter 5. 
2.7.2. Clinical observations 
Rachman (1993) noted that when patients with OCD came to the clinic, in 
particular those with compulsive checking problems, they often reported that it was 
difficult to undergo behavioural therapy, as it was much harder to elicit the urge to check 
in the clinic than in their own home. Rachman and Hodgson (1980) attributed the failure 
to elicit discomfort in patients with checking rituals to the fact that 'the presence of another 
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person, especially someone in a responsible position, apparently inhibits the arousal of 
discomfort... What seems to happen is this: the subject reasons that the experimenter is 
unlikely to allow the gas taps, for example, to be left on, and even if they did, then the 
responsibility for ensuing harm from this act of carelessness would rest with the 
experimenter, not the subject. If the obsessional subject is divested wholly or partly of 
responsibility for the act, then he or she experiences little discomfort' (Rachman and 
Hodgson, p. 177). The observation that in-patients displayed little compulsive checking on 
the ward until they were accustomed to it and began to feel a sense of association, and 
perhaps responsibility for its security, is also consistent with the reformulated cognitive- 
behavioural model. 
It must be remembered that clinical observation, whilst important, is not always an 
entirely reliable indication of what may be occurring, and Rachman's interpretations of the 
behaviours and lack of behaviours are subjective. Furthermore, this information was 
largely available at the time of the formulation of the theory and may have been used in 
its construction and therefore cannot be used to support the theory. 
2.7.3. Empirical and Psychometric Studies in the Normal Population 
These studies are reviewed in Salkovskis (1989). In summary, there is evidence for 
the following: 
0 the salience of intrusive thoughts is linked to aversiveness (Edwards and Dickerson, 
1987a, 1987b; England and Dickerson, 1988). 
" neutralising activity increases the discomfort associated with, and frequency of, 
intrusive thoughts (Salkovskis et al., 1989). 
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" there is a link between beliefs concerning responsibility and the occurrence of 
neutralising (Salkovskis and Dent, 1989). 
2.7.4. Thought suppression literature 
The reformulated theory states that it is the active attempt to 'suppress' the 
unwanted thought (because it has been misinterpreted) that leads to an increase in the 
occurrence of the thoughts. The studies on thought suppression (see Wegner, 1989) show 
this to be the case, although differences in methodology have led to some studies being 
difficult to interpret. The effects of thought suppression have recently been linked to the 
perception of heightened responsibility (Salkovskis, 1995). 
2.7.5. Treatment Studies 
As in the use of treatment studies to provide evidence for the behavioural model of 
OCD, treatment studies cannot logically provide evidence to support a model 
conclusively. However, the failure of clinical applications based on the cognitive- 
behavioural model would be difficult for the model to explain. Early indications from two 
controlled studies demonstrated that a cognitive intervention (based on Rational Emotive 
Therapy along the lines of Ellis, 1962) was as effective as exposure with response 
prevention based on the behavioural model (Emmelkamp, Visser and Hoekstra, 1988). In 
a subsequent study, no difference was found between Rational Emotive Therapy and self- 
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controlled exposure in vivo plus response prevention; a combined package was not found 
to be superior to exposure in vivo plus response prevention alone (Emmelkamp and Beens, 
1991). However, these studies did not use a cognitive-behavioural therapy deriving from 
Salkovskis's theoretical model. A single case study of treatment of a patient with OCD 
based on the cognitive-behavioural model was used to illustrate the technique and was 
effective in the patient described (Salkovskis and Warwick, 1985). 
Recently, a controlled treatment trial was undertaken to evaluate therapy based 
on the cognitive model of Beck and Salkovskis by comparing it to the efficacy of self- 
controlled exposure in vivo plus response prevention (van Oppen et al., 1995a). The study 
also compared the efficacy of (1) cognitive therapy without behavioural experiments to (2) 
exposure in vivo with response prevention without cognitive elements. The cognitive 
therapy was aimed at modifying (I) overestimation of danger and (II) inflated responsibility 
in the manner outlined by van Oppen and Arntz (1994). 
Twenty-eight patients underwent cognitive therapy, and twenty-nine underwent 
exposure in vivo for sixteen weekly sessions lasting 45 minutes. Both treatments led to 
significant improvement both clinically and statistically. There was no significant 
difference between cognitive therapy and exposure in vivo with response prevention, once 
initial differences between conditions were taken into account, although the effect sizes 
on the obsessional measures were all larger in the cognitive therapy than in the exposure 
condition. Cognitive therapy was as effective as self-controlled exposure in vivo with 
response prevention. (with six sessions of treatment only). No differences between 
phenomenological sub-groups (e. g. 'washers' vs 'checkers') were found. 
It is somewhat disappointing for the cognitive-behavioural model that therapy based 
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on it is not more effective than exposure in vivo with response prevention, since one of the 
motivations for incorporating the cognitive element was the limitations of the effectiveness 
of behavioural treatment. Furthermore, the drop-out rate was the same in both conditions. 
Although the treatment study concluded that 'this form of cognitive therapy, which also 
includes behavioural experiments, may be even more effective than exposure in vivo' the 
cognitive model predicts that cognitive therapy should be clinically and statistically 
superior to behavioural treatment which does not address the appraisal of responsibility and 
overestimation of danger. However, it is possible that future cognitive therapy will 
become more effective by incorporating recently identified cognitive distortions such as 
thought-action fusion (see chapter 6) , and other 'thinking errors' (Salkovskis, 
1995). 
It is also possible that cognitive therapy is more effective than exposure in vivo in 
maintaining gains and preventing relapse as has been found in cognitive therapy for 
depression and bulimia nervosa (Beck, 1991; Fairburn et al., 1993). 
2.7.6. Evidence of the importance of Religion in OCD 
Blasphemous obsessions and intrusive thoughts of a religious nature are among the 
first documented (see Introduction). Despite the strong clinical associations between 
religion and obsessionality, few empirical studies provide support for such an association. 
In a review, Fitz (1990) concluded that it was insufficient to look at the religious affiliation 
of people, and that religious affiliation in itself was not indicative of psychiatric 
disturbance. A multidimensional definition of religion was suggested in order to determine 
which particular aspects of religion affect obsessional disorder. The subject of religion, 
OCD and the cognitive-behavioural model is examined in chapter 4, with consideration 
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paid to the importance of the moral guidelines provided by religions. 
2.7.7. Evidence of the importance of Guilt in OCD 
Guilt has often been observed to characterise OCD (Rachman, 1993). However, 
empirical studies are somewhat confused. For example, although there was an association 
between obsessional symptoms and guilt levels, guilt levels were not higher in OCD 
patients than anxiety controls (Steketee, Quay and White, 1991). In some studies, guilt 
has been found to be a significant predictor of obsessional variables (Niler and Beck, 1986; 
Watkins, Shafran and Charman, 1995), whereas an attempted replication of the Niler and 
Beck study failed (Reynolds and Salkovskis, 1991). Much of the confusion can be 
attributed to poor measures of the assessment of guilt. The relationship between guilt, 
anxiety and responsibility is of interest and is discussed more fully in chapter 4. 
2.7.8 Summary of the Evidence for the Cognitive-Behavioural Model 
The cognitive-behavioural model has much evidence in its support. Not only does 
the evidence in support of the original behavioural theory support the model, but there are 
data to support the expansion to a cognitive-behavioural framework. Manipulation of 
responsibility results in changes in obsessional phenomena in the manner predicted by the 
model. Clinical observation is consistent with the emphasis on the role of responsibility, 
and empirical studies of the normal population and studies on thought suppression are also 
fulfilling the predictions made by the model. Cognitive therapy based on the model was 
not superior to exposure in vivo with response prevention, although it is possible that the 
effects of the former are more long lasting or that therapy based on recent developments 
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of the formulation would be more effective. There has been no study to demonstrate 
directly that appraisal of intrusions in terms of responsibility is the direct cause of 
obsessional complaints and further investigations are warranted. 
2.8. General Comments on the Cognitive-Behavioural Model 
Although there is evidence in support of this model, as reviewed above, there are 
some general criticisms which the model needs to address. Many compulsive behaviours 
appear to occur without a process of appraisal, for example compulsions involving order, 
number and touching (Tallis, 1995). Some patients do not report appraisals but rather 
state that things just 'have to be' that way until something 'feels right' whilst 
acknowledging that a failure to undertake the behaviours would have few negative 
consequences. Children with OCD in particular do not readily put forward cognitive 
explanations for their difficulties, which appear to be experienced as an inability to stop 
performing an action (Rapoport, 1990) It is possible to suggest that the appraisal process 
has become 'automatic' and no longer available to conscious awareness, but such an 
explanation is not testable and therefore lacks utility in the testing of theories by empirical 
investigation. However, one case in this thesis (JB) reported compulsive activity without 
any appraisal or the experience of anxiety. When his compulsive activity was interrupted, 
to his surprise, he reported feelings of anxiety, although he could not specify the cause. 
It may be, therefore, that through repetition, behaviours become automatic and the original 
motivation and appraisals become difficult to report. 
Other difficulties arise when considering the current model to be a complete account 
of the formation and maintenance of all obsessional problems. There are many people who 
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feel excessive responsibility and yet have no psychiatric difficulties. Excessive 
responsibility and guilt are also a key feature of depression (Beck, 1967). Similarly there 
are many people with high moral standards who may have the 'dysfunctional assumptions' 
and 'thinking errors' suggested by Salkovskis, yet do not have obsessional behaviours. 
The links between the appraisal of intrusions and the manifestation of compulsions (some 
of which can be bizarre) are not fully explained by the theory. Finally, neurological 
dysfunction in OCD is not addressed by this model, despite the apparent strength and 
diversity of evidence in support of a neurological model of the disorder. 
2.9. Summary of the Cognitive-Behavioural Model of OCD 
This chapter has detailed the behavioural model of OCD. This model applies 
learning theory to the development of obsessions and compulsions. Anxiety is a core 
feature of this model and avoidance serves to maintain the disorder. A wide variety of 
evidence supports the model, but there is room for further improvements owing to 
limitations which were described. The incorporation of cognitive elements into the model 
was aimed at improving the conceptual understanding of the disorder and its treatment. 
The most well developed cognitive-behavioural model suggests that appraisal of normal 
intrusions in terms of 'responsibility' is important to the disorder. There is evidence to 
support this model, although treatment based on the model was not more effective than 
behavioural treatment without a cognitive element. The data in support of the model and 
the potential for the improvement of therapy for OCD based on its principles, warrants 
further empirical investigation of the cognitive-behavioural model. 
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CHAPTER 3 
The Nature of Anxiety in People with OCD 
"Often I dream that 1 am incontinent and wake in a total panic and have to check the 
bed, the entire floor, my bottom with a mirror many times and then I am afraid to sleep again 
in case it happens again" (KW). 
"To protect myself I use avoidance, e. g., I never visit my local town centre; 1 
communicate with my contaminated brother only by phone; 1 gave up my job (in the town 
centre); I keep people out of my house; I don't answer the door" (SL). 
3.1. Introduction 
The previous chapter detailed the behavioural model of OCD and the recent 
development of the cognitive component of the model. The reformulated cognitive- 
behavioural model places anxiety at its core. Anxiety is considered to be at the heart of the 
formation of the disorder via conditioning, and avoidance by neutralising (compulsive 
behaviour) is suggested to maintain the disorder (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). Cognitive 
and psycho-physiological components were included in the three systems analysis of the 
disorder (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). The purpose of the study in this chapter was to 
investigate further the nature of the anxiety that characterises an obsessional population. 
3.2. Anxiety and the Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
In the introductory chapter, reference was made to the two aims of the studies in this 
thesis. The first aim is to investigate and develop the cognitive-behavioural model, and the 
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second aim is to generate data to test the hypothesis that different sub-groups may exist, one 
characterised by anxiety, responsibility and guilt and the other by neurological deficits. 
Anxiety is at the core of the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD and yet is not considered 
important by the neurological theorists, who fail to mention anxiety disorders even within the 
hypothesized spectrum of disorders (Hollander, 1993). Nevertheless, exposure with response 
prevention is still considered to be an important treatment of such obsessive-compulsive 
'related' disorders (Josephson and Brondolo, 1993). The data generated in this study are used 
to test the heterogeneity hypothesis in chapter 9. 
3.3 Study to Investigate the Nature of Anxiety in An Obsessional Population. 
3.3.1. Background 
The behavioural model of OCD considers anxiety to be important both for the 
formation of obsessional difficulties via conditioning, and for the maintenance of the disorder 
by avoidance of anxiety through compulsive activity (see previous chapter). 'Fear of fear' is 
also considered as an important maintaining factor (Rachman, 1990). Anxiety can be 
measured in different ways, and one of the most common is to administer self-report ratings 
of standardised measures such as the Beck Anxiety Inventory. No study has reported scores 
on the Beck Anxiety Inventory with a large number of obsessional subjects, i. e. n>30. The 
three-systems model of anxiety described in the previous chapter (Rachman and Hodgson, 
1980) can be tested by use of a questionnaire designed specifically to assess the three 
components of anxiety. In this questionnaire, the 'cognitive' component is separated into 
' negative affect' and ' cognitive' components, thus providing a measure of ' four systems' of 
anxiety. Although the instrument has good psychometric properties, it is in need of further 
development (Koksal and Power, 1990, Koksal, Power and Sharp, 1991). In particular, the 
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prediction that people with OCD score more highly on all components needs to be examined 
using an adequately sized sample as the OCD sample used by Koksal et al. (1991) had only 
8 patients. 
Information regarding the 'fear of fear' aspect of the model, could be tested by 
administering the'Anxiety Sensitivity Index', a measure designed specifically to assess the fear 
inducing properties of anxiety (Taylor et al., 1992). Anxiety sensitivity has been defined as 'the 
fear of anxiety-related sensations, which arises from beliefs that these sensations have harmful 
somatic, psychological or social consequences' (Taylor, 1995; Reiss, 1987). During the 
course of the thesis, data have been published showing that a large Canadian sample of OCD 
subjects scored more highly on this measure than healthy controls (Taylor et al., 1992). 
Recently, the theoretical and empirical findings relating to anxiety sensitivity, or 'fear of fear', 
have been reviewed (Taylor, 1995). It was concluded that anxiety sensitivity was a unitary 
construct at a higher-order level, and may be multidimensional at a lower-order level 
(corresponding to fear of somatic harm, psychological harm and social harm). Anxiety 
sensitivity is thought to particularly characterise patients with panic disorder, it is distinct from 
other fears and is distinct from trait anxiety (although the two are related). The questionnaire 
has not been administered in a British sample. 
Neither the 'Four Systems Anxiety Questionnaire' nor the 'Anxiety Sensitivity Index' 
has been related to obsessional symptoms within an obsessional population. Although not 
explicitly stated in the behavioural model, it is implicit that obsessional symptoms as measured 
by the Padua Inventory (Sanavio, 1988) or the MOCI (Hodgson and Rachman, 1977, 
although see later for a discussion as to severity) would be related to all the measures of 
anxiety described above. 
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3.3.2. Aims 
There were two primary aims to this study. The first aim was to test the hypotheses 
and predictions made by the behavioral model about the nature of anxiety in an obsessional 
population. The second aim was to provide data to test the heterogeneity hypothesis (see 
Chapter 9). Only data relevant to the first aim of the study will be reported in this chapter. 
3.3.3. Hypotheses and Predictions 
Hypothesis I 
People with obsessional difficulties will show more anxiety of a clinical nature than a 
normal population. 
Prediction 1 
An obsessional population will score significantly higher on the Beck Anxiety 
Inventory than data published for the normal population. 
Hypothesis 2 
Anxiety in people with obsessional difficulties has more than one component, 
including cognitive, behavioural and psycho-physiological components. An obsessional 
population will show more of each of these components than a normal population. 
Prediction 2 
An obsessional population will score significantly higher on each of the subscales of 
the Four Systems Anxiety Questionnaire than data published for the normal population. 
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Hypothesis 3 
Fear of fear will characterise an obsessional population more than a normal 
population (see p. 43) 
Prediction 3 
An obsessional population will score significantly higher on the 'Anxiety Sensitivity 
Index' than data published for the normal population. 
Hypothesis 4 
The extent of anxiety will be related to the severity of obsessional symptoms 
Prediction 4 
There will be a significant correlation between measures of obsessionality and 
measures of anxiety. 
3.3.4. Methods 
Subjects 
Subjects were recruited from three sources. 
1) Six subjects were patients who had been referred to Professor Mark's Behavioural 
Treatment Unit at the Bethlem Royal Hospital, Kent. 
2) Seven subjects were members of a self-help group for people with OCD in Surrey. 
3) Thirty-six subjects were those who: 
" Responded to an advertisement on the radio or in a woman's magazine asking for help 
with research into OCD 
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" They had returned their screening questionnaires and had a score of 11 or more on the 
Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (MOCI; Hodgson and Rachman, 1977), 
i. e. in the clinical range. 
0 They were all willing to travel to the Institute of Psychiatry for an assessment. 
Two of the sample did not meet DSM-III-R criteria for OCD and hence their data were 
excluded from the analysis. The remaining 47 subjects met DSM-III-R criteria for OCD 
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987). Since these criteria are more stringent than those 
ofDSM-IV (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), all these subjects would have fulfilled 
the current diagnostic criteria of DSM-IV. One or two subjects failed to complete some 
questionnaires; therefore the number of subjects who completed the questionnaires vanes 
between n=45 (FSAQ) and n=47 (ASI). 
The data from the current sample with OCD are compared with published norms for 
scores on the questionnaires. 
Sample Characteristics: 
The mean age of the OCD sample was 36.3 years (sd 9.46; range 23-70). 29 (61.7%) 
were female, 18 (38.3%) were male. The mean duration of the illness was 15.27 yrs (range 
1-50 yrs; sd 11.62). The overall average age of onset was 20.87 yrs (range 4-40 yrs, sd 
10.37). Age of onset for women was 19.48 (range 5-39 yrs; sd, 10.52) and for men was 21.17 
yrs (range 4-40 yrs; sd 10.63). 24 subjects (51.1%) were known to be on medication at the 
time of the study; 10 of these were taking clomipramine. Twenty seven of the 47 subjects 
(57%) reported that their obsessional intrusions occurred somewhere between several times 
a day and ' all the time'. On a scale corresponding to 0 'Not at all' to 8 'Very Severely, I can't 
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cope, the mean interference with work was reported as 3.9 (sd 2.0), interference with home 
management was reported as 4.14 (sd. 4.14) and the mean interference with social activities 
was 3.88 (sd. 2.10), all of which correspond to a definite impairment. The most common 
single obsession concerned fear of harming others (17%). 20/47 (42.6% ) reported a 
combination of compulsions (checking, washing etc), 6 subjects had checking rituals only and 
the remainder had washing, symmetry or mental rituals. 
Measures 
For Prediction 1: 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory: (BAI: Beck, Brown, Epstein and Steer, 1988). This is a 21- 
item scale comprising symptoms of anxiety. The scale measures the severity of anxiety in 
adults and children; symptoms are rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 ('not at all') to 3 
('severely: you could barely stand it). This measure is considered to assess clinical anxiety 
more accurately than other measures, such as Spielberger's measure of trait anxiety 
(Spielberger et. al., 1980). 
For Prediction 2: 
The Four Systems Anxiety Questionnaire: (FSAQ: Koksal and Powers, 1990). This is a 
60-item self-report inventory. Subjects report whether they have experienced any of the 
thoughts, feelings, physical symptoms, or behaviours in the manner indicated by the items. 
Some items are reverse coded and subjects' scores are calculated by adding the scale values 
of the items with which they agreed. 
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For Prediction 3: 
The Anxiety Sensitivity Index: (ASI: Taylor, Koch and McNally, 1992). This is a 16-item, 
self-report inventory in which subjects are requested to rate the extent to which they agree 
with each item on a 5-point Likert scale. The scale ranges from 0 ('very little') to 4 ('very 
much'). The total score ranges from 0 to 64 and is obtained by summing the item scores. 
For Prediction 4: 
Padua Inventory - Revised: (P I-R; Sanavio, 1988; van Oppen, 1995c). This is a 41-item 
list of common obsessional thoughts and compulsive behaviours (see appendix 1). It was 
revised from an earlier 60-item list. Each of the 41 items is rated on a five-point scale in terms 
of the frequency with which they are experienced. The scale points are labelled from ' not at 
all' (score of zero) to 'very much' (score of four). All items are negatively phrased ('I feel 
my hands are dirty when I touch money'). An investigation into the factor structure of this 
measure for a British obsessional population can be found in appendix . 
Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory: (MOCI; Hodgson and Rachman, 1977). 
This is a 30-item questionnaire. Subjects are requested to respond 'TRUE' or 'FALSE' to 
each item. There are four subscales: checking, washing, doubting and slowness. 
Procedures 
The questionnaires were given to subjects who indicated that they were willing to 
participate in a research project investigating OCD. The questionnaires were sent to the 
subjects' homes and returned when the subjects attended the institute of Psychiatry for an 




Descriptive statistics for the BAI total scores are presented in Table 1. 
Table 3.1. Scores on the Beck Anxiety Inventory 
Grou n Mean SD 
Normal (non-students, Dent 36 7.78 5.65 
and Salkovskis, 1986) 
OCD (this sample) 46 19.07 9.74 
OCD 26 21.69 12.42 
(Beck et al. 1988) 
Panic Disorder with 95 27.27 13.11 
Agoraphobia (Beck et. al. 
1988) 
Assuming homogeneity of variance, a one-way ANOVA was conducted to determine 
whether there were any significant differences between the OCD group in the present study 
and subjects with Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia and healthy controls for whom there are 
published norms (detailed in Table 3.1). The analysis showed a significant overall difference 
between the OCD subjects, subjects with Panic Disorder with Agoraphobia and healthy 
controls 
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(F (2,174)=48.2, p<0.001) thereby indicating that it was appropriate to conduct independent 
t-tests to identify differences between 2 specific groups. 
Therefore independent t-tests were conducted to compared the mean BAI scores of 
the present sample to published norms for other clinical groups and for non-clinical subjects. 
The current OCD sample was significantly more anxious than the normal population (t=6.1, 
p< 0.01). There was no significant difference between BAI scores in the current sample and 
scores of subjects with OCD in the Beck et al. (1988) study (t=0.43, p>0.05). The current 
OCD sample had significantly lower BAI scores than the scores reported by Beck et. al. for 
patients with panic disorder with agoraphobia (t=3.78, p <0.01). 
Prediction 1 was fulfilled. 
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Prediction 2: 
Descriptive statistics for the FSAQ are presented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2. Scores on the Four Systems Anxiety Questionnaire 
Group n Mean and SD 
FSAQ FSAQ FSAQ FSAQ FSAQ 
Feelin Co nitive 
Behaviour Somatic Total 
Normal 218 17.3 23.98 20.08 18.89 20.21 
University (14.02) (18.2) (13.05) (11.98) (11.77) 
Students (Koksal 
et al. 1991). 
OCD (this 45 54.17 64.48 35.71 33.36 46.93 
sample) (17.7) (15.64) (16.43) (18.38) (12.62) 
OCD 8 40.3 68.6 24.4 32.0 41.3 
(Koksal et al. (13.1) (11.7) (16.3) (13.8) (9.2) 
1991) 
Other Anxiety 10 54.6 59.8 36.2 52.5 50.8 
Disorders (20.3) (17.7) (22.6) (18.3) (17.8) 
(Koksal et at. 
1991) 
It is not possible to assume that the data from subjects with OCD and other anxiety 
disorders in the Koksal et al. (1991) study are normally distributed owing to the small sample 
sizes, and it is unlikely that the variance is homogeneous among the different groups. 
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Therefore, comparisons were made only between the subjects with OCD in this sample and 
normal university students. It was not possible to do a Hotelling's T2 to determine whether 
there were significant overall differences between two groups on the individual subscales, as 
the raw data were not available from the study of Koksal and colleagues. Therefore an 
independent t-test was used to compare Total FSAQ scores on each of the components of the 
FSAQ between the present sample of OCD subjects and the published data for normal 
university students. The Total scores were greater for the present sample of OCD subjects 
than for non-clinical controls (t=13.7, p<0.001). Therefore comparisons were made on scores 
on the subscales for OCD subjects using independent t-tests. These were all significantly 
higher for OCD subjects than healthy controls (p<0.001). 
Prediction 2 was fulfilled. 
Prediction 3 
Descriptive data are given in Table 3.3. below: - 
Table 3.3. Scores on the Anxiety Sensitivity Index 
Group n Mean SD 
Normal (Taylor et 
al. 1992) 
1013 17.8 8.8 
OCD (this sample) 47 26.74 12.73 
OCD 
(Taylor et al. 1992) 
67 25.4 12.4 
Panic Disorder 
(Taylor et al. 1992) 
151 36.6 12.3 
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Given the difference in sample sizes, it was not appropriate to conduct a one-way 
ANOVA since homogeneity of variance could not be assumed. Therefore an independent 
t-test was used to compare ASI scores between the present sample of OCD subjects and the 
published data. ASI scores were significantly greater for the present sample of OCD subjects 
than for non-clinical controls (t=6.6, p<O.. ýO 1); ASI scores were significantly lower for OCD 
subjects than for patients with Panic Disorder (t=-4.8, p<O. k', O1) and there was no significant 
difference between ASI scores for the present OCD sample and the Canadian OCD sample 
(t=0.56; p>0.05) 
Prediction 4 
Pearson's correlation coefficients were computed to determine the association between 
scores on measures of obsessionality and measures of anxiety. The correlation coefficient 
matrix is shown in Table 3.4. Significance levels were set at p<0.001, as multiple correlations 
were being computed. 
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Table 3.4. Correlation Coefficient Matrix for Anxiety and Obsessional Variables 
Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (n-46) 
TOTAL CHECK WASH DOUBT SLOW 
ASI TOTAL . 4331** . 4585** . 3664 . 0096 . 
1821 
Beck Anxiety . 1994 . 2341 -. 0172 . 1824 . 
1821 
Inventory 
Four Systems Anxiety Questionnaire 
FEELINGS . 1946 . 1977 . 1361 -. 1265 . 
1978 
COGNITION . 1346 . 2584 . 0372 -. 0504 -. 0579 
BEHAVIOUR . 2228 . 1498 . 2750 . 1045 -. 0453 
SOMATIC . 2564 . 0299 . 1856 . 1424 . 
2072 
TOTAL . 2734 . 2068 . 2147 . 0262 . 1088 
PADUA (n"46) 
IMPULSES WASHING CHECK RUMINATE PRECISION TOTAL 
ASI TOTAL . 4013** . 3397 
Beck Anxiety . 2573 -. 0132 
Inventory 
Four Systems Anxiety Questionnaire 
. 4131** . 4104** . 1427 
. 0673 . 2987 . 2333 
FEELINGS . 4304** . 1198 . 0535 
COGNITION . 3748 . 0433 . 1891 
BEHAVIOUR . 2099 . 3125 . 1520 
SOMATIC 
. 2272 . 0098 -. 0474 
TOTAL 
. 4036** . 1542 . 1081 
. 5473** . 0645 
. 5429** -. 0654 
. 3299 . 0453 
. 1457 . 2230 









The correlation coefficient matrix showed a significant positive correlation between 
the total number of obsessional symptoms (as measured by the MOCI and the PI-R) and the 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (r=0.43 and r-0.51 respectively, p<0.001). The FSAQ was 
associated with total number of obsessional symptoms as measured by the PI"R. (r-0.41, 
p<0.001) and the subscale to assess feelings was also associated with the PI-R total (r=0.4. 
p<0.001). The rumination subscale of the PI-R was associated with several different indices 
of anxiety, most notably the cognitive and feeling subscales of the FSAQ (i=0.55 and r=0.54 
respectively, p<0.001). Of note, anxiety as measured by the BAI was, surprisingly, not 
correlated with measures of obsessionality. 
Prediction 4 was partially fulfilled. 
Summary of Results 
Prediction 1 was fulfilled. 
Prediction 2 was fulfilled. 
Prediction 3 was fulfilled. 
Prediction 4 was partially fulfilled. 
Obsessionals had significantly more anxiety than in a normal population, their anxiety 
was higher on all four systems (cognitive, feeling, somatic and behavioural) and they showed 
significantly more 'fear of fear' than a normal population (although less than patients with 
Panic Disorder). Prediction 4 was only partially fulfilled as some of the measures of anxiety 
were associated with measures of obsessionality, but others were not. 
There was support therefore for the following hypotheses: - 
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Hypothesis 1- People with obsessional difficulties showed more anxiety of a clinical nature 
than a normal population. 
Hypothesis 2- Anxiety in people with obsessional difficulties has more than one component, 
including cognitive, behavioural and psycho-physiological components. An obsessional 
population showed more of each of these components than a normal population. 
Hypothesis 3 'Fear of fear' characterised an obsessional population more than a normal 
population. 
There was partial support for the fourth hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4 The extent of anxiety was related to the severity of obsessional symptoms, but 
only with respect to some measures of obsessionality. 
3.3.6. Discussion 
This is the first study to examine closely the nature of anxiety within a population 
with OCD, in particular the different systems, and to relate the systems to measures of 
obsessionality. The results provide support for the behavioural model of OCD. Anxiety 
does characterise the disorder in that people with OCD show significantly more anxiety 
than healthy controls. The negative findings are perhaps, most worthy of discussion, in 
particular the lack of a relationship between anxiety as measured by the BAI and and 
obsessional symptoms, and the lack of an association between the measures of four systems 
of anxiety and the MOCI scores. 
It is possible either that: 
1) There is an association between the severity of obsessionality and extent of anxiety 
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but the instruments have failed to detect it. 
2) There is no association between the severity of obsessionality and the extent of 
anxiety. 
3) The sample is too small and restricted to answer the questions adequately. 
One reason that the instruments may have failed to detect the relationship between 
severity of obsessionality and the extent of anxiety is that the MOCI does not seem to be 
particularly sensitive to the severity of symptoms within an obsessional population. 
Although the MOCI is sensitive to treatment effects (Taylor, 1995), there is no measure 
of severity within the instrument. Therefore it is not able to distinguish between severely 
impaired people with OCD and people with OCD who are less impaired but have the same 
concerns and behaviours. Some evidence in support of this suggestion comes from the lack 
of association between the MOCI and the Compulsive Activities Checklist (Philpott, 1975). 
This measure determines the extent of interference caused by obsessional symptoms, but 
was not found to correlate highly (r=0.29) with the MOCI score within a normal 
population (Sternberger and Burns, 1990). The lack of sensitivity to symptom severity 
is not a failing of the MOCI per se, as it was never intended to discriminate between the 
severity of the problem within a clinical population, but is a possible reason that the MOCI 
scores do not correlate with a measure of anxiety. 
However, the PI-R is sensitive to change with treatment (van Oppen et al., 1995b) 
and, given that there is a scale to measure the frequency of the obsessions and behaviours, 
it should be able to distinguish severity of symptoms within an obsessional population. 
Nevertheless, there was no significant correlation between the PI-R score and score on the 
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BAI. It is plausible, therefore, that the results are valid and there is no association between 
the severity of anxiety (as measured by the BAI) and the severity of obsessional symptoms. 
This lack of an association does not mean that anxiety is not part of OCD but could 
be explained by a 'ceiling' effect. It may be that a certain level of anxiety is necessary 
for the formation and/or maintenance of OCD, but that it is not the case that the more 
anxiety, the worse the symptoms. People may have different thresholds for the tolerance 
of anxiety so that for one person, a small amount of anxiety is sufficiently aversive to 
promote associations between unrelated events (as in classical conditioning) and to motivate 
avoidance behaviours. More anxiety need not necessarily lead to more aversion and 
stronger (mis) associations, and it may not increase avoidance behaviours if the anxiety 
level has already reached a maximum level for that person (the 'ceiling'). Another 
person may need to experience much more anxiety before associations are made between 
cognitions and events, and before compulsive behaviour is initiated and OCD develops and 
is maintained. 
Overall, the results are consistent with the behavioural model that proposes that 
anxiety characterises OCD. Given that anxiety characterises other disorders such as Panic 
Disorder which are distinct from OCD, obsessionality cannot merely be construed as just 
extreme anxiety. More information about the nature of obsessional symptoms within an 
obsessional population is needed to be able to construct hypotheses about what may 
uniquely characterise people with OCD and distinguish them from other people. 
3.4. Summary 
This study investigated the nature of anxiety in people with OCD. Compared to 
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published data, the obsessional population had significantly higher scores on all measures of 
anxiety including general clinical anxiety, behavioural anxiety, cognitive anxiety, psycho- 
physiological anxiety, negative affect and sensitivity to anxiety ('fear of fear'). There was 
a significant association between many, but not all, of these measures of anxiety and the 
severity of obsessional symptoms. 
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CHAPTER 4 
Guilt and Religion in OCD 
'I advise all... to take heed of placing Religion too much in Fears, and Tears, and 
Scruples' (Richard Baxter, Reliquiae Baxterianae, 1696). 
'One might venture to regard obsessional neurosis as a pathological counterpart of 
the formation of a religion, and to describe that neurosis as an individual religiosity, 
and religion as a universal obsessional neurosis' (Freud, 1907/1961, pp126-127). 
7 was brought up as a Catholic with very strict parents Thought was as bad as deed 
I was told to confess bad thoughts. Guilt plays a major part in my life. Constantly 
it seems that anything important, I have doubts about and subsequent guilt. The 
more I suppress the thoughts, the more they come back at me. When this started, 1 
remember waiting at the age of 7 outside a confessional box, not being able to 
convince myself whether I was sorry or not for my sins. Although I was sorry, my 
conscience was telling me I wasn't and until I could convince myself that I was sorry, 
I couldn't go in the confessional box' (FC. Punctuation amended). 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD was detailed, and 
the role of anxiety investigated in a questionnaire study. The first half of this chapter 
considers the importance of guilt and obsessionality. The role of guilt within the cognitive- 
behavioural model is reviewed and the relevance of guilt for the heterogeneity hypothesis is 
outlined. The literature on guilt in OCD is reviewed. A second questionnaire study on the 
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relationship between guilt and obsessionality in an obsessional population is reported. 
Religious instruction may be one reason that people with obsessional complaints feel guilty. 
The second half of this chapter considers the importance of religion and obsessionality. 
Religion is discussed within the context of the cognitive-behavioural model and the relevance 
of religion for the heterogeneity hypothesis is outlined. The clinical picture of religious 
obsessions is presented and the literature on the role of religion in OCD is briefly reviewed. 
A large questionnaire study on the relationship between religion and obsessionality in an 
obsessional population is described, and the findings discussed with reference to the cognitive- 
behavioural model. 
4.2. Guilt and the cognitive-behavioural model 
There are many definitions of guilt, most of which involve a negative emotion with 
an accompanying recognition that one has done something wrong (Arnold, 1970; Demaria 
and Kassinove, 1988). Guilt is closely related to responsibility, since guilt is the emotion that 
is most likely to result from an appraisal of responsibility for a negative outcome. Guilt is 
suggested to serve both as a factor predisposing to obsessional difficulties, and as a factor 
which perpetuates the problem. Feelings of guilt (related to the appraisal of responsibility) 
would serve to motivate a person to avoid the relevant thoughts or actions and make 
restitution if avoidance fails. 
As well as serving as a motivator to act upon appraisals of responsibility, guilt may 
also predispose to the development of the problem. A person may have dysfunctional 
schemata which relate to guilt, for example 'if bad things happen, I will feel guilty because I 
should have acted to prevent it. ' When an intrusive thought occurs relating to harm of a loved 
one, such dysfunctional schemata are activated, according to the model, and negative 
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automatic thoughts involving an appraisal of responsibility may occur. For example, I am 
responsible for making sure my loved one is safe, so 'if my loved one is harmed, I will feel 
guilty because I should have acted to prevent it'. A person without dysfunctional schemata 
concerning responsibility relating to guilt is less likely to make an appraisal, since there are no 
latent concepts about guilt resulting from failures to act. 
4.3. Guilt and the Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
The cognitive-behavioural model suggests that guilt may serve as both a predisposing 
and perpetuating factor in obsessionality. An inflated sense of responsibility, which is central 
to the model, is closely related to intense feelings of guilt; in turn, intense feelings of guilt 
could contribute to the hypothesised misappraisal of intrusions. If some people have a 
' neurological' form of OCD, there is no reason to predict that their guilt levels will be elevated 
compared to non-clinical norms. However, those whose obsessionality is better accounted 
for by the cognitive-behavioural model are predicted to have elevated levels of guilt compared 
to non-clinical controls. 
The heterogeneity hypothesis is tested with respect to guilt in chapter 9. It is worth 
noting that if the heterogeneity hypothesis is supported, discrepancies found in empirical 
studies of guilt can be understood in terms of the heterogeneity of the disorder. 
4.4. The Clinical Picture of Guilt and OCD 
Invariably, guilt is described as a major part of obsessional complaint. In DSM IV 
(APA, 1994), guilt is mentioned as an 'associated feature' of the disorder. 'Guilt and anxiety 
are the dominant affective symptoms' according to a recent phenomenological study 
(Rasmussen and Eisen, 1991). A patient is described by Rachman (1978) as having intrusive 
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thoughts that 'provoked considerable discomfort and guilt'. A person may feel guilt for 
having 'bad thoughts', and many of the subjects in the study reported feelings of guilt about 
their thoughts and their actions. Examples from these subjects are given below: 
'[On the interruption of a ritual] I went berserk and told my father that I hated him 
which of course for me, considering myself a Christian.. was a dreadful thing to say. 
The guilt was awf ul.. my rituals increased' (PL) 
'I always felt guilty about things - always thought I would be in trouble over 
ever_ything.. I didn't realise I had feelings of guilt until I was about 25 or 26 years old, 
and then I Mew that from age 2, when my mother left, I had been blaming myse f for 
her leaving and had been feeling guilty ever since' (AS) 
Guilt is also a characteristic of depression (see Beck, 1976). Since depression also 
characterises OCD (see Rachman and Hodgson, 1980), it can sometimes be difficult to 
determine whether the guilt is related to obsessional or depressive features of the illness. 
Some differences between obsessional guilt and depressive guilt are discussed in section . 
4.5. A review of the literature on Guilt and OCD 
Originally, the Old English term 'gylt' meaning 'crime, debt or fine' did not refer to any 
feelings experienced by the culprit (see Berrios et al., 1992). European equivalents of the 
term, referred to 'doing wrong', the act of rule breaking, but not to any feelings of remorse. 
The term gradually grew to incorporate the action of moral self-scrutinising and the feelings 
of uneasiness that accompany transgression of moral codes. 
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'Guilt may be defined as the dysphoric feeling associated with the recognition that one 
has violated a personally relevant moral or social standard' (Kugler and Jones, 1992). This 
definition is similar to Beck's (1976) conclusion that guilt results from a perceived 
transgression of one's own internal rules. 'Tangney et al. (1992) have distinguished guilt from 
shame on the grounds that 'In guilt, the object of concern is some specific action (or failure 
to act). There is remorse or regret over 'the bad thing that was done' and a sense of tension 
that often serves as a motivation for reparative action-In shame, the object of concern is the 
entire self. The 'bad thing' is experienced as a reflection of a 'bad self and the entire self is 
painfully scrutinized and negatively evaluated' (Tangney et al., 1992). In an extensive review 
of the literature, Kugler and Jones (1992) have examined the different definitions, 
consequences, theories and measurement of guilt. 
When blame is assigned externally, anger may result, and when it is assigned 
internally, guilt may be experienced (Dryden, 1994). The attempt to avoid self-directed blame 
or criticism was put forward as a possible explanation for some checking compulsions, for 
example 'the underlying motive in all of these examples is the attempt to avoid punishment in 
the form of criticism either from others, or self-directed criticism i. e. guilt. Where the cleaners 
are mainly trying to avoid coming into contact with danger, discomfort or fear, the checkers 
are mainly taking steps to avoid criticism or guilt' (Turner et al., 1978). Following from this, 
in checkers, a failure to avoid criticism or guilt would lead to an increase in checking 
behaviour, in order to prevent further criticism or guilt. Further, 'checkers should also 
experience more intense and more frequent feelings of guilt than do cleaners.... Also, doubters 
should experience more intensive and frequent feelings of guilt than do cleaners' (Rachman, 
1993). The latter statement is based on the closer association between checking and doubting, 
than between cleaning and doubting (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). 
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Despite the long history of clinical documentation of the prominence of guilt in OCD, 
there has been relatively little research in this area. Owing to space limitations, this review 
excludes the following related areas: 
1) the relationship between guilt and OCD via the associations between guilt in 
depression, and depression and OCD. 
2) the relationship between guilt and OCD via perfectionism 
3) an analysis of the theoretical relationship between guilt, responsibility and control 
(see Salkovskis, 1989, and Shaver and Drown, 1986 for further discussion of this 
interesting relationship). 
The brief communication of Turner and colleagues (1976) reported that people with 
checking compulsions showed more sensitivity to criticism than washers or phobics. 
However, guilt was not assessed directly. Niler and Beck (1989) used the Perceived Guilt 
Index (PGI; Otterbacher and Munz, 1973) to investigate the relationship among guilt, 
dysphoria, anxiety and obsessions in a normal population. This study found that the PGI was 
the best predictor of negative intrusive thoughts and impulses. The first attempted replication 
of this study in a normal population failed - guilt did not strongly influence the experience of 
negative intrusive thoughts, but levels of self-reported depression and anxiety did (Reynolds 
and Salkovskis, 1991). 
Steketee, Quay and White (1991) used a situational measure of guilt which assessed 
guilt in the domains of interpersonal harm, norm violation and self-control failure (Klass, 
1987). Thirty three patients with OCD were compared to 24 patients with anxiety disorders 
and, contrary to expectations, there were no differences on any of the domains of guilt 
between these two groups. However, significant correlations were found between the extent 
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of guilt and the extent of pathology in OCD subjects (as measured by the MOCI). Significant 
associations were also found between the extent of guilt and religiosity in OCD patients, but 
not in anxious controls. Subclinical obsessive-compulsive subjects were recently found to 
have significantly higher scores on all domains of guilt than non-compulsive subjects using this 
situational measure (Frost et al., 1994). 
However, Klass's situational measure of guilt is long to complete and rather 
cumbersome. A new self-report measure of guilt has recently been developed by Kugler and 
Jones (1992) with three subscales - state guilt, trait guilt and guilt standards. In a non-clinical 
population, the level of trait was found to be a significant predictor of obsessionality (as 
measured by the MOCI), but guilt standards, state guilt, depression and anxiety were not 
(Watkins, Shafran and Charman, 1995). 
In summary, the research literature, is in a state of confusion. There does appear to 
be a relationship between obsessionality and guilt, but patients with OCD did not report more 
guilt than anxious controls; two studies have found that in the normal population, guilt was 
the best predictor of intrusions, another found that it was not at all significant in predicting 
intrusions. Most recently, subclinical obsessive compulsives were found to have more guilt 
than non-compulsives in all domains. In the most recently published book on OCD, Talfis 
(1995) states that ' there is considerable evidence suggesting that guilt is a significant 
phenomenological feature of OCD'. 
4.6 A study of guilt and obsessionality 
4.6.1. Background 
Based on the associations between responsibility and guilt, it has been suggested that 
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people with checking compulsions and * doubters' will experience more guilt than people with 
cleaning compulsions (Rachman, 1993). People with obsessional difficulties have been 
suggested to be of 'tender moral conscience'. Such high morality has been suggested as a 
means by which normal intrusive thoughts assume 'special significance' (Salkovsksis, 1985). 
Two of three studies using normal subjects have found that some form of guilt is a 
predictor of obsessionality (Niler and Beck, 1989; Watkins, Shafran and Charman, 1995), but 
a third - using the largest subject sample - did not (Reynolds and Salkovskis, 1991). Instead, 
this large study found depression and anxiety to be the best predictor of obsessionality as 
measured by the MOCI; however the other studies (Niler and Beck, 1989; Watkins et al. 
1995) did not find depression or anxiety to be a significant predictor of obsessionality. Only 
one study has examined guilt in an obsessional population and the results produced were 
themselves contradictory and difficult to interpret (Steketee et at., 1991). The sample size 
was small (n=33) and the authors suggested the need for 'further research establishing the 
pervasiveness and severity of guilt in OCD'. 
4.6.2. Aims 
There were three aims in the present study. 
1) To determine the relationship between guilt and obsessionality, taking into 
consideration depression and anxiety. 
2) To determine differences in guilt among 'checkers', 'cleaners' and' doubters' 
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3) To collect data to test the heterogeneity hypothesis (See Chapter 9). 
The following describes data relating to the first two aims of the study. The heterogeneity 
hypothesis is tested, in part, using data from this study and is described in chapter 9. 
4.6.3. Hypotheses and Predictions 
Hypothesis I 
Guilt is associated with obsessionality. 
Prediction ]a 
An obsessional population will have more guilt (and higher moral standards) than a 
non-obsessional population. 
Prediction lb 
Measures of guilt will be correlated with measures of obsessionality. 
Hypothesis 2 
The relationship between guilt and obsessionality is affected by depression and 
anxiety. 
Prediction 2 
The correlations between guilt and obsessionality will be reduced by controlling for 
the effects of depression and anxiety. 
Hypothesis 3 
Guilt, depression and anxiety are significant predictors of obsessionality. 
Prediction 3 
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In regression analyses, guilt, depression and anxiety will predict scores on measures 
of obsessionality. 
Hypothesis 4 
'Checkers' and 'doubters' show more guilt than 'cleaners'. 
Prediction 4 
'Checkers' and 'doubters' will score significantly more highly than 'cleaners' on the 
measure of guilt. 
4.6.4. Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were recruited in the same manner described in chapter 3. Approximately 
200 sets of questionnaires were sent out. 108 usable replies (54%) were received. The 
mean age of the sample was 36.3 years (sd=11.07; age range 18-70). 82.4% of the 
sample were female (n=89). 
Measures 
Guilt Inventory: (GI; Kugler and Jones, 1992). This is 45 item self-report inventory 
designed to assess the following domains: trait guilt, defined as a continuing sense of guilt 
beyond immediate circumstances (e. g., 'Guilt and remorse have been a part of my life for 
as long as I can recall, ' 'I often have a strong sense of regret, ' and 'Frequently I just hate 
myself for something I have done'); state guilt defined as present guilty feelings based on 
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current or recent transgressions, (e. g., 'At the moment, I don't feel particularly guilty 
about anything I have done, ' 'I have recently done something that I deeply regret, ' and 
'Lately, I have felt good about myself and what I have done); and moral standards defined 
as subscription to a code of moral principles without reference either to specific behaviours 
or overly specific beliefs (e. g., 'I believe in a strict interpretation of right and wrong, ' 
'What is right and wrong depends on the situation, ' 'I have always believed strongly in a 
firm set of moral-ethical principles. ' 
The Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al. 1961). This is a 21-item inventory designed 
to assess depressive symptoms over the past week, including the day of responding. 
Subjects respond on a four point scale ranging from 0 (not depressive) to 3 (highly 
depressive). Subjects can circle more than one response. 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck et al. 1988). See p 62, 
Padua Inventory - Revised: (P I-R; Sanavio, 1988; van Oppen, 1995a). This is a 41-item 
list of common obsessional thoughts and compulsive behaviours (see appendix 1). It was 
revised from an earlier 60-item list. Each of the 41 items is rated on a five-point scale in 
terms of the frequency with which they are experienced. The scale points are labelled 
from 'not at all' (score of zero) to 'very much' (score of four). All items are negatively 
phrased ('I feel my hands are dirty when I touch money'). 
Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory: (MOCI; Hodgson and Rachman, 1977. 
This is a 30-item questionnaire. Subjects are requested to respond 'TRUE' or 'FALSE' 
to each item. There are four subscales: checking, washing, doubting and slowness. 
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Statistical Analyses 
Following the example of Reynolds and Salkovsksis (1991), correlations were 
calculated using Pearson product moment correlations. Stepwise multiple regression 
analyses were used with the total MOCI and PI-R scores as the dependent variables. 
Regressions were carried out in two separate ways: - 
(i) Forcing the same variables used by Niler and Beck into the regression in the 
same order as they used; ie sex, G-trait, BDI and BAI. 
(ii) Allowing all variables for which sufficient data were available to enter in free 
competition according to their relative significance, to look for the best overall 
predictors. 
4.6.5. Results 
The means and standard deviations for the main measures used are shown in Table 
4.1. The mean scores on the subscales of the GI were compared with published norms 
using t-tests for independent groups. The results are shown in Table 4.2 and indicate that 
the present obsessional sample had significantly higher scores than the normal sample of 
Kugler and Jones (1992) on state guilt, trait guilt, and significan . fly 
lower moral standards. 
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Table 4.1. Means and standard deviations of questionnaire measures. 
Mean (sd) 
MOCI total 16.63 (4.24) 
PI-R total 69.75 (26.76) 
BDI total 21.65 (11.52) 
BAI total 20.71 (11.57) 
Trait Guilt 70.41 (11.75) 
State Guilt 34.42 (7.11) 
Moral Standards 46.56 (5.37) 
Total GI-score 150.71 (17.96) 
Table 4.2. Comparison of scores on the GI between obsessional and published norms. 
Obsessionals 
(n = 108) 
Normal Adults 
(n = 209) (Kugler 
and Jones, 1992) 
t p 
Trait Guilt 70.41 (11.75) 53.73 (12.54) 7.9 <0.01 
State Guilt 34.42 (7.11) 24.44 (6.61) 12.4 <0.01 
Moral Standards 46.56 (5.37) 50.15 (8.14) -4.12 <0.01 
Correlations 
The correlations amongst the measures used in the present investigation which 
corresponded with those reported in Reynolds and Salkovskis (1991) and Niler and Beck 
(1989) were calculated. Anxiety was significantly correlated with depression (r=0.59, 
P<0.001); trait guilt and state guilt were both significantly correlated with depression 
(r=0.52 and r=0.56, p<0.001 respectively) and anxiety (r=0.39, r=0.509 p<0.001 
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respectively). Moral standards were not significantly correlated with depression or anxiety 
scores (r=-0.104, r=-0.04 respectively, p>0.05). 
The correlations between the guilt subscales and measures of obsessionality 
(including subscales) are given in Table 4.3. 
Table 4.3. Product-moment Correlations between Guilt and Obsessionality. 
n=108 Trait Guilt State Guilt Moral Standards 
MOCI total 0.49 ** 0.40 ** 0.12 
MOCI checking 0.40 ** 0.34 ** 0.09 
MOCI washing 0.28 ** 0.25 * 0.06 
MOCI slowness -0.04 0.05 -0.04 
MOCI doubting 0.34 ** 0.22 * 0.07 
PI-R total 0.59 ** 0.49 ** 0.12 
PI-R impulses 0.47 ** 0.39 ** 0.11 
PI-R washing 0.23 * 0.14 -0.01 
PI-R checking 0.26 ** 0.15 0.13 
PI-R rumination 0.54 ** 0.48 ** 0.13 
PI-R 
precision/order 
0.26 ** 0.27 -. 002 
** p<0.01 * p<0.05 
The correlational analyses were repeated controlling for the effects of anxiety and 
depression, given the strong association between these measures and guilt. The results are 
shown in Table 4.4. 
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Controlling for the effects of depression and anxiety revealed a significant positive 
correlation between total scores on the MOCI and PI-R and Moral Standards scores. 
Furthermore, many of the associations between the MOCI and PI-R subscales and state 
guilt decreased and were no longer significant; the majority of correlations between the 
MOCI and PI-R subscales and trait guilt measure remained strong and significant. 
Table 4.4 . Product-moment Correlations between measures of Guilt and 
Obsessionality, controlling for the effects of depression and anxiety. 
n=108 Trait Guilt State Guilt Moral Standards 
MOCI total 0.43 ** 0.29* 0.26* 
MOCI checking 0.36 ** 0.19 0.17 
MOCI washing 0.33 ** 0.17 0.22 
MOCI slowness -0.16 0.19 0.12 
MOCI doubting 0.21 0.12 -0.02 
PI-R total 0.45 ** 0.26* 0.25* 
PI-R impulses 0.26* 0.11 0.18 
PI-R washing 0.18 0.05 0.16 
PI-R checking 0.30 ** 0.17 0.13 
PI-R rumination 0.49 ** 0.35 0.31 
PI-R 
precision/order 
0.12 ** 0.11 0.05 
"' p<0. U1 * p<0.05 
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The regression analyses were conducted twice, as Reynolds and Salkovksis (1991) 
had obtained different results depending on whether the regression analyses were forced 
in the same order as those found to be significant by Niter and Beck (1989) or whether the 
variables were allowed to enter into a free sequence. 
Stepwise Multiple Regression Analyses 
Niler and Beck's sequence. The analyses were carried out firstly using the following 
as the dependent variables (not unpleasant thoughts as in the previous studies of Niler and 
Beck, Reynolds and Salkovsksis): - 
MOCI total (Table 4.5) 
MOCI subscales 
PI-R total (Table 4.6) 
PI-R subscales. 
The BAI was used instead of the Spielberger trait anxiety measure, and trait guilt 
measured by the GI was entered as the equivalent of trait guilt assessed using the PGI. 
When the analysis is carried out according to Niler and Beck's procedure (sex, trait guilt, 
BDI and BAI were the independent variables), the best and only significant predictor of 
MOCI total was trait guilt. Results are shown in Table 4.5. To comply with Bonferroni's 
correction for multiple comparisons, the alpha level was set at 0.01. 
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Table 4.5. Table for analysis forcing sex, trait guilt, anxiety and depression into 












Sex 0.18 0.03 0.03 3.17 0.12 1.30 0.19 
Trait 
Guilt 
0.50 0.25 0.22 14.84 0.32 9.76 0.49 
BDI 0.56 0.31 0.06 13.19 0.18 2.69 0.45 
BAI 0.59 0.34 0.03 11.17 0.20 3.84 0.41 
The regression analyses were repeated using the subscales of the MOCI, again 
forcing the same variables as Niler and Beck as the independent variables. Trait guilt was 
the only significant predictor of MOCI checking and doubting (Multiple R=0.413, F- 
change(2,88) = 8.64; Multiple R= 0.346, F(4,98) =7.2, respectively; p<0.01); BDI 
score was the only significant predictor of MOCI washing (Multiple R=O. 29, 
F(4,91)=8.64). No variables were significant predictors of MOCI slowness. 
The regression analysis was repeated using PI-R total as the dependent variable and 
again trait guilt was the only significant predictor of PI-R total (p < 0.01) (See Table 4.6). 
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Table 4.6. Table for analysis forcing sex, trait guilt, anxiety and depression into 













Sex 0.06 0.04 0.04 0.365 -0.04 0.25 0.06 
Trait 
Guilt 
0.59 0.39 0.34 24.88 0.44 20.43 0.59 
BDI 0.64 0.41 0.06 21.20 0.26 5.86 0.52 
BAI 0.64 0.41 0.003 15.89 0.06 0.39 0.38 
The regression analyses were repeated using the subscales of the PI-R, again 
forcing the same variables as Niler and Beck as the independent variables and setting 
alpha=0.01. Trait guilt was the only significant predictor of PI-R factor 1 (impulses) and 
4 (rumination) (Multiple R-0.47, F(4,92) =6.25; Multiple R=0.54, F(4,99) =15.44 
respectively); BDI score was the only significant predictor of PI-R factor 2 
(contamination) (Multiple R=0.33, F(4,96)=10.35). No variables were significant 
predictors of PI-R factors 3 or 5 (checking and precision/order). 
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Free Sequence 
The stepwise regression analyses were repeated allowing all variables to enter in 
free competition according to their relative significance. State guilt and moral standards 
were entered into the competition. The SPSS for Windows programme selects variables 
for entry in order of the greatest amount of variance accounted for. The tables show the 
order in which the variables were entered with 1) MOCI total and 2) PI-R total as 
dependent variables. 
Table 4.7. MOCI total as the dependent variable: free sequence 
variables Multiple RSQ Change F ratio Std F ratio r 
in the R in RSQ at entry reg. coef at final 
equation f 
Trait 0.51 0.26 0.26 29.92 0.51 29.92 0.59 
Guilt 
BDI 0.56 0.31 0.06 13.19 0.18 2.69 0.45 
The regression analyses were repeated using the subscales of the MOCI, again the 
sequence was free and state guilt and moral standards were allowed to compete. Trait guilt 
was the only significant predictor of MOCI checking and doubting (Multiple R=0.445, 
F(1,89)=22.01 Multiple R==0.350, F(1,95)=13.23, respectively; p<0.01); BDI score 
was the only significant predictor of MOCI washing (Multiple R=0.35, F(1,89)=12.56). 
No variables were significant predictors of MOCI slowness. 
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Table 4.8. PI-R total as the dependent variable: free sequence 
variables Multiple RSQ Change F ratio Std F ratio r 
in the R in RSQ at entry reg. coef at final 
equation f 
Trait 0.59 0.34 0.34 46.68 0.44 21.16 0.59 
Guilt 
BDI 0.64 0.40 0.06 29.81 0.28 8.83 0.52 
The regression analyses were repeated using the subscales of the PI-R; again the 
sequence was free, state guilt and moral standards were allowed to compete, and alpha 
was set at 0.01. BAI and trait guilt significantly predicted PI-R factor 1 (impulses) and 
factor 4 (rumination). (Impulses: BAI - Multiple R=0.48, F(1,90)=26.92; Trait Guilt 
- Multiple R=0.55, F(2,89)=19.49. Rumination: Trait guilt - Multiple R=0.54, 
F(1,96)=39.67; BAI - Multiple R=0.61, F(2,95)=28.47); Trait guilt was a significant 
predictor of PI-R factor 3 (checking) (Multiple R=0.28, F(1,90)=7.42, p<0.01). BDI 
score was the only significant predictor of PI-R factor 2 (contamination) (Multiple 
R=0.38, F(2,92)=8.12). BAI score was the only significant predictor of PI-R factor 5 
(precision/order) (Multiple R=0.32, F(1,90)=10.52). 
Obsessionals scoring in the top quartile of the MOCI checking subscale were 
labelled 'checkers' and their guilt scores were compared with those who scored in the top 
quartile of the doubting subscale and cleaning subscale. A repeated measures ANOVA was 
carried out and no significant differences were found between subgroups on any of the guilt 
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subscales (p>0.05 ). The results are shown in Table 4.9. 
Table 4.9. Comparison among checkers', 'doubters' and 'washers' on the Guilt 
Inventory 
Checkers Doubters Washers 
Trait guilt 75.0 (10.4) 73.6 (10.7) 75.8 (10.1) 
State guilt 37.3 (6.3) 36.3 (6.6) 37.7 (6.6) 
Moral standards 47.5 (10.4) 47.3 (4.5) 46.8 (6.8) 
Summary of Results 
Trait guilt significantly predicted MOCI total, checking and doubting regardless of 
whether the sequence was forced or free. Trait guilt also significantly predicted the PI-R 
total, the impulses subscale and rumination, in both types of sequence. The BDI predicted 
MOCI washing and PI-R contamination regardless of the type of sequence; in the free 
sequence it significantly predicted the MOCI and PI-R total scores. Although the BAI did 
not significantly predict any variables in the forced sequence, in the free sequence it 
significantly predicted the PI"R subscales of impulses, rumination and precision/order. 
Prediction la: An obsessional population will have more guilt (and higher moral 
standards) than a non-obsessional population. This prediction was partially fulfilled. 
Obsessionals had higher trait and state guilt than published norms, although they did not 
have higher moral standards. 
Prediction Ib Measures of guilt will be correlated with measures of obsessionality. This 
prediction was fulfilled. 
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Hypothesis 1- Guilt is associated with obsessionality - is supported with respect to trait guilt 
and state guilt, but not with respect to moral standards. 
Prediction 2. The correlations between guilt and obsessionality will be reduced by 
controlling for the effects of depression and anxiety. This prediction was fulfilled and 
Hypothesis 2- The relationship between guilt and obsessionality is affected by depression and 
anxiety - is supported. 
Prediction 3: In regression analyses, guilt, depression and anxiety will predict scores on 
measures of obsessionality. This prediction was fulfilled and Hypothesis 3- Guilt, 
depression and anxiety are significant predictors of obsessionality - is supported. 
Prediction 4: 'Checkers' and 'doubters' will score significantly more highly than 
'cleaners' on the measure of guilt. This prediction was not fulfilled and Hypothesis 4- 
'Checkers' and 'doubters' show more guilt than 'cleaners' - is not supported. However, trait 
guilt was the best predictor of the MOCI subscales of checking and doubting, and not 
washing. 
4.6.6. Discussion 
The results provide empirical support for the clinical observation that state and trait 
guilt are associated with obsessionality. Obsessionals had significantly higher state and 
trait guilt scores than published norms. However, contrary to the prediction derived from 
the cognitive-behavioural model, obsessionals did not have higher moral standards. 
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The finding that obsessionals did not have higher moral standards than published 
norms, yet felt more guilt, can be interpreted in a number of ways. Firstly, it is possible 
that the measurement of moral standards is not valid. Partial support for this comes from 
the lack of variance within the measure. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine someone strongly 
disagreeing with the statement 'I believe in a strict interpretation of right and wrong' and 
only 6 subjects (5.6%) reported that they disagreed or strongly disagreed with that 
statement. However, there was more variability amongst the other items. It is possible 
that, rather than having higher moral standards per se, obsessionals perceive themselves 
to have transgressed those standards more frequently (or more intensely) than others. 
Therefore, a cognitive intrusion in an obsessional person may be interpreted in terms of 
violating a moral standard, giving rise to feelings of guilt; the same intrusion may not be 
seen to violate the same moral standard in a non-obsessional. This suggestion is in keeping 
with the emphasis of the cognitive-behavioural model that interpretation of intrusions is 
important in obsessionals and could be tested empirically. 
The results showed a strong association between trait guilt and obsessionality that 
was maintained when the effects of depression and anxiety were partialled out. The 
association between state guilt and obsessionality was reduced once the effects of 
depression and anxiety were considered, suggesting that current feelings of guilt are 
mediated somewhat by affect. The relationship between moral standards and 
obsessionality was particularly interesting. It would appear that the association between 
high moral standards and obsessionality is masked when depression and anxiety are 
considered. This could occur in the following way: subjects who are depressed may believe 
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themselves to be worthless and even, perhaps, evil. Therefore, they would not consider 
their own moral standards to be particularly high. However, if the effect of depression or 
anxiety is removed, an association between high moral standards and obsessionality 
becomes evident. This suggested relationship is in keeping with the cognitive-behavioural 
model and may explain how thoughts are imbued with an appraisal in terms of guilt (and 
responsibility). 
The regression analyses were conducted twice, as Reynolds and Salkovksis (1991) 
had obtained different results depending on whether the regression analyses were forced 
in the same order as those found to be significant by Niler and Beck (1989) or whether the 
variables were allowed to enter into a free sequence. In both sets of analyses, trait guilt 
significantly predicted total obsessionality and contributed to the prediction of several 
subscales, notably doubting/rumination. Trait guilt also significantly predicted the score 
on the checking subscale of the MOCI. Although the measurse of the dependent variables 
(MOCI and PI-R) were different from those used by either Niler and Beck or Reynolds and 
Salkovskis, all studies were designed to determine whether guilt was a strong predictor 
of variables associated with obsessionality. Of note, state guilt and moral standards did 
not contribute significantly to the total scores of obsessionality or to any of the subscales. 
It is important to note that depression scores contributed significantly to the 
prediction of washing/contamination subscales. It would seem, therefore, that depression, 
not guilt, contributes to this one form of obsessionality. However, guilt contributes to 
rumination, checking and the overall score of obsessionality. Given that the majority of 
people with OCD experience depression and that guilt is a major part of depression, it is 
possible that people with checking behaviour develop washing behaviour after an episode 
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of depression. Similarly, it is possible that people who have washing behaviour, in 
particular, are more likely to have checking and rumination problems if guilt forms a major 
part of their depression. These suggested relationships should be explored further; they 
give rise to predictions that are easily testable within an experimental design. 
Given the findings from the regression analyses, it is not surprising that the 
hypothesis that checkers and doubters would show more guilt than 'washers' was not 
fulfilled. Since guilt forms a major part of depression, and regression analyses indicate 
that depression contributes significantly to the prediction of washing behaviour, the total 
amount of guilt experienced by all subgroups may be similar. It is suggested that it is not 
the amount of guilt per se that is important, but rather whether the guilt is depressive or 
obsessional in nature. 
Suggested differences between 'obsessional' and 'depressive' guilt are purely 
speculative. However, Berrios et al. (1992) have suggested that depressive guilt comprises 
a cognitive/attitudinal factor (e. g. being ashamed of something done, feeling as if you have 
committed a sin, feeling you must die to pay for your sins, and feeling like praying to God 
for forgiveness) and a mood/feeling factor (e. g. feeling wicked for no reason, feeling 
guilty for no reason, and feeling people know that you are a bad person). On the other 
hand, obsessional guilt is hypothesised to be associated with responsibility (Rachman, 
1993). 
The relationship between guilt and responsibility is complex. Micelli (1991) has 
suggested that in order to have guilt, it is necessary (a) to assume responsibility for the 
event, and b) to judge that event to be harmful. Unreasonable guilt could stem from 
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either unreasonably assuming responsibility (it is unreasonable to feel responsible for a 
misfortune to which one does not contribute or over which one has no control) or from 
exaggerating the harm of the event. For example, 'obsessional' guilt could be experienced 
by a person in a restaurant whose friend was rude to the waiter. Logically, one should not 
feel guilty as one had little or no contribution to the act. The person may misjudge the 
harmfulness of the consequence and imagine that the waiter is perhaps distressed. Another 
example of 'obsessional guilt' is the guilt experienced when a person borrows his/her 
boss's car and gets rear-ended. Logically, the person should not experience guilt as he/she 
could not have foreseen the event, and had no control and therefore, according to logic, 
did not have any responsibility. However , the person may experience 
'obsessional' guilt 
if he/she perceive falsely that they had control or else if they mistook hindsight for 
foresight.. There is evidence that inflated responsibility is a feature of OCD (e. g. 
Rachman, 1993; see chapter 5) and that risk appraisals are biased in obsessionals (Carr, 
1974). 
The types of guilt which are thought to characterise obsessionality and depression 
respectively overlap considerably, particularly in the area of cognitions/attitude. The 
above account speculates that guilt is a common link between obsessions and depression, 
but it is well noted that having a disorder such as OCD is depressing (Rachman and 
Hodgson, 1980; pp. 35-36. ). If having OCD led to depression, it is suggested that both 
forms of guilt should be present. If a person has multiple obsessions, including washing, 
then both forms of guilt should be present according to this account. However, if a person 
has only depression, or only checking/rumination difficulties, only one type of guilt is 
hypothesised to be present. A series of clinical studies might perhaps be designed to test 
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this proposed account of guilt in OCD and depression. 
Although the theoretical relationship between guilt, depression, morality and 
responsibility is beyond the scope of this thesis, consideration of these issues has proved 
to be particularly interesting and challenging throughout the duration of the research. 
4.7. Summary 
Guilt is one of the features of the OCD considered to be important in the cognitive- 
behavioural account of the disorder. Clinically, people with OCD are often plagued with 
guilt. However, research into this area has produced conflicting results. Therefore a large 
study to examine the nature of guilt in an obsessional population was undertaken. The 
results indicate that trait guilt is strongly associated with obsessionality, independently of 
the effect of depression and anxiety. Associations between state guilt and obsessionality 
may be mediated by depression and anxiety. Obsessionals did not have higher moral 
standards than published norms. Trait guilt was the best predictor of obsessionality 
overall, but depression was the best predictor of washing behaviour and contamination 
fears. It was suggested that there may be two types of guilt - obsessional guilt and 
depressive guilt - which are different but related. Contrary to predictions, there were no 
differences on guilt subscales among checkers, doubters and cleaners. 
4.8. Religion and Guilt 
Guilt is an implicit and explicit part of many religions, although the association 
between religiosity and guilt has rarely been explored in a systematic manner (Narramore, 
1974). In a psychometric study of normal subjects, religiosity was a significant predictor 
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of guilt (Demaria and Kassinove, 1986). Although the study described below did not 
specifically investigate the relationship between guilt and religion, the two are related, yet 
can be considered separately within the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD. 
4.9. Religion and the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD 
The cognitive-behavioural model of OCD suggests that intrusive thoughts may 
activate dysfunctional schemata and result in unpleasant automatic thoughts relating to ideas 
of being responsible for negative outcomes (Salkovskis, 1985). Dysfunctional beliefs are 
thought to be encased in schemata which have a variety of properties: content, valence, 
permeability, density and flexibility (Beck, 1991). These dysfunctional beliefs encased in the 
schemata may be formed in a vanety of ways, including learning experiences. It is stated that 
'At this stage, we can only speculate about the possible causes of the process by which 
obsessions acquire extraordinary significance for the person. The inclination to over-interpret 
the significance of our intrusive thoughts can be taught by direct instruction, moral or 
religious. Moral education may also promote elevated levels of personal responsibility' 
(Rachman, 1993; emphasis added). 
A strict religious upbringing may give rise to the belief similar to 'sin by thought, sin 
by deed', as in the quote of FC which opened this chapter. Other beliefs may be 'I will be 
punished if I have bad thoughts' or 'I will be sent to Hell if I have bad thoughts' or'Only bad 
people have bad thoughts' or'If I think something, I must want it to happen and therefore I 
am bad etc'. If a person were to hold dysfunctional schemata encasing beliefs such as these, 
a normal unwanted intrusive thought (for example, I wish my brother were dead) would, 
according to this model, interact with the dysfunctional schemata and result in a negative 
automatic thought such as 'I have sinned by having that thought', 'If my brother dies, it will 
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be my fault', I will go to Hell for thinking that thought', 'My brother will die as a punishment 
for my wicked thoughts', etc. One of the subjects who participated in research for this thesis 
stated 'I also have the thought that something awful (death mostly) will befall my husband and 
son if I do something I consider wrong' (CM). 
In summary, according to the model, a religious upbringing instils a set of beliefs and 
moral values that are likely to be activated on the occurrence of a normal unwanted intrusive 
thought. In turn, negative automatic thoughts result relating to ideas of being responsible for 
harm coming to oneself or others, perhaps in the form of divine punishment. 
4.10. The Clinical Picture of Religious Obsessions 
Religious obsessions were recorded in the earliest documentation of obsessional 
phenomena. One of the earliest descriptions stems from the 15th Century compendium on 
psychopathology and witchcraft, Malleus Maleficarum. This records that 'a certain 
Bohemian.. brought his only son, a secular priest, to Rome to be delivered because he was 
possessed-When he passed any church, and genuflected in honour of the Glorious Virgin, 
the devil made him thrust his tongue far out this mouth-when [he] tr[ied] to engage in prayer, 
[the devil] attack[ed him] more violently' (Kramer and Sprenger, 1951). Today, the themes 
of an obsessional problem can be remarkably similar, as illustrated by one of the subjects in 
the current study: 'Since 19 years of age I have thought about the word Devil: I do not hear 
voices, nor do I believe 1 am the devil or anyone else is the devil. Associated with this word, 
I also get or experience a range of negative automatic thoughts. Associated with such 
thoughts are feelings of anxiety and depression' (W). 
The theme of the devil is only one type of obsession related to religion. Another 
theme related to religion is that of 'scrupulosity'. This term is derived from the Latin 
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'scrupus', whose diminutive form, 'scrupulus' means a small sharp stone. Conceptually, a 
minute weight could tip the scales of a sensitive balance, such as the scales of conscience 
(Palazzioi, 1962). Early descriptions of scruples preceded the psychiatric definition of 
obsessions by two hundred years. In the 17th century, scrupulosity was considered to include 
both religious overconcern and a general indecisiveness (Hunter and MacAlpine, 1963). 
'Scrupulosity' is often incorrectly used interchangeably with the term 'religious obsessions' (for 
example on the Yale Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale; Goodman et, al., 1989a). In fact, 
scrupulosity refers to an excess concern with the moral code of the religion, and difficulty in 
deciding between what is right and what is wrong. Scrupulosity can therefore be differentiated 
from concerns about blasphemy and being sacrilegious. 
Janet (1903) first classified scrupulosity as a psychiatric rather than a religious state, 
placing it in his overinclusive category of psychasthenia. Today, scrupulosity is'diagnosed' 
when there is excessive observance of religious or moral teachings to a degree that a) far 
exceeds the expected practice of the individual's moral or religious reference group and b) is 
very difficult to actually accomplish, thus becoming a source of great distress to the person 
and the person's social network (Greenberg, 1984). A good example of the sort of 
scrupulosity that is found in an obsessional population is provided by the concern of one of 
the cases seen in the study (DL). DL was plagued by whether he had been immoral by 
'stealing' some paper towels from the office where he worked as a volunteer. His primary 
concern was that he had done something 'wrong', was a bad person and therefore would be 
punished by God for his sins. 
Other types of religious obsessions include Blasphemous concerns which usually 
occur in people for whom religion is important. For example, James (1942) observed that 'the 
lives of the saints are full of such blasphemous obsessions, ascribed invariably to the direct 
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agency of Satan' (p. 167). Blasphemous obsessions include the fear of blurting out 'God does 
not exist' in Church for example, or thinking the thought that God does not exist. Compulsive 
behaviours may include covert neutralising as in one of the cases in the study (CM? ). 
Whenever she had the intrusive thought that 'God does not exist' she would feel compelled 
to think and image the sentence that 'God DOES exist' clearly, three times. Similar to people 
with scrupulosity, she feared that she would be punished for doubting the existence of God 
(even though she did not rationally doubt His existence) and would therefore go to Hell for 
eternity. Intrusive blasphemous images are also described by patients who, for example, may 
experience the image of having a sexual relationship with Jesus. This causes a considerable 
amount of distress and concern, often regardless of the degree of religious observance 
practised by the patient. Religious images may also be used as a means of neutralising the 
responsibility appraisal of the intrusive thoughts, for example 'The thought is that something 
awful is going to happen, not to me, but to my family... what I do now when I get this thought 
is to imagine certain things. It is a very fixed sequence. I have to visualize pictures of my 
wife, my parents - who are both dead now - then pictures of the Virgin Mary and Jesus 
Christ... When I imagine pictures of the Virgin Mary and Jesus Christ, they have to have little 
golden-yellow lights around them' (de Silva and Rachman, 1992, p. 37). Another example is 
provided by one of the subjects who participated in research for this thesis. 'I find myself 
unable to relax or concentrate for very long without having really bad thoughts come into my 
mind. When they come I feel a compulsion to pray to God for forgiveness and once I start 
praying ... 
if I feel that I haven't done it correctly, I have to start all over again' (P. L). 
4.11. A literature review of religion and OCD 
Freud (1907) was perhaps amongst the first to comment on the parallels between 
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religious ceremony and obsessional rituals (C. Lewis, 1994). Freud considered religion and 
obsessions to have the same function, namely that of controlling instincts and impulses, 
reducing anxiety associated with apparent moral transgressions and warding off potential 
disasters. Aubrey Lewis (1936) was 'impressed by the frequency with which filth, harm, sex 
or religion give the content to the obsessional idea' (p. 326, emphasis added). In more 
systematic investigations, it has been found that between 5% and 16% of obsessions have a 
religious theme (Dowson, 1977; Akhtar et al., 1975; Rachman and Hodgson, 1980; Steketee 
et al., 1991). In Egypt, a recent study found that 60% of their obsessional sample had religious 
obsessions (Okasha et al., 1994). 
Superficially, compulsions appear to closely resemble religious rituals, for example in 
the Jewish religion, after prayer, hands should be washed in a specified particular manner 
before eating. Fear of contamination is echoed in the dietary laws' avoidance of non kosher 
food and separation of milk and meat. Jewish law dictates that all rituals should be performed 
precisely and correctly, concerns which are manifest in the performance of obsessional rituals. 
Greenberg (1984) suggested that religious rituals and compulsions could be differentiated on 
the basis that: - 
0 religious rites are not resisted. 
0 religious rites are not. ego-dystonic. 
0 religious rites do not interfere with social, work or role functioning. 
0 religious obsessions are restricted to particular topics and do not reflect excessive 
concern in all areas of religious practice. 
By contrast, obsessions are: - 
0 personal 






In his analysis, Greenberg suggested that it was the individual's personality that was 
a determining factor in becoming religious and that certain religious rituals were 'particularly 
suitable for the development of obsessive fears' (p. 530). In his study, half of the obsessional 
patients at a psychiatric clinic in an orthodox area of Jerusalem reported experiencing 
obsessional problems relating to their religion at some time in their lives. The onset of their 
obsessional difficulties was often related to an increase in religious commitment. One of the 
important distinctions drawn by Greenberg and echoed in a phenomenological analysis of two 
cases, is that obsessional symptoms often exaggerate a particular part of a religious ritual at 
the expense of other areas of religious practice (Hoffnung et al., 1989). One of Greenberg's 
religious patients was successfully treated with exposure and response prevention, whilst 
ensuring that the religious laws were not contravened (Greenberg, 1987). General difficulties 
with treating religious patients have been noted elsewhere (Greenberg, 1991). 
A review of the literature concluded that the evidence for religious factors in the 
aetiology of OCD was ambiguous and that methodology must be improved before any firm 
findings can be drawn (Fitz, 1990). The need for the multidimensional nature of religion to 
be considered was emphasized. A review of the same literature led to the conclusion that 
religion was a medium that 'partly determines how, although not necessary whether, 
[obsessional] symptoms are expressed' (Steketee et al., 1991, p. 360; original emphasis). 
These authors conducted a good methodological investigation of religion, guilt and 
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obsessionality, and a relationship was found between the degree of religiosity (a self-report 
measure on a4 point scale) and OCD symptoms (Steketee et al. 1991). 'Religiosity' can be 
defined as 'the degree to which a person believes in and practices his or her religion' (Demaria 
and Kassinove, 1988). A relationship was found between religiosity and guilt, but contrary 
to expectations, OCD patients were not more religious than patients with other anxiety 
disorders. This study did not find particular religious faiths such as Catholicism and Judaism 
to be more associated with obsessionality than other religions, although these religions are 
often selected for special consideration (Suess and Halpern, 1989). 
During the course of this thesis, a study was reported comparing religious factors in 
patients with OCD (n=86), panic disorder (n=73) and non-anxiety psychiatric disorders 
(n=292) (Higgins, Pollard and Merkel, 1992). Four religious factors were assessed by 
questionnaire (the rating of which is not described). These factors were the patients' religion 
of origin, whether they perceived their parents as religious, whether they were currently 
involved in organized religious activities, and whether they were currently experiencing 
religious conflict or doubt. Of these factors, the results indicated that only the 'religious 
conflict' factor was more closely associated with OCD than with other psychiatric conditions. 
The authors did not consider their findings within the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD, 
but it is possible that the conflict was between the types of intrusive thoughts experienced by 
the patients, and the patients' religious and moral beliefs concerning the morality of having 
blasphemous, sexual and violent cognitions. The authors concluded that 'A better 
understanding of the complex relationship between obsessions, compulsions, and a variety of 
factors related to religious background, practice and beliefs will not be gained without a great 
deal more research' (p. 84). 
Recently, an association was found between religiosity (as measured by the'Francis 
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Scale of Attitudes Toward Christianity; Francis and Stubbs, 1987) and obsessional traits, but 
not between religiosity and obsessional symptoms (as measured by the Sandler-Hazari 
Obsessionality Inventory; Sander and Hazari, 1960) (Lewis, 1994). This study was 
conducted on a student sample, and it was suggested that'a more accurate examination of this 
issue may be through the use of a sample for whom religion has some special salience', such 
as the 'obsessional neurotic' (p. 192, Lewis, 1994). 
Scrupulosity and other religious obsessions are amenable to the same treatment 
methods as other obsessional complaints. Behaviour therapy, fluoextine and clomipramine 
are all effective treatments of the disorder (Greenberg, 1987; Fallon et al., 1990; Suess and 
Halpern, 1989). However, special considerations are needed when undertaking behaviour 
therapy with religious patients (Greenberg and Witzuni, 1991). 
4.12. A study of religion, morality and obsessionality 
4.12.1 Background 
Religious obsessions concerning blasphemy and scrupulosity may occur in 
approximately 10% of patients (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980; Fallon et al., 1990). Despite 
the well documented clinical phenomenon, little systematic research has been conducted 
examining the nature of religious beliefs and how they relate to morality, guilt and obsessional 
behaviour. One study investigating religion in OCD patients measured 'religiosity' by asking 
subjects : how religious they considered themselves to be on a four point scale and no 
psychometric data were available (Steketee et al. 1991). A second study on OCD patients 
identified 'religious conflict' to be associated with obsessional symptoms (Higgins et al., 1992) 
but no data were obtained to specify the nature of such a conflict. 
As in eating disorders, a number of relationships might be proposed linking religion 
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and OCD, some of which are contradictory (Joughin et al., 1992). It may be that the clear 
moral guidelines of the religion help protect against the development of a disorder in which 
the assuming of responsibility and control is so central. Alternatively, it may be that an 
inability to adhere to strict guidelines that are easily transgressed leads to feelings of guilt and 
depression. This may lower resistance to normal intrusions which then become difficult to 
dismiss, more aversive and so on. Perhaps the most simple relationship would be that 
religious beliefs such as 'sin by thought, sin by deed' are encased in dysfunctional schemata 
and interact with normal intrusive thoughts resulting in an appraisal in terms of responsibility 
(Salkovskis, 1985). However, little systematic data have been collected on the relationship 
between the extent of religiousness, moral values and obsessional symptoms. The present 
study was intended to address some of these issues in an examination of the possible 
relationship between obsessional symptoms and religion. 
4.12.2. Aims 
The aim of the present study was to determine the perceived relationship between 
religious beliefs, morality and obsessional variables. 
4.12.3. Hypotheses and Predictions 
Hypothesis 1 
Religious people are more obsessional than non-religious people. 
Prediction 1 
Subjects who report religious faith/beliefs will have higher scores on measures of 
obsessionality than subjects who do not report religious faith/belief. 
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Hypothesis 2 
Religious variables are associated with clinical variables 
Prediction 2 
Within the group who report having a religion, religious variables will be correlated 
with measures of obsessionality. 
4.12.4. Method 
Subjects 
Subjects were recruited in the same manner described in earlier studies. 
Approximately 200 sets of questionnaires were sent out. 118 usable replies (59%) were 
received (i. e. the majority of all three questionnaires were completed). The mean age of 
the sample was 36.03 years (sd=11.16; age range 17-70). 82.2% of the sample were 
female (n=97). 
Measures 
Religion and Obsessions Questionnaire (ROQ). This questionnaire was based on that of 
(Joughlin et al.; 1992) .', designed to assess the perceived relationship between eating 
disorders and religion. The questionnaire asks patients their religion and the religion of 
their parents. A visual analogue scale (0 to 100) is used to assess the importance of 
religious beliefs, the strength of religious beliefs as a child, the importance of religion to 
the subject's parents, the impact of obsessions/compulsions on religious beliefs, whether 
the subject's religion offers a clear set of moral guidelines and whether obsessional 
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difficulties have conflicted with the subject's religious code. 
Padua Inventory - Revised: (PI-R; Sanavio, 1988; van Oppen, 1995a). See above. 
Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory: (MOCI; Hodgson and Rachman, 1977). 
See above. 
4.12.5. Results 
The mean MOCI total score of the sample was 16.90 (sd=4.56); the mean PI-R 
total was 70.88 (11.16). Sixty eight percent of the sample said that they had a religion 
(n=80), 32% (n=38) said that they did not. Of those who reported a religion, 56.3% 
(n=49) were Anglican, 17.5% (n=14) Roman Catholic, 18.8% (n=15) belonged to other 
religions (eg Jehovah's Witness, Buddhist, and Greek Orthodox), and 6 subjects did not 
specify a particular affiliation. Within the entire sample, subjects reported 60% of their 
fathers and 73% of their mothers, as having religions. 
For most of the analyses, the sample has been divided into those who said they had 
no religion (n=38) and those who said that they had a religion (n=80). There were too 
few subjects in religions other than Anglican to warrant analyses according to the type of 
religion specified. 
Prediction 1 
Independent t-tests were conducted to compare clinical variables between subjects 
who said they had no religion with subjects who said they had a religion (Table 4.10 ). 
Subjects who reported having a religion scored significantly more highly on the MOCI 
subscale of doubting (t= 2.07, p<0.05) and the Padua subscale of rumination, (t=2.12, 
112 
p <0.05). The data were further analysed to examine whether there were differences in 
MOCI or Padua data between those subjects reporting their parents as having a religion and 
those who did not. No significant differences were found on any of the clinical variables 
(p>0.05). 
Table 4.10. Clinical variables for those with a religion and those with no religion. 




MOCI wash 4.0 (3.2) 4.3 (3.0) 
MOCI checking 6.2 (1.5) 6.1 (1.9) 
MOCI slowness 2.9 (1.7) 2.8 (1.6) 
MOCI doubting 4.9 (1.4) 5.39 (1.2)* 
PADUA impulses 6.3 (6.7) 6.8 (6.1) 
PADUA contamination 14.6 (12.3) 15.8 (12.9) 
PADUA checking 16.2 (8.2) 15.3 (7.8) 
PADUA rumination 22.5 (10.9) 26.8 (9.8)* 
PADUA precision/order 8.58 (7.14) 9.42 (7.1) 
MOCI total 16.58 (5.3) 17.07 (4.2) 
PADUA total 65.46 (29.7) 73.48 (27.7) 
*p<0.05 
Prediction 2 
As in the study of Joughlin et al. (1992)., the validity of the 
113 
weakening/strengthening question from the ROQ (Q2) was examined by correlating this 
item with a new variable derived by a subtraction of strength of religious belief as a child 
(Q5) from the present importance of religious belief (Q1). Some validation was shown by 
a correlation coefficient of 0.39, p <0.001. Two other variables were derived by 
separately subtracting the importance of the parents' religion from that of the subjects' : 
Relative Importance of Religion Subject/Father' (Q1-Q6) and 'Relative Importance of 
Religion Subject/Mother' (Q1-Q7). A correlation matrix is presented for correlations 
between clinical and religious variables, including these two derived variables (Table 4.11) 
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Table 4.11. For Ss who have a religion: Product-moment Correlations between 
clinical and religious variables 
n-80 MOCI 
wash check slowness doubting TOTAL 
Importance of . 06 -. 09 -09 -. 
05 -. 01 
religion 
Effect of OC . 13 -. 03 . 02 -. 
04 . 05 
problems on religion 
Moral guidelines . 04 -. 01 -. 16 . 
07 . 03 
from religion 
Conflict of OC . 25* . 18 -. 
03 . 
04 . 31* 
problem with moral 
guidelines 
Strength of religion -. 29* -. 16 -. 03 . 
07 -. 32* 
as a child 




Importance of -. 09 . 




Parent's religion -. 11 -. 08 -. 11 -. 01 -. 17 
provide moral 
guidelines for family 
Strength of religion . 21 -. 05 -. 12 -. 
08 . 01 
relative to father 
Strength of religion . 14 -. 09 -. 07 -. 
02 . 04 
relative to mother 
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Table 4.12. For Ss who have a religion: Product-moment Correlations between 
clinical and religious variables 
n-80 PADUA -R 
Impulses Washing Checking Rumination Precision TOTAL 
(F1) (F2) (F3) (F4) /Order 
(FS) 
Importance of religion -. 02 . 
07 -. 27* . 
04 . 09 -. 
01 
Effect of OC problems . 06 . 06 -. 07 . 18 . 
08 . 06 
on religion 
Moral guidelines from . 07 . 05 -. 15 . 10 . 
03 . 03 
religion 
Conflict of OC . 30** . 18 . 19 . 
32** . 27* . 
41 
problem with moral 
guidelines 
Strength of religion as -. 07 -. 06 0.08 -. 16 -. 14 -. 05 
a child 
Importance of father's -. 19 -. 13 . 12 -. 10 -. 
24 -. 16 
religious beliefs 




Parent's religion -. 02 -. 01 0.03 -0.05 -. 30 -. 05 
provide moral 
guidelines for family 
Strength of religion . 12 . 17 -. 28* . 
10 . 23 . 
12 
relative to father 
Strength of religion -. 01 . 08 -. 19 . 01 . 
15 . 14 




Prediction 1 was not fulfilled. There were no differences on obsessional variables 
between subjects with a religion and those without with the exception of 
doubting/rumination 
. There was no support 
for the hypothesis that religious people are 
generally more obsessional than non-religious people. Prediction 2 was partially fulfilled, 
in that there was a consistent association between the obsessional variables and the extent 
to which having obsessional problems conflicted with the moral code of the religion. 
There was therefore partial support for the hypothesis that religious variables are associated 
with clinical variables. 
4.12.6. Discussion 
The results showed a significant positive relationship between the extent to which 
subjects felt that their obsessive-compulsive problem had conflicted with the moral 
guidelines and code of conduct of their religion, and the extent of the obsessional problem 
as measured by the MOCI and the PI-R. Although there were other significant 
associations between variables, there was no other consistent relationship found between 
the religious variabls and the obsessional variables when measured by both the MOCI and 
PI-R. These relationships are therefore not considered robust and will not be discussed 
further. 
The results of this study can be compared to the study investigating religious beliefs 
in patients with eating disorders (Joughlin et al. 1992). Although the number of subjects 
is smaller in the current study, subjects in both studies were in the community and self- 
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selected in choosing to reply to requests for research volunteers. Unlike the study 
investigating religion in patients with eating disorders, subjects in this sample who had a 
religion were not, overall, more severely than subjects who had a religion. However, in 
both studies, the term 'have a religion' may be ambiguous, as many people who describe 
themselves as 'having a religion' say so because they have parents that were of a particular 
denomination. They may not have had any religious practices or beliefs themselves, and 
this is one of the major disadvantages of conducting a self-report questionnaire study as 
opposed to interviewing participants. 
There was also no significant relationship between the importance of religious 
beliefs and extent of obsessionality, or between the importance of religious beliefs and the 
effect of having obsessional problems on the subjects' religion. One possible reason for 
this discrepancy is merely statistical: correlations between the variables are often of a 
similar magnitude in both samples, but are only statistically significant in the study of 
subjects with eating disorders owing to the large sample size. 
It is interesting that, although there was no association between the extent to which 
religion offered moral guidance and the extent of obsessionality (or eating disorders), 
nevertheless in both studies there was an association between the conflict of the problem 
with the moral guidelines of the religion and the extent of the problem. This finding 
extends that of Higgins et al. (1992, who found that 'religious conflict' characterised 
obsessional patients more than other psychiatric patients. 
The notable finding of this study is therefore the strong association between 
obsessionality and the conflict of the obsessional problem with the moral guidelines of the 
religion. This finding can be considered within the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD 
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(Salkvoskis, 1985). According to the model, the interpretation of intrusions in such a way 
that they are accorded special significance in terms of appraisals of responsibility is the key 
to intrusions becoming aversive, avoided and repetitive (Salkovsksis, 1989). It is only 
when occurrence and content of the intrusions are appraised as having violated a moral 
code (regardless of the extent or nature of the moral code) that the intrusions will be 
appraised in terms of responsibility and acquire obsessional properties. People may 
interpret the violation of the moral code as evidence that they are blasphemous or evil, and 
are likely to be punished (in the form of harm befalling loved ones) unless restitution is 
made. For example, one may have the intrusion that 'God does not exist'; the appraisal 
may be 'I am a sinner and I will be punished for having that thought unless I say 'God 
does exist three times'. The same intrusive thought in a person who did not believe that 
it was a sin to doubt God's existence, would not lead to the same urge for restitution. 
The study did not distinguish between thoughts which may conflict with the moral 
guidelines of the religion, and compulsive behaviours such as checking, which may 
perhaps conflict with the moral code of the religion. Future studies should try to separate 
out the precise nature of the conflict and the type of violations perceived. 
Rachman and Hodgson (1980) suggested that people with obsessional difficulties 
were of 'tender conscience' (p. 252), as described by Jeremy Taylor (1660) and quoted in 
Hunter and Macalpine, 1963, p. 163-164), in that 'They repent when they have not sinned, 
and accuse themselves without form or matter'. The results suggest that, for someone with 
an obsessional problem, the degree of objective morality or religion is unimportant; rather 
it is perception of the violation of morality with the occurrence of intrusive thoughts, that 
may serve to both precipitate and maintain an obsessional disorder. 
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The relationship between morality, religion and obsessional problems warrants 
further research. It would be fruitful to examine the relationship between the religious 
variables outlined in this study and the type of obsessional intrusions (religious vs non- 
religious), as opposed to the severity of the problem. It is possible that subjects who 
experience the greatest the conflict of the obsessional problem with the moral guidelines 
of the religion are more likely to experience religious obsessions as opposed to other types 
of obsessions. Future research should, if possible, use interviews as opposed to self-report 
measures in order to identify the meaning of the religion for individual. The sort of 
conflict between the moral code of the religion and the obsessional difficulties could be 
explored further in order to specify both the nature of the conflict and the interpretation 
of a perceived violation of the moral code for the individual. 
4.13. Summary of the relationship between religion and OCD 
Religious obsessions can be considered within the framework of the cognitive- 
behavioural model, as strict religious or moral upbringing may result in dysfunctional 
schemata which interact with intrusive thoughts to produce an appraisal in terms of 
personal responsibility. This study has produced the first quantitative analysis of the 
association between religious and obsessional variables. Obsessional complaints often have 
a religious theme, as evidenced by clinical descriptions and epidemiological studies. 
Relatively few empirical investigations have been conducted examining the relationship 
between obsessionality and religiosity. The results from a questionnaire study are 
reported. Subjects who reported having a religion did not score more highly overall on 
measures of obsessionality. However, an association was identified between obsessional 
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complaints and the conflict of the obsessional problem with the moral guidelines of the 
religion. Further research investigating this conflict in more depth is suggested. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Perceived responsibility and OCD 
'I think that if I don't do my rituals then something terrible will happen and it will be my 
fault' (AB). 
'I think things have got the way they are due to me having my own responsibilities and 
making sure no harm comes to my children. In my mind, dog mess is dangerous and 1 am 
afraid of it, so 1 have to make sure it does not get near my children' (J. Lo). 
5.1. Introduction 
In the previous chapters, the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD was described, and 
a study was reported exploring the type of anxiety that may characterise the disorder. Studies 
on religion and guilt were also described. The appraisal of intrusive thoughts in terms of 
responsibility is the crux of the cognitive element of the cognitive-behavioural model. 
Throughout this chapter and thesis, the term 'responsibility' refers to subjective, perceived 
responsibility as opposed to real, objective responsibility. This chapter briefly reviews the 
relevant aspects of the cognitive-behavioural model in terms of responsibility appraisals. The 
relevance of data on responsibility to the 'heterogeneity' hypothesis is commented upon. 
Evidence relating to the importance of perceived responsibility in OCD is reviewed from 
clinical observations, psychometric data, studies in which responsibility has been manipulated 
and treatment. Three studies investigating perceived responsibility and OCD are then 
reported. The first concerns the use of an instrument to assess responsibility and its 
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relationship to obsessionality (and guilt) in an obsessional population. The second describes 
the development of a questionnaire to measure responsibility and relates responsibility to 
obsessionality (and guilt) in a normal population. The final study reports on a manipulation 
of responsibility and the effects of the manipulation on obsessional symptoms. 
5.2. Responsibility and the Cognitive-Behavioural Model 
According to the cognitive part of the cognitive-behavioural model, perceived 
responsibility is central to OCD (see chapter 2). In the most recent elaboration of the 
model (: , Salkovskis (1995), the fundamental difference between the intrusive thoughts that 
occur normally and those which beseige the OCD patient is still considered to be 'the way 
in which obsessional patients interpret intrusions as an indication that they may be 
responsible for harm or its prevention... intrusive thoughts, impulses, images and doubts 
are normal, but only people who have an enduring tendency to misinterpret their own 
mental activity as indicating personal 'responsibility' will experience the pattern of 
discomfort and neutralising characteristic of OCD' (original emphasis, Salkovskis, 1995). 
It is the misinterpretation of the intrusive thought that is considered to be critical. Once 
misinterpreted, discomfort ensues and behaviours designed to alleviate the discomfort serve 
to reinforce the frequency of intrusions: 'The distorted sense of responsibility which the 
sufferer attaches to his or her activities.. leads them ... a pattern of mental effort 
characterised by both overcontrnl and pre-occupation. ' (Salkovskis, 1995). This hypothesis 
gives rise to a number of propositions, one of which was that 'appraisal of responsibility and 
consequent neutralising can arise ... 
from an increase in the level of perceived personal 
responsibility' (proposition number 6, p. 678, Salkovskis, 1985). 
The recent paper includes a definition of the appraisals of 'responsibility' made by 
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obsessional as 'The belief that one has power which is pivotal to bring about or prevent 
subjectively crucial negative outcomes' (Salkovskis, Rachman, Ladouceur and Freeston, 
1992). Neutralising is re-defined in this paper as 'voluntarily initiated activity which is 
intended to have the effect of reducing the perceived responsibility'. It also serves to 
reduce anxiety which may result from reducing the perceived responsibility, but may also 
be independent of it. Intrusions are considered to be appraised on two dimensions - the 
occurrence and content - in terms of having implications for responsibility. Appraisal links 
the intrusive thought with both distress and the occurrence of neutralising behaviour. It 
is suggested that, if the appraisal solely concerns harm or danger without an element of 
responsibility, then the effect is more likely to be anxiety or depression as opposed to 
obsessional problems. 
5.3. Responsibility and the Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
Although perceived responsibility is a fundamental part of the cognitive-behavioural 
model, it is not considered to be important by neurological theorists, who consider the 
disorder to be a brain hiccup' (Forster, 1994). In testing the heterogeneity hypothesis outlined 
in the introduction and specified in chapter 9, it is plausible to suggest that if the disorder is 
heterogeneous, one sub-group will have difficulties which include excessive perceived 
responsibility, and the other will not. Data generated in the second study described were used 
to test the heterogeneity hypothesis, details of which can be found in chapter 9. 
5.4. Evidence for the importance of perceived responsibility in OCD 
A wide variety of evidence supports the hypothesis that perceived responsibility is 
associated with OCD. Evidence that will be reviewed includes clinical observation, 
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psychometric assessments and a study in which responsibility was manipulated. 
5.4.1 Clinical evidence for the importance of perceived responsibility in OCD 
Although Salkovskis (1985) is often credited with drawing attention to the importance 
of perceived responsibility in OCD, it is acknowledged that he drew upon documented clinical 
observations in order to formulate the model. It must also be remembered that evidence used 
to formulate a model cannot then be cited as support resulting from testing a prediction made 
by the model. One of the earliest papers noted that checking behaviour occurred most when 
patients were alone and was less intense when responsibility is diminished' (Rachman, 1976b, 
p. 273-4). The significance of responsibility was discussed in terms of criticism and guilt, but 
a full cognitive model was not formulated. Case descriptions have been given, exemplifying 
the theoretical propositions (Salkovskis, 1985). The first case feared that she would be 
contaminated by substances and that it would all be her fault because she had not done enough 
to prevent such an occurrence. A second case feared that he was responsible for something 
that might result in a terrible disgrace. A further two cases have been described in which a 
single learning experience was suggested to explain obsessions, exaggerated perceived 
responsibility and guilt (Tallis, 1993). 
Some of the subjects who participated in research for this thesis reported ideas of 
excessive perceived responsibility for negative outcomes. Some examples are given below: - 
'As is quite common, I am a checker of cookers, taps, switches etc. 1 also have a 
daily household routine of cleaning and checking that I HAVE to do EVERY day. 
But probably the worst 'thing' is that I have intrusive, unwanted thoughts that I will 
write 'bad' things, i. e. things that are not true or verging on the truth but extremely 
125 
exaggerated, that will cause a lot of trouble. disaster or heartache if read and 
believed by certain people' (JW, emphasis added). 
'I get thoughts in my head that if I don't do these things I'll get spots and also I think 
something terrible will happen to my daughter and me' (J. Ly). 
5.4.2. Psychometric Studies 
A questionnaire designed to measure responsibility in a clinical and non-clinical 
population has been developed by the Oxford Group ('The R-scale'; Salkovskis, Gledhill and 
Reynolds, 1993). The questionnaire comprises mainly self-referent items (except for two) and 
aims to assess responsibility for harm. Preliminary findings show that OCD patients perceive 
themselves to be responsible for negative events significantly more than matched controls. 
Questionnaire items include I often feel responsible for things that go wrong', 'I must protect 
others from harm' and 'I often take responsibility for things which other people don't think are 
my fault'. However, it may be that people with generalised anxiety disorder and depression 
also score highly on this instrument and further investigation of its specificity is required 
(Salkovskis, 1995; personal communication). 
The relationship between exaggerated perceived responsibility and the nature of 
intrusions has been studied in a series of questionnaires developed by the Quebec group and 
administered to non-clinical populations. Questionnaires have been developed such as the 
Cognitive Intrusions Questionnaire (CIQ), and the Inventory of Beliefs Related to Obsessions 
(IBRO; Freeston et al., 1992a, 1992b; Freeston et al., 1993). The CIQ elicits reports of 
intrusive thoughts, images or impulses over the past month in a variety of obsessional content 
areas. The most common intrusions are then rated according to different constructs, including 
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frequency and associated guilt and responsibility. The 'evaluation' factor (comprising 
responsibility, disapproval and guilt) was the only significant predictor of compulsive activity 
and was strongly associated with avoidance. Therefore, as predicted by Salkovskis's model, 
'responses to intrusive thoughts are a key variable in the experience of cognitive intrusions'. 
The IBRO comprises three factors: the first is concerned with responsibility and guilt, the 
second with overestimation of threat and the third is intolerance of uncertainty. The 
questionnaire was developed on a normal sample but showed criterion related validity as it 
discriminated between a small group of obsessionals and a matched normal control group. 
The Quebec group has recently developed a semi-idiographic 'Responsibility 
Questionnaire' to test the validity of the theoretical definition of'responsibility' (Rheume et al., 
1995) and has found a significant relationship between responsibility and obsessive- 
compulsive symptoms, thought suppression, irrational beliefs and obsessional thoughts. The 
authors concluded that the results 'provide additional empirical support to the proposed 
connection between responsibility and the development and maintenance of obsessive- 
compulsive behaviour'. 
This conclusion, however, is not justifiable as it not possible to determine direction of 
causality from questionnaires and correlational analysis. Only an empirical design with a 
specific intervention, such as that described below, elucidates causal connections. There are 
also problems with the nature of the questionnaires. The 'R-scale' confounds items of 
responsibility about harm with general beliefs about harm such as 'Inactivity can cause as 
much harm as deliberate bad intentions', 'Once I have caused harm, I cannot forgive myself 
and 'I should never cause even the slightest harm to others'. Items concerning the moral 
evaluation of cognitions are also included in the questionnaire e. g. 'If I think bad things, this 
is as bad as doing bad things' (see chapter 6), even though they are not concerned directly 
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with responsibility for harm. 
In summary, the CIQ has not established criterion validity and is not a specific measure 
of responsibility, although the rating of an idiosyncratic intrusion is more meaningful than 
rating intrusions that may not have any personal relevance. The IBRO has much potential use 
but at present the translation from French to English has not been well made and questions 
remain confusing for many to complete, particularly the item 'Uncertainty should not disturb'. 
Although the semi-idiographic 'Responsibility Questionnaire' has the advantage that 
it is meaningful to the individual concerned, it has contaminated the items about responsibility 
with OCD itself. The questionnaire therefore does not test the model as all the situations 
present were obsessional in content. The theory suggests that responsibility is heightened in 
general and not that people with OCD feel more responsibility than non-obsessionals in 
specific obsessional situations, such as checking the stove . 
To state that people with OCD 
feel more responsible for making sure that the house is locked/germ-free would be purely 
descriptive and not advance our understanding of the disorder. For example, asking 
individuals to rate how responsible they feel in the obsessional situation of checking the door 
confounds responsibility and the disorder. 
In summary, at the time of the current study, therefore, there were indications from 
questionnaires to support Salkovskis's model, but no adequate assessment instrument had 
been devised. 
5.4.3. Manipulation Studies 
At least two previous studies have manipulated perceived responsibility. In the first 
(Gledhill, 1992), responsibility was manipulated in two tasks of low personal relevance which 
involved making decisions about the shape of beads. Responsibility was increased by 
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informing 11 OCD and 13 non-clinical subjects that 'the implications of this research are 
potentially very important and far-reaching. For example, it may be used to advise drug 
companies on the way they design pills for blind people, who rely mainly on shape to know 
what type of pill they are taking. Subjects were asked to rate how responsible they felt for the 
task, however, it was not possible to test the effectiveness of the manipulation as no base-line 
measure of responsibility was taken. The responsibility manipulation in this study did not 
influence state anxiety, accuracy in tasks or time needed to make a decision. However, this 
may be attributable to a failure to increase responsibility for the task. Since the study was 
conducted with the experimenter in a white coat (to increase the face validity of the 
manipulation), it may be that the subjects perceived that the responsibility would primarily be 
that of the 'doctor' or experimenter. 
Secondly, Lopatka and Rachman (1995) have carried out a successful responsibility 
manipulation in a community of 18 male and 12 female checkers who reached diagnostic 
criteria for OCD according to the Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule-Revised (ADIS-R; 
DiNardo et al., 1985). These subjects had been selected from 221 individuals who had 
responded to advertisements as fulfilling both the diagnostic criteria and the criterion that the 
urge to check could be elicited in the presence of the experimenter. The experiment was only 
conducted with subjects with checking compulsions, as pilot work indicated that 
responsibility could not be manipulated satisfactorily in subjects with cleaning compulsions. " 
The manipulation involved two experimenters travelling to the subject's home for a 
detailed interview. After the DSM III -R criteria for OCD had been met, subjects gave a 
detailed description of their obsessions and compulsions. Particular attention was paid to the 
consequences of their obsessions. For example, when the obsessional thoughts and behaviour 
concerned a fear of burglary with resultant checking of locks and doors, descriptions of the 
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potential burglary were elicited and specific details obtained. 
In the light of this knowledge of the individual difficulties, the therapist asked subjects 
to describe three different situations in which they would normally feel compelled to carry out 
checking behaviours. The experimenter and the subject worked together to negotiate the three 
situations in which the subject would experience discomfort of at least 70 on a 100 point scale 
and a perceived responsibility for the negative event of 50 on the same 100 point scale. 
The experiment had a within-subjects design and each subject was put into the 
following conditions in a counterbalanced order: high responsibility, low responsibility and 
a control condition in which responsibility was not manipulated. 
In the low responsibility condition, subjects were asked to hand over responsibility to 
the experimenter, who would assume full responsibility for the consequences of not carrying 
out the checking behaviour. The experimenter and subject signed a written contract which was 
also signed by a witness and read aloud to the subject. The subject was instructed to expose 
himself/herself to the feared situation (e. g. leaving the house without checking the locks) and 
to refrain from checking. After the subject had undergone exposure but was prevented from 
carrying out the response, the second experimenter, blind to the condition, asked the subject 
to rate on a 100 point scale his anxiety/discomfort levels, urge to check, fear of criticism, 
control, likelihood of the feared consequence and likelihood of panic. To determine the 
efficacy of the responsibility manipulation, the subjects were also asked how responsible they 
would feel if their feared consequence occurred. 
The same procedure was conducted in the high responsibility condition except that 
participants were instructed that they were to take full responsibility for the consequences of 
their actions (or inactivity, i. e. not checking). In the control condition, no instructions were 
given about responsibility for the outcome. 
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In summary the manipulation of responsibility was successful. In the control condition, 
the mean responsibility level was 59/100 points, in the high responsibility condition it was 
90/100 points and in the low responsibility condition it was 16/100 points. Furthermore, when 
responsibility was high, the urge to check and the discomfort experienced were high, but in 
the low responsibility condition, the urge to check and discomfort experienced were reduced. 
Interestingly, a series of cognitive biases emerged including the control bias in which subjects 
felt responsible for events over which they rationally had little or no control, and the 
probability bias in which they predicted that negative events were more likely if and when they 
felt responsible for the events. 
This experiment was the first of its kind and raised important questions: can the same 
findings be obtained using different methods of manipulation? Is the importance of 
responsibility confined to producing checking behaviour or will it also prove important in 
those with cleaning compulsions? Are the cognitive biases the same in subjects with different 
phenomenology? The present experiment described below, was designed to address these 
issues. 
5.4.4. Treatment 
Cognitive-behaviour therapy specifically targeting appraisals of responsibility 
was not found to be more effective than exposure in vivo with response prevention (see 
chapter 2; van Oppen et al., 1995a). 
5.4. Summary 
Assuming responsibility for negative outcomes is suggested to be at the core of 
obsessional difficulties (Salkovskis, 1985,1989,1995). Data from clinical observation, 
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questionnaire measures and manipulation of responsibility appear to support this hypothesis. 
It is concluded that the relationship between obsessional difficulties and the perception of 
responsibility is worthy of further investigation. 
5.5. Pathological responsibility, obsessionality, depression, anxiety and guilt 
5.5.1. Background 
As outlined above, the cognitive-behavioural model proposes that there is a 
relationship among responsibility for threat, obsessionality, depression and guilt (see chapter 
2). To test this proposition, a measure of responsibility is needed. At the start of the thesis, 
the Oxford Group were in the process of developing the'R-scale' (Salkovskis, Gledhill and 
Reynolds, 1995). Preliminary findings indicated that this measure had criterion validity and 
that obsessional subjects scored more highly on this measure of responsibility for harm than 
matched control subjects. Questionnaire items included 'I often feel responsible for things that 
which go wrong', 'I must protect others from harm' and 'I often take responsibility for things 
which other people don't think are my fault'. One of the criticisms of this questionnaire is that 
it does not test the broad notion that perceived responsibility is generally higher in OCD 
patients than normal controls, because the items assess pathological responsibility that is 
'obsessional' in content. For example 'If I know that harm is possible, I should always try to 
prevent it, however unlikely it seems', ' I have to make sure other people are protected from 
all the consequences of things I do', 'I need to be careful because I may often be close to 
causing harm'. The question of the assessment of responsibility is addressed in the subsequent 
study. 
Nevertheless, the relationship between this specific, pathological 'obsessional' 
responsibility and obsessionality, depression, anxiety and guilt is of interest. Twenty years 
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ago, it was suggested that 'Increases in guilt feelings, evoked directly or mediated indirectly 
through depression will increase checking behaviour... Reductions in guilt.. will result in a 
decrease in checking behaviour' (Rachman, 1976b, p. 275). Theoretically, guilt should only 
result if a person feels responsibility for a negative event (Micelli, 1991). Depression is part 
of the phenomenology of guilt, and two-thirds of people with OCD have a life-time diagnosis 
of depression (Beck, 1967). Anxiety is related to all these variables - responsibility, 
obsessionality, guilt and depression (Beck et al., 1985). The cognitive-behavioural model 
suggests that there is a specific relationship between perceived responsibility and 
obsessionality, irrespective of guilt, anxiety and depression, although 'this model would 
predict that increased accessibility .. as occurs 
in heightened anxiety and depression. . would 
result in clinical worsening of obsessions' (Salkovskis, 1985; p. 575). The purpose of this 
study was to explore the relationships between pathological responsibility, obsessionality, 
depression, anxiety and guilt, with a view to testing the cognitive-behavioural model. 
5.5.2. Aims 
The primary aim of the study was to test the cognitive-behavioural model by exploring 
the relationships between pathological responsibility, obsessionality, depression and guilt. 
A second aim of this study was to generate data to test the 'heterogeneity hypothesis' (see 
chapter 9). 
5.5.3. Hypothesis and Predictions 
Hypothesis 1 There is a specific relationship between pathological responsibility and 
obsessionality. 
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Prediction 1 There will be significant positive correlations between the R-scale and 
measures of obsessionality when the effects of depression, anxiety and guilt are controlled . 
Hypothesis 2: There is a specific relationship between pathological responsibility and guilt. 
Prediction 2: There will be significant positive correlations between the R-scale and 
measures of guilt after controlling for the effects of depression and anxiety. 
5.5.4. Method 
Subjects 
101 people living in the community who had a significant number of obsessional 
symptoms (>I 1 on the Maudsley Obsessive-Compulsive Scale) completed a series of 
questionnaires to assist in research into OCD. Advertisements for the project had been placed 
in women's magazines. 81% of the sample were female. The mean age of the sample was 36 
years, 5 months (sd=11.25; range 18-70). 
Measures 
The R- Scale (Salkovskis, Gledhill and Reynolds, 1995). This is a 43-item scale 
assessing pathological responsibility. All items except for 2 are self-referent; all items are 
positively scored on a range of 1 'totally disagree' to 7' totally agree'. Examples of items 
include'If I don't act when I can foresee danger, then I am to blame for any consequences if 
it happens'; 'I often cause harm" If I cannot be certain I am blameless, I feel that I am to 
blame'. 
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI: Beck, Epstein, Brown and Steer, 1988). This 
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is a 21-item scale comprising symptoms of anxiety. The scale measures the severity of 
anxiety in adults and children and symptoms are rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 
('not at all') to 3 ('severely: you could barely stand it). This measure is considered to 
assess clinical anxiety more accurately than other measures such as Spielberger's measure 
of trait anxiety (Spielberger et al., 1980). 
Guilt Inventory (GI; Kugler and Jones, 1992). This is a 45-item self-report inventory 
designed to assess the following domains: trait guilt, defined as a continuing sense of guilt 
beyond immediate circumstances (e. g., 'Guilt and remorse have been a part of my life for 
as long as I can recall, ' 'I often have a strong sense of regret, ' and ' Frequently I just hate 
myself for something I have done'); state guilt, defined as present guilty feelings based on 
current or recent transgressions (e. g., 'At the moment, I don't feel particularly guilty about 
anything I have done, ' 'I have recently done something that I deeply regret, ' and 'Lately, 
I have felt good about myself and what I have done'); and moral standards, defined as 
subscription to a code of moral principles without reference either to specific behaviours 
or overly specific beliefs (e. g., 'I believe in a strict interpretation of right and wrong, ' 
'What is right and wrong depends on the situation, ' 'I have always believed strongly in a 
firm set of moral-ethical principles. ' (see chapter 4). 
The Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al. 1961). This is a 21-item inventory designed 
to assess the symptoms of depression in the past week. Subjects are required to respond 
on a4 point scale ranging from 0 (the subject does not have that symptom) to 3 (the 
symptom is very marked). 
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Padua Inventory - Revised (P I-R; Sanavio, 1988; van Oppen, 1995c). This is a 41-item 
list of common obsessional thoughts and compulsive behaviours (see appendix 1). It was 
revised from an earlier 60-item list. Each of the 41 items is rated on a five-point scale in 
terms of the frequency with which it is experienced. The scale points are labelled from 
% not at all' (score of zero) to 'very much' (score of four). All items are negatively 
phrased ('I feel my hands are dirty when I touch money'). An investigation into the factor 
structure of this measure for a British obsessional population can be found in appendix 1. 
Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (MOCI; Hodgson and Rachman, 1977). 
This is a 30-item questionnaire. Subjects are requested to respond 'TRUE' or 'FALSE' 
to each item. There are four subscales: checking, washing, doubting and slowness. 
5.5.5. Results 
The alpha level was set at 0.01 to compensate for the number of computations. 
Missing values were replaced with the series mean for all analyses. 
Pearson's correlation coefficients were computed to determine the associations 
between responsibility, obsessionality, depression, anxiety and guilt. The coefficient matrix 
is shown in Table 5.1. 
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Table 5.1 Pearson product-moment Correlation Matrix showing associations 
between pathological responsibility and obsessions, depression, anxiety and guilt. 
n4108 
PI (R) 
R- SCALE TOTAL 
Correlation Coefficient 
Impaired Control over mental events . 4602** 
Contamination -. 0187 








Checking . 4122** 
Washing -. 0019 
Doubting 
. 1960 
Slowness -. 0903 
Total . 2677** 
Guilt 
Standards . 1546 
State 
. 4502** 
Trait . 5118** 
Total 
. 5130** 
Beck Anxiety Inventory . 4194** 
Beck Depression Inventory . 4738** 
** = p<0.01 
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The correlation matrix indicated that pathological responsibility was significantly 
associated with checking behaviour on both the PI-R and the MOCI, and was not associated 
with washing/contamination on either of these measures. Although related to the other 
subscales of the PI-R, the R- Scale was not related to the other subscales of the MOCI. The 
R- Scale was significantly associated with depression, anxiety and all measures of guilt except 
for guilt standards. 
Prediction 1 
The analyses were repeated to determine whether the correlation between the R- 
Scale and measures of obsessionality remained when the effects of guilt, depression and 
anxiety were partialled out. The correlation coefficient matrix is shown in table 5.2 
Table 5.2 Pearson product-moment Correlation Matrix showing associations 
between pathological responsibility and obsessions, controlling for depression, anxiety 
and guilt. 
n-96 R- Scale Total 
PI (R) 


























The association between pathological responsibility and checking behaviour on the PI- 
R remained significant, and there was a non-significant trend for pathological responsibility 
to be associated with checking behaviour on the MOCI. There was a significant association 
between rumination on the PI-R and pathological responsibility. Neither the total scores nor 
any other subscales were significantly related to pathological responsibility. 
Prediction 2 
The analyses were repeated to determine whether the correlation between the R- 
Scale and guilt remained when the effects of depression and anxiety were partialled out. The 
correlation coefficient matrix is shown in table 5.3: - 
Table 5.3 Pearson product-moment Correlation Matrix showing associations 
between pathological responsibility and guilt, controlling for the effects of depression 
and anxiety. 











The results showed a significant association between pathological responsibility and total 
guilt. The association between trait guilt and pathological responsibility was significant and 
there was a trend for guilt standards and state guilt to be related to pathological responsibility. 
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Summary of Results 
Prediction 1: There is a specific relationship between pathological responsibility and 
obsessionality. The results partially supported this hypothesis. There was evidence for a 
specific relationship between pathological responsibility and checking behaviour in particular, 
but the evidence for relationship between pathological responsibility and other obsessional 
features was weaker. 
Hypothesis 2: There is a specific relationship between pathological responsibility and guilt. 
The results partially supported this hypothesis. There was evidence for a specific relationship 
between pathological responsibility, trait guilt and overall guilt. There was a trend for state 
guilt to be associated with pathological responsibility. 
5.7.6. Discussion 
Overall, the results showed partial support for the cognitive-behavioural model in that 
pathological responsibility was associated with obsessional symptoms and with depression, 
anxiety and guilt. Nevertheless, a specific association between pathological responsibility and 
checking behaviour, which was not accounted for by these variables was found. Also of 
interest and in need of explanation is that the association between guilt standards and 
pathological responsibility increased once the effects of depression and anxiety were partialled 
out. Since this association was not significant, it may be a chance statistical finding. 
5.6. A study of General Perceived Responsibility: Structure and Significance 
This work was carried out in conjunction with Rachman, Thordarson and Woody at 
the University of British Columbia, Vancouver. I was involved with designing the 
questionnaire, collecting and analysing the data. Professor Rachman led the research team and 
wrote-up the results for publication (1995), Dana Thordarson assisted with data analysis and 
Sheila Woody contributed to the questionnaire design. 
5.5.1. Background 
Given the data from psychometric, experimental and clinical studies connecting 
inflated responsibility with OCD, there was a strong need for a reliable and valid measure of 
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responsibility which was not confounded with the disorder itself. The R-scale described in the 
previous study could be considered to be circular, as it was assessing responsibility in 
obsessional situations as opposed to general increased levels of responsibility. The literature 
review and previous study indicated that there may be a stronger relationship between 
responsibility and checking behaviours than other obsessional complaints. Furthermore, the 
relationship between responsibility and other clinical variables such as guilt and anxiety 
warranted further exploration. 
5.6.2. Aims 
The main aim of the study was to produce a reliable scale, free from obsessional 
content, for measuring responsibility. A second aim was to investigate the relationship 
between responsibility and obsessionality, guilt and depression. 
5.6.3. Hypotheses and Predictions 
Hypothesis 1 
Perceived responsibility is related to obsessionality 
Prediction 1 
There will be a significant positive correlation between responsibility and obsessional 
behaviour. 
Hypothesis 2 
The relationship between responsibility and checking behaviour will be stronger than the 
relationship between responsibility and washing/cleaning behaviour. 
Prediction 2 
The correlation between responsibility and the checking subscales will be stronger than the 
correlation between responsibility and the washing/cleaning subscales. 
Hypothesis 3 
Responsibility will be related to depression and guilt. 
Prediction 3 
There will be a positive correlation between measures of responsibility and depression and 
guilt. 
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5.6.4. Part 1. Development of the 'Responsibility Appraisal Questionnaire' 
The study was carried out in two parts. The purpose of the first part of the study was 
to develop a questionnaire to assess responsibility in normal subjects. A pool of items was 
written and administered to undergraduate students; their responses were used to select the 
best items for a final scale. 
5.6.4.1. Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 291 psychology students at the University of British Columbia who 
completed the questionnaire package for course credit. Their average age was 19.5 years; 
72% of the sample was female. 
Measures 
We devised a pool of 36 items to assess responsibility in five content areas: 
9 responsibility for property damage (e. g. if I smelled smoke in a store, it is (not)up to 
me to inform the manager); 
0 responsibility for physical harm coming to other people (e. g. when driving it is (not) 
up to me to make sure that my passengers are wearing safety belts) 
" responsibility in social contexts (e. g. I should not turn down an invitation from a 
friend); 
" responsibility which is positive (e. g. I would welcome the opportunity to be put in 
charge of the safety of buildings) 
0 thought-action fusion (TAF) which is the belief that thoughts can influence events 
(e. g. My mean thoughts wishing a person harm can increase the chance that something 
harmful will happen to him/her) or the belief that thoughts are almost the moral 
equivalent to actions (e. g. For me, having a mean thought is (not) as bad as doing 
something mean) (see chapter 6 and Rachman, 1993). 
Particular care was taken to avoid items with obsessional content. Approximately half the 




A principal components analysis with varimax rotation performed on the 36 items 
indicated that the best simple structure was obtained using a2 or 4 factor solution. The 4 
factor solution was selected because it nearly corresponded to our original 5 domains of 
responsibility. The 4 factor solution, which accounted for 30.9% of the variance, 
approximated the domains of responsibility for harm (incorporating both physical harm and 
property damage; 11.4% of variance), social responsibility (7.4% of variance), positive 
responsibility (5.5% of variance) and thought-action fusion (TAF; 6.6% of variance). The 
four-factor solution can be seen in Table 5.4. 
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Table 5.4 The Four-Factor Rntnterl Fartnr CnIsif; nn for th m l1 _itnm A Ail 
Harm Social Thought- Positive 
(Factor 1) (Factor 2) Action (Factor 
Fusion 4) 
(Factor 3) 




take special care when driving during 
scho l i h open o ng ours 
It is okay to wish misfortune on other . 54162 . 
12358 
. 
30463 -. 22647 
people 
If I smelt smoke in a store, it is not up . 53826 . 02778 -. 04982 -. 01525 to me to inform the manager 
If I knew I woudn't be caught I would . 49612 . 
03724 
. 
10782 -. 06738 drink and drive 




brakes of my car are in perfect working 
condition 
It is not important to me to always . 43856 . 
11837 -. 09203 . 
04555 
remember to send a card or call on friends' birthdays 






borrowed book in the same good 
condition as I received it 




me to repay it 
When driving, it is not up tome to . 33380 . 
08476 -. 07083 . 14145 make sure that my passengers are 
wearin safe belts 
When I am in a restaurant with friends, -. 07431 . 62841 . 
07481 -. 03883 it is up to me to personally ensure that 
we have left a large enough tip 
It is up to me to protect other people from harm -. 
05779 . 58743 -. 05028 . 
27281 





If a child looks lost in a supermarket, it . 
40361 
. 50202 -. 13736 . 
00002 
is up to me to take the child to the store 
manager 




from a friend 
It is up to me to hand in a stranger's . 
32617 
. 44743 -. 25882 -. 01529 wallet to the police if I see it lying in 
the street 
If I know road conditions are . 
31337 
. 42372 04699 . 
19805 
dangerous, it is my duty to tell a friend . 
It is my duty to take care of a stray . 
02969 
. 42200 -. 13347 -. 01958 
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Table 5.4. cntd... The Four-Factor Rotated Factor Solution for the 36-item RAQ. 
Harm Social Thought- Positive 
(Factor 1) (Factor 2) Action (Factor 
Fusion 4) 
(Factor 3) 
It is important to me to fulfill my social . 
09559 





It is not my duty to always help a . 22371 . 37912 -. 07030 -. 
04782 
friend in need 
When going out socially, it is not my . 




role to ensure that everyone has a good 
time 
My mean thoughts wishing a person harm cannot increase the chance that 
-. 14812 -. 06231 . 61923 . 
12624 
something harmful will happen to 
hier 
It is important to me to make sure that 
I don't have impure thoughts . 
06411 
. 
10279 . 57344 -. 
05012 
If I have a thought about something -. 05089 . 
18265 . 51370 . 
09578 
horrible happening to an acquaintance, 
it may bring them bad luck 
For me, having a mean thought is not . 
11051 -. 05232 . 51001 -. 04730 as bad as doing something mean 
I would carry a passenger in the car . 35359 -. 09721 . 48504 -. 07336 when road conditions are dangerous 
My mean thoughts cannot have the . 
06659 -. 20613 . 44501 -. 01905 same consequences as my mean 
actions 
I do not feel obligated to give money to -. 05606 . 30049 . 39457 -. 
25976 
panhandlers 
It is important tome to never serve . 17672 . 20415 . 22896 . 
15201 
food to people that is a little past the 
due date 
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Table 5.4. cntd... The Four-Factor Rotated Factor Solution for the 36-item RAQ. 
Harm Social Thought- Positive 
(Factor 1) (Factor 2) Action (Factor 4) 
Fusion 
(Factor 3) 
I welcome the opportunity to take on . 
08376 
. 
06487 -. 08063 . 68651 
new responsibilities 
I would welcome the opportunity to -. 11096 . 
07040 . 
12068 . 65647 
be put in charge of the safety of 
buildings 
I would welcome the opportunity to -. 13125 . 
00622 -. 09854 . 61200 
take the lead in team projects/events 




23484 . 41260 
it is important to me to replace it 




20768 . 35184 
child does not eat food that has 
fallen on the floor 
Before buying a gift, I make sure it is . 
15899 -. 02299 . 
32934 . 34952 in perfect condition 
I do not welcome the opportunity of . 
23553 
. 
09825 -. 20269 . 
31506 
being entrusted with other people's 
belongings 
If I saw someone acting suspiciously, . 
18664 
. 
27464 -. 01726 . 28731 
it is up to me to telephone the police 
From the original pool of 36 items, 18 were retained to form the final scale with 
subscales based on the four factors. Three criteria were used in the selection of items: 
loading only on their hypothesized factor (harm, social, positive, or TAF) 
high item-total and item-subscale correlations 
mean response not extremely high (to maximize the ability of the scale to discriminate 
among subjects at high levels of responsibility. 
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Cronbach's alpha coefficient was computed for all four subscales. The coefficient 
alphas were: 0.56 for Harm (5 items), 0.46 for Social (5 items), 0.58 for Positive (4 items), 
and 0.51 for TAF (4 items). Only the subscales of Harm and TAF, and Social and Positive 
were correlated (r=0.18, r=0.17 respectively; p<0.01). 
The revised Responsibility Appraisal Questionnaire (RAQ) was administered to a new 
sample to verify its factor structure and investigate its relationship with other variables such 
as obsessionality, depression and anxiety (see Part 2). 
5.6.5. Part 2. Correlates of Responsibility 
The association between responsibility, as measured by the subscales of the revised 
RAQ, and obsessionality, depression and guilt was investigated. 
5.6.5.1. Method 
Subjects 
The subjects were 234 psychology students at the University of British Columbia who 
completed the questionnaire package for course credit. Their average age was 20 years; 68% 
were female. 
Measures 
The following questionnaires were completed. 
RAQ.: The 18 item revised RAQ, with instructions to rate agreement with the statements on 
a six point scale, ranging from ' 1' (absolutely disagree) to '6' (absolutely agree). 
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Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (MOCI). (Hodgson and Rachman, 1977; 
see chapter 3). This is a 30 item true/false inventory with subscales of cleaning, checking 
doubting/conscientiousness and slowness. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI). (Beck, 1967). This is a 21 item inventory to assess the 
severity of depression. 
Guilt Inventory (GI). (Kugler and Jones, 1992). This is a 45 item questionnaire comprising 
subscales of trait guilt, state guilt and guilt standards. Subjects endorse items on a scale of 
' 1' (very untrue of me, or strongly disagree) to '5' (very true of me, or strongly agree). (see 
chapter 4). 
The Inventory of Beliefs Related to Obsessionality (IBRO). (Freeston, Ladouceur, 
Thibodeau & Gagnon, 1993). This is a 20 item inventory in which subjects endorse beliefs on 
a scale of' 1' (I believe strongly that this statement is false) to '6' (I believe strongly that this 
statement is true). 
5.6.5.2. Results 
A principal components analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the 18 items. 
A four-factor solution accounted for 46.2% of the variance and corresponded to our four 
domains of responsibility from the first part of the study. The factors for TAF and Positive 
Responsibility were most coherent, whereas two Social and one Harm item unexpectedly 
loaded on factors other than their own. The factor solution can be seen in Table 5.5. 
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Table 5.5. The Four-Factor Rotated Factor Solution for the 18-item RAQ. 
Thought- Positive Social Harm 
Action (Factor (Factor 3) (Factor 4) 
Fusion 2) 
(Factor 1 
If I have a thought about . 84370 . 
01328 
. 
00682 -. 07574 
something horrible happening 
to an acquaintance, it may 
bring them bad luck 
My mean thoughts wishing a . 78418 . 
06678 -. 06945 -. 14886 
person harm can increase the 
chance that something 
harmful will happen to 
him/her 
My mean thoughts can have . 77128 -. 12788 -. 
03881 . 
05151 
the same consequences as my 
mean actions 





thought is almost as bad as 
doing something mean 
I would be able to turn down . 39437 -. 22562 . 19668 . 
12541 
an invitation from a friend 
I would welcome the -. 02481 . 73416 . 
10571 -. 00506 
opportunity to take on new 
responsibilities 
I would welcome the -. 06450 . 73349 -. 02541 -. 
05872 
opportunity to take the lead in 
team projects/events 
I would welcome the -. 03163 . 70433 -. 05963 . 
01494 
opportunity to be put in 
charge of the safety of 
buildings 
I would welcome the -. 07182 . 51509 . 29206 . 
09801 
opportunity of being entrusted 
with other people's belongings 
I would inform the manager if -. 02723 . 44387 . 
38251 . 
11392 






Table 5.5 contd.. The Four-Factor Rotated Factor Solution for the 18-item RAQ. 
Thought- Positive Social Harm 
Action (Factor (Factor 3) (Factor 
Fusion 2) 4) 
(Factor I 
It is important to me to fulfill my -. 00440 -. 01645 . 72693 -. 
06516 
social obligations 
I would remember to send a card or . 
00544 
. 
08568 . 56571 . 
09632 
call a friend on his/her birthday 
I would take special care when . 
02922 
. 
17625 . 55315 . 
34069 
driving near a playground 
I would be obliged to lend a friend . 21348 . 
04978 . 44786 -. 21219 
money if asked 
I would carry passengers in the car . 
19473 -. 12470 . 
02461 . 72380 
when road conditions were dangerous 
If my car were making an unusual -. 00086 . 
00803 
. 
04273 . 57513 
noise, I would continue to drive it 
When I am in a restaurant with . 
03736 -. 21808 . 
35848 -. 53869 
friends, it is up to me to personally 
ensure that we have left a sufficiently 
large tip 
I would return a borrowed book -. 07572 . 
05988 
. 
28649 . 38458 
which I had slightly torn without 
saying anything 
The means, standard deviations and internal consistencies of the RAQ subscales are 
given in Table 5.6. MOCI scores ranged from 0 to 20 (M=7.60, sd=4.64); BDI scores 
ranged from 0 to 43 (M=9.26, sd=7.08). The means of the MOCI and BDI were, as 
expected, in the non-clinical range. 
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Table 5.6. Descriptive Statistics for the RAQ Subscales: Study 2 
Subscale No. Items Mean SD Cronbabh's 
Alpha 
TAF 4 8.57 3.32 0.76 
Positive 4 15.72 3.31 0.66 
Social 5 19.68 2.97 0.40 
Harm 5 19.98 3.40 0.43 
Pearson product-moment correlation coefficients were calculated to investigate the 
relationships between RAQ subscales and measures of obsessionality, depression and guilt 
(see correlation matrix in Table 5.7. ) 
These subscales were based on the original items suggested to comprise the factors, 
as opposed to the results of the factor analysis. 
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Table 5.7. Pearson product-moment correlations among RAQ subscales and 
measures of obsessionality, depression and guilt. 
TAF Positive Social Harm 
MOCI - total . 




MOCI - washing . 




MOCI - checking . 
41** -. 12 . 
09 . 
04 
MOCI - doubting . 
26** 
. 02 . 
23** . 
12 
MOCI - slowness . 











38** -. 17* . 
12 . 
09 
Guilt trait . 




Guilt state . 
34** -. 13 . 
12 -. 02 





* p<0.01 ** p<0.001 
Of the RAQ subscales, TAF was most strongly correlated with measures of 
obsessionality, particularly the IBRO. TAF was also associated with depression and guilt 
measures. Partial correlation coefficients, controlling for BDI scores, were also computed. 
All significant correlations between the RAQ subscales, including the TAF subscales and 
measures of obsessionality remained significant after partialling out the BDI scores. However, 
after controlling for the effects of depression, the correlations between RAQ subscales and 
guilt were no longer significant. 
It is possible that high MOCI scorers (i. e. subjects who score within the clinical range) 
are qualitatively different from other subjects. Therefore analyses were conducted comparing 
subjects scoring above a clinical cutoff of 15 on the MOCI with the rest of the sample. The 
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TAF scores of high MOCI scorers were significantly greater than those of the rest of the 
sample, but there were no differences between groups on the other RAQ subscales (see table 
5.8) 






































* p<0.005 ** p <0.001 
-3.1* 
The results are consistent with the suggestion that TAF is implicated in obsessionality, 
but that responsibility in general may not be elevated in OCD. 
5.6.6. Summary of Results of the Two Studies 
Prediction 1: There will be a significant relationship between responsibility and obsessional 
behaviour. This prediction was partially fulfilled. There was no significant relationship 
between obsessional behaviour and the RAQ subscales of Harm, Positive or Social (with the 
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exception of a correlation with the doubting subscale of the MOCI). However, the TAF 
subscale was strongly associated with all subscales of the MOCI, except for slowness. 
Prediction 2: The relationship between responsibility and checking behaviour will be 
stronger than the relationship between responsibility and washing/cleaning behaviour. This 
prediction could be tested with respect to the TAF subscale of responsibility only, since this 
was the only subscale which showed any relationship with the MOCI subscales. The 
prediction was not ' fulfilled with respect to the TAF subscale. The correlation of TAF 
with the checking subscale of the MOCI was higher than that of the cleaning subscale (r=0.41 
and r--0.35) respectively, , but this difference was wt statistically significant (p>0.05). 
Prediction 3. Responsibility will be related to depression and guilt. This prediction was 
partially fulfilled. The TAF subscale was significantly correlated with scores on the BDI, and 
with state and trait guilt, but not with guilt standards. There was a significant negative 
correlation between Positive responsibility, and trait guilt and BDI scores, and between Harm 
and guilt standards. However no relationship was found between the Harm or Social 
subscales, and scores of depression, state guilt and trait guilt. 
5.6.7. Discussion 
The results of the two studies show the need to qualify the original, broad view of 
inflated responsibility. The postulated connection between inflated responsibility and 
obsessional-compulsive problems appears to be more situation-specific and idiosyncratic than 
was originally assumed. The idea that people affected by obsessional problems are broadly 
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over-responsible is difficult to support. Furthermore, even some patients with severe OCD 
problems and definite evidence of inflated responsibility nevertheless seek and welcome 
specific types of responsibility (e. g., teachers with OCD who still enjoy the responsibility of 
looking after a class of children, but avoid checking gas taps). 
The results of the studies indicated a relationship between TAF and measures of 
obsessionality. In this study, the TAF subscale comprised four questions - two relating to the 
'moral equivalence' component of TAF, and two relating to the belief that thoughts may 
influence events (the lkelihood' component). Given these encouraging results, a further study 
was conducted to explore the relationship between TAF and obsessionality. Further 
exploration was also warranted, as there were indications that TAF was more strongly related 
to checking than cleaning behaviour, although there were significant associations with both 
subscales of the MOCI. The TAF subscale was also related to depression and guilt state and 
guilt trait measures in this second study, but not to guilt standards. This was a somewhat 
surprising result, as the guilt standards subscale is designed to assess moral standards held by 
the individual, and part of TAF assesses beliefs about the morality of thoughts and actions. 
A number of explanations for this result are possible. It may be that the guilt standards 
subscale is not valid, and some evidence for this was found in the study of guilt and 
obsessionality reported in chapter 4. Alternatively, it may be that people with OCD do not 
have high moral standards in general, but it is a specific type of morality concerning thoughts 
and actions that is associated with OCD. This explanation is in keeping with results from the 
study of religion and OCD (see chapter 4), and from this study which indicates that 
connections between responsibility and obsessionality are probably situation-specific and 
idiosyncratic, rather than broad and commonly held. 
There are several arguments in favour of a situation- specific explanation for the 
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importance of perceived responsibility in OCD. Firstly, there is far more inflated responsibility 
than there is OCD. Hence, inflated responsibility (IR) by itself is not sufficient to account for 
OCD-possibly because IR is too broadly conceived. Presumably, it is only certain 
manifestations of IR that contribute to OCD (e. g. Rheume et al., 1995). Secondly, the 
psychometric studies failed to reveal a unitary factor of responsibility, and the total scores on 
the Responsibility (R) scale showed little relation to the OCD measures. Only one of the 
factors on the R scale, thought-action fusion, correlated with aspects of OCD, particularly 
with the measure of beliefs related to obsessionality (IBRO). This relationship is to be 
expected, given that the IBRO has a number of items concerning beliefs about thoughts (e. g. 
'Guilt is an appropriate response to unacceptable thoughts'). In the Lopatka experiment on 
induced responsibility, considerable effort and time had to be devoted to identifying the exact 
actions that were responsible for shifts in responsibility; it was not possible to construct a set 
of standardised instructions that would apply across the board (Lopatka, 1992, personal 
communication). The subjects had specific, idiosyncratic ideas of responsibility and of the 
misfortunes that might occur if they failed to exercise their self-determined responsibility. 
Similarly, in the early experiments by Rachman and Hodgson (1980) on compulsive checking, 
the variability (and at that time, the lack of predictability) of the patient's sense of 
responsibility was a hindrance. Specific and idiosyncratic expressions of responsibility were 
common, and broad, universally experienced expressions of responsibility were unusual 
(Rachman et al., 1995). 
Even patients who report high levels of inflated responsibility are easily able to 
delineate those tasks/events which evoke no responsibility at all. Further, as noted earlier, 
even patients who are tormented by highly irrational responsibility can describe specific 
situations in which they welcome responsibility. 
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The results do not support the idea that people with OCD may have generally inflated 
responsibility, and subjects with MOCI scores within the clinical range were as likely as other 
subjects to welcome some forms of responsibility. The presence of OCD tendencies does not 
necessarily eliminate or even suppress the acceptance of responsibility. All of this suggests 
that the inflated responsibility which plays a part in OCD must be situation specific; it is not 
general and does not preclude acceptance of certain forms of responsibility. 
It is possible, of course, that the RAQ scale is not sufficiently sensitive for the purpose. 
However, Rheume et al., (1995) found that it was specifically pivotal responsibility that may 
be the key factor. The association with OCD may come into play only when the affected 
person feels solely or mainly responsible for the anticipated harmful event (i. e., feels pivotally 
responsible). The inclusion of items designed to tap feelings of pivotal responsibility may 
increase the sensitivity of the RAQ, and then reveal a degree of association between OCD and 
inflated responsibility that extends beyond TAF. It is important, however, to balance the need 
for an assessment of responsibility that is person and situation-specific with an assessment 
that is not confounded by including obsessional situations. 
One of the criticisms that could be levelled at this study is that a non-patient sample 
was used. However, one of the fundamental assumptions of the cognitive-behavioural model 
is that intrusions are a normal phenomenon (Salkovskis, 1985, p. 577). Furthermore, a recent 
study suggested that non-patient samples could be utilised in the study of OCD if one targets 
the top 2% of scorers as those likely to have a clinical disorder (Burns et al., 1995). 
The concept of psychological responsibility appears, then, to be multi-factorial. To 
date, only one of the four psychometric factors, TAF, seems to relate to OCD. From the 
assessment point of view, the use of a general measure of responsibility may make little 
difference, except perhaps as a baseline. The TAF factor score showed more promise and 
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warrants psychometric development. A study investigating TAF and its relationship to 
obsessionality is reported in chapter 6. 
5.6.6. Summary 
In summary, there was little relationship between the measure of responsibility and 
measures of obsessional symptoms. The most likely explanation is that the postulated 
association between responsibility and OCD is situation-specific and that people with 
obsessional problems do not have a broad inflation of responsibility, but that it is inflated 
idiosyncratically. Furthermore, some OCD patients seek some type of responsibility (e. g. 
teachers) whilst avoiding others (e. g. making sure the gas is off). A series of arguments 
supporting the view that in OCD responsibility is inflated in only specific situations can be 
found in Rachman et at., (1995). The relationship between TAF and OCD was the most 
promising and is explored further in chapter 6. 
5.7. Manipulation of Responsibility 
5.7.1. Background 
The results from the previous study did not find a relationship between the broad 
concept of inflated perceived responsibility and obsessional symptoms. However, results 
from clinical experience and empirical studies in which responsibility is manipulated, provide 
strong evidence for the importance of the role of responsibility in OCD. 
The manipulation of responsibility is probably one of the most important methods by 
which the role of responsibility in OCD may be elucidated. One of the arguments that has 
been made against the emphasis on the role of responsibility is that 'there may be a tendency 
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to mistake therapeutic techniques for theory' (Jakes, 1993). Jakes asks the question 'Why 
should one not suppose that anyone who experienced, say, obsessional impulses to harm their 
relatives with the frequency and intensity with which such impulses are experienced by those 
OCD patients for whom they are a major problem, would be similarly inclined to think badly 
of themselves as a result?.... On this argument, then, the sense of responsibility and guilt etc. 
experienced by OCD patients who suffer from aggressive, sexual or blasphemous obsessions 
may indeed be producing at least some of their distress, but this sense of responsibility and 
guilt may nonetheless be regarded as a 'normal response'to their abnormal experience... The 
argument . suggest s. then, that the cognitive-behavioural account may place the cart before the 
horse in assigning the feelings of responsibility and guilt experienced by these kinds of OCD 
patients a primary role, and it is perhaps best to suspend judgment, therefore, as to whether 
these feelings may be assigned such a role' (Jakes, 1993). 
One of the methods that may be used to refute Jakes's argument is an experimental 
design. If obsessional symptoms are shown to vary IN RESPONSE to the manipulation of 
responsibility, this gives some indication that, in Jakes's words, the horse comes before the 
cart. If obsessional symptoms led to feelings of responsibility, then altering the perceived 
responsibility would not, according to this model, greatly alter the obsessional symptoms. 
The manipulation of responsibility by Lopatka and Rachman was successful (1995), 
and the study has been described in detail previously. In summary, in situations of high 
responsibility, the urge to perform compulsive 'neutralising' behaviours, anxiety experienced 
and estimates of the probability of threat all increased. Feelings of control over the threat did 
not change in the high responsibility condition. It is interesting that feelings of perceived 
control which should, by logic, be closely related to feelings of responsibility did not change 
in the different conditions. This may imply that the logic which governs most people's 
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perception of responsibility (and involves estimations of control over negative events) is 
different in people with OCD. The manipulation study was conducted only with people with 
checking compulsions, as pilot work indicated that the responsibility manipulation was not 
effective in people with other compulsive behaviours. This study provided strong 
support for aspects of the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD. However, the method by 
which responsibility was manipulated was somewhat artificial and involved the use of 
contracts. Therefore it is possible that the results were obtained owing to the non-specific 
effects of experimenter demands, although this is unlikely. The present study aimed to use 
a more natural manipulation of responsibility for the dual purpose of replicating the findings 
of Lopatka and Rachman, and extending it by comparing patients with both checking and 
cleaning compulsions. Given the suggestion that 'when the affected person experiences an 
unwanted obsessional thought, he/she feels unduly responsible for the thought and its 
significance' (Rachman, 1993; emphasis added), the study was extended to include separate 
assessments of the perceived responsibility for the threat, and perceived responsibility for the 
thought. However, it was expected that when responsibility for the threat was high, 
responsibility for the intrusive thought would also be high. 
The method chosen of manipulating responsibility arose from the clinical observation 
that 'most checking rituals are carried out when the person is alone-the rituals are most 
intense when a person feels responsible for the act concerned'. (Rachman, 1976b; p. 270). 
Further clinical observations included 'it has proved easier under .. experimental conditions ... 
to 
provoke anxiety discomfort among compulsive cleaners than among compulsive checkers' 
(Rachman, 1976b, p. 273). It is possible, therefore, that responsibility plays a greater part in 
checking rituals compared to cleaning rituals. In addition, some checking behaviours could 
not be elicited if the patient was in the presence of someone that he/she trusted (spouse or 
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therapist). The reason for these observations may concern responsibility. When the person 
is alone, he/she may feel more responsible for a negative outcome than when someone else 
is present. This 'diffusion' of responsibility is well documented in social psychology, where 
the degree of responsibility is inversely proportional to the number of people present (e. g. 
Latane and Darley, 1970). Given the close relationship between anxiety and compulsions (see 
chapter 3), it is also possible that perceived responsibility affects the degree of 
discomfort/anxiety, anxious cognitions and fear sensations that may be experienced during 
exposure in vivo with response prevention. 
The present study based the manipulation of perceived responsibility on clinical 
observations, and hypotheses and predictions were based on these observations and the 
findings from the manipulation study of Lopatka and Rachman (1995). The 'high' 
responsibility condition involved the subject undergoing exposure in vivo with response 
prevention when alone. The 'low' responsibility condition involved the subject undergoing 
exposure in vivo in the presence of the experimenter. 
5.7.2. Aims 
To use an ecologically valid manipulation of responsibility to: 
0 investigate the effect of manipulating responsibility on obsessional cognitions and also 
on anxious cognitions and fear sensations 
0 compare the effect of manipulating responsibility on checking and cleaning 
compulsions. 
5.7.3. Hypotheses and Predictions 
Based on clinical observations and the work of Lopatka and Rachman (1995), the 
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following hypotheses and predictions were made: 
0 Hypothesis 1. Perceived responsibility for threat will vary according to the 
presence/absence of an experimenter 
0 Prediction 1. Perceived responsibility for threat will be higher when a subject conducts 
exposure in vivo with response prevention alone, than when a subject conducts 
exposure in vivo with response prevention in the presence of an experimenter. 
0 Hypothesis Z. There is a causal relationship between perceived responsibility for 
threat and the urge to perform compulsive 'neutralising' behaviours. 
0 Prediction 2a The urge to perform compulsive neutralising behaviours will be higher 
when undergoing exposure with response prevention in the high responsibility 
condition (subject alone) than in the low responsibility condition (subject + 
experimenter). 
0 Prediction 2b. There will be significant positive correlations between estimates of 
perceived responsibility for threat and the urge to perform compulsive 'neutralising' 
behaviours. 
0 Hypothesis 3. There is a causal relationship between perceived responsibility for threat 
and discomfort/anxiety. 
0 Prediction 3a. Discomfort/anxiety will be higher when undergoing exposure with 
response prevention in the high responsibility condition (subject alone) than in the low 
responsibility condition (subject + experimenter). 
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0 Prediction 3b. There will be significant positive correlations between estimates of 
perceived responsibility for threat and discomfort/anxiety. 
0 Hypothesis 4. There is a causal relationship between perceived responsibility for threat 
and perceived responsibility for thoughts. 
" Prediction 4a. Perceived responsibility for thoughts will be higher when undergoing 
exposure with response prevention in the high responsibility condition (subject alone) 
than in the low responsibility condition (subject + experimenter). 
0 Prediction 4b. There will be significant positive correlations between estimates of 
perceived responsibility for threat and perceived responsibility for thoughts. 
0 Hypothesis 5. Estimations of the probability of threat are dependent upon perceived 
responsibility for threat; estimates of the controllability of threat are not. 
0 Prediction 5a. The estimations of the probability of threat will be higher in the high 
responsibility condition (subject alone) than in the low responsibility condition (subject 
+ experimenter), but the estimations of the controllability of threat in the high 
responsibility condition (subject alone) will not differ from those in the low 
responsibility condition (subject + experimenter). 
0 Prediction 5b. There will be significant positive associations between responsibility 
for threat and estimates of the probability of threat, but not between responsibility for 
threat and estimates of the controllability of threat. 
0 Hypothesis 6. Manipulation of perceived responsibility, and its effects, will be different 
for 'checkers' and 'cleaners'. 
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0 Prediction 6a. The responsibility manipulation will be more effective in checkers than 
cleaners. 
0 Prediction 6b. It will be harder to elicit the urge to check compared with the urge to 
wash/clean especially in the low responsibility condition. 
" Hypothesis 7. There is a causal relationship between perceived responsibility for threat 
and the experience of anxious cognitions and fear sensations. 
Prediction 7. There will be more fear cognitions and body sensations in the high 




Forty-six subjects who participated in the earlier experiments agreed to attend the 
Institute of Psychiatry to participate in this one. Five subjects were used to pilot the design 
of the present experiment. One subject could not think of any behavioural task that was 
suitable for the IoP and was not included in the analyses. Therefore forty subjects were 
included in the analyses. The subjects all fulfilled DSM - III- R criteria for obsessive 
compulsive disorder. The mean age of the subjects was 35.78 years (sd=9.97; range 23-70 
years) and 24 (60%) were female. 
The Responsibility Manipulation 
Perceived responsibility for a feared outcome was manipulated naturally by conducting 
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exposure in vivo with response prevention in two different conditions 
" high responsibility - the subject is alone 
0 low responsibility - the subject is with the experimenter. 
Procedure 
This experiment was the last given to all subjects, as it was partially dependent on 
information concerning obsessional thoughts and compulsions which had been collected 
throughout the assessment. As in the Lopatka and Rachman (1995) study, the feared stimulus 
to which the participant would be exposed was negotiated between the experimenter and the 
subject. The task used for the manipulation was determined by the experimenter and subject 
in the following way: 
Experimenter: 
'If it's O. K. with you, I'd like to carry out some behavioural work here today. You mentioned 
in the interview that your biggest problem is (e. g. checking, washing, mental 
compulsions). I'd like you to (EXPOSURE: e. g. leave the building, touch the toilet 
seat, think about death) without (RESPONSE PREVENTION: checking the door 
is closed, washing your hands, thinking a good thought). Since this is research and not 
treatment, I don't want to make you too frightened. Do you think that if you (e. g. left 
the building, touched the toilet seat, thought about death) without (e. g. checking the 
door, washing your hands, thinking a good thought) that you will become anxious? After you 
have (e. g left the building, touched the toilet seat, thought about death), I will ask 
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you a series of questions. After that, you can (e. g. check the door, wash your hands, 
think a good thought) afterwards if you would like to'. 
Negotiation took place as to the precise nature of the task that would take place, for 
example, touching the toilet seat, door or handle. 
Subjects were then entered into one of two conditions: high responsibility (exposure 
+ response prevention in the clinic alone), or low responsibility (exposure + response 
prevention in the clinic with the experimenter). Subjects could not be entered into these two 
conditions in a counterbalanced manner as the nature of the task sometimes necessitated the 
experimenter accompanying the participant during the first exposure session to make it clear 
what the participant should be doing. In cases when this was not necessary, the subjects were 
entered into the conditions in a way that would promote equally sized groups in both 
conditions. Twenty-one of the 40 subjects first experienced exposure + response prevention 
in the presence of the experimenter, while the remaining 19 subjects first experienced 
'exposure + response prevention' condition while alone. 
Instructions continued as follows: - 'After you have (e. g. left the building, 
touched the toilet seat, thought about death), what I want you to do is to resist the urge to 
(e. g. check the door is closed, wash your hands, think a good thought) Instead, I want 
you to think about (FEARED CONSEQUENCE: e. g. the building being burgled, you 
being contaminate death of a relative) for 5 minutes. [I will now leave the room and return 
after 5 minutes to ask you some questions]. If you feel as though you cannot last the 5 
minutes, please tell me [or come and get me]. Do you understand what I would like you to 
do? '. 
After this 5 minute time period (or before, if the participant was unable to resist his/her 
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compulsions for this time), the experimenter then asked a series of questions, based on those 
used by Lopatka and Rachman in their study. 
Measures 
During exposure with response prevention, a variety of different measures were taken 
including urge to neutralise, discomfort, responsibility for the intrusive thoughts, probability 
estimates and estimates of feelings of control. Measures of fear cognitions and body 
sensations were also taken in order to determine the effects of manipulating responsibility on 
these, as well as the effect on specific obsessional cognitions. 
Questions asked during exposure, before carrying out compulsions. 
All participants were asked to answer the following on a scale where 0=' None at all' 
to '100' meaning extremely high. The first set of questions will be referred to as 'OCD' 
questions, the second set as 'bodily sensations' questions and the final set as questions 
concerning "fear cognitions'. The questions for the first set are based on those from the 
Lopatka and Rachman study and the questions for the other two sets are based on 
Chambless's fear cognitions and body sensations questionnaires. See appendix 2 for measures. 
In all cases in which the experiment had elicited any discomfort, after the completion 
of the questions, subjects carried out their compulsions. They were told that the experiment 
would be repeated but this time the experimenter would (not) be with them. 
The experiment was completed with an additional question at the end - did you think 
that you wanted to go home? This was usually met with a smile and ended the assessment on 
a good note. Subjects were given information about obsessive-compulsive disorder as a token 
of our appreciation for having participated in the study and were invited to an annual 'OCD 
168 
Support Day' at the Institute of Psychiatry. They were asked whether they would like have 
their name on the OCD database so that they could be informed about developments in OCD 
research and be contacted to participate in other research projects. The experimenter's name 
and telephone number were given to the participants, who were told that they should feel free 
to call this number if they had any questions about any part of the study. 
5.7.5. Results 
Missing values for all analyses were replaced with the series mean. 
The Responsibility Manipulation 
Prediction 1 
Analyses were conducted to determine whether responsibility for threat was greater 
in the high responsibility condition (subject alone) than in the low responsibility condition 
(subject + experimenter). Responsibility for the perceived threat in the absence of another 
adult had a mean of 60.36 points out of 100 (summarised as 60.36% from now on) with a 
standard deviation (sd) of 38.37. In the condition where the experimenter was present, the 
mean responsibility was 44.54% (sd=35.805). A student's t-test for the difference between 
dependent means was significant (t=3.56, P<0.01). These analyses confirmed that the 
manipulation was successful. It should be noted, however, that the mean difference in 
perceived responsibility between the two conditions was 15.82% compared with a mean 
difference of 73.7% in the responsibility manipulation study of Lopatka and Rachman. The 
mean scores for the obsessional variables within each condition are shown in Table 5.9. 
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Effect of the Responsibility Manipulation 
Predictions 2a, 3a, 4a, and 5a 
The mean scores on the "obsessional' variables are shown for each condition in 
Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9. Descriptive Statistics for Obsessional Variables within each condition 
Condition 
Subject alone 
(High Responsibility for 
threat) 
Subject + Experimenter 
(Low Responsibility for 
threat) 
Mean sd Mean sd 
Responsibility for 
Threat 
61.68 (38) 44.54 (38) 
Urge to Neutralise 60.13 (34) 48.78 (35) 
Discomfort/Anxiety 46.64 (31) 38.81 (27) 
Responsibility for 
Thoughts 
62.97 (41) 62.94 (38) 
Likelihood of Threat 34.46 (33) 26.73 (32) 
Control over Threat 38.48 (43) 32.62 (39) 
A multivariate analysis of variance for repeated measures (MANOVA) was 
conducted on all measures. This approach is identical to that of Lopatka and Rachman 
(1985) used for a variety of reasons, including that it controls for type 1 error rates by 
taking into account that several of the dependent variables may be inter-related. 
MANOVA allows for differences that may not be revealed in separate analyses of 
variances and thus it can be a more powerful statistical tool. 
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Analyses were conducted to determine the effect of the the two conditions of 
responsibility on the obsessional variables, and the order of the exposure + response 
prevention, given that subjects were allocated in a non-random way. The within-subject 
factor was the condition of responsibility (high or low) and the between group factor was 
the order of presentation (with experimenter first vs alone first). A significant main effect 
was found for the within-subject factor of the condition of responsibility (_F, (b, 3)V 2$4 
p<0.025), but there was no significant effect of order (F(6,33)=O. 904, P>0.05)-'. The 
significant main effect suggests that there were differences between the two conditions of 
responsibility. The significant results indicated that it was appropriate to continue to 
conduct further analyses. 
Paired t-Tests were conducted comparing the dependent variables in each of the 
two conditions. The alpha level was set at p=0.05 unless otherwise specified. 
Compared to the low responsibility condition, subjects in the high responsibility condition : 
a) felt a significantly higher urge to perform the compulsion, t(=2.93) 
b) felt significantly more discomfort/anxiety, (t=2.16) 
c) felt that the feared consequence was significantly more likely to happen, (t=2.00). 
There were no significant differences between the subjects on the following variables: 
responsibility for their thoughts (t=0.28) or control over the threat (t=1.02). 
Correlational Analyses 
Predictions l b, 3b, 4b and 5b 
The correlations between perceived responsibility for threat and the other 
obsessional variables are shown in Table 5.10 for each condition. 
171 
Table 5.10. Pearson Product Moment Correlations between perceived 
responsibility for threat and other obsessional variables within each condition. 
HIGH RESPONSIBILITY CONDITION (Subject Alone) 
Urge to Discomfort Resp. Likelihood Control 
Neutralise /Anxiety for of threat of 
Thoughts threat 
RESPONSIb- 
. 4355** . 3793* . 1810 . 




















LOW RESPONSIBILITY CONDITION (Subject + Experimenter) 
Urge to Discomfort Resp. Likelihood Control 
Neutral- /Anxiety for of threat of 
ise Thoughts threat 
RESPONSIB-ILITY 
. 3803* . 5250** . 0631 . 
1248 . 1814 
FOR THREAT 
Urge to . 6680** . 2228 . 
2210 . 0385 
Neutralise 
------------ 
Discomfort . 2803 . 2895 . 0504 
Anxiety 
--------------------------- 
Responsibility -. 0429 -. 0054 
for Thoughts 
------------------ - - - - - - - - 
Likelihood of 
- ------- - - - - - - 
-. 0913 
Threat 
Effect of type of compulsion 
Predictions 6a and 6b 
The analyses to test the effect of the responsibility manipulation were repeated 
dividing subjects according to the type of compulsion elicited in the behavioural test- 
checking (n=16) and washing (n=10) - 
,. 
The multivariate analysis of variance was conducted. The within-subject 
factor was the responsibility condition and the between group factor was type of 
compulsion. There aas no significant main effect for the responsibility condition (F(6.19)=1.28, p>0.05) or 
for the type, of compulsion (F(6, lip 1.57, p>0.05). There was no significant interlnc"on between the 
responsibility condition and the 
type of compulsion (F(6,19)=0.68, p>0.05). 
The results comparing the different types of 
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compulsions are shown in Table 5.11. 
5.11 Effect of the Responsibility Manipulation on Different Compulsions 
Variable Subject Alone (High Responsibility for Subject + Experim enter (Low 
Threat) Respon sibility for Threat) 
Group Means Check- Wash- Mental Syrnme- Check- Wash- Mental Sym- 
and Standard ers ers rituals 
' try ers ers 
' rituals metry 
Deviation =6 n=10 n=K n=4 n=12 n=10 
Resp. for threat 52.83 74.5 64.87 76.25 37.76 ; 64.41 46.69 ; 40.00 
(39) (33) (36) (38) (34) (34) (36) (40) 
Urge to 47.50 80.50 56.25 65.00 40.55 68.76 40.00 61.25 
neutralise (34) (29) (29) (41) (33) (22) ; (36) (39) 
Discomfort/ 37.12 ; 71.00 1 40.0 47.5 33.11 ; 52.76 36.88 ; 42.50 
Anxiety (26) (30) ; (28) (34) (26) (23) (26) (31) 
Resp. for 52.07 75.00 50.0 ; 70.00 53.86 72.59 65.00 52.5 
thoughts (43) (35) (44) (36) (39) ; (24) (35) (41) 
Likelihood of 20.31 44.00 24.88 67.5 14.67 
; 38.85 10.13 71.25 
threat (23) (41) (29) (39) (14) (32) (14) (45) 
Control over 30.94 29.00 54.3 17.5 28.3 37.02 50.88 0.00 
threat (43) (41) (47) (35) (40) (33) (41) (0) 
The urge to clean was significantly higher than the urge to check both when the 
experimenter was present (t=2.36, p<0.05) and she was absent (t=2.52, p<0.05). 
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Effect on Fear Cognitions and Bodily Sensations 
Prediction 7 
Bodily Sensations 
There was no significant difference between the number of bodily sensations 
experienced in the low and high responsibility conditions (mean=3.7 in low responsibility 
condition, mean=3.8 in high responsibility condition; t=0.31). The strength of the 
endorsements in both conditions was computed as the sum of the strength of the 
endorsements of individual items. A t-test revealed no significant differences between the 
strength of endorsement in the two conditions (t=-1.16). 
Fear Cognitions 
There were no significant differences between the number of fear cognitions 
experienced in the low and high responsibility conditions (means= 1.03 and 1.08 
respectively). The strength of the cognitions was computed as the sum of the strengths of 
the endorsements of the individual items. A paired t-test showed no significant differences 
between the strength of endorsements the two conditions (t=-0.3, p<0.05). 
Summary of Results 
Prediction 1. This was fulfilled. Perceived responsibility for threat was higher when a 
subject conducted exposure in vivo with response prevention alone, than when a subject 
conducted exposure in vivo with response prevention in the presence of an experimenter. 
This provides support for the hypothesis that perceived responsibility for threat will vary 
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according to the presence/absence of an experimenter. 
Prediction 2a and 2b. These were fulfilled: the urge to perform compulsive neutralising 
behaviours was higher when undergoing exposure with response prevention in the high 
responsibility condition (subject alone) than in the low responsibility condition (subject + 
experimenter); there was a significant positive correlation between estimates of perceived 
responsibility for threat and the urge to perform compulsive 'neutralising' behaviours. This 
provides support for hypothesis 2 that There is a causal relationship between perceived 
responsibility for threat and the urge to perform compulsive 'neutralising' behaviours. 
Prediction 3. Predictions 3a and 3b were fulfilled: discomfort/anxiety was higher when 
undergoing exposure with response prevention in the high responsibility condition (subject 
alone) than in the low responsibility condition (subject + experimenter); there was a 
significant positive correlation between estimates of perceived responsibility for threat and 
discomfortlanxiety. This provides support for hypothesis 3 that there is a causal 
relationship between perceived responsibility for threat and discomfort/anxiety. 
Prediction 4. This was not fulfilled. Perceived responsibility for thoughts was no different 
when undergoing exposure with response prevention in the high responsibility condition 
(subject alone) than in the low responsibility condition (subject + experimenter); there was 
no significant positive correlation between estimates of perceived responsibility for threat 
and perceived responsibility for thoughts. There was no support for the hypothesis that 
there is a causal relationship between perceived responsibility for threat and perceived 
responsibility for thoughts. 
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Prediction 5. This prediction was fulfilled: estimations of the probability of threat were 
higher in the high responsibility condition (subject alone) than in the low responsibility 
condition (subject + experimenter) but the estimations of the controllability of threat in the 
high responsibility condition (subject alone) did not differ from those in the low 
responsibility condition (subject + experimenter); there was a significant positive 
association between responsibility for threat and estimates of the probability of threat, but 
not between responsibility for threat and estimates of the controllability of threat. This 
provides support for the hypothesis that estimations of the probability of threat are 
dependent upon perceived responsibility for threat; estimates of the controllability of 
threat are not. 
Prediction 6. This prediction was partially fulfilled. The elicited urge to check was 
significantly lower than the elicited urge to clean (i. e. it was harder to elicit the urge to 
check than the urge to clean), particularly in the low responsibility condition. However there was no 
significant interaction between the responsibility condition and the type of compulsion. 
Therefore there was some support for the hypothesis that perceived responsibility plays a 
greater role in checking compulsions than cleaning compulsions. 
Prediction 7. This was not fulfilled. There were no significant differences in the number of 
fear cognitions and bodily sensations experienced between the two conditions. The results 
did not support the hypothesis that there is a causal relationship between perceived 
responsibility for threat and the experience of anxious cognitions and fear sensations. 
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5.7.6. Discussion 
The primary aim of this study was to investigate the effect of manipulating 
responsibility on obsessional cognitions, and also on anxious cognitions and fear 
sensations. The responsibility manipulation was successful in that perceived responsibility 
for threat was higher when the subject was alone than when the experimenter was present. 
This supports the observation that the presence of the experimenter or clinician leads to a 
lack of the normal obsessive-compulsive response in OCD patients, particularly those with 
checking compulsions (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). However, the manipulation of 
responsibility was indirect, and the resulting levels were low compared to the Lopatka and 
Rachman (1995) manipulation. 
The results provide some support for the hypothesis that obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena are a function of perceived responsibility for threat, since in a condition of 
high responsibility the urge to 'neutralise', discomfort/anxiety and estimations of the 
probability of threat were all higher than in the low responsibility condition. The 
relationship between high responsibility and the urge to neutralise is directly in keeping 
with the definition of 'neutralising' as 'voluntarily initiated activity which is intended to 
have the effect of reducing the perceived responsibility' (Salkovskis, 1995). It follows 
from this that the greater the responsibility, the greater the need to reduce it by 
neutralising. Similarly, it is easy to understand the relationship between an increase in 
anxiety and an increase in perceived responsibility for threat. If a person felt as though 
he/she were personally responsible for causing a burglary, for example, by leaving a 
window open, the thought of the burglary may cause more anxiety and discomfort than 
if a person felt as though a burglary was inevitable. However, it is possible that it is 
not the increase in the perceived responsibility for threat that gives rise to elevated 
anxiety, but rather the increase in the estimation of the probability of threat. 
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The finding that a person perceives a threat to be more likely to happen in the 
high than the low responsibility condition is interesting for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, the finding ties in with Carr's (1974) and subsequent observations that people 
with OCD overestimate the probability of danger. On the other hand, Salkovskis 
(1985) suggested that it is not estimation of risk per se that is important in OCD, but 
the appraisal of intrusions as being responsible for harm. The results from the study 
indicate that these phenomena may interact. It may be that it is the appraisal of 
intrusions as being responsible for harm that leads to an increase in the estimation of 
risk. Given the direction of the manipulation (i. e., perceived responsibility was 
manipulated, resulting in an increase in the estimation of risk), this explanation is 
more plausible than the possibility that an estimation of risk leads to one feeling 
responsible for the negative outcome. The role of thought-action fusion in this 
appraisal process, and the relationship between thought-action fusion and responsibility 
may be fruitful areas for further research (see chapter 6). 
However, unlike in the Lopatka study, there was no association between 
likelihood of threat and responsibility for threat. This may be explained by the actual levels 
of perceived responsibility. In the high responsibility condition, the responsibility for 
perceived threat was still only 62 points compared to the mean responsibility level of 90 
points in the experimental manipulation of the Vancouver group. This particular 
manipulation of responsibility was less effective than that of Loptaka and Rachman (1995), 
but this was only to be expected as the manipulation was indirect as opposed to direct. 
As in the study of Lopatka and Rachman (1995), no relationship was found 
between estimates of control and perceived responsibility. The relationship between 
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control and responsibility is complex and for reasons of space cannot be examined in detail 
here. However, according to logic (but not feelings), although control can exist without 
responsibility, responsibility cannot exist without an element of control. Therefore, if a 
person has no control over an event, he/she cannot be held responsible for it. Similarly, if 
a person has much control over an event, according to logic, the responsibility of that 
person increases. One explanation for the lack of relationship between perceived 
responsibility for threat and control over it is that people with OCD may be assuming 
excessive control over all negative events, whether or not they can influence them. 
Therefore even in a low responsibility situation, subjects perceive control. In support of 
this possibility is the work on the fusion of thoughts and actions in which some people 
with OCD perceive themselves able to influence real world events by their thoughts. 
There was also no difference between the high and low responsibility conditions in 
the perceived responsibility for thoughts. Although the perceived responsibility for threat 
and thoughts were similar in the high responsibility conditions, the presence of the 
experimenter did not decrease perceived responsibility for thoughts in the same way that it 
reduced the perceived responsibility for threat. On my asking the question about how 
responsible the subjects felt for their thoughts, many looked at me as though I were mad! 
The presence of another person may reduce the perceived responsibility for threat because 
another person can take action to prevent the threat, such as making sure the door is 
locked, but seemingly cannot alter the perceived responsibility for thoughts. This makes 
intuitive sense. 
The differences between people with checking and cleaning compulsions were 
interesting. The presence of the experimenter did reduce the responsibility for threat in 
'checkers' more than 'cleaners'. It may be that responsibility is less important for people 
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concerned with contaminating themselves, who fear that they themselves will become ill 
through contaminants, than for cleaners who fear contaminating others and being 
responsible for someone else becoming ill. Unfortunately in this study, the numbers were 
too small to allow for refined analysis of that nature, but future studies designed to 
specifically assess responsibility in people with cleaning compulsions would be valuable. 
Fear cognitions and body sensations experienced did not change between 
conditions of high and low responsibility. Since fear cognitions and body sensations are 
responsive to changes in anxiety, this finding provides some support for the suggestion 
that, although both anxiety and responsibility are different between the two conditions, 
what is crucial in determining the obsessional variables is the level of responsibility. The 
finding supports the assertion that the effect of responsibility on obsessionality is fairly 
specific, and does not work through the more general mechanism of anxiety. 
Further work is needed in this area. The differential role of responsibility 
according to the types of compulsions - people who check, clean and other obsessional 
phenomenological groups - would prove a fruitful area to explore. Similarly, the 
relationship between cognitive biases, responsibility and thought-action fusion warrants 
further investigations. Studies investigating thought-action fusion can be found in chapter 
6. 
5.7.7. Summary 
Perceived responsibility for threat was manipulated by varying the 
presence/absence of an experimenter. In the high responsibility condition (subject alone), 
the urge to neutralise, discomfort/anxiety and estimates of the probability of threat were all 
higher than in the low responsibility condition (subject + experimenter). Responsibility for 
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thoughts and perceived control over the threat remained unchanged in the different 
conditions. There were significant associations between the level of perceived 
responsibility for threat and (i) the urge to neutralise, and (ii) discomfort/anxiety. No 
significant positive correlations were found between perceived responsibility for threat and 
(i) estimates of the likelihood of threat, (ii) perceived control over the threat and (iii) 
responsibility for thoughts. The responsibility manipulation interacted significantly with 
the type of compulsion elicited; the presence of the experimenter did not reduce perceived 
responsibility for threat in the cleaners as much as for checkers. Fear cognitions and 
bodily sensations did not change significantly between conditions, indicating that the 
effects on obsessional variables of the manipulation of responsibility are fairly specific and 
are unlikely to work solely through anxiety mechanisms. 
5.8. General Discussion 
The aim of the three studies was to test the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD 
and elucidate the role of perceived responsibility in obsessional complaints. The crux of 
the cognitive-behavioural hypothesis is that intrusive cognitions are interpreted in such a 
manner that the patients perceives themselves to be potentially responsible for harm to 
themselves or others unless they take action to prevent it. The first study did not provide 
support for the suggestion that obsessional complaints are associated with perceived 
responsibility in general. This does not undermine the model, since perceived 
'responsibility for harm' has consistently been the only domain which has been considered 
to be important in the model. However, the model would predict the subscale 
'responsibility for harm' to be associated with obsessional complaints, and for the high 
MOCI scorers to show more perceived responsibility for harm than low MOCI scorers. 
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The final I study showed that changes in perceived responsibility for threat resulted in 
changes in the urge to neutralise, discomfort/anxiety and estimates of the probability of 
harm. This was particularly true of people with checking compulsions, and directly 
supports the assertion that the purpose of neutralising is to reduce perceived responsibility 
second 
(Salkovskis, 1995). The .. study indicated that there was a specific association 
between 
pathological responsibility and obsessional variables. 
Overall, these studies can be considered to have tested and elucidated the role of 
responsibility in obsessional complaints. In the latter two studies, it appeared as though 
perceived responsibility was more important in checking compulsions than washing 
compulsions. 
The major findings of the present studies have important implications, both for 
future research into OCD and for clinical practice. There is no good measure of 
responsibility appraisal, despite the development of a series of questionnaires, some more 
successful than others (Gledhill, 1992; Rheaume et al., 1995; Rachman et al., 1995). A 
new measure is currently under development in Oxford (Salkovskis, Wroe et al., 1995). 
This measure is specific and is designed to assess interpretation of, and reaction to, 
intrusive thoughts. In particular, interpretations of cognitions in terms of responsibility for 
harm is assessed, for example 'I could be responsible for harm', 'It would be irresponsible 
to ignore these thoughts'. Interpretation of cognitions in terms of emotions is also 
assessed, e. g. 'I'll feel awful unless I do something about this thought'. Questions also 
relate to TAF and the relationship between thoughts and actions in the real world e. g. 
'Thinking this could make it happen'. Subjects are asked to rate how often they interpret 
their thoughts in terms of responsibility for harm, and their belief in this interpretation. 
This questionnaire is much more closely related to the cognitive-behavioural model 
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than the RAQ. The questionnaire is specific and free of obsessional content, since it is up 
to subjects write down their own intrusions. However, it is also important to find a 
balance between testing theoretical assumptions of the model, and merely describing the 
phenomenon. 
The results indicate that the model may be more closely applicable to compulsive 
checking than compulsive cleaning behaviours. This has important implications, and 
stands in need of explanation. It is clear that in some patients with contamination fears, 
responsibility for passing contaminants onwards is an important feature of the disorder. 
Yet, in others, the disorder appears to be closely related to phobias (see Hodgson and 
Rachman, 1980). Further studies are needed with larger samples to determine whether 
this finding is robust. If it is, a number of theoretical predictions arise: - 
cleaners/washers with low perceived responsibility for threat will be more 
concerned about contaminating themselves than others. 
cleaners/washers with high perceived responsibility for threat will be concerned 
about contaminating others as well as themselves. 
cleaners/washers with high perceived responsibility for threat are more likely to 
have checking compulsions than those with low perceived responsibility for threat. 
If perceived responsibility differs between those with washing and checking 
compulsions, it follows from the third study that guilt, depression and anxiety may also 
differ. It may be that washers experience more of an anxious/depressive guilt, perhaps for 
failing to live up to one's own moral (and other) standards; on the other hand, the guilt 
that characterises checkers may result from perceived responsibility for a negative event. 
Although clearly related to each other, guilt that results from perceived responsibility for a 
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negative event may differ in the following ways from depressive guilt (Berrios et al., 
1992): - 
Guilt resulting from Perceived Responsibility 
for a negative event 
Depressive Guilt 
Restorative Action possible No possible restorative action 
Specific (relating to event) General (relating to person) 
Triggered by intrusion No identifiable trigger 
Concrete punishment imminent No specific punishment 
More 'cognitive' More 'mood/feeling' 
It is suggested that the relationship between perceived responsibility for threat and 
its emotional sequelae should be explored in future studies. 
Clinically, the studies have important implications for treatment. The presence of 
another person appears to reduce perceived responsibility for the threat in people with 
checking compulsions. Therefore, in a graded hierarchy of exposure in vivo with response 
prevention, the presence of the experimenter should be considered. It may be that 
exposure exercises in the clinic should be undertaken with the expe rimenter absent in 
order to elicit the urge to neutralise and expose the patient to the feared stimuli. Issues of 
perceived responsibility for threat should be addressed in therapy, particularly for checkers 
and perhaps those with fears of contaminating other people. Finally, the studies have 
identified a cognitive bias which has clinical implications and is potentially of importance 
to our conceptual understanding of the disorder. This bias of TAF warrants further 
investigation in order to determine its prevalence amongst patients with OCD, and the 
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normal population. The effects of the bias on obsessional symptoms is also of interest and 
future studies should aim to elucidate the effects of manipulating TAF on obsessional 
complaints. 
5.9. Summary 
Three studies were conducted to explore the nature of perceived responsibility and 
its relationship to obsessional complaints. The conclusion from the first study was that, if 
responsibility is important in obsessional complaints, it is a specific type of responsibility, 
and that the data did not support the importance of the broad concept of responsibility in 
obsessional complaints. One of the subscales of responsibility, thought-action fusion 
(TAF), was found to be related to obsessional complaints in a reliable manner, and future 
work in the area of TAF was suggested. The second study manipulated perceived 
responsibility for threat by varying the presence/absence of the experimenter. This 
manipulation was successful, and subjects had a significantly greater urges to neutralise, 
discomfort/anxiety and estimates of the probability of harm in the high than the low 
responsibility condition. Controllability of threat and perceived responsibility for thoughts 
did not vary between conditions. The responsibility manipulation was more successful in 
people with checking compulsions than those with cleaning compulsions, since the 
presence of another person did not appear to reduce the perceived responsibility for threat 
in this latter group. The final study used a measure of pathological responsibility, and 
there was evidence of a significant, specific relationship between this measure and 
checking behaviours. There was also a significant association between guilt and 
pathological responsibility. 
In sum, these three studies have served to test and develop the cognitive- 
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behavioural model of OCD. The studies also indicated that the cognitive bias of TAF 
would be a fruitful area for future research. The next study therefore was designed to 
explore the nature of thought-action fusion in an obsessional population. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Thought Action Fusion 
"I also have the fear that my thoughts may harm someone" (CM). 
6.1. Introduction 
In the psychometric study to design a general measure of responsibility, one of the 
most interesting findings was that the subscale of Thought Action Fusion (TAF) was highly 
reliable and strongly associated with obsessionality. In this chapter, the concept of TAF is 
explored. TAF is considered within the cognitive-behavioural (C-B) model of OCD and the 
relationship between TAF and perceived responsibility, anxiety and guilt is outlined. A large 
psychometric investigation of TAF is reported, and the findings considered within the 
theoretical framework of the C-B model. Two case studies of people with TAF are given to 
illustrate this phenomenon in an obsessional population. The chapter concludes by discussing 
future research that could be done to examine the importance of TAF in OCD. 
6.2. Thought Action Fusion: The concept 
At first glance, it appears strange that an intrusive thought (e. g., about harm coming to 
a loved one) can prompt a series of apparently unrelated behaviours, such as touching a 
specific object three times, or carrying out another ritual. However, this phenomenon is not 
restricted to an obsessional population, since early results indicate that physical action can 
neutralise intrusive thoughts. 
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The broad question about the relationship between internal and external events will not 
be discussed at length. Rather the specific connection between unwanted intrusive thoughts 
and how they relate to the real world is the topic under investigation. One of the 
propositions set out by Salkovskis (1985) in his exposition of the C-B model of OCD was that 
some patients may have the dysfunctional assumption that 'a thought is like an action' 
(Salkovskis, 1985, p. 574). This dysfunctional assumption is rather broad and a number of 
possibilities remained open. It is possible that people with OCD: 
do not discriminate between thoughts and actions at all e. g. if I think of harming a 
child, I actually harmed a child. 
2 evaluate the occurrence and content of thoughts and actions in the same way, e. g. if I 
think about harming a child, this is as bad as actually harming a child. 
3 retrospectively confuse thoughts and actions e. g. did I really harm a child or did I only 
think about harming a child? 
4 believe that there is an indirect association between thoughts and actions e. g. if I think 
about harming a child, this makes it more likely that I will harm a child. 
S believe that there is a direct association between thoughts and actions e. g. 
believe that thoughts mean they should carry out an action directly, as in patients 
with schizophrenia who hear voices telling them to 'kill' e. g. if I think about harming a 
child, I should harm a child. 
The clinical phenomena and research evidence exclude the first and last options from 
being the sort of fusion between thoughts and actions that characterise this disorder 
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(Rachman, 1993; Bolton, 1995). The retrospective fusion between thoughts and actions is 
apparent in the doubting that plagues people with OCD (Rasmussen and Eisen, 1991) and it 
would be confusing to term this phenomenon'TAF as opposed to doubting. Therefore, 
Rachman (1993) defined two types of TAF. 
The first type of TAF will be termed 'moral' TAF and is defined as: - 
The psychological phenomenon in which unacceptable thoughts and forbidden actions are 
interpreted as morally equivalent. The person feels that his or her unacceptable thoughts, 
images or impulses are (almost) as bad as the event. For example, if a carer experiences the 
unwanted thought that she is going to stab an elderly patient in her care, she is likely to feel 
(almost) as morally reprehensible as if she had harmed the elderly patient in reality. 
The second type of TAF will be termed 'likelihood' TAF and is defined as: - 
the belief that thinking about an unacceptable or disturbing event makes it more likely to 
happen in reality. For example, if a husband experiences the intrusive thought of his wife 
being in a car accident, he is likely to feel that his wife is at greater risk of having a car 
accident, because he has had the thought. 
6.3. TAF and the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD 
The C-B model of OCD emphasizes the role of anxiety, guilt and perceived 
responsibility for threat (see chapter 2). It was recently hypothesised that the psychological 
fusion of thoughts and actions may be a common factor in obsessions, responsibility and guilt 
(Rachman, 1993), serving to inflate the significance of intrusive thoughts. The relationship 
between TAF and anxiety is open to speculation, but it is not difficult to see how a person 
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who believes in the 'likelihood' type of TAF in particular will become anxious when an 
intrusive thought occurs. Having TAF imbues the thought with anxiety-provoking qualities 
which in turn makes the intrusions harder to dismiss, more frequent etc. (Butler et al., 1995). 
The moral TAF may be more closely related to depression than anxiety. Since depression is 
closely related to OCD and anxiety (Karno et al., 1988), it may be that the moral TAF also 
gives rise to anxiety. Alternatively, being anxious may increase TAF, since people may 
believe that they would not feel such a high level of anxiety on the occurrence of the 
significant thought, unless they were causing the action in some way by their cognitions. 
Similarly, a high level of anxiety may be interpreted as evidence that the person is 'bad' for 
having had the unwanted thought and is (almost) as bad as he/she would be if the action had 
been carried out. 
The relationship between TAF and guilt may be similar to that of anxiety. Both types 
of TAF could lead a person to feelextremely guilty. A belief in the 'likelihood' TAF would 
lead to feelings of guilt owing to the potential for harming a loved one. This is closely 
associated with a perception of responsibility. A belief in the 'moral' TAF would almost 
directly raise levels of guilt on the occurrence of an intrusive thought. As with anxiety, the 
process may be two-way, as high levels of guilt could lead to the belief 'I must be bad' since 
the person may seek an explanation as to why he/she is experiencing such high levels of guilt. 
If the person perceives that guilt levels could not be any higher if the action had been carried 
out, this may increase any moral TAF that may be present. Similarly, feeling very guilty 
could lead to the assumption that the person in some way increased the chances of the event 
happening by his/her intrusive thoughts. It is probable that feelings of guilt will be directly 
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associated with feeling of perceived responsibility, as discussed in chapter 5. 
TAF can be seen most clearly within the C-B model when considering the association 
between TAF and responsibility. Salkovskis suggests that the link between the occurrence of 
a cognitive intrusion and the need for action is the misinterpretation of the cognition that the 
person may be responsible for harm unless action is taken to prevent it. TAF, in particular the 
likelihood type, may be a fundamental part of the catastrophic misinterpretation 'I am 
responsible for harm'. Salkovskis (1985) specified that the misinterpretation involves 'an 
inflated belief in the probability of being the cause of serious harm to others or self (p. 575. 
original emphasis). A person is liable to believe that he/she has contributed to being the cause 
of the negative event, if he/she believes that the probability of a negative event is increased by 
thinking about it. A strong belief in TAF may even lead a person to believe that he/she has 
pivotal responsibility for the negative outcome (Rheaume et al. 1995). Having assumed (some) 
responsibility for potentially causing a negative event, the person may assume (some) 
responsibility for preventing that negative event from occurring, particularly when the event 
may be the death of a loved one. The steps that a person may take to prevent the negative 
event from occurring may be to remove the power of the intrusive thought by internal 
neutralising, such as repeating an intrusive thought with DOES NOT' a certain number of 
times after the intrusive thought, 'I hope my mother dies'. Thus some examples of mental 
neutralising can be seen as a reverse form of TAF: the person attempts to influence real world 
events by effortfully changing his/her cognitions. Checking behaviours may be a form of 
external neutralising which could arise from TAF. If a person experienced the intrusive 
thought that the gas was on, and believed that thinking about this may have increased the 
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chance of the gas being left on, checking that the gas is off is a means by which the effects of 
the cognition may be counteracted. 
6.4. TAF and the Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
The C-B model predicts that TAF is associated with obsessionality, whereas the 'basal 
ganglia deficit' model does not necessarily predict an association between TAF and 
obsessionality. Another difference between these models is that TAF would be considered to 
be on a continuum with normal behaviour. That is, TAF would be predicted to occur in the 
normal population, although to a lesser extent than in an obsessional sample. However, the 
basal ganglia deficit model assumes that 'deficits' are abnormal and do not occur unless a 
biological system is not functioning correctly. 
6.5. Case Illustrations of TAF 
Tallis (1994) has described two cases who experienced TAF, obsessions, 
responsibility `,, and guilt. These two cases reported having simultaneously experienced a 
negative event and an unwanted intrusive thought. After the occurrence of the event, the 
person interpreted subsequent occurrences of her intrusions as signalling the possibility of 
future disaster unless action was taken to prevent it. The subject: - 
'Had enormous difficulty distinguishing thought from action. For example, she would 
become extremely distressed after preparing meals for the elderly, thinking that she may have 
unwittingly mixed a poisonous substance into their food. These thoughts were particularly 
troublesome when the S was given more responsibility than usual, for example when taking 
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her wards on an outing. Exploration of the origins of this characteristic revealed a critical 
learning incident. As a child she had been continually sexually abused by her father. When 
she was 15 years of age, she recalled forming an intense wish that he would'go' or be'taken 
away', and prayed to this effect. Within a week, her father was involved in a rail 'accident'. 
He was instantly killed. There was some suspicion of suicide. Thereafter, the S experienced 
extreme guilt` and self-blame. This guilt was so unbearable that she reported wanting to die. 
In later life, she experienced several occasions when she thought about 'disasters' 
which were subsequently reported in the media , Although she did not feel that she was the 
cause of these disasters, they served to reinforce her belief that mental events and events in the 
real world bore a close relationship to each other' (Tallis, 1994). 
In this study, two people had TAF and consented to an informal interview about their 
beliefs concerning thoughts and actions. These two cases are described below: - 
Case 1 
KP is a caucasian married woman who volunteered to participate in our research 
project into OCD. She is in her mid-thirties, married with no children. She has never sought 
help for her difficulties. She openly stated that when she has a bad thought about her parents 
dying, she feels as though she has to perform a ritual (usually touching things or going over 
things in a certain way) in order to stop the bad thing happening. If she does not do this, she 
said that she would feel responsible if something bad happened to her parents, and that she 
does the rituals so that, if something bad did happen to her family, it would not be her fault. 
During the exposure exercise, KP expressed her belief that thinking about a bad event, 
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such as her parents dying, could increase the chance of the event happening. She consented to 
go into further detail. 
She expressed the belief that there was something inside her which she and her sister 
had termed the 'devil'. This devil was part of her. The bad thought about her parents' deaths 
would come into her head and immediately trigger off this 'devil', whose powers could extend 
and influence the event and make the car crash. She did not truly believe in the presence of 
the 'devil', and I suggested the word 'vibe' may be more appropriate than devil and she agreed. 
She said that it was as though the thought triggered off a vibe, and it was the vibe that had an 
effect on the real world and could somehow make the car crash. 
From her talking, I had the picture in my mind that this vibe was like a beam radiating 
from her. When I asked if this was the case, she said that it was sometimes like this, but that 
it wasn't always the case that the thought would trigger the'vibe' or devil and the devil would 
work its influence. This only happened when she was thinking about something like her 
parents having a crash on their forthcoming journey. Sometimes the thought would just come 
that she had to touch something to stop something bad from happening, and in that way she 
could act to stop the devil, although she did not have anything to do with setting the devil of 
By this time, she was a little confused, and said that, with some thoughts that she had, 
she could influence things by triggering off the devil and thus she could affect real world events 
by means of her thoughts. However, sometimes she could only act to stop the vibe/devil. She 
said that performing the ritual served to postpone the devil, but that she could never banish it 
completely. Sometimes doing something once would not be enough to postpone the vibe, but 
she would have to do it over and over before it could be broken. 
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I asked about the limits and the power of this devil/vibe and whether or not it could 
make good things happen. She said that it could, for example, .. make 
her confident, but 
she was uncertain as to whether that was her or the power of the vibe/devil. She said that if 
she had good thoughts, t hen that could make her confidentwhich would send out signals to the 
world and make the day go well. It was more often, t hough, that she could stop the bad thing 
happening by intercepting the vibe/devil and carrying out the ritual to break its power. 
Throughout the interview she maintained that she knew rationally that she did not have this 
power and it made her feel guilty to talk in this way, as it almost sounded 'egocentric'. 
I asked whether there was a specific incident whereby something she had thought in 
the past had coincided with something happening to someone in reality. She recalled being 
told to rub the stomach of a Buddha which was in her parents' home, and making a wish. She 
wished to pass her 11+ examination and she did. She also recalls rubbing the stomach and 
wishing that her father, who was an alcoholic, would not drink. Her father continued to abuse 
alcohol despite the wish. However, this was discounted by KP, who said that it was as 
though her father still drank because of some ritual that she had failed to perform properly. 
KP recalled that she had thought as a child that something she did or did not do might 
have an influence on her father's drinking. She was uncertain as to whether her rituals had any 
effect in reality. She said that, when something bad did happen, such as her brother-in-law 
having cancer, she did not feel responsible for the event but did feel as though her actions 
could affect the outcome of treatment. Hence she performed rituals in order that his test 
results may be clear, and they were. She said that she knew rationally that this was ridiculous 
as she did not have that sort of power to make things happen, but she still felt as though she 
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had some influence. 
Case 2 
CM is a 42 caucasian married woman with one daughter. Initially she was extremely 
anxious during the interview but gradually relaxed throughout the assessment. She has 
received in-patient psychiatric treatment for her obsessional difficulties but is not currently 
taking medication. 
During the assessment she spontaneously talked about having to follow a positive 
thoughtby a negative thought in case she was tempting fate. She also said that thinking about 
something did increase the chance of its happening. When asked to explain a little more about 
this, she said that it was 'safer' to say something negative becaus, e if she said something 
positive, then it would not come true as a punishment for her wishing it. If she wished 
something, then this could affect Tate'. She was uncertain of the role of God in fate, saying 
that she did not believe in God, but did not rule out the possibility that He controls fate. 
Examples of C. M. influencing fate were given. If C. M. had not turned up for the 
interview, then I may have gone somewhere and been hit by a car. It was not the case that she 
thought the reverse, in that her arriving had had a good effect and prevented me from having 
an accident. She reported that she did not know the outcome of things, so she never knew 
whether she had stopped something bad, but she felt as though she could be instrumental in 
bringing about a bad event. 
Fate was described as a chain reaction in which you do something and that has a 
knock-on effect in many other places. If CM made a suggestion, then that suggestion could 
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alter fate and have a bad outcome. She said that she did not want to make suggestions, so if 
something bad happened, she would not have any responsibility for it. She had had a stillborn 
baby and although she rationally knows that she was not responsible for this, she still feels if 
only'. Rumination about chains of events was a major feature of CM's obsessional complaint. 
Fate could be influenced by bargaining with God. Fate/God was described as a 
supernatural force, and she spoke of the'Established Law of the Universe'. For example, if a 
library book had been contaminated in some way by CM and then returned to the library, the 
person reading the book afterwards might die because of the contamination. As a punishment 
to CM for returning the book (without consideration for the person who may die), her family 
would be struck down and killed. Thus she would be directly responsible for a stranger's 
death and her family would be killed as a punishment. When asked to explain this, CM said 
that it was just the way that it was, as though it were a Law of the Universe. This law 
dictated that something bad would happen on the 13th day of the month, and that something 
bad would happen if she did not touch wood and carry out her compulsions. 
Similarly, CM had the idea that, if she did something for herself as part of an exposure 
+ response prevention programme (for example try on clothes in a shop), and accidentally 
contaminated the clothes, then God would punish her. It was as though, by trying to get 
well by doing exposure exercises, she would hurt other people and God would therefore 
intervene and something bad would happen to the person trying on clothes and also to a 
member of CM's family. It was assumed that by doing anything for herself, she would cause 
harm to others. 
Other examples were more directly religious in orientation. If CM swore something 
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on someone's life and broke the oath, then there would be divine retribution which would kill 
the person whose life she swore on. If she swore on the life of someone who was not a family 
member, she would be more anxious about breaking it, because they would die and CM's 
family would be killed as punishment. The theme of punishment featured a lot in the 
interview. CM reported that she felt as though at times 'the whole universe is pitted against 
me', and that she suffered from'the ultimate paranoia'. 
When asked whether anything in the past had happened when she altered the outcome 
of things, CM talked about the death of her mother. She said that she had been due to visit 
her mother on the weekend of her death, but had cancelled because she was having 
obsessional difficulties. That weekend, her mother went out for a walk with her sister and her 
brother in-law and her mother was killed. CM considers her mother's death her fault because, 
if she had gone to see her that weekend as planned, her mother would not have gone for a 
walk, as CM would have been about to catch the train home at that time. She also mentioned 
that, in her childhood, CM's sister had said 'I wish you were dead' and CM had retorted 'I 
could kill you'. CM was reprimanded by her mother, who told her that what she had said was 
worse than that which her sister had said. 
If CM said anything positive, she would always be compelled to say something 
negative to avoid the punishment of the good thing not happening. If she said anything 
negative, then this does not have any effect most of the time. God/fate could be bargained 
with. Although CM recognised the 'punishment' and bargaining to be irrational, she 
maintained that it was reasonable that fate could be influenced and the course of events 
changed by both her actions and her thoughts. 
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6.5.1. Comment 
Both these cases illustrate the phenomenon of'Thought-Action Fusion'. In both cases, 
thoughts could be discriminated from thoughts and actions in that having a thought could 
influence an event, but thoughts and events were not indistinguishable. The occurrence and 
content of the thoughts and actions were evaluated in the same way, and both cases reported 
believing that there was an indirect association between thoughts and actions either through 
the 'devil/vibes' or'God/The Established Law of the Universe'. Neither case believed that 
there was a direct association between thoughts and actions, as in patients who suffer from 
schizophrenia. There is some data to support the suggestion that a sub-set of people with 
OCD have over-valued ideas and schizophrenia-like delusions ( Eisen and Rasmussen, 1993; 
Stanley et al., 1990; Lewis et al., 1991; Tallis and Shafran, 1995). Recent data also suggest 
a common information processing deficit (Beech and Enright, 1994; Peters et al., 1994). 
However, the incidence of schizophrenia in people with OCD is no higher than that expected 
for the general population (Rachman and Hodgson, 1980) and a recent review concluded that 
'the rates of schizophrenia among those with OCD do not indicate a special association of 
these disorders' (Kozak and Foa, 1994, p. 347). In the cases described, there was insight into 
the the beliefs, albeit fluctuating. This is consistent with the view that the beliefs are typical of 
OCD, as opposed to being the fixed delusions that characterise schizophrenia. 
6.6. A study of Thought Action Fusion 
In addition to describing cases, empirical research was conducted into TAP. This 
work was carried out in conjunction with Jack Rachman and Dana Thordarson. I was 
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involved in data collection and analysis for the obsessional sample, and in writing up the 
results of the study for publication (Rachman, Shafran and Thordarson, 1995). Jack 
Rachman led the research team and designed the questionnaire; Dana Thordarson was 
involved in data collection for the student population, and in data analysis and writing up 
the results for publication. 
6.6.1. Background 
It has been argued that some patients with OCD experience TAF in which 
intrusive thoughts are interpreted as having special significance. TAF is suggested to be 
a phenomenon which occurs in the normal population, and is related to obsessions, 
responsibility and guilt (Rachman, 1993). Two case studies have been reported which 
support the construct of TAF (Talfis, 1993). 
An earlier psychometric study in students had used four questions to form a TAF 
subscale within a responsibility appraisal questionnaire (Rachman et al. 1995). The 
following conclusions were made with respect to TAF: - 
1 The TAF subscale was reliable 
2A minority of a normal population believed in both the likelihood and moral type 
of TAF. 
3 Subjects would endorse one TAF statement, but not the others. Therefore TAF 
was specific to the content of the statment and was not a general bias applied to 
all situations. 
4 Fewer than half the participants disagreed with any of the statements. 
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5 TAF was strongly associated with obsessionality (Rachman et al. 1995). 
The encouraging results of that study led to a need to develop a full TAF 
questionnaire, separating out the different types of TAF, and TAF for different types of 
thoughts. The previous subscale of four items had only included one addressing the moral 
TAF ('For me, having a mean thought is as bad as doing something mean'); two had addressed 
the likelihood TAF ('If I have a thought about something happening to an acquaintance, it may 
bring them bad luck'; 'My mean thoughts wishing a person harm can increase the chance of 
something harmful happening to him/her'). The fourth question was a mixture of both types 
of TAF ('My mean thoughts can have the same consequences as my mean actions'). A new, 
fuller measure of TAF was needed to address the question of whether this phenomenon 
occurred in the normal population, whether it occurred more in the obsessional population, 
and to explore the relationship between types of TAF and obsessionality. 
6.6.2. Aims 
The aims of the study were 
1. To develop a refined and reliable measure of TAP. 
2. To compare TAF in obsessional and non-clinical samples. 
3. To explore the relationship between TAF and measures of obsessionality. 
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6.6.3. Hypotheses and Predictions 
Hypothesis 1 
In obsessional subjects TAF occurs at one end of a continuum of TAF. 
Prediction ]a 
The factor structure of the TAF questionnaire will be similar across both a normal and 
obsessional population. 
Prediction Ih 
Thought-action fusion occurs more often in an obsessional population than in the normal 
population. 
Hypothesis 2 
TAF is related to obsessionality 
Prediction 2 
There will be a positive correlation between TAF and measures of obsessionality in the normal 




190 undergraduate students at the University of British Columbia participated in a 
questionnaire study in exchange for 1 course credit. The sample was 65% female, mean age 
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19 years. The response rate was 81%. 
Obsessional Population 
225 questionnaires were distributed to individuals who were suffering from obsessive 
compulsive symptoms. The subjects had all responded to requests for participants to help 
research OCD and had scored above a clinical cut-off of 11 on the Maudsley Obsessive- 
Compulsive Inventory (MOCI: Hodgson and Rachman, 1977). 
21 questionnaires were returned blank with various explanations (including one person 
who no longer thought she had OCD); 2 were excluded as not having OCD or ever having 
had OCD, 1 was excluded as returned with only 2 questionnaires partly filled in, 1 was 
excluded as it was returned too late. 
147 completed questionnaires were returned (response rate 65.3%). Of those, 38 were 
men (26%), 109 were women(74%). The mean age of the sample was 38 years (range 16-70). 
Measures 
The TAF Scale (see appendix 2). This scale included 13 questions to evaluate the fusion 
of thoughts and actions in terms of morality (e. g 'having a blasphemous thought is almost as 
sinful as a blasphemous action'). 7 questions were used to assess the belief in TAF of negative 
events happening to a friend (e. g. 'if I think of a friend failing a test, this increases the risk that 
he/she will fail a test'); 6 questions assessed TAF of negative events happening to oneself 
(e. g. 'if I think of myself failing a test, this increases the risk that I will fail a test'); 4 questions 
asked about TAF of positive events happening to a friend (e. g. 'if I think of a relative/friend 
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winning the lottery, this increases the chance that he will win'); 4 questions asked about TAF 
of positive events happening to oneself (e. g. 'if I think of myself winning the lottery, this 
increases the chance that I will win'). Scores were O'disagree strongly', 1 'disagree', 2 
'neutral', 3 'agree' and 4'agree strongly'. No items were reverse scored. 
Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory (MOCI: Hodgson and Rachman, 1977). This 
is a 30 item True-False inventory to measure obsessive-compulsive symptoms. 
Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck, 1967). This is a 21 item scale which has been 
widely used in the measure of depression. 
Checking Questionnaire (Based on Sher et al., 1983). The questionnaire comprised 23 
statements of checking behaviour. Subjects were required to rate the frequency with which 
they carried out these checking behaviours using a5 point scale (O=not at all; 4= very often). 
6.6.5. Results 
Reliabilities 
The internal consistency of the full TAF scale was high for both samples (Cronbach's 
alpha=0.94 for the students, 0.96 for the obsessional group). 
Factor Structure 
A principal components factor analysis with a varimax rotation was performed on the 
TAP items separately for each sample. The best solution for the student sample was a 3- 
factor solution which accounted for 61.6% of the variance. The moral type of TAF emerged 
as a cohesive factor accounting for 14.5% of the variance. The likelihood type of TAP was 
split into 2 factors: TAP events for other people ('other likelihood') accounting for 37.4% of 
the variance, and TAF for events happening to oneself ('self likelihood') accounting for 9.8% 
of the variance. A Pearson Product-moment correlation coefficient showed aa significant 
association between other likelihood TAF and Moral 
TAF, and the self likelihood TAF and Moral TAF 
(r=0.50 and r=0.41 respectively, p<0.01). 
The best solution for the obsessional sample, however, was a 2-factor solution which 
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accounted for a similarly high 61.1 % of the variance. The moral type of TAF accounted for 
15% and the likelihood type for 46.1%. A 3-factor solution in the obsessional group had poor 
simple structure, and the likelihood factor did not divide into other vs self as in the student 
sample. However, there was a tendency for TAF of positive events to separate from TAF of 
negative events. Pearson's correlation coefficient for the two subscales was significant 
(r=0.49, p<0.01). 
Table 6.1. shows the item loadings for both groups on two factors (i. e. 
combining the different types of likelihood TAF for the student sample for the purposes of 
comparison with the obsessional population). An item was considered to load on a factor if 
the factor loading coefficient >0.5). 
Cable 6.1. The Two-Factor Solution of the TAF Questi onnaire. 
Factor Loading 
FACTOR 1 (LIKELIHOOD) 




he/she will lose her job 





risk that he/she will have a car accident 





fail a test 





will pass the test 




chance that he/she will inherit a lot of money 




will have a fall and be injured 




chance that he/she will obtain a desirable job 
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Table 6.1 contd.. Factor Loading 
FACTOR 1 (LIKELIHOOD) 
Obsessionals Students 
If I think of myself being in a car accident, this increases the risk that I 
. 773 . 
517 
will have a car accident 




that I will have a lot of money 




his/her relationship will end 




risk that he/she will come to harm 




chance that he will win 




will fall ill 





risk that he/she will have a fall and be injured 




come to harm 
If I think of myself falling ill, this increases the risk that I will fall ill . 
679 (. 329) 
If I think of myself losing my job, this increases the risk that I will lose . 
678 (. 3 98) 
my job 





If I think of myself failing a test, this increases the risk that I will fail a 
. 
638 (. 329) 
test 
If I think of myself passing a test, this increases the chance that I will , 
582 (. 241) 
pass a test 
If I think of myself obtaining a desirable job, this increases the chance 
. 
580 (. 224) 
that I will inherit a lot of money 
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Table 6.1. cntd.. The Two-Factor Solution of the TAF Questionnaire. 
Factor Loading 
FACTOR 2 (MORAL ) 
Obsessionals Students 








carrying out a nasty action 





as bad as doing it 




as unaccepable as actually saying it 




me as actually swearing 










almost as sinful as actually doing it 









unacceptable to me as actually cheating 





















To fully explore group differences the likelihood component was divided along two 
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dimensions, other/self and negative/positive. Therefore the TAF scale was divided into 5 
subscales for analysis - the moral subscale, other-negative, other-positive, self-negative, self- 
positive. This is justifiable since the purpose of the analyses was to fully explore the data and 
the factor solutions were different for the two different samples. A Hotelling's T2 revealed 
significant overall differences between the groups on the 5 TAF subscales (F(5,308)=20.10, 
p<0.001). This was followed up by independent groups t-tests for each subscale. The mean 
scores of the TAF subscales in the obsessional and student samples are given in Table 6.2 




















*p<0.05; ** p<0.01. 
People in the obsessional sample differed most from the student sample on the other- 
negative subscale of TAF. Of note, the mean_scores did not indicate that the obsessional 
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group were stating that they believed strongly in TAF; rather, they disagreed with TAF 
statements less than the student group. However, 35% of the obsessional groups said that 
they agreed or agreed strongly with at least one example of TAF compared to 19% of the 
student group who agreed/agreed strongly with a TAF item. The responses of both groups to 
the individual items can be seen in Figure 6.1. 
Figure 6.1. Item by Item Response to the TAF Questionnaire: Obsessional and 
Student Populations 
211 
Associations with Measures of Obsessionality 
Prediction 2 
Pearson's correlation coefficients were calculated to determine the strength of 
association between obsessional variables and the moral and likelihood types of TAF. 
(The likelihood subscales were not examined separately as such numerous analyses would 
be less interpretable). Owing to the high number of coefficients being computed, alpha 
was set at p<0.01. 










Checking total 0.30* 
Obsessional Sample 
(n=147) 











0.27* 1 0.39* 








All significant correlations remained significant when the effects of depression 
were partialled out. Since TAF is itself a reaction to an unacceptable thought, it is 
perhaps unsurprising that TAF was highly correlated in both samples with other responses 
(such as 
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feeling ashamed, guilty or that deep down I really wish to be mean on the occurrence of a 
'nasty thought about someone else'). 
As in the use of the MOCI in the investigation of anxiety (chapter 3), it is possible that 
the correlations with the MOCI are lower in an obsessional sample than in a student sample, 
because of the restricted range of the MOCI scores in the obsessional group (All totals >1 I 
and the majority totals <24). 
The correlations were mostly consistent across the two samples, with the exception 
that likelihood TAF was not related to washing behaviour in the clinical sample, and was in 
the student sample. In both samples, the likelihood TAF was more strongly associated with 
checking behaviour than the moral TAF. Of particular interest is the strong relationship 
between behavioural responses to images and impulses (as opposed to the occurrence of the 
images and impulses per se) and the belief in TAF. 
Analyses were conducted in the obsessional sample dividing subjects into those with 
exclusively washing compulsions (n=24), and those with exclusively checking compulsions 
(n=24). The results can be seen in Figure 6.2. An independent groups t-test showed that 
those with checking compulsions were significantly higher on the likelihood TAF; there was 
no difference between the groups on moral TAF (t=2.2, p<0.05 and t=0.58, p>0.05 
respectively. 
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Summary of Results 
Hypothesis 1. in obsessioiial subjects, I At' occurs at one end of a con/, /lunn/r1 of ' 7AF . 
There was partial support for this hypothesis. Prediction I a, the, factor structure of'the 
1AF 
questionnaire will he similar across both a normal and ob, ve, 'sru/rul J)ulmlutrun was only 
partially supported. The TAF scale was highly reliable and accounts for a large percentage 
of the variance in both a student and an obsessional population. The factor structure, 




the two groups, differed when a 3-factor solution was extracted. The best factor solution for 
the student sample was moral TAF, self-likelihood TAF, and other-likelihood TAF. The 
obsessional group did not distinguish between self-likelihood and other-likelihood but perhaps 
made a distinction between likelihood TAF for positive and negative events. Prediction 1 b, 
thought-action fusion occurs more in an obsessional population than in the normal 
population, was fulfilled. Although neither group strongly endorsed TAF beliefs, 34% of the 
obsessional sample reported agreeing a TAF statement compared with 19% of the student 
sample. Therefore, endorsements of TAF varied with the statement and were dependent on 
the type of event (positive/negative) and who was involved (self/other). 
Hypothesis 2. TAF is related to measures of obsessionality 
There was support for this hypothesis. Prediction 2a, there will be a positive correlation 
between TAF and measures of obsessionality in the normal and obsessional populations, was 
fulfilled. TAF was associated with checking behaviour in particular, and with other 
obsessional characteristics, notably responses to unwanted images and impulses, and 
responses to a negative thought. Likelihood TAF was stronger in those with checking 
behaviours compared to those with primarily washing behaviours. 
6.6.6. Discussion 
The aims of the study were to develop a reliable, valid questionnaire measure of TAF 
and to examine the relationship between TAF and other obsessional variables. These aims 
were achieved and there was evidence for two distinct but related types of TAF in the 
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questionnaire, as predicted. The questionnaire also had criterion validity in that an obsessional 
sample scored more highly on all the subscales, except for TAF relating to positive events 
happening for oneself. The largest difference between the two groups on the likelihood 
subscale was related to belief in TAF for negative events happening to other people. It seems 
as though both students and obsessionals may believe (or not) in the'power of positive 
thinking' to the same extent when it relates to themselves, although there was a non- 
significant tendency for the obsessional group to disbelieve more that their thoughts could 
bring about good events for themselves. However, this tendency is reversed when it comes to 
thinking about good thoughts for other people. The student group disagree more that their 
thoughts can bring about good events for other people compared to the obsessional group. 
Most notably, however, the student group more strongly disagree that their bad thoughts 
about other people can increase negative events, compared to the obsessional group. 
Some obsessional respondents believed in some type of TAF more than others, and 
some students believed in some types of TAF more than others in their group. These beliefs 
are themselves not intrinsically odd or maladaptive, and only occur in a minority of the 
obsessional and student population. However, since a significant minority (19%) endorsed a 
type of TAF statement, it is reasonable to conclude that TAF is on a normal continuum and 
thus is better considered within the C-B model of OCD than a basal ganglia deficit' model 
(Rapoport and Wise, 1988). Furthermore, by noting the influence of TAF, it is possible to 
reconcile Carr's (1974) model of risk appraisal, in which obsessionals are considered to have 
increased probability estimates for threat, with Salkovskis's view that it is the appraisal of 
intrusions in terms of responsibility that is fundamental to the disorder. 
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This initial study was speculative but gives rise to a number of exciting ideas and 
suggestions of future work. Firstly, the relationship between TAF and guilt and responsibility 
is of interest. It is presumed that TAF will lead to an increase in perceived responsibility, but 
it is also possible that an increase in perceived responsibility will result in an increase of TAF, 
perhaps via suppression of thoughts. The direction of causality should be established with an 
experimental manipulation, and such work is currently being conducted in Vancouver. The 
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direction of causality is particularly important since it is easy to confuse TAF with the belief 
that thoughts reflect a real world event. For example, if a husband thinks about harming his 
wife and makes the appraisal that 'I would not be having this thought unless there is a real 
chance of it happening', this would increase probability estimates for the negative event. 
However, it would not mean that the person perceived himself/herself to have increased the 
likelihood of the event occurring owing to his/her own cognitive processes. 
Second, the association between TAF and guilt is of interest. Preliminary work from 
an undergraduate project which I supervised has shown that moral TAF is strongly associated 
with obsessionality in 120 non-student adults and with state and trait guilt (Watkins, Shafran 
and Charman, 1995). Again, experimental designs are needed to assess causality. It is 
possible that the different types of TAF are associated with different types of guilt - perhaps 
likelihood TAF is more related to 'obsessional guilt' and moral TAF is more related to 
'depressive guilt', as outlined in chapter 5. In turn, perhaps the different types of guilt are 
associated with different obsessional phenomena, for example likelihood TAF may be 
associated with obsessional guilt and inflated perceived responsibility for negative events and 
checking behaviour, whereas moral TAF could be more closely connected with depressive 
guilt and washing behaviour. This proposition is summarised below and leads to a series of 
predictions, the most obvious one being that an episode of depression is predicted to increase 
washing behaviour in people with checking compulsions, and an elevation in perceived 
responsibility will result in checking behaviour in people with washing compulsions. 
Although, this is speculative, it may perhaps lay the foundations for future experiments in the 
area. 
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The situation specificity of TAF is also an important area for future research. Only a 
minority, 34%, of the obsessional sample endorsed a TAF statement. However, several 
commented that their responses would be completely different if they were in 'obsessional' 
mode. The endorsement of TAF is predicted to be much higher if the subject were exposed to 
a feared stimulus and prevented from carrying out a response. If this does turn out to be the 
case, it implies that cognitive work challenging beliefs about TAF should be done when the 
subject is carrying out exposure in vivo in addition to when he/she is sitting calmly, depending 
on the extent of the TAF and associated anxiety levels. 
In summary, TAF may be one path in which intrusive thoughts are given significance 
and stimulate action for some individuals with OCD. Further empirical studies are need to 
determine how this pathway may work. 
6.7. Summary of investigation of the Cognitive-Behavioural Model 
The studies conducted so far have provided support for the importance of anxiety, 
moral conflict, guilt and perceived responsibility for threat in obsessional problems. Since 
these features comprise the C-B model of OCD, the studies can be considered to have 
provided support for the model. In addition, the findings have expanded the model in the 
following ways: - 
The findings have helped to specify more precisely the type of anxiety that is important 
in obsessionality ('fear of fear' and 'cognitive anxiety' as opposed to 'somatic anxiety). 
2 The studies have indicated that it may be the conflict between obsessional problems 
and the moral code of a person's religion that is important in obsessionality, as 
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opposed to the degree of religiosity per se. 
3 Trait guilt is of particular importance in obsessional difficulties. Although there were 
no differences in guilt levels between people with checking and cleaning compulsions, 
depression played a greater part in cleaning compulsions. It was suggested that two 
different types of guilt may be important in obsessional difficulties. 
4 Studies on perceived responsibility for threat have indicated that the sort of 
responsibility that was inflated in OCD may be specific, and not a general inflation of 
all types of responsibility. 
Manipulation of responsibility in a natural way led to changes in obsessional variables 
and there was evidence of an association between pathological responsibility and guilt, 
independent of depression. 
5A cognitive bias, in which thoughts and actions are fused in a moral manner and in 
terms of likelihood of the event, has been identified. Although only a minority of 
obsessional subjects had this bias, there were significantly more obsessional subjects 
endorsing TAF beliefs than student subjects. A questionnaire has been developed with 
high reliability, and there is good evidence that it is valid. Future research of TAF 
and its clinical implications were discussed. 
6.8. The Following Chapters 
The next chapter moves away from investigating the C-B model of OCD. Instead, the 
focus changes to providing data to test the hypothesis that OCD is a heterogeneous disorder, 
and that some patients have a neurological deficit (basal ganglia deficit), whilst others have 
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difficulties that are best conceptualised within a C-B framework. There is a strong need to try 
to reconcile the C-B model with a neurological deficit model, since the majority of work being 
conducted in the USA is considered within the context of a deficit. This is exemplified by a 
recent 'Up-to-the-minute' account of OCD which has only 2 pages on the behavioural model 
of OCD, and no mention of cognitive developments. Although theoretically a neurological 
deficit model need not conflict with the C-B model - both are explanations at different levels - 
in conceptual and practical terms the models are at loggerheads. Thus it is becoming more 
common to find patients referred to a psychologist claiming that they know it is caused by a 
chemical imbalance, and querying the value of behaviour therapy to change brain chemistry 
(Rachman, 1992; personal communication). 
The next chapter outlines a widely investigated basal ganglia deficit model of OCD, 
and reports on a study of neurological soft signs. The purpose of this study was primarily to 
generate data to test the heterogeneity hypothesis, although the findings are also interesting in 
their own right. The following chapter reports on an investigation of neuropsychological tests 
in people with OCD, again with a view to testing the heterogeneity hypothesis, and being of 
intrinsic interest. The testing of the heterogeneity hypothesis is reported in the ninth chapter. 
The tenth and final chapter of the thesis summarises the investigation of the C-B model, its 
reconciliation with the neurological deficit model, discusses the clinical implications of the 
research and makes suggestions for further work. 
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CHAPTER 7 
The Basal Ganglia Deficit Model of OCD and a study of Neurological Soft Signs 
The following paragraph is an excerpt from a book on OCD written for children: - 
"'It's like your brain has the hiccups. That is what makes you warft to do all that 
checking and counting and washing over and over again. So you see, Polly, just like 
a computer that isn't working correctly, your brain can get stuck sometimes, too. ' 
Polly's mom was very relieved that they had found out what was making Polly 
do all these funny things. But she still wanted to know what they could do so that 
Polly could stop all this weird stuff and be the way she used to be before she got sick 
with OCD. 
'I'll send Polly to a special doctor who will try to find a medicine that may help Polly 
not need to do all these things. Sometimes the right medicine and vitamins can help 
a lot, 'said Dr. Jay. " (C. Forster, 1994). 
7.1. Introduction 
The basic assumptions of the neurological deficit models of OCD are described in the 
opening section of this chapter. The basal ganglia deficit model is described in detail, and 
evidence for the model is critically reviewed. The relevance of the model to the heterogeneity 
hypothesis is examined. The model predicts that patients with OCD will have neurological 
soft signs (NSS), and a study is reported which establishes NSS in subjects with OCD with 
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a view to testing the heterogeneity hypothesis and for intrinsic interest. 
7.2. Neurological Deficit Models 
The crux of neurological deficit models is that a structural or functional brain 
abnormality is the cause of OCD. These models place OCD within the realm of'abnormality' 
and patients with the disorder are considered to be qualitatively different from the normal 
population. The models are one of disease, and are based on the medical model (Kraeplin, 
1883) in which clusters of symptoms are assumed to be a direct reflection of a physical disease 
process. It is not disputed that psychological phenomena have neurological substrates, and 
the search for such substrates may provide an explanation of OCD at a different 'level' to that 
which describes psychological phenomena. However, the utility of mapping complex 
psychological phenomena, which could be socially constructed, to specific neurological 'sites' 
is questionable (Hallam, 1985b). However, neurological deficit models are in conflict with 
psychological models such as the C-B model, in that the conceptualisation of the disorder as 
'abnormal' and reflecting disease is in direct opposition to the assumption within the C-B 
model that the disorder is on a continuum with normal behaviour. 
7.3. Basal Ganglia Deficit Models 
In order to understand the effects on a person when a system is dysfunctional, it is 
important to know the normal functioning of such a system. For example a model of dyslexia 
is only possible in the context of a model of normal reading ability (Bradley and Bryant, 
1985). Until recently, the function of basal ganglia was thought to be restricted to motor 
control. Now that is considered over-simplified and the basal ganglia are thought to comprise 
a series of a parallel array of 'loops' including the striatum, pallidum, thalamus and cerebral 
cortex (see Goldman et al., 1990). These loops connect the basal ganglia with the cortex; 
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sensorimotor information may be relayed to prefrontal areas and associational information is 
relayed to the premotor areas. (Goldman et al., 1990). The basal ganglia serve to specify 
the combination, direction and sequence of collicular neurones that should discharge 
(Chevalier and Deniau, 1990). In this way the basal ganglia are involved with the 
sensorimotor aspects of movement and conditional aspects of planning movements, program 
selection and motor memory and retrieval. In other words, the basal ganglia are critical in the 
mechanism for the attainment of goals (Gray, 1995). Graybiel (1990) suggests that 
neurotransmitters in the basal ganglia reflect the role of the basal ganglia in the modulation 
of behaviour based on sensorimotor, memory-related and conditional cues derived from the 
neocortex and limbic system. 
There are several 'basal ganglia hypotheses', and there is a lack of agreement amongst 
the proponents of each hypothesis. The different models will not be described in detail, since 
the aim of the investigation was not to test the basal ganglia deficit models per se, but rather 
to generate data to test the hypothesis of heterogeneity. The core features of the hypotheses 
will be described in order to provide a context for the prediction of the model that 
neurological and neuropsychiatric impairments will characterise OCD (see chapter 9). 
Moddell et al., (1989) have proposed that dysfunction of neuronal circuits interconnecting the 
orbitofrontal cortex, basal ganglia/limbic striatum, and thalamus underlies the pathogenesis 
of OCD. The ventromedial(limbic) portions of the striatum are thought to modulate activity 
in the frontothalamic circuit through a negative feedback loop. Inadequate integration of 
inhibition in the reciprocally excitatory frontothalamic neuronal interchange is hypothesised 
to give rise to an aberrant positive feedback loop in this interchange. This aberrant positive 
feedback loop is thought to give rise to obsessional symptoms. Insel (1988) conducted 
an ethological analysis in order to determine the factors that induce, maintain and terminate 
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the compulsive behaviours which characterise obsessive-compulsive behaviour. The 
behaviours were conceptualised as a link between social influences and neural events, and 
Insel suggested that the stereotyped motor acts that are seen in OCD could be like 
displacement behaviours in animals: - they are triggered by conflict between two opposing 
tendencies and then, once started, continue in an autonomous fashion. Displacement 
behaviours were first described in detail by Lorenz in the 1930s (see Lorenz, 1970), and it 
was Holland (1974) who proposed that the behavioural excesses of OCD patients resembled 
those of animal displacement phenomena. Displacement behaviours also arise in a vacuum. 
The displacement behaviours that animals exhibit include grooming and washing 
behaviours, and the quality of displacement behaviour could be described by the term 'fixed 
action pattern', which determines the 'all or nothing' quality of the displacement (and 
obsessional) behaviour. In sum, the neuroethological model of OCD 'proposes that the 
symptoms of this disorder are similar to animal displacement behaviours and that similar 
mechanisms are responsible for each' (Stein, 1992). 
In this model, the displacement behaviours are dependent on a combination of 
serotonergic inputs, basal ganglia mediation and learning. A deficit in any of these systems 
or environmental confinements (Voith, 1985) could create a disorder in displacement 
behaviour. 
Baxter and colleagues (1990) suggest that 'the primary disease in OCD might be in 
the striatum and that the abnormal behaviours of OCD are mediated by a dysfunctional 
integration of this brain region with other, mainly cortical brain regions that, as a direct 
consequence, must increase their activity to abnormal levels" (p. 180; emphasis added). They 
suggest that impairment in the gating and screening functions of the striatum result in 
phenomena coming into awareness, as they are not being inhibited ('controlled') by the 
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striatum and associated cortical mechanisms, particularly the limbic region. The obsessional 
urges 'leak through', as do compulsive motor behaviours in response to sensations and 
thoughts not being inhibited. Rituals and avoidance are all seen as conscious efforts to combat 
the impulses. The impaired system also results in difficulties in termination of the motor act 
or impulsive thought and thus perseveration of the obsessional symptom would ensue. Pitman 
(1989) has suggested that disruption of the basal ganglia system may leave the organism 
unable to disattend to irrelevant stimuli, and inappropriate response patterns may persist. The 
suggestion of Baxter and Pitman is reminiscent of Frith's model of schizophrenia in which 
positive symptoms of schizophrenia were attributed to 'a defect in the mechanism that 
controls and limits the contents of consciousness' (Frith, 1979). 
The most well-developed 'basal ganglia hypothesis' is that of the NIMH group (eg 
Wise and Rapoport, 1989). This hypothesis proposes that the striatum acts to trigger 
behaviour, and that inappropriate triggering of genetically stored and learned behaviours is 
the primary cause of OCD (Rapoport and Wise, 1989). This hypothesis is described below. 
7.3.1. The basal ganglia deficit model of the NIMH Group 
The theory proposed by Rapoport also suggests that obsessional phenomena result 
from a dysfunction of the basal ganglia in releasing the behavioural response. When 
functioning, it is suggested that the neurons in the basal ganglia fire a 'fixed action pattern' to 
give rise to motor behaviour. Fixed action patterns are defined by ethologists as spontaneous, 
stereotyped behaviours that are independent of immediate external control and individual 
learning (Eibl-Eisfeld, 1970) ; they included, e. g., nest-building in birds, food burying in pigs, 
grooming behaviours and hoarding. 
The fixed action pattern is usually triggered by stimulus detection but can be triggered 
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without a key stimulus as in the case of vacuum or displacement behaviours. These are 
behaviours that are emitted out of context, i. e. apart from situations that usually elicit them 
(Tinbergen, 1949; Lorenz, 1971). Holland (1974) first suggested that these behaviours 
resemble the compulsions of OCD, and Rapoport suggests that basal ganglia dysfunction 
giving rise to displacement activity is the cause of OCD. 
The striatum contains stimulus detectors - pattern-recognition circuits and internal 
motivation detectors. These striatal assemblies converge to inhibit a pallidal cell assembly, 
resulting in disinhibition of the thalamic cell group and releasing behaviour. In addition, striatal 
serotonin afferents potentiate. inputs to the striatum. Thus, normally, the stimulus causes 
cells in the striatum to discharge, releases the thalamus from inhibition and releases 
appropriate behaviour. Alternatively, action in the cingulate cortex can serve as an internal 
motivation detector and act on cells in the thalamus in the same way without an appropriate 
stimulus. Hyperactivity in the cingulate cortex or striatum can cause disinhibition of the 
thalamus and release of behaviour. This hyperactivity could be caused by an increase in the 
serotonergic excitatory inputs to the striatum. In addition, if the output of another circuit 
were blocked or dysfunctional, build-up of basal ganglia activity might cause 'sparking over' 
to displacement activity which Rapoport suggests is manifest as OCD (Wise and Rapoport, 
1989). Obsessional thoughts are likened to motor acts of the mind or'mental tics'. 
Although the authors state that 'the present hypothesis views the basal ganglia and OCD in 
a high cognitive context' (Rapoport and Wise, 1988) it is not clear how the transition from 
excess neuronal activity to a high cognitive context is made. 
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7.4. Evidence for a Basal Ganglia Dysfunction 
There is an abundance of evidence cited to support the hypothesis that OCD patients 
suffer from a dysfunction in the basal ganglia. Although none are convincing alone, the 
convergence of the evidence is considered by some to provide support for the theory (e. g. 
Jakes, 1994, personal communication). The most influential studies have been those which 
have involve neuroimaging. 
7.4.1. Neuroimaging Studies 
These studies provide evidence that OCD patients may have a dysfunction in the basal 
ganglia. Computerised Tomography (CT) scans were among the first such scans to be 
conducted, but only the study of Luxenberg (1988) found atrophy of the head of the caudate 
nucleus, whereas other CT scans were normal (Insel et al., 1983; Behar et al., 1984). 
Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) studies (Garber et al., 1989; Weilberg et al., 1989) failed 
to detect any brain abnormalities in OCD patients. A detailed review is not provided here as 
the findings up until 1990 are reviewed by Baxter and colleagues (1990) and by Insel (1992). 
Baxter's review emphasizes the high probability of type 2 (false negative) error in all the 
studies which have used small numbers of subjects. Whether the studies provide consistent 
findings or not is disputable. The studies of the UCLA group (led by Baxter) and the NIMH 
group led by Nordhal using Positron Emission Tomography (PET) scans suggest that OCD 
patients have an increase in the normalised metabolic rate in both orbital gyri, and normal 
metabolic rates in the caudate nucleus. The other NIlVIH group (led by Swedo, 1989b) did 
not find a significant increase in the orbital gyri, but found increased normalised metabolic 
rates in the right lateral prefrontal and left anterior cingulate regions only. These data were 
interpreted as providing evidence of a frontal lobe-anterior cingulate-basal ganglia loop 
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dysfunction. 
Baxter notes that 'different methods used in PET studies makes them difficult to 
compare. There were marked differences in scanners, stimulus conditions, and perhaps of 
most importance, in the methods used to determine neuroanatomic regions of interest and to 
calculate absolute and normalized metabolic rates'. This may be used to account for the 
discrepant findings of Martinot (1990), who found evidence of decreased metabolic rate in 
the prefrontal cortex, compared to the PET study of Sawle (1991) whose findings included 
evidence of an increase in metabolic rate in the prefrontal cortex. 
Insel (1992) regards 'increased metabolism of the orbitofrontal cortex in untreated 
patients with OCD, as well as normalization in the orbitofrontal cortex and caudate nucleus 
with recovery' to be 'relatively consistent' and 'too interesting to ignore with regard to possible 
functional implications', whilst acknowledging that 'a single structure (or cluster of structures) 
is unlikely to be the cause of this disorder and the data do not yet define a cause'. Single 
photon emission computerised tomography (SPECT) studies such as that of Machlin et al., 
(1991) and Rubin et al., (1992) implicate the medialfrontal cortex and the orbitofrontal cortex 
bilaterally, the dorsal parietal region, the left posterofrontal cortex and the head of the caudate 
nucleus bilaterally. The two studies themselves were inconsistent, which is attributed to 
differences in scanner resolution and frequency of sampling. 
An alternative explanation for the discrepancies in findings across studies may be able 
to explain part ofthe inconsistencies in findings. An interesting study by Baxter and colleagues 
(1992) found that the caudate glucose metabolic rate (which had been found by some PET 
studies to be abnormal in OCD patients) changed with administration of both pharmacological 
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and behavioural therapy. Similarly, McGuire and colleagues (1994) that the identified areas 
altered as the patient was exposed to different feared stimuli in vivo whilst being scanned. The 
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authors interpreted their findings as evidence against any structural or functional abnormality 
in the basal ganglia region, bat instead argued that any brain changes are reflective of the 
symptomatology, rather than the cause of it. The small sample size (n=4) and lack of control 
group are methodological flaws of this study which needs to be extended and replicated. The 
observations of blood flow change with symptom change are statements of the obvious. For 
example, anxiety increases blood flow in the orbitofrontal cortex of normal controls; 
obsessionals (who are highly anxious) would therefore have a comparatively higher blood flow 
in this area. Decreases in blood flow would be associated with an improvement in symptoms. 
Thus neuroimaging data are 'not necessarily evidence for a neurological dysfunction nor .. 
necessarily evidence that these brain areas are critical to the experience of obsessional 
disorder' (Salkovskis 1995). 
The finding that the symptoms are critical for the neuroimaging results implies that 
OCD symptom severity should be correlated with basal ganglia abnormalities. With the 
exception of the study by Swedo et al., (1989) and Rubin et at., (1992), OCD symptom 
severity has not been reported to be correlated with the basal ganglia abnormalities. This 
provides an obstacle for basal ganglia theorists, who would predict that a severe basal ganglia 
dysfunction would result in more displacement activity (Rapoport's model) or'leakage into 
consciousness' (Baxter's model). Furthermore, the change in brain functioning with symptom 
change highlights the need for anxiety controls in the neuroimaging literature in order that the 
specificity and importance of the relationship between symptoms and brain functioning can 
be properly ascertained. 
7.4.2. Neurological Soft Signs 
OCD patients are hypothesised to show an abnormally high number of neurological 
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soft signs (NSS) which are considered to be indicative of a basal ganglia disorder. A 
neurological soft sign is 'a particular from of deviant performance in the neurological status 
examination. ' (Shaffer et al., 1985). It refers to any neurological deviation (motor, sensory or 
integrative) that does not localise the site of a putative central nervous system lesion (Quitkin 
et at., 1976). The designation soft is usually taken to indicate that the person with the sign 
shows no other feature of a fixed or transient neurological lesion or disorder (Shaffer et al., 
1985). Soft signs are important clinically as they implicate a central nervous system 'factor' 
that might have causal or predictive value for psychological difficulties. 
It is possible to postulate that impaired integration of sensory units, motor co- 
ordination and sequencing of motor patterns reflect abnormalities in parietal lobe, cerebellum 
and frontal lobe respectively but this is an'erroneous simplification' (Heinrichs and Buchanan, 
88). Instead, NSS 'reflect impairments in several functional systems that included in their 
neurological substrate the previously mentioned regions. The actual location of neurological 
deficits need not be at these sites but may involve components of these systems at other levels 
of the neuroaxis. ' Such components could be found in the basal ganglia and brainstem 
(Kennard, 1960) or limbic system (Mosher et al., 1971). Chen et al., (1995) believe that 'the 
relationship between a particular sign and a cerebral location is likely to be complex' (p. 4). 
Studies on the relationship between the presence of NSS and brain abnormalities as 
shown by CT scans have proved inconsistent (e. g. Weinberger and Wyatt, 1982; Kolakowska 
et al., 1985, King et al., 1991, and Schroder, 1992). Part of this may be attributable to 
differences in methodology. Sample size, diagnosis, temporal stability, medication and 
demographic variables should all be considered. Most importantly, it is vital to have a reliable, 
standardised assessment in order that meaningful comparisons can be made across populations 
when considering NSS. 
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NSS are developmental signs whose persistence in later years is associated with 
hyperactivity (e. g. Mikkelsen et al., 1992), impulsivity (Paulsen and O'Donnell, 1979), 
learning disability (e. g. Adams et al., 1974), anxiety and depression (Shafer et al., 1983) and 
impulsivity in adults (Quitkin 1976), and with anxiety and affective disorders in later 
adolescence (Shaffer et al., 1985,1986). No relationship was found between early soft signs 
and attention deficit or conduct disorders (Shaffer et al., 1986) although such disorders are 
hypothesized to be associated with basal ganglia dysfunction and obsessional neurosis (Bolton 
and Turner, 1984). 
Quitkin et al. 's (1976) study was the first to assess neurological soft signs specifically 
in adults in a systematic matter. Three hundred and fifty patients were examined in this study 
which claimed increased evidence of neurological soft signs for the subgroup of patients with 
emotionally unstable character disorders (who are antisocial, impulsive and have short, 
nonreactive, bipolar mood swings) and for patients who had schizophrenia with premorbid 
asociality. Patients with other types of schizophrenia and character disorder did not show 
evidence of neurologic impairment; no normal control group was included. Since then, 
neurological soft signs in patients with schizophrenia have been described by several 
researchers (e. g. Walker and Green, 1982). A review by Heinrichs and Buchanan concluded 
that 'cumulative evidence strongly argues that there are more neurological signs in 
schizophrenic patients' (p. 11). 
Most recently, the neurological soft signs of sixty-two schizophrenic patients were 
compared with those of one hundred normal controls in the course of the development of the 
Cambridge Neurological Inventory (Chen et al., 1995). The data reported showed that 
schizophrenic patients had significantly more neurological soft signs (motor and sensory) than 
the normal control group (see later). 
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Signs of central nervous system dysfunction in obsessive-compulsive disorder have 
been examined in both children and adults (Denckla et al, 1988; Hymas et al., 1991 and 
Hollander et al., 1991). In her uncontrolled study of 54 children and adolescents with OCD, 
Denckla adapted Quitkin's Physical and Neurological Examination for Soft Signs (PANESS)' 
to form the 'Neurological Examination for Subtle Signs (NESS)'. She found that 44 (81%) 
of the sample showed neurological abnormalities such as 'choreiform' movements and 
miscellaneous neuro-developmental abnormalities. Seventeen adults with obsessional slowness 
were given a standard neurological examination and motor examination, which revealed subtle 
neurological abnormalities more frequently than in matched normal controls (Hymas et al., 
1991). The abnormalities included loss of motor fluency, hesitancy of initiation of limb 
movements, speech and gait abnormalities, cogwheel rigidity, complex repetitive movements 
and tics. There was no association between the extent of the neurological abnormalities and 
the degree of obsessionality. The findings (amongst others) were suggested to show that 
'patients with obsessional slowness may have a dysfunction in the frontal-basal-ganglia loop 
system. 
NSS were examined in 37 drug-free non-depressed subjects with obsessive compulsive 
disorder and 20 healthy volunteers (Khanna, 1993). The group with OCD had significantly 
more total NSS than the controls. The largest study of NSS in people with OCD used a 
battery based on that which was originally designed to assess NSS in schizophrenics, but 
extended to included visuo-spatial tasks (Hollander et al., 1990). This study found that 41 
medication-free patients had significantly more neurological soft signs than the control group 
(n=20). The abnormalities were in fine motor co-ordination, involuntary and mirror 
movements and visuo-spatial function. Soft signs were related to the severity of obsessions 
but not compulsions in the patient group. It was concluded that the neurological impairment 
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found in patients with OCD should be compared with that of other psychiatric populations 
(Hollander etal., p. 27). 
In summary, although the presence of neurological soft sign does not indicate a 
dysfunction at a particular site, a high prevalence of neurological soft signs would be 
consistent with a basal ganglia dysfunction. Some evidence shows that people with OCD have 
abnormal NSS, which supports the basal ganglia hypothesis. 
7.4.4. Relevance of Tests of Neuropsychological Functioning 
The literature regarding neuropsychological test performance of patients with OCD 
will be discussed in section of the thesis. However, it is important to note that, if the basal 
ganglia hypothesis were correct, OCD patients would perform poorly on tests of 
neuropsychological functioning, in particular those which involve visuo-spatial skills which 
require the basal ganglia. Since the suggested deficit also involves the fronto-striatal loop, 
deficits would be expected on tests of executive function (including set-shifting and inhibition 
of unwanted stimuli, ) since these are thought to require an intact frontal lobe (Milner, 1963). 
This is not to say that these tests have a 'localising function', but rather that they can be used 
to identify the cognitive strengths and weaknesses associated with a disorder (Otto, 1992). 
It is fair to say that, if the basal ganglia were damaged in the manner suggested by the basal 
ganglia hypothesis, a poor performance on tests of executive function, inhibition and visuo- 
spatial abilities would be expected. 
Although some studies have found evidence of neuropsychological deficits of 
executive function, the results have been inconsistent. The results concerning visuo-spatial 
difficulties are also hard to interpret, as deficits are only found in some studies and not others. 
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7.4.5. Relationship between OCD and basal ganglia disorders 
As the historical review in chapter 1 indicated, obsessive-compulsive phenomena have 
been associated with post-encephalitic disorders. Since the publication of the monograph of 
von Economo (1917, translated 1931), compulsive behaviour has been observed in post- 
encephalitic disorders, including Parkinson's Disease. Post-encephalitic disorders are thought 
to be disorders of the basal ganglia. Lewis (1957) cites work reporting the presence of 
obsessive-compulsive phenomena in extrapyramidal disorder, Parkinsonism and chorea. 
Recent findings apparently confirm a higher incidence of obsessive-compulsive symptoms in 
Sydenham's Chorea (Swedo et al., 1989a), although there is no evidence for Huntington's 
disease-like cognitive dysfunction in OCD (Martin et al., 1993). 
Much research has focused on the link between Tourette's Syndrome (TS) and 
obsessive-compulsive behaviour (e. g., Pauls et al., 1986,1992; George et at., 1993; Holzer 
et al., 1994). Studies have found between 37%, 47%, 52% and 90% of individuals with TS 
have Obsessive-compulsive symptoms according to semi-structured interviews and 
questionnaire measures (Robertson et al., 1988; van de Wetering et al., 1988; Frankel et al., 
1986; Nee et al., 1980). Specifically, Pitman et al., (1987) found that 63% of their patients 
with TS had obsessive-compulsive disorder according to the Diagnostic Interview Schedule. 
Pauls et al., (1986) designed their own semi-structured interview and assessment 
based on DSM - III criteria for OCD and TS. OCD was found in 
0 50% of probands. 
0 19% of relatives of probands with TS + OCD 
0 27% of relatives of probands with TS but no OCD 
0 0% of adoptive relatives (5 families) 
The authors concluded that TS and some obsessional disorders were aetiologically related (at 
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least within families of TS patients) and OCD represents a different manifestation of the same 
underlying factor. A common sex-linked TS/OCD gene expressing itself as TS in males and 
ý OCD in wöme1i has been suggested and findings from a further large family study are 
consistent with earlier work (Pauls et al., 1992,1995). Alternatively, relatives of TS 
patients with OCD have been considered to have a genetic sub-type of OCD due to the 
incomplete expression of a TS gene (Comings and Comings, 1987). The 5-HT1A serotonin 
neuroreceptor and tryptophan oxygenase genes have been excluded as the TS/OCD candidate 
gene (Brett et al., 1995). 
However, unlike the other disorders, it is still disputed as to whether TS is actually a 
disorder of the basal ganglia (Shapiro and Shapiro, 1992) and to cite, as the Rapoport group 
frequently does (e. g. Wise and Rapoport, 1989; Rapoport, 1990), a possible link between 
OCD and a possible basal ganglia disorder as evidence in support of OCD as a basal ganglia 
disorder is at best weak and tenuous evidence in support of a theory. 
Other difficulties exist with these data. It is possible that there is no genetic influence, 
but that 'compulsions' are learned imitations of the TS behaviours (de Groot and Bornstein, 
1994). Symptoms of chorea and TS may well register as compulsions on measures of 
obsessive-compulsive disorder, and behaviours resembling compulsions may be seen in 
diseases of the basal ganglia (Shapiro and Shapiro, 1992). The need for a clear conception 
and definition of tics, obsessions and compulsions has been emphasized (Hollander et al., 
1989). There are two important points to be made here. The first is that a similar 
phenomenology does not mean that two disorders have a similar aetiology. The second point 
is equally important : OCD is NOT merely the presence of compulsions. Stereotypical motor 
behaviours do not comprise OCD. The warning of Aubrey Lewis (1936) showed great 
foresight and is worth repeating: - 
'In the writings of some psychopathologists it is assumed that a ritual or ceremonial 
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is, ipso facto, obsessional - ignoring the absence of the essential subjective features 
of compulsion. Repetitive mental happenings and more or less stereotyped motor 
activities occur in a wide range of illnesses... But clearly, by observing that a ritual 
or repetitive motor activity is pursued, whether it be with or without anxiety, with or 
without evident purpose, one cannot tell that it is an obsessional activity... The 
experience of subjective compulsion is the essential feature of obsessions.. Without 
suchfinal criteria all other problems of obsessional disorder lose their sharpness and 
even their reality, the very term or conception 'obsessional' becomes worthless, 
because it can then be extended to cover everything'. (p326). 
The warnings of Aubrey Lewis against generalising from obsessive-compulsive 
phenomena to the presence of obsessive-compulsive disorder have been ignored by the 
proponents of the basal ganglia model. 
7.4.6. Brain Lesions 
Evidence concerning the association between head trauma and OCD can be found 
mainly in the form of case studies (see Jenike, 1990 for a review). Discrete caudate-frontal 
lesions evoke obsessive-compulsive behaviour (Tonkonogy and Barreira, 1990), obsessive- 
compulsive disorder has been observed to emerge after brain injury (McKeon et al., 1984; 
Kettle and Marks, 1986; Max et al., 1995), and there is a reported association between birth 
trauma and obsessive-compulsive disorder (Capstick and Seldrup, 1977). Naturally occurring 
brain lesions are usually not circumscribed and it is therefore difficult to use these data to 
support specific theories regarding basal ganglia dysfunction. The use of circumscribed 
psychosurgery has shown that a lesion of the cingulate gyrus alleviates OCD (see Chioccoa 
and Martuza, 1990; Mindus et al., 1994) although its effectiveness may be mediated by 
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alleviation of anxiety rather than directly via the basal ganglia. Again it is hard to infer function 
from dysfunction without demonstrating double dissociative effects. 
7.4.7. Animal Models 
Empirical data in support of this hypothesisare sparse, but includes the study of Voith 
(1985) in which dogs suffered from a disorder of grooming, giving rise to acral lick dermatitis. 
Dogs with this condition improve when given clomipramine (CMI; Goldberger and Rapoport, 
1991; Rapoport et at., 1992). Three of five dogs in the open trial of CMI in the treatment of 
acral lick dermatitis improved in the study of Stein (1992), which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that a specific serotonergic dysfunction is the basis for dysfunction of displacement 
behaviour in animals. 
Aside from the general sociobiological criticism that it is hard to generalise from 
animal models to those of humans, the proponents themselves acknowledge, animal models 
are 'highly speculative' (Stein et al., , 1992, p 278). Furthermore, the animal model uses the 
similar phenomenology of compulsive washing and compulsive acral lick in dogs to posit a 
similar origin for the problem. Not only is this foolhardy (the same symptom can arise for 
many different reasons e. g. endogenous and reactive depressions, stereotypical behaviours), 
but the phenomenology is far more dissimilar to animal behaviour than it is similar. 
Compulsive checking behaviour does not have an animal equivalent provided by the 
researchers and, critically, the role of thoughts in generating the compulsions is not addressed 
by the model. There is no animal version of ruminations, a core feature of OCD and patients 
report that the compulsions serve a purpose and arise from the unwanted intrusive thoughts. 
Aside from the general difficulties in using animal models to investigate phenonema which 
may be, in part, social constructions (Hallam, 1985), it would require much ingenuity to test 
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the occurrence of unwanted intrusive thoughts in animals. 
The use of animal models of OCD has been taken to an extreme, as illustrated by this 
serious (! ) article entitled 'Mind the Dog' that recently appeared in the Sunday Times (March 
1995). 
'Obsessive behaviour - such as constant hand washing or irrational checking of light 
switches before leaving the house - has long been recognised in humans. But most pet 
owners do not realise that obsession is common in animals as well. 
According to John Fisher, a pet behaviour counsellor based in Surrey, obsessive 
compulsive disorder (OCD) is especially common in dogs, and certain breeds are more 
vulnerable than other. Bull terriers chase their tails, Doberman pinchers like siucking their 
flanks, bearded collies are prone to spinning, and rottweilers and collies can become 
addicted to shadow chasing. 
Such behaviour releases endorphins - chemicals that produce a feeling of pleasure - 
so that the actions become self-rewarding. Animals can become so obsessed in their 
behaviour patterns that they exhaust or even mutilate themselves. 
Fisher has just treated Sherlock Holmes, afive-month-old German shepherd, who 
started chasing his tail about three weeks ago. Because his owners initially found the 
movement amusing, Sherlock Holmes's behaviour began as a device to seek attention. 
However, Sherlock Holmes has begun not only to chase his tail constantly, but is also 
deliberately hitting his head against objects. If his owners try to restrain him, Sherlock 
Holmes begins growling and displaying aggressive behaviour. 
'The initial reward comes from gaining attention, but soon the chemical effects are 
self-rewarding, ' says Fisher. 'OCD often indicates an unstimulated environment or is a 
result of stress or medically -related problems. ' 
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To combat the problem, Fisher advises pet owners to find out if their breed of dog 
is predisposed to OCD and then to watch closely for signals. When the animal begins to 
display such behaviour, usually at an early age, owners should not react in any way. The 
best cure is to quietly remove the dog to another room for, five minutes. This is not a form 
of punishment, but rather to illustrate to the pet that social isolation is a consequence of that 
action. 
Cats need different handling. They usually display a more introverted form of OCD 
such as over grooming or tail licking, which can lead to alarming self-mutilation. OCD in 
cats indicates a high level of insecurity. Owners should organise a routine around the cat - 
feeding times, playing time - so that it feels more secure. 
If the behaviour continues, the animal should be referred to a pet behaviour 
counsellor. It will then be put on a combination of drug support and behaviour therapy. 
Fisher says: 'If the animal were merely on drug support, it may suppress the chemical rush 
it gets from its behaviour. However, OCD usually means something is wrong with the 
environment the animal is in. ' 
Fisher has also developed sound therapy to deal with OCD. He uses a training disc, 
an object that creates a noise when dropped 'When an owner scolds a dog, that in itself is 
a form of gaining attention, ' he says. 'If he or she ignores the dog, it may continue to be 
obsessive because of the endorphin release. My method involves placing food in front of the 
dog, then dropping the discs, and lifting the food out of the way. Soon the animal realises 
that the discs are a prelude to not getting a reward It learns to walk away from the sound, 
and sit by its owner quietly. ' 
OCD is a condition that is best dealt with in its early stages. If your pet seems to be 
developing these symptoms, try these methods. But OCD can be a symptom of the problem 
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in your household, as much as a problem in itself. ' 
The 'disorder' in this pet is clearly not equivalent to OCD in humans for a variety of 
reasons, but primarily because OCD causes distress - tail chasing to release endorphins does 
not. The extreme silliness of the article exemplifies the danger of losing sight of the immense 
anxiety and fear experienced by people with OCD. 
7.4.8. Serotonergic mechanisms 
The evidence used to support the serotonergic dysfunction hypothesis of OCD is also 
used to support the basal ganglia hypothesis. This hypothesis is based on the efficacy of 
selective serotonin re-uptake inhibitors (SSRIs), especially clomipramine (CMI) in the 
treatment of OCD (see Abel, 1993, and Jenike, 1992, for reviews). It was hypothesised that 
OCD may be caused by a dysfunction in the serotonergic system of patients. Since the basal 
ganglia are rich in serotonergic synapses (Rapoport and Wise, 1988), it is possible that the 
serotonergic mechanism which governs the firing of the action pattern in the striatal system 
is oversensitive in some patients with obsessive-compulsive disorder. Alternatively, in Baxter's 
model, the serotonergic dysfunction could occur in regulating the'control' mechanism of the 
limbic system or in the striatum affecting gating and screening of stimuli. 
Although initial clinical trials were poor methodologically and were open trials without 
appropriate placebo controls (e. g. Marshall, 1971), the efficacy of treatment with 
clomipramine has been shown in several studies which have used double-blind placebo 
controls (e. g. Zohar and Insel, 1987; Clomipramine Collaborative Study Group, 1991; De 
Veaugh-Geiss, 1994). Sample sizes, however, are generally small with often fewer than 20 
patients in a group. The serotonergic hypothesis was advanced by a study of Zohar and 
colleagues (1988) who gave nine OCD patients m-chlorophenylpiperazine (mCPP; a 
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serotonergic agonist) before and after long term treatment with CMI. Although mCPP 
increased OCD symptoms and anxiety in patients before CMI treatment, after prolonged CMI 
treatment, mCPP did not increase OCD symptoms. The authors proposed that OCD patients 
have a hyperactive serotonergic system and that long-term CMI treatment may downregulate 
the serotonergic system. Studies using other serotonin selective re-uptake inhibitors such as 
fluoxamine, have been found to be superior to placebo in alleviating symptoms of OCD (Price 
et al., 1987, Goodman et al., 1989. ) and as effective as CMI (Pigott et al., 1990). A recent 
meta-analysis confirmed the efficacy of pharmacological treatment in OCD and found that 
SSRIs were more effective in alleviating OCD symptoms than antidepressant- drugs with no 
selective serotonergic properties (Piccinelli et al., 1995) 
There are several difficulties facing the serotonergic hypothesis of OCD, not least of 
which is that the evidence cited in support of the theory is the evidence that was in fact used 
to formulate it, namely the efficacy of drug treatment. In addition, the assumption is that 
because interference with the serotonergic system alleviates some of the symptoms of OCD, 
the serotonergic system must be causing those symptoms. One of the first rules of psychology 
is that function cannot be inferred from dysfunction without the presence of a double 
dissociation which means, in this case, that not only would OCD patients have dysfunctional 
serotonergic systems, but that normal and other psychiatric patients would have 'normal' 
serotonergic functioning that would not be helped by administration of selective serotonin re- 
uptake inhibitors. As Rapoport herself acknowledges 'the relationship between the cause of 
a disease and its treatment is not straightforward...... Mutatis mutatum' (p. 341, Rapoport, 
1989). In fact, serotonergic fever is sweeping the psychiatric literature and dysfunctional 
serotonergic systems have been found in disorders of bulimia nervosa (Fluoxetine bulimia 
nervosa collaborative group, 1992), anorexia nervosa (Kaye et at., 1991), pain (Sternbach et- 
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al., 1976) and schizotypal and borderline personality disorder (Markovitz et al., 1991). CMI 
was first introduced for the treatment of depression and, although CMI is considered to be 
specifically anti-obsessional, close examination of the findings in the literature still leaves open 
the possibility that the mechanism for the effectiveness of CMI stems from its efficacy in 
treating depression (Rachman, 1993, personal communication). 
Another difficulty for the hypothesis is the finding that a highly selective serotonergic 
drug, sertraline did not result in a significant improvement in obsessive-compulsive symptoms 
(Jenike et al., 1992). An additional problem is that relapse after stopping CMI is immediate 
and there is a rebound effect (see Abel, 1993), which is not predicted by Zohar's down- 
regulatory hypothesis of serotonergic drug efficacy. Important, also, is that not all OCD 
patients improve with the administration of CMI; several of the patients in the Pigott study 
(1990) who did not improve with CMI improved with fluoxetine and vice versa. The current 
hypothesis could not explain this and neither could it account for the patients who fail to 
respond to either type of drug treatment. The efficacy of the drug is limited, with the 
improvement ranging from 50-75% and the drug is reported to 'take the edge off the 
obsessional symptoms' rather than provide a cure whereby the intrusive thoughts and 
compulsive behaviour do not occur at all (see Abel, 1993). Also, there is no dose-dependent 
relationship, i. e., an increase in the dose is not followed by a proportional increase in 
improvement of symptoms. Lastly, serotonin challenge tests have demonstrated that the 
serotonergic system in OCD patients is functional (Barr et at., 1992), which theorists 
suggesting a dysfunctional serotonergic system as the primary cause of obsessive-compulsive 
behaviour will find difficult to explain. 
Although the data supporting the serotonergic system are consistent with the basal 
ganglia hypotheses, the hypotheses were made after the efficacy of the serotonin selective 
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reuptake inhibitors were known. Data used to construct a theory cannot be used to later 
support it. In addition, the problems with the serotonergic model also apply to the basal 
ganglia theories. 
7.4.9. Comment on Basal Ganglia Deficit Model 
A wide variety of evidence appears to support the basal ganglia deficit model of OCD. 
The general consensus amongst clinicians both in the USA and increasingly in the U. K. is that 
the disorder is 'biological'. For example, Chris Freeman, an advocate of cognitive-behavioural 
therapy for the treatment of eating disorders, regards OCD to be a disorder of biology 
(Freeman; personal communication, 1994). The implication is that it is of no interest to 
psychologists, and that psychological therapies can only work by changing brain structure and 
functioning. However, a close examination of the evidence indicates that the logic behind 
many assumptions, most notably with regard to the efficacy of serotonin reuptake inhibitors, 
is flawed. Also, the neurological deficit theory is not stated in a way that opens it to potential 
disconfirmation, it is untestable in many respects and often vague and non-specific. 
Nevertheless, as a whole, the evidence appears voluminous and converging towards a 
consensus of neurological impairment. 
7.5. The Basal Ganglia Deficit Model and the Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
The evidence for the basal ganglia deficit model is not predicted or addressed by the 
C-B model. Similarly, the basal ganglia model does not place critical importance on the role 
of anxiety or on the subjective experience of obsessions. It does not address the central role 
of resistance in obsessive-compulsive phenomena, and it cannot begin to account for the 
success of behavioural therapy, much less the changes in brain functioning observed with 
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behavioural therapy (McGuire et al., 1994). Critically, the basal ganglia model reduces OCD 
to mere motor phenomena and it fails to take account of the'O' in OCD. If these models were 
merely different levels of explanation, they might co-exist side by side. However, the 
fundamental assumptions underlying the C-B model and basal ganglia deficit model are very 
different. The former considers OCD to be a psychological phenomenon subject to the same 
influences as in the normal population, mediated by its neurological substrate. The basal 
ganglia deficit model considers the disorder to be one of disease, qualitatively different from 
that of the normal population. The intrusive thoughts, anxiety, guilt and perceived 
responsibility for threat that comprise the C-B model are not addressed by the basal ganglia 
model, nor are the neurological soft signs, neuroimaging and other studies addressed by 
cognitive-behaviourists. 
A simple solution is that one model is suitable for some people, and the other model 
is suitable for others. In other words that some people will show anxiety, excessive 
responsibility and guilt, whilst others will have a high number of neurological soft signs and 
neuropsychological deficits. This hypothesis is tested in chapter 10. 
The following section describes a study to generate data to test the hypothesis by 
examining NSS in people with OCD. 
7.6. A Study of Neurological Soft Signs in OCD 
7.6.1. Aims 
The aims of the study were to: 
I Provide data to test the heterogeneity hypothesis 
Z To investigate NSS in people with OCD 
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7.6.2. Background 
Neurological soft signs have been found in people with a variety of psychiatric 
disorders, notably schizophrenia (see earlier for a review of the literature). It is a matter for 
debate as to whether these NSS have any localising function (Heinrichs and Buchanan, 1988) 
but they are regarded, to an extent, as the poor man's PET scanner! In summary, there is some 
evidence to show that OCD patients have an increased number of neurological soft signs 
compared to healthy controls (Hollander et al., 1990). This group has also found that 8 OCD 
patients with high soft sign scores had significantly increased ventricular volumes compared 
with 8 OCD patients with low soft sign scores and 8 non-psychiatric control subjects; caudate 
and ventricular nucleus volumes did not differ between groups. 
In summary, an individual with dysfunctional basal ganglia would be expected to show 
abnormal neurological soft signs, particularly in areas of sensory integration and fine motor 
movement. Since these signs are subtle, the assessment used for determining NSS is 
important. Quitkin and colleagues (1986) based their assessment on the work of Hertzig and 
Birch, which was communicated to them personally. Their assessment comprised a standard 
neurological investigation to determine the presence of 'hard' neurological signs and a soft 
signs assessment. Included in the latter assessment was an examination of mirror movements, 
speech, right-left confusion, adventitious overflow, finger-to-thumb opposition, finger-to- 
thumb mirror movements, pronation-supination, left and right foot taps and a face-hand test. 
Quitkin's assessment was used as the basis for other studies, some of which used 10 items 
(King et al., 91), and others 12 (Kolokowska et al., 85). The soft signs assessment battery of 
Shaffer and colleagues (1985) is not specified although abnormalities were reported on tests 
of finger-nose testing, finger pursuit and complex fine motor activities (dysdiadochokinesis, 
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i. e., the inability to perform rapid alternating movement of hands and feet in a smooth, fluent 
andrhythmic- fashion; dysphraphesthesia, i. e., the inability to detect predisplayed symbols traced 
on the palmar surface when blindfolded; and asterognosis, i. e., the incorrect identification of 
three-dimensional objects in an outstretched hand when blindfolded). This assessment was 
conducted on children. The assessment of childhood neurological soft signs by Denckla 
(Denckla et al., 1988) was similar to that of Shaffer, and reliability studies were conducted on 
the NESS (Vitiello et at., 1989) 
The battery used by Hollander and colleagues (1990) involved 20 individual tasks 
which were associated with one of four categories - fine motor co-ordination, involuntary 
movements, sensory function and visuo-spatial tasks. The battery was based on that of Quitkin 
and Denckla and was expanded to include visuo-spatial tasks. Hollander interprets his results 
as suggesting'for case finding, a cutoff of three [soft signs] is best, whereas if high specificity 
is needed, as with biological studies, a cutoff of five is best'. This suggestion and its associated 
clinical implications is only possible to apply in practice if the neurological soft signs 
assessment is standardised and used consistently, as increasing the number of tasks would 
increase the detection of neurological soft signs. Although Hollander did not publish the 
inventory used to assess soft neurological signs, Schroder's 17 item inventory went some way 
towards establishing a standardised measure. Recent work by Chen and colleagues has 
provided an assessment measure which is standardised, complements the basic neurological 
examination, facilitates further neurological assessment and could be administered routinely 
in a clinical setting. The paper details the development of the inventory which was based on 
previous published work. 
The primary purpose of the present study was to generate data to test the 
heterogeneity hypothesis. However, the study is also of intrinsic value since neurological soft 
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signs have not been assessed in OCD patients by means of a standardised instrument such as 
the Cambridge Neurological Inventory (CNI), or in patients who were recruited from the 
community. It is also the first time that NSS have been examined in obsessional patients from 
England who do not specifically have obsessional slowness. 
7.6.3. Method 
Subjects 
24 subjects with OCD were included in this study, 11 male and 13 female. The mean 
age of the sample was 37 years, 2 months (sd 9.3; range 23 - 70 years). The 24 subjects were 
taken from the larger sample of 46 people who agreed to attend an appointment at the 
Institute of Psychiatry (see chapters 3 and 5). Subjects were selected if their appointments 
were at a time when the Neurologist was available to conduct the NSS examination. There 
were no significant differences in age or severity of the OCD (as measured by the Maudsley 
Obsessive-compulsive Inventory - MOCI), between the 24 subjects who were given the 
examination and the 22 subjects who were not (t-test for independent means: t=1.29, p>0.05; 
n=24 in group 1, n=21 in group 2). All the subjects met DSM III -R criteria for OCD. 
Duration of the illness ranged from 1 year to 40 years (mean duration was 17 years). The 
average age of onset was 20 years (median age of onset 17 years). The subjects were not 
asked to be medication-free for the purposes of the examination. Eleven subjects were known 
to be on medication at the time of the study and 9 were undergoing psychological treatment. 
Results from this group were compared with data published for groups of people with 
no psychiatric symptoms and with schizophrenia (Chen et al., 1995) 
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Measures 
The Cambridge Neurological Inventory 
The inventory takes approximately 30 to 45 minutes to administer and must be 
administered by a neurology specialist (personal communication, Hymas 1992). The 
categories into which the signs are classified and the individual tasks of which they are 
composed are detailed below: - 
'Hard' Neurological Signs: Plantar reflexes, power and reflexes in extremities. 
Motor Coordination: Finger-nose test, finger-thumb tapping, finger-thumb opposition, 
dysdidochokinesia, fist-edge-palm test, Oseresky test. 
Sensory Integration: extinction, finger agnosia, stereoagnosia, agraphesthesia, left-right 
orientation. 
Primitive reflexes: snout reflex, grasp reflex, palmo-mental reflex. 
Tardive dyskinesia: simple, complex and dyskinetic abnormal involuntary movements in the 
face, trunk and limbs 
Catatonic signs: gait mannerism, gegenhalten (resistance to passive movement which 
increases with the force exerted), mitghehen (Anglepoise lamp' raising of arm in response to 
fight pressure), imposed posture, abrupt and/or exaggerated spontaneous movements, iterative 
movements, automatic obedience and echopraxia. 
Parkinsonism: increased tone in limbs, decreased associated movements in walking, shuffling 
gait, arm dropping, tremor, rigidity in neck. 
Failure to suppress inappropriate response: Blinking in saccadic eye movement; head 
movement in saccadic eye movements; winking with one eye. 
Ratings on the CM are standardised to indicate normal response (0), equivocal response 
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(0.5), abnormal response (1) or grossly abnormal response (2). Signs were categorised 
according to Chen et al., (1995). 
Procedure 
Eighteen subjects were administered the Cambridge Neurological Inventory by B. G., 
a Consultant Neurologist. Six of these examinations were video-taped. The remaining six 
subjects were administered the CNI by A. L., also a Consultant Neurologist. The neurologists 
were not blind to the diagnosis of OCD. 
7.6.4. Results 
In order to compare across groups, before any analyses were conducted, the samples 
were tested for heterogeneity of variance. If this test was significant, Scatterthwaite's 
approximation was used. The Mann-Whitney-U test was not used, as such an analysis would 
have required the raw data from the schizophrenic and normal groups in order to make a 
comparison across groups. 
There were no significant differences 
in the total number of NSS 
in the patients seen 
by the two different 
Neurologists (tata1=14.083 for AL; total=13.444 
for BG; Chi-squared (', 1,19)=-33, P>0-05)- 
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The mean number of NSS was 13.6. The results can be seen in Table 7.1. 









Mean (s. d) Mean (s. d Mean s. d 
TOTAL 13.60 (6.6) 19.91 (10.79) 4.56 (3.92) 
Hard signs 0.21 (0.59) 0.57 (0.94) 0.35 (0.79) 
Motor co-ordination 3.75 (4.09) 5.23 (3.96) 0.84 1.41) 
Sensory integration 4.6 (2.02) 5.03 (4.10 1.61 1.87 
Primitive reflexes` 0.59 (0.83) 0.38 (0.66) 0.01 (0.10) 
Tardive d skinesia"* 0.17 (0.38) 0.78 (1.03) 0.02 (0.09 
Catatonic signs* 0.02 (0.1) 0.77 1.09) 0.04 0.14 
Extra pyramidal signs" 0.4 (0.51) 1.49 1.65 0.07 (0.27) 
Failure of su ressions 0.83 (1.07) 1.58 (1.54) 0.37 (0.75) 
`° = sig difference between OCD and normals 
*s= sig difference between OCD and schizophrenics 
The mean age of the Chen's patients was 41.36 yrs (sd=14.15) and the mean age of 
the control 
group was 40.17 years. 66% of each group were male. 
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There was a significant difference between the total scores on the CNI for normals and 
OCD subjects (t=8.39 , p<0.01). 
There was a significant difference between the total score 
on the CNI for schizophrenics and OCD subjects (t=-2.25, p<0.05). OCD Ss show 
significant differences from normals (p<0.05) on all sub-sets of signs except for hard signs, 
tardive dyskinesia and catatonic signs (p>0.05). In the comparison with schizophrenics, there 
is a significant difference between schizophrenics and OCD for all subgroups of signs, except 
motor co- ordination, primitive reflexes, sensory integration and failure of suppression 
(p>o. 05). 
There was no significant difference between the number of NSS of subjects on medication 
(n=11) and subjects who were not on medication (n=13) (t=0.19, p>0.05). 
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7.6.5. Discussion 
This study showed that OCD subjects had abnormal soft signs, particularly in sensory 
integration and motor co-ordination. These findings are in keeping with those of Hollander 
et al., (1990), although the nomenclature is slightly different. Hollander found that OCD 
patients had abnormalities in fine motor co-ordination, involuntary and mirror movements 
(sensory integration) and visuo-spatial function (considered as sensory integration by the 
CNI). It is important to note that the deficits of the schizophrenic group are also in the area 
of motor co-ordination and sensory integration (see Heinrichs and Buchanan, 1988 for a 
review). Specifically, the majority of the more comprehensive studies examining NSS have 
found abnormalities in the area of integrative sensory function and in the area of motor co- 
ordination. 
The results could indicate that abnormal NSS in the area of sensory integration and 
motor function are associated with the presence of any psychiatric disturbance. However, in 
their comprehensive review, Heinrichs and Buchanan (1988) conclude that 'the preponderance 
of data suggest that schizophrenic patients have more neurological abnormalities than patients 
with mixed psychiatric disorders and affective disorders'. The studies reviewed did not, 
however, include the research on NSS in OCD patients, nor the study of Shaffer and 
colleagues (1986) in which NSS at age 7 predicted later psychiatric disturbance characterised 
by anxiety, withdrawal and depression - not psychoses. Furthermore, the results are in keeping 
with those of Nasrallah et al., (1983, ) in which there were no significant differences between 
schizophrenic and bipolar patients, although there was more impairment in the former. 
Our study found that OCD patients had abnormal soft signs. This is in keeping with 
the basal ganglia hypothesis, although it is generally accepted that, unlike 'hard' signs, they do 
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not have a localization function. Furthermore it is possible that NSS are non-specific and 
would be found in the majority of psychiatric disorders. There is a need for investigation of 
NSS in other psychiatric populations, particularly in those with anxiety disorders. 
These results should be interpreted with caution. Firstly, although a standardised 
instrument was used to assess NSS in the normal, schizophrenic and OCD samples, the 
examinations were conducted by different neurologists for whom inter-rater reliability could 
not be established. The neurologists were not kept blind to the diagnosis and the 
examinations were also carried out at different locations. Secondly, the groups were not 
matched for age, sex and intelligence and there is some evidence to show that NSS are 
associated with intelligence (Shaffer et al., 1985; Schoenfeld et al., 1989). 
In summary, the findings of this study are in keeping with those of Hollander and with 
the basal ganglia hypothesis but must be regarded with caution. Future research should 
examine NSS in patients with other psychiatric conditions, particularly anxiety. 
7.7. Summary 
This chapter set out the basic assumptions of the neurological deficit model of OCD. 
Particular attention was paid to describing the basal ganglia deficit model of OCD proposed 
by the NIMH group. Evidence from a variety of sources - neuroimaging, neurological soft 
signs, neuropsychological tests, brain lesions, associations with known basal ganglia disorders 
and the efficacy of serotonin re-uptake inhibitors- was critically reviewed. It was concluded 
that much of the evidence is flawed, but that it converges to form coherent support for the 
model. The relevance of the model to the heterogeneity hypothesis was examined. A study 
is reported which aimed to 1) generate data to test this hypothesis (see chapter 9and 2) to 
examine NSS in people with OCD. People with OCD had more NSS than published data for 
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people without OCD, but fewer signs than people with schizophrenia. Like those with 
schizophrenia, the primary difference was a high number of NSS in motor co-ordination and 
sensory integration, both of which are served by the basal ganglia. It was suggested that such 
deficits are not specific to any particular psychiatric group, and that future research should 
examine NSS in people with anxiety disorders. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Neuropsychological Aspects of OCD 
8.1. Introduction 
Neuropsychology is concerned with the behavioural correlates of altered brain function 
(Grand and Reed, 1988). Neuropsychological assessment consists of a careful evaluation of 
'those behaviors and abilities that tend to become disrupted or altered in the presence of brain 
disease (p. 122; Grand and Reed, 1988; emphasis added). Such tests have been widely used 
to determine possible cognitive deficits in people with OCD. Although neuropsychological 
tests of OCD have examined the role of memory (e. g. Malloy, 1987), the role of memory in 
OCD will not be discussed in this chapter for two reasons. Firstly, there is a need to be 
focused owing to time and space limitations. Secondly, assessments of memory are not 
needed to test the heterogeneity hypothesis described in chapter 9. Many of the 
neuropsychological investigations of OCD have assessed visuo-spatial functioning and the 
functioning of the frontal lobe (in particular with regard to set-shifting ability). This chapter 
therefore concentrates on studies in these areas. 
This chapter starts by reviewing the literature on neuropsychological aspects of OCD. 
The purpose of neuropsychological testing is discussed within this section. The literature on 
neuropsychological test performance in OCD is examined and summarised briefly. The 
relevance of neuropsychological tests to the heterogeneity hypothesis is discussed before we 
go on to describe a study of neuropsychological aspects of OCD, the primary aim of which 
was to generate data to test the heterogeneity hypothesis. The chapter concludes by 
emphasizing the need for control groups in order to place any neuropsychological deficits in 
context. 
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8.2. Review of neuropsychological aspects of OCD 
8.2.1. What neuropsychological tests CAN'T tell us 
Researchers differ in their understanding of the purpose of neuropsychological testing. 
For example, Cox et a]. (1989) regard neuropsychological tests as a useful tool in the search 
for 'a new biological factor in obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD)' (chapter 5, p. 73). 
Hollander et al. (1991) report that neuropsychological tests were presumed 'to reflect 
functions mediated by particular cortical regions, and deficit performance was presumed to 
reflect focal cortical dysfunction' (Hollander et al., 1991, p. 131). Whilst noting 'several 
limitations to this kind of attempt to localise neuropsychological deficits using 
neuropsychological tests', Stein et al. (1994) agree that 'tests of set-shifting ability reflect 
frontal lobe function'. (p. 170). Christensen et al. make the same assumption that 'from a 
neuropsychological perspective, the findings of specific cognitive deficits lead to consideration 
of possible neuroanatomic correlates' (Christensen et al. 1992, p. 15). Visuo-spatial deficits 
are considered to reflect either right hemisphere dysfunction or dysfunction of the basal 
ganglia. 
However, Otto et al. (1990) caution against the use of neuropsychological 
investigation as a 'lesion detector', as it is not straightforward to determine function from 
dysfunction. A double dissociation is required. He emphasizes that 'interpretations of cognitive 
deficits as a neural pathology must be made with caution in this disorder that so clearly affects 
cognition and emotion'. (Otto, 1992) p. 830. He warns that: 
1 Neuropsychological tests cannot differentiate between certain basal ganglia and frontal 
lobe dysfunctions. 
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2 The absence of performance deficits on tasks sensitive to frontal lobe or basal ganglia 
dysfunction does not rule out basal ganglia involvement or frontal involvement in 
OCD. 
3 Cognitive deficits may be secondary to the disorder rather than representing a causal 
or maintaining factor. For example, an increase in latency may result from obsessional 
thoughts interfering in a task. Alternatively, obsessional subjects may adopt a 
maladaptive strategy for example, checking task performance to make sure it is 'right'. 
Each of these warnings is important to remember whilst reviewing the literature. The 
first statement arises from criticisms of those who use tests as 'lesion detectors'. People who 
assume a 1: 1 connection between neuropsychological test performance and the locality of a 
lesion are following the logic below: - 
1. Everyone who has a discrete lesion in (Y) does poorly on a particular test (X). 
2. Good performance on (X) means that (Y) is intact and functional. 
3. Poor performance on (X) means that (Y) is damaged. 
There are obvious problems with this logic. 
It seems as though Otto's first warning stems from the observation that assumption 
(3) is illogical. It is perfectly possible for the frontal lobe to be intact and yet for one to do 
poorly on neuropsychological tests owing to other factors such as slowness, intelligence, 
258 
anxiety, or lesions in other areas of the brain (although these factors may share a common 
neurological 'cause' with the deficit in question). Matched control groups are essential to 
isolate the specific factor that may be associated with neuropsychological test performance. 
For example, an athlete may fail to win a race because he has a broken leg. It may be 
reasonable to infer that to win a race, an intact leg is needed. However, an athlete may fail 
to win a race because he has a stomach upset, a headache or has girlfriend troubles on his 
mind! It is not reasonable to infer that all those who fail to win a race have broken legs. It is 
not even reasonable to infer that all those who fail to complete the race at all have broken 
legs. There could be many reasons for failing to win - physical and psychological. Winning 
a race is therefore not a direct reflection of whether legs are broken or not, and by the same 
logic, neuropsychological test performance is not a direct reflection of whether frontal lobes 
are damaged. In addition, poor performance on the tests may reflect damage that is 
secondary to the functioning of the frontal lobe (such as damage to the fronto-striatal loop) 
and may not reflect frontal lobe damage directly. This can be seen in the example of E. Miller 
(1979; cited in Lezak, 1983): 
'It is tempting to conclude that, if by removing a particular part of the brain we can 
produce a deficit in behaviour, e. g., a difficulty in verbal learning following removal 
of the left temporal lobe in man, then that part of the brain must be responsible for the 
impaired function.... [T]his conclusion does not necessarily follow from the evidence 
as can be seen by the following analogy. If we were to remove the fuel tank from a 
car, we would not be surprised to find that the car was incapable of moving itself 
forward. Nevertheless, it would be very misleading to infer that the function of the 
fuel tank is to propel the car' (pp 19-20). 
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Therefore, not only does poor performance on these tests fail to discriminate between 
cortical lesions, it also fails to discriminate between cortical lesions and psychological 
processes that may be important in the disorder. Furthermore, it does not inform us directly 
about the function of cortical regions. 
Otto's second warning may stem from the specificity and accuracy of 
neuropsychological tests. For example, the best that can be said of the Trail Making Test is 
that 'the test is sensitive to the presence of brain damage' (Aronowitz et al. 1994). One is 
forced to wonder about the utility of including such a test amid a lengthy battery. A patient 
with OCD may show no deficit on a test designed to assess planning abilities (which require 
the frontal lobe) and yet may still have a deficit in the ability to shift sets. Alternatively, 
despite their face validity, the tests may lack construct validity. For example, Milner (1963) 
interpreted poor performance on the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST; Milner, 1963) in 
terms of a failure of the inhibition of central sets . 
However, it has recently been suggested 
that other factors such as the salience of the stimulus situation and the propensity to guess 
may be important (Burgess and Shallice, 1994a). Therefore, a person may do well on a task 
but it may not mean that cortical dysfunction is absent. 
The third warning - that neuropsychological tests cannot tell us about the direction of 
causality is often forgotten, and it is often implicit in the literature that poor performance on 
a neuropsychological test not only reflects cortical damage but it is that cortical damage that 
CAUSES OCD. However, it is perfectly possible that having OCD may : 
(1) cause a dysfunction in a cortical region e. g. by excessive anxiety 
(2) impair performance owing to depression which increases slowness 
(3) impair performance owing to the effect of drugs 
(4) cause a poor neuropsychological test performance, irrespective of the involvement in 
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any particular brain region 
8.2.2. What neuropsychological tests CAN tell us 
Otto suggests that neuropsychological assessment studies can help identify the 
cognitive strengths and weaknesses associated with the disorder and emphasizes the utility of 
neuropsychological investigations as a'neurobehavioural descriptor of functional strengths and 
weaknesses' (Otto et al. 1990, p. 133). When used properly, neuropsychological assessments 
can be a useful clinical tool indicating the specific deficits of an individual. Lezak (1983) 
believes that 'A competent practitioner [in neuropsychological assessments] must have the 
interviewing and counselling skills, the appreciation of social and cultural variables, and the 
psychodiägnostic'tc acumen of a clinical psychologist; the statistical sophistication and test 
familiarity of a psychometrician, and a fairly comprehensive understanding of the human 
nervous system and its pathologies, at least at a level comparable to that of a general 
practitioner' (p. 4). 
Providing that the practitioner is competent and the neuropsychological examination 
is not conducted or interpreted in a vacuum, neuropsychological assessments can help in 
diagnosis (e. g., in distinguishing between different neurological conditions), patient care (e. g., 
the extent to which medications enhance or compromise a patient's mental efficiency) and 
research (e. g., to study the organisation of brain activity and its translation into behaviour, and 
in investigations of specific brain disorders and behavioural disabilities). 
8.2.3. The Literature 
Good reviews of the neuropsychological investigations into OCD are provided by Otto 
(1992), Stein et al., (1994) and Alarcon et al., (1994) and are summarised in Table 8.1. A 
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description of the tests mentioned in the table can be found in a compendium of 
neuropsychological assessment (Lezak, 1983) and therefore will not be described in detail in 
this section. 
Stein's review concluded that 'Overall, there has been some agreement between 
different studies, but the implications on specific neuropsychological tests in OCD are not 
readily interpretable' (Stein et al., 1994. p. 173 ). Evidence of executive dysfunction in patients 
with OCD has been found in 5 studies, 5 studies failed to find evidence of frontal lobe 
dysfunction, and the remainding studies found evidence for frontal lobe dysfunction in some 
of their tests but not others (see Table 8.1 for more details). The evidence for basal 
ganglia/right hemisphere dysfunction (based on deficits in visuo-spatial ability) is more 
consistent, although differences are found between studies (see Table 8.1). 
To the best of my knowledge, only one study (Harvey et al., 1987) has reported a 
relationship between clinical variables (the Leyton Obsessional Inventory) and 
neuropsychological test performance. In the other studies, either no association was found 
(e. g. Boone et al., 1991; Zielinksi et. al., 1991), or else associations are not reported (e. g. 
Hollander, 1990; Christensen et al. 1991). It is surprising that the presence/absence of such 
associations are not commented on, since the meaning and utility of neuropsychological 
assessments are surely dependent on a relationship between clinical indices and the assessment 
index. The lack of a relationship between clinical indices of OCD and neuropsychological 
test performance raises questions about the usefulness of such assessments and indicates that 
neuropsychological deficits may not be specific to OCD but may be the results of a more 
general factor such as anxiety or neuroticism. The only study to include psychiatric controls 
(Cohen et al. 1995) found no difference in neuropsychological test performance between 
social phobics and OCD patients, supporting the suggestion that neuropsychological deficits 
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are not specific in OCD. 
Table 8.1. A summary of the neuropsychological investigations to date 
Sample Included Cont- Tests administered Executive Visuo- Comments 
those on rols? included: - dysfun- spatial 
drugs? ction deficit 
Flor-Henry 11 adult Yes No Wechsler Adult Partial Yes The category test on the 
et al. 1979 OCD Intelligence Scale Halstead-Reitan was abnormal, 
(WAIS)', Halstead- but the one established 
Reitan Battery, 2.3 measure of frontal lobe 
function in the WAIS (Verbal 
fluency) was normal. 
Insel at al. 18 adult Yes No Halstead-Reiten No Yes No overall impairment on 
1983 OCD Battery" battery. Failed to replicate Flor- 
Henry (1979) 
Behar et al. 17 Yes Yes Moneys Road Map Yes Partial Impaired on SML 
1984 adolescen Test (MRM)4, Stylus (frontal/temporal lobe), MRM, 
is OCD Maze Learning Task both of which measure visuo- 
and (SMLT)', Rey spatial and set-shifting. Some 
normal Osterreith Complex abnormal on ROCFT. Not 
controls Figure Test impaired on measures of 
(ROCFT)` attention. Deficits did not 
correlate with ventricular: brain 
ratios on computerised 
tomography 
Harvey at 19 adults Yes No Nelson's modified Yes N/A Impairment correlated with 
al. (1987) OCD WCST'"' scores on Leyton Obsessional 
Inventory 
Malloy I1 adults Yes No Luria Motor Tasks', Yes N/A Only a subset of Ss showed 








Diamond et 18 adult Yes No ROCFT` N/A Yes Test of visuoconstructional 
al. (1988) OCD. ability and incidental visual 
memory 
Flor-Henry 28 No No Purdue Pegboard", Yes N/A 
and Lind tmmedica Tactual 
(1988) ted OCD; Performance2l'" 
normal Halstead Category 
controls WCST' 
Rosen et al. 34 adult Yes Yes Matching familiar N/A Yes 
(1988) OCD, figures test 
normal (MiFT)", Benton 
controls Visual Retention 





Sample Included Cont- Tests administered Executive Visuo- Comments 
those on rols? included: - dysfun- spatial 
drugs? ction deficit 
Head et al. 15 No No Nelson's WCST°. Partial Partial Difficulties in maintaining 
(1989) unmedica LOT12, WAIS-R (impaired (impaired attention on relevant stimulus 
ted OCD, subtest (block on on in the Stropp. 
15 normal design)", Word WCST V AIS-R 
nomtols Fluency tests20, and block 
MRM`, Semmes MRM not design, 
Personal Orientation SPOT or not LOT 
test(SPOT)Z', SMLT) 
SMLT'. 
Cox et al. 42 Yes Yes WCST`, MRM' Partial No? Impaired on card sort but not 
(1989) adolescen SMLT2 on perseverative and non- 
t patients, perseverative errors on WCST. 
normal 
controls 
Laplane et 8 OCD Yes No WAIS-R verbal Yes Yes No formal statistical analyses 
al. (1989) subscale", Raven's were conducted PET and 
Progressive Matrices- nlvgü scans showed basal 







Hollander 30 No Yes? MFFT", B VRT16 N/A Partial Number of neurological soft 
et al. medicatio (impaired signs correlated with number of 
(1990) n free on errors on BVRT not MFFT. 
OCD BVRT) 
Martinot et 16 non Yes Yes COWA1°, ROCFT°, No No OCD Ss impaired on 
al. (1990) depressed attentional tests and attentional tasks) 
OCD, 8 tests of mental 
normal control. 
controls 
Boone at 20 non- Yes Yes WAIS-R", WMS", No Yes Patients with family history of 
al. (1991) depressed WCST', Stroop", OCD were more impaired than 
OCD; 16 Auditory Consonant those without a family history. 
matched Trigrams23, COWA'°, 
controls Design Fluency`, 
Hooper Visual 
Organisation TestTO, 
Rey Tangled Lines26 
and ROCFT°. 
Zielinksi et 21 adult Yes Yes Raven's Progressive No Yes impairment did not correlate 
al. (1991) OCD and Matrices- Short with anxiety 
normal Formu; California 









Sample Included Cont- Tests administered Executive Visuo- Comments 
those on rols? included: - dysfun- spatial 
drugs? ction deficit 
Christense 18 non- Yes Yes WAIS-R subtests", No Yes No differences on tests of 
n et al. depressed WMS". Continuous executive function (category 
(1992) adults Paired Association test, COWA, design fluency, 
OCD, Booklet Category WCST or verbal fluency on 
normal Test1°, Porteus Maze WAIS) 




Otto et al. 20 Yes No Battery including No Yes Also found evidence of verbal 
(1992) untreated ROCFT' (subgro- memory deficits 
OCD up) 
Martin et 17 OCD, Yes No WAIS-R", Money No No Suggested only a subgroup of 
at. (1993) 11 Road Map', Room OCD have cognitive 
Trichotill Test", COWA', impairment 
omania, Reaction Time", 
16 normal Visual Search Task", 
controls California Verbal 
Learning Teste 
Aronowitz 31 adult yes No WAIS-R ", BVRT", Yes Partial Male patients particularly 
et al. OCD; 22 M FT's, TUT» (impaired impaired compared to female. 
(1994) normal Stoop Test" on BVRT 
sex- and MFT, 
matchedc not block 
ontrols design) 
Cohen et 65 OCD, Yes No WAIS-R subtests", No Yes No difference in impairment 
at. (1995) 17 social BVRT", MFFT", between OCD and social 
phobic, TMT" phobics 
32 normal 
controls 
Veale et at. 40 in- Yes No Set-shifting and Yes N/A Symptoms did not correlate 
(1995) patients Tower of London with deficits 






Among tests of executive function and visuo-spatial deficits, there is no single test on 
which people with OCD consistently perform worse than normal controls. Possible reasons 
for the inconsistencies in the findings between studies include the neuropsychological 
methodologies, the comprehensiveness of assessments, the small sample sizes and the lack of 
appropriate controls. The question of the validity of neuropsychological tests plagues the area 
- how do we know if we are measuring what we think we are? Most of the tests used require 
a variety of neurological systems for a good performance, not just the most obvious ones of 
executive functioning. For example, the WCST needs an ability to sort, to form concepts, 
and to shift sets amongst other abilities. Another reason for discrepancies between studies may 
be inconsistency in matching subjects in the control group. In some studies, subjects are 
matched to the probands on indices of age, sex and intelligence (e. g. Head et al. 1989), but 
in other studies, there were significant differences in IQ between subjects and controls (e. g. 
Boone et at. 1991). Another important factor that has been neglected in some studies is the 
role of speed in test performance. Some of the assessments are subject to constraints of time 
(e. g. Block Design) and it may be that an individual's natural speed is affecting test 
performance. Depression, medication, and anxiety may also influence test performance. It 
is important, therefore, to consider these other variables when comparing the 
neuropsychological test performance of controls and patients. A final reason for the 
inconsistency between studies is that OCD may be a heterogeneous disorder with 
homogeneous subgroups characterised by different neuropsychological abilities (see section 
8.2). 
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8.2.4. Neuropsychological tests and the heterogeneity hypothesis 
'Thus, to date, there have been no common impairments exhibited by all OCD subjects 
on neuropsychological or cognitive assessments... OCD may be a heterogeneous disorder 
characterized by various homogeneous subgroups' (Aronowitz et al. 1994). The lack of any 
consistent neuropsychological impairment both between studies (eg Flor-Henry et al, 1979; 
Insel et al. 1983) and within studies (e. g. impairments were found only in a subgroup of 
patients in the study by Otto, 1992; Head et al., 1989) found deficits on the SPOT assessment 
of 'frontal lobe function' but not the SMLT) has given rise to the suggestion that OCD is a 
heterogeneous disorder. Different authors have different suggestions as to the homogeneous 
sub-groups that may characterise this 'notoriously heterogeneous group' (Head et at. 1989, 
p. 936) and further discussion of this can be found in chapter 9. 
It is possible, therefore, that some OCD patients have neuropsychological deficits, 
whilst others do not. If some patients have the basal ganglia/frontal lobe dysfunction 
suggested (Rapoport and Wise, 1989), they will show a deficit on assessments of visuo-spatial 
and set-shifting abilities. If others do not show a basal ganglia/frontal lobe dysfunction, they 
may be more likely to show features of anxiety, guilt and responsibility in accordance with the 
cognitive-behavioural hypothesis. The test of this hypothesis of heterogeneity is detailed in 
chapter 9. 
8.3. A study of neuropsychological aspects of OCD 
8.3.1. Background 
Neuropsychological tests can help identify the cognitive strengths and weaknesses 
associated with disorders. A variety of studies have attempted to assess the 
neuropsychological features of people with OCD (Head et a1., 1989; Martinot et al. 1990; 
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Boone et al., 1991; Zielinski et al., 1991 and Christenson et al., 1992) (see Table 8.1). The 
majority of studies have demonstrated that people with OCD have a deficit in tasks designed 
to assess visuo-spatial abilities. Although they cannot act as specific 'lesion detectors' poor 
performance on tasks of visuo-spatial abilities have been considered to reflect basal ganglia 
dysfunction or right hemisphere dysfunction (Flor-Henry et al. 1979; Stein et. al. 1994). 
People with frontal lobe lesions have a deficit in tasks of verbal fluency and set-shifting 
abilities (Milner, 1964), and poor performance on tasks designed to assess such abilities is 
assumed to reflect a frontal lobe dysfunction. Making that assumption, there is inconsistent 
evidence that OCD is characterised by a deficit in 'frontal abilities (see Table 8.1). Part of the 
reason for the inconsistency may be that factors such as speed, intelligence and anxiety have 
not always been considered but may influence performance. 
The utility of neuropsychological assessments in elucidating the cognitive strengths 
and weaknesses associated with OCD is dependent upon a relationship between clinical 
indices of OCD and neuropsychological test performance. However, only Harvey (1987) has 
found an association between OCD symptom severity and neuropsychological impairments, 
implying that any impairment may not be specific to OCD or that the deficit is not secondary 
to the symptoms. 
In this study, performance on tests of both visuo-spatial and frontal abilities was 
assessed in patients with OCD and normal controls, although greater emphasis was placed on 
assessing frontal abilities, given the greater controversies in the literature. Two new tests 
were included (the Brixton and the Hayling-Burgess and Shallice, 1994a and b), and the study 
took account of the effect of speed, IQ and anxiety on test performance. 
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8.3.2. Aims 
There were three aims in the present study: 
1) To test the hypothesis that people with OCD have a deficit in visuo-spatial and set- 
shifting abilities relative to normal controls using old and new tests. 
2) To investigate the relationship between neuropsychological impairments (if any) and 
symptom severity. 
3) To provide data to test the heterogeneity hypothesis (see chapter 9). 
The following describes data relating to the first two aims of the study. The heterogeneity 
hypothesis is tested, in part, using data from this study and is described in chapter 9. 
8.3.3. Hypotheses and Predictions 
Hypothesis 1 
(Controlling for the effects of speed, intelligence and anxiety) People with OCD have a deficit 
in visuo-spatial abilities, relative to normal controls. 
Prediction 1 
(Controlling for the effects of speed, intelligence and anxiety) OCD subjects score 
significantly lower than normal controls on tests designed to assess visuo-spatial abilities. 
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HT pothesis 2 
(Controlling for the effects of speed, intelligence and anxiety), People with OCD have a deficit 
in executive function relative to normal controls. 
Prediction 2 
(Controlling for the effects of speed, intelligence and anxiety), OCD subjects ; core 
significantly lower than normal controls on tests designed to assess executive functi-, n 
Hypothesis 3 
(Controlling for the effects of speed, intelligence and anxiety, ) . There is a relationship 
between neuropsychological impairment and symptom severity. 
Prediction 3 
(Controlling for the effects of speed, intelligence and anxiety, ) There will be a significant 






47 subjects, 19 male, 28 female were included in the study. All subjects met DSM III-R 
(APA) criteria for the disorder. Subjects were recruited from the psychological treatment unit 
at the Maudsley Hospital, a self-help group for people with OCD and from advertisements 
requesting volunteers with OCD to participate in a research project. The mean age of the 
group was 36.38 years (sd=9.46; range=23 to 70). Scores on clinical indices can be seen in 
Table 8.2. 
Normal group 
47 subjects were contacted and asked to participate in the study. Subjects were matched to 
the probands on age (within one year) and sex. Subjects were not matched on intelligence 
owing to practical difficulties in recruitment of subjects. No subject had any history of 
psychological disorder, and none had studied psychology at a post-graduate level or beyond. 
Subjects were paid £5.00 for their participation. Data from three subjects were excluded from 
the analysis, as scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (Beck et al. 1967) exceeded 15, 
indicating that they had moderate to severe depression. Another subject failed to return the 
questionnaires assessing depression, anxiety and obsessions. Since it was not possible to 
determine whether this subject had these features to a clinical degree, the data from this 
subject's neuropsychological assessments were not included in the analyses. Therefore data 
from 43 subjects were included in the analysis. Nineteen subjects were male, 24 female. Their 





The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI: Beck, Epstein, Brown and Steer, 1988) 
This is a 21-item scale comprising symptoms of anxiety. The scale measures the severity of 
anxiety in adults and children and symptoms are rated on a 4-point scale ranging from 0 ('not 
at all') to 3 ('severely: you could barely stand it). 
The Beck Depression Inventory (BDI: Beck et al. 1961) 
This is a 21-item scale comprising symptoms of anxiety. The scale measures the severity of 
depression in adults and children symptoms are rated on a 3-point scale ranging from 1 to 3. 
Maudsley Obsessional Compulsive Inventory: (MOCI; Hodgson and Rachman, 1977) 
This is a 30-item questionnaire. Subjects are requested to respond 'TRUE' or 'FALSE' to 
each item. There are four subscales: checking, washing, doubting and slowness. 
Neurop_sychological Measures 
Money's Road Map of Directional Sense (Money et al. 1965) 
This spatial test reflects an ability to mentally rotate in space, and performance may 
be impaired by both basal ganglia and frontal lesions. Subjects are presented with a simulated 
street map comprising two routes. The first route has four turns and is used for practice. 
The second route has 32 choice points, and is divided into two sections of 16 turns each. 
Subjects are told to imagine going along the route as if they were walking and to indicate 
whether they would be turning right or left at each choice point. In the first half, the direction 
of travel is congruent with the subject's body orientation. In the second half, the direction is 
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reversed and therefore travel proceeds in a direction rotated 180 degrees from the subject's 
body orientation. The map remains in a fixed position in front of the subject, who is instructed 
that twisting or turning the body to facilitate left-right judgements is not allowed. The 
sequence of turns along the routes is random, with an equal number of left and right turns. 
The number of correct responses is recorded. This test is not timed. 
The Block Design Test (Wechsler et al. 1981) 
This is a sub-test of the WAIS-R (Wechsler et at. 1981). The test is designed to assess 
visuo-spatial skills and is thought to reflect the functioning of the basal ganglia right 
hemisphere. Nine blocks (cubes) are presented coloured red on two sides, white on two sides 
and half red, half white on two sides. 9 cards with printed designs are bound into a booklet. 
The subject works directly from a block model constructed by the examiner for the first 
design, and from printed cards for designs 2-9. The edge of the model and designs are always 
oriented so that the unbound edge of the card or model is toward the subject. In laying out 
the blocks for the subject to use, care is taken that a variety of surfaces face up, that only one 
out of the four blocks has the red/white side facing up, and only three blocks have the 
red/white side facing up when 9 blocks are in use. There is a time limit for each design. For 
the first two designs, a second trial is allowed and timing begins again. The exact time taken 
to complete each design is recorded if it is within the time limit. An item is failed if the 
subject's design is faulty (i. e. does not match the model precisely) or is not completed in the 
allotted time. Rotation of a design by about 30 degrees or more is considered a failure. This 
test is timed. 
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The Modified Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST) (Nelson et al., 1976; Heaton et al., 
1981) 
This test is designed to assess set-shifting ability and is considered to reflect frontal 
lobe functioning. Four stimulus cards are placed in front of the subject - one red triangle, two 
green stars, three yellow crosses, and four blue circles. The subject is then handed a deck of 
64 response cards and instructed to match each one of the response cards to one of the four 
stimulus cards. They are told that the examiner cannot tell him/her how to match the card, 
but will inform him/her whether the response is correct or not. The subject has to deduce the 
correct sorting principle without help. The same sorting principle remains in effect for 6 
consecutive correct sorts, after which the principle changes without warning. The test is 
discontinued after all 64 cards have been sorted. The number of completed categories, correct 
responses, perseverative responses, perseverative errors, nonperseverative errors, and unique 
errors are scored as outlined by Heaton (1981). This test is not timed. 
The Brixton (Burgess and Shallice, 1994a) 
This is a new test designed to assess set-shifting ability and is considered to reflect 
frontal lobe functioning. It allows an assessment of the ability to detect rules using a test that 
is not confounded by salient aspects of the stimulus situation, colour, shape and number like 
the WCST. In this rule attainment test, the rules are related to the relation between successive 
cards and do not correspond to any perceptually salient aspect of the stimuli. The test 
comprises 56 A4 pages with 10 circles in two rows of 5. Nine of the circles are empty and 
one is filled in. Pages differ only in the position of the filled circle, which has a relation to its 
position on the preceding page that obeys one of a number of rules. The number of the 
consecutive pages where a particular rule applies varies in an unsystematic fashion from 3 to 
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8, so that changes in the rule cannot be anticipated. Subjects are instructed to work out where 
the coloured circle is going to be on the next page. The number of errors in guessing where 
the coloured circlee is going to be is recorded. A guess is not considered to be an error at the 
point where the rule has changed and the subject is still following the previous rule. This test 
is not timed. 
Controlled Tests of Word Association (FAS) (Benton and Hamsher, 1976) 
This test is designed to assess verbal fluency and is considered to reflect executive 
functioning of the frontal lobe. Subjects are given one minute to think of as many words as 
they can which begin with the letter 7. The number of words reported and the number of 
words that are repeated are recorded. The procedure is repeated with the letters 'A! and 'S'. 
This test is timed. 
Hayling (Burgess and Shallice, 1994b) 
This is a new test and is considered to reflect the executive functioning of the frontal 
lobe. In this task, the differing components of initiation and inhibition can be examined with 
minimal changes in the background characteristics of the task (unlike tests such as the 
Stroop). 20 sentences in which the last word is omitted are presented to the subject, the 
sentences being chosen such that there is a high probability of a particular response occurring. 
The subject's task is to complete the sentence. In the first half (10 sentences) the subject can 
complete the sentence with any word; in the second half (10 sentences) subjects are 
instructed to complete the sentence with a word which makes no sense in the context; in this 
second condition the rational response has to be inhibited. This test is timed. 
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Speed Task 
This is a straightforward task in which subjects are given an A4 sized piece of paper 
with letters A to E printed randomly in 11 rows and 8 columns (see appendix 2). Subjects are 
first required to count up the number of A's on the page as quickly as they can and inform the 
examiner. After this has been completed, subjects are asked to cross off (place a line) through 
all the B's on the page and tell the examiner when the task has been completed. The mean 
speed for these two tasks is calculated and used in the analyses. This test is timed. 
National Adult Reading Test (NART; Nelson and O'Connell, 1975) 
The NART comprises a list of 50 words printed in order of increasing difficulty. The words 
are relatively short and are all 'irregular' with respect to the common rules of pronunciation. 
The subject reads aloud down the list of words and the number of errors made is recorded. 
Full scale WAIS (Wecshler et al. 1951) IQ can be predicted from this reading error score by 
inserting it into the appropriate formula. This test is not timed. 
8.3.4. Results 
The alpha level was set at 0.05. The mean scores of the two groups on the clinical 
indices are given in Table 8.2. 
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MOCI total 17.15 (4.83) 3.34 (2.41) 
MOCI checking 6.21 (1.79) 0.71 (0.97) 
MOCI washing 3.76 (2.51) 1 (1.4) 
MOCI doubting 5.2 (1.29) 1.41 (1.16) 
MOCI slowness 2.45 (1.77) 2.24 (0.66) 
BDI 17.53 (9.04) 3.71 (3.11) 
BAI 19.13 (9.7) 4.29 (3.8) 
Both groups had above average intelligence as measured by the NART. The mean full IQ 
scores for the obsessional and normal group were 111.23 (sd=6.33) and 114.16 (sd=6.03 ) 
respectively (t=-2.17, p<0.05). The obsessional group were significantly slower on the Speed 
Test than the normal controls (mean for obsessional group= 17.25, sd=3.82; mean for normal 
group=14.46, sd=3.2; t=3.7, p<0.05) 
Prediction I 
Simple Factorial Analyses of Variance (ANOVA) were conducted to determine whether there 
were any significance differences between the groups on measures of visuo-spatial abilities i. e. 
block design and the Money Road Map Test. There was a trend for the obsessional subjects 
to have a worse performance on the block design than normals. This trend approached 
significance as can be seen in Table 8.3. There was also a non-significant trend for the 
obsessionals to perform more poorly on the Money Road Map task (see Table 8.3). When 
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scores on the Speed Test and NART IQ were entered as covariates, the trend for the 
obsessional group to score worse on the Block Design disappeared F(1,73)=0.31, p=0.579. 
Table 8.3 Visuo-Spatial Test Performance (not controlling for other variables) 
Obsessionals Normals F p 
Block Design 32.26 (9.27) 36.26 (9.99) 3.62 0.061 
(1,80) 
Money Road Map Test - 3.8 (5.14) 2.65 (3.4) 1.43 0.235 
Number of Errors (1,80) 
Prediction 1 was not fulfilled. 
Prediction 2 
Multiple Analyses of Variance (MANOVA) were conducted to determine whether there were 
any significant differences between the groups on measures of frontal abilities. Hotellings Tz 
= 2.84 (6,79), p<0.05, indicating that there was a significant overall difference between the 
groups when the measures of frontal abilities were entered as dependent variables. It was then 
appropriate to do further analyses using univariate tests to detect the specific measures that 
may differ between groups. The results are summarised in Table 8.4. There was a non- 
significant trend for obsessionals to complete fewer categories and show more perseverative 
errors than the normal control group on the WCST. There was also a non-significant trend 
for obsessionals to show more errors on the other task of set-shifting, the Brixton. 
Obsessionals produced significantly fewer words on the COWA test, and there was a 
significantly greater difference between the time taken to respond to the straightforward 
sentence completion on the Hayling and the nonsense completion section. There were no 
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significant differences on the number of errors made on this test. 
Table 8.4. Scores on tests of Executive Function (not controlling for other variables). 
Obsessionals Normals F p 
WCST 4.15 (2.11) 5.05 (2.16) 3.49 (6,79) 0.065 
categories 
completed 
WCST 14.91 (5.88) 12.67 (5.66) 3.02 0.085 
perseverative 
errors 
Brixton errors 13.72 (5.16) 13.72 (5.16) 3.59 0.062 
Hayling 25.12 (21.52) 14.66 (17.35) 6.66 0.012 
difference (A- 
B) 
Hayling errors 2.98 (3.81) 3.35 (3.52) 0.08 0.773 
Verbal 14.61 (3.85) 17.19 (4.26) 8.89 0.004 
Fluency 
The analyses were repeated entering scores on the Speed Test and NART IQ as covariates. 
Hotellings T2 was no longer significant F(6,72)=0.36 showing that there was no overall 
difference between the groups on these indices. It was therefore inappropriate to continue 
to conduct univariate analyses of variance. 
This prediction was therefore not fulfilled. 
Prediction 3 
Both Groups Joined 
Correlational analyses were conducted using Spearman's Rank Correlation Coefficient 
to determine whether there were any significant associations between scores on clinical indices 
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and scores on neuropsychological assessments. Given the large number of correlations that 
were conducted, the alpha level was set at 0.01. The correlation matrix is shown in Table 8.5. 
There was a significant negative correlation (r=-0.29, p<0.01) between total scores on the 
MOCI and number of errors on the Brixton. Since there was also a significant positive 
association between scores on the BAI and number of errors on the Brixton (r=0.36, p<0.01), 
the correlations were re-run, partialling out the effects of anxiety. The significant association 
between total scores on the MOCI and number of errors on the Brixton disappeared (r=-0.01, 
n. s. ). 
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Table 8.5. Correlations among Neuropsychological and Obsessional Variables (both 
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1442 -. 2895** . 
2265* -. 0372 . 
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1522 -. 2102 
-checking -. 2037 . 
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1432 -. 2555 
-washing -. 0449 . 
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-doubt -. 1731 . 
0868 -. 2408 . 
2004 -. 1171 . 
1819 
. 
0714 -. 0234 
BAI -. 2099 . 
1304 -. 1288 . 
3591** -. 1102 . 
1254 
. 
1251 -. 0922 
BDI -. 1025 . 





1613 -. 0887 
There was also a significant association between the difference in time taken to 
complete sections A and B in the Hayling Task and the checking subscale of the MOCI 
(r--0.29, p<0.01). The differences remained significant when the effects of anxiety were 
partial led out (r--0.28, --p<0.0 1.: . ). 
The analyses were repeated, partialling out the effects of performance on the Speed 
Task and NART IQ. No significant associations remained, except for a positive correlation 
between anxiety and number of errors on the Brixton (r--0.32, p<0.01). 
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Correlational Analyses for the Obsessional Group Only 
Correlational analyses were conducted partialling out the effects of performance on 
the Speed task and NART IQ. The only significant correlation was between errors on the 
Brixton and anxiety (r-0.54, p<0.01). There was a strong but non-significant correlation 
between depression scores and number of perseveration errors on the WCST (r=0.43, 
p=0.02). 
Correlational Analyses for the Normal Control Group Only 
Correlational analyses were conducted partialling out the effects of performance on 
the Speed task and NART IQ. The only significant correlation . was; 
between verbal fluency 
scores and the total score on the MOCI (r=-0.414, p<0.01). There was a non-significant 
association between (i) depression scores and (ii) checking total on the MOCI, and errors on 
the Money Road Map Test (rß. 35, and rß. 38 respectively, p<0.05). The strong association 
between verbal fluency scores and total score on the MOCI was removed by partialling out 
the effects of depression (r--O. 19, n. s). 
Summary of Results 
Prediction 1- This prediction was not fulfilled. Taking account of performance on the speed 
task and IQ scores, there were no significant differences between groups on measures of 
visuo-spatial abilities. 
Prediction 2- This prediction was not fulfilled. Taking account of performance on the speed 
task and IQ scores, there were no significant differences between groups on measures of 
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abilities served by frontal lobe. 
Prediction 3- This prediction was partially fulfilled. There was no association between the 
majority of neuropsychological and clinical variables, when the effects of depression, speed 
and NART IQ were partialled out. However, in the obsessional group, there was an 
association between anxiety and the number of errors made on the Brixton. 
8.3.5. Discussion 
The results did not show patients with OCD to have deficits in either frontal lobe 
abilities or visuo-spatial abilities, once the effects of depression, anxiety, intelligence scores 
and speed were taken into account. The finding that obsessionals had a deficit in verbal 
fluency relative to controls could probably be explained in terms of depression. This study 
replicates that of Martinot et al. (1990) but differs from many of the other studies (see Table 
8.1). However, the other studies failed to control for speed, anxiety and depression. 
There were no significant associations between scores on the MOCI (the clinical index 
of obsessions) and neuropsychological test performance. However, there was an association 
between anxiety and number of errors on the rule detection task (Brixton) in the obsessional 
group but not in the normal controls. It may be that, when the rule is unknown, people prone 
to anxiety become particularly anxious and unable to concentrate on detection. People less 
prone to anxiety (the normal controls) may not respond to rule detection with the same 
increase in anxiety. However, it is difficult to see why this may be the case for the 'Brixton' 
as opposed to the WCST where detection of sets is also important. 
The utility of neuropsychological assessments has been questioned in section 8.2.1. 
Heeding the warnings of Otto et al. (1990), it is not possible to interpret these results in terms 
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of the presence/absence of a deficit in the frontal lobe or basal ganglia. However, it is 
possible to make some general comments in terms of the cognitive strengths and weaknesses 
associated with OCD. 
Generally, the analyses showed the importance of considering speed, intelligence, 
anxiety and depression when determining differences between groups. Ideally, groups would 
be matched on these variables before neuropsychological testing commenced, but it becomes 
extremely difficult in practical terms to match subjects on 4 variables (age, sex, speed and 
intelligence). The best control group would comprise anxious or depressed subjects obtained 
randomly, matched on all four criteria, but recruitment of such a group is likely to be 
impossible without immense resources in human and financial terms. Statistical controls are 
more practical and the influence of speed and intelligence can be accounted for. This study 
shows how necessary it is to take account of such influences before making interpretations 
of the data. 
The study helps elucidate the cognitive strengths and weaknesses associated with OCD 
in general. Although the obsessional group had a relatively lower NART IQ than the 
controls, both groups were considerably above average (IQ= 100), and it cannot be concluded 
that the obsessional group had an 'intelligence deficit' or any other 'deficit' except for speed. 
Speed deficits appear to characterise OCD and therefore influence performance on 
neuropsychological tests. It is possible that such a deficit is a primary problem - for example 
Rachman (1978) has described a group with primary obsessional slowness. However, it has 
been difficult to distinguish such a sub-group from those with secondary obsessional slowness 
(Darnley, 1995, personal communication) as people who check (or wash or hoard) are 
delayed on other tasks owing to their obsessional problem (see Veale, 1993). 
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The utility of neuropsychological tests in informing about strengths and weaknesses 
associated with OCD is dependent on establishing a relationship between OCD symptoms and 
neuropsychological test performance. Furthermore, the pattern of neuropsychological deficits 
must be specific to OCD in order to inform us meaningfully about the characteristics of this 
disorder, as opposed to others. It is incorrect to use such tests as 'lesion detectors'. However, 
this study and others have failed to find a relationship between OCD symptoms and 
neuropsychological test performance and the utility of these assessments is questionable. 
8.4. Summary 
Deficits have been shown in the performance of OCD patients on neuropsychological 
tests assumed to reflect performance of the basal ganglia/right hemisphere and the frontal 
lobe. However, such deficits have not been found consistently, perhaps because factors such 
as speed, intelligence and anxiety have not been fully considered. No relationship has been 
found between OCD symptom severity and neuropsychological test performance. A study 
was conducted to determine neuropsychological test deficits in patients with OCD and normal 
controls. Once speed, intelligence, anxiety and depression were taken into account, there 
were no differences between groups on any of the neuropsychological test variables. There 
were no associations between neuropsychological test performance and the measure of 
obsessionality, once speed, intelligence, anxiety and depression were considered, with the 
exception of a relationship between errors on the rule detection task and anxiety levels in the 
obsessional group. 
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Given that neuropsychological tests cannot act as 'lesion detectors', the utility of 
neuropsychological assessments in OCD is debatable. 
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CHAPTER 9 
The Heterogeneity of OCD 
'Inevitably, the beginning clinician is struck by the diversity of the clinical 
presentations of OCD. However, this initial impression is soon replaced by the 
realization that the number of types of obsessions are remarkably limited and 
stereotypic.... One of the major advantages for researchers working with OCD is its 
relative homogeneity' (Rasmussen and Eisen, 1994 Chapter 2, p. 19,13). 
'OCD is biologically homogeneous' (Okasha et al. 1994) 
'Obsessive-compulsive disorder is a heterogeneous condition' (Pauls et at, 1995, p. 76) 
'The identification of homogeneous subgroups of OCD patients has remained elusive' 
(Baer, 1994, p. 18) 
9.1. Introduction 
Throughout this thesis, reference has been made to the 'heterogeneity hypothesis' and 
data have been generated in order that the hypothesis may be tested. This chapter details the 
different meanings of 'heterogeneity' and the context in which it is considered in the current 
analysis. The literature is reviewed with respect to heterogeneity, and its importance is made 
explicit. Cautions against using the term too broadly are made. The heterogeneity hypothesis 
is explained, and prerequisites for the testing of the hypothesis are detailed. The next sections 
test whether such prerequisites were met in the current study. The following tests are made 
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to determine whether: 
1 Performance on neuropsychological tests is intercorrelated. 
2 Performance on neuropsychological tests is correlated with neurological soft 
signs 
3 Anxiety, guilt and responsibility are inter-correlated 
On the basis of findings from these tests, the heterogeneity hypothesis is revised, and 
two alternative heterogeneity hypotheses are posited. These revised hypotheses are both 
tested. The chapter concludes by discussing the findings and the 'heterogeneity of 
heterogeneity'. 
9.2. What is meant by 'Heterogeneity' 
Throughout this thesis, reference has been made to the 'heterogeneity of OCD. 
Heterogeneous can be defined as 'composed of diverse elements' (Oxford Dictionary), 
whereas homogeneous means 'of the same kind or nature; uniform'. There may be different 
sorts of heterogeneity. For example, cars are heterogeneous both in terms of colour, and in 
terms of manufacturers. Depression is considered to be heterogeneous in terms of aetiology 
(social, chemical, cognitive and behavioural factors are all implicated), treatment (medication 
vs psychological therapies) and, perhaps, in clinical presentation (bipolar affective disorder 
vs major depressive episode). Within a heterogeneous group, there may be homogeneous 
subgroups. 
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9.3. Literature Review on Heterogeneity 
Within OCD, there may be different sorts of heterogeneity, with various 
homogeneous subgroups. For example, McDougle et al. (1990) reported on a subgroup of 
9 of 17 patients with treatment-resistant OCD who responded to the addition of a neuroleptic. 
A positive response to treatment was associated with comorbid tic disorder in this subgroup 
and it was suggested that such patients have impairment in both CNS dopamine and serotonin 
system. Different personality subtypes have been hypothesised to form homogeneous 
subgroups within OCD. Patients with comorbid Cluster A personality disorders (e. g. 
schizotypal and paranoid personality disorders) have been found to be significantly less 
responsive to both pharmacological and psychological treatment (Baer et al. 1992; 
Minichiello et al., 1987). Quantitative electroencephalography (QEEG) has been used to try 
to identify homogeneous subgroups of OCD patients. Marked differences between baseline 
QEEG patterns were found between responders and non-responders to medication, and 
cluster analysis revealed a relationship between cluster membership and treatment outcome 
(Prichep et al, 1991; Mas et al, 1991). 
The findings of Pauls et al. (1986,1992) of a genetic relationship between OCD and 
Tourette's Syndrome (TS) have led to the suggestion that people with OCD who have TS in 
the family form a distinct subgroup (George et al. 1993; Holzer et al. 1994). The current 
movement towards establishing a variety of 'obsessive compulsive related disorders' 
(Hollander, 1994) carries with it the assumption that OCD is a heterogeneous disorder. One 
of the fundamental questions in OCD research at present concerns the boundaries of the 
disorder and whether it is one disorder or several different ones (Insel, 1994). Body 
Dysmorphic Disorder, Anorexia Nervosa, Hypochondriasis, sexual compulsions, pathological 
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Figure 9.1. The Spectrum of Obsessive Compulsive Related Disorders (From 
Hollander, E. 1993, p. 2). Overlap between OCD and somatoform, dissociative, eating,, 
+delusional, tic, neurological, impulse control, and impulsive personality disorders (Note thq 
ýbsence of overlap between OCD and anxiety / depressive disorders). Abbreviationsi 
(clockwise from top): Hypochondriasis (Hyp); body dysmorphic disorder (BDD);; 
epersonalization (Dep); anorexia nervosa (AN); delusional disorder, somatic subtypo 
DD, SS); Tourette's Syndrome (TS); Parkinson's disease (Pk); Autism (Aut); epilepsy 
E p); S denham's Chorea Sd" sexual compulsions Sex trichotillomania Trich k P), y (Y ), ( Co); () 
pathological gambling (PG); borderline personality disorder (Bord); antisocial personality 
disorder (AS). 
'spectrum' of OCD (Stein and Hollander, 1993). The conceptual relationship between such 
subgroups is shown in Figure 9.1. 
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Several spectrums are suggested to exist based on apparent overlaps in pathogenic 
mechanisms and phenomenological overlap between the disorders, although no relationship 
uniting the different spectra is discussed (Stein and Hollander, 1993). The authors consider 
their analysis to have implications for the classification of OCD and, in fact, suggest that it be 
redefined. 
'Our review indicates that the current classification of OCD perhaps overemphasizes 
the link between OCD and anxiety, and downplays the relationships between OCD and 
its related disorders... Hopefully the current DSM-IV field trials will help in the 
revision of the diagnostic criteria for OCD' (Stein and Hollander, p. 262). 
In DSM IV (APA, 1994), OCD is still characterised as an anxiety disorder, although 
it is stated that 'There is a high incidence of Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder in individuals 
with Tourette's Disorder' (p. 419). There is not a similarly high incidence of Tourette's 
disorder in OCD (Pauls et al. 1992). 
Perhaps the reason that the search for homogeneous subgroups has remained elusive 
(Baer, 1994) is because none exist. Rasmussen and Eisen (1991) imply that it is only naive 
psychologists who search for homogeneous subtypes since 'the inexperienced clinician is 
immediately struck with the diversity of clinical presentations of OCD' (p. 36). According to 
Rasmussen and Eisen, different phenomenological sub-groups (such as cleaners and checkers) 
are similar in terms of demographic variables, course of illness, other clinical features and 
comorbid diagnosis. Other evidence used to argue for the relative homogeneity of the 
disorder in terms of symptom subtypes includes: (a) patients frequently present with multiple 
obsessions and compulsions; (b) patients usually have several principal obsessions or 
compulsions over the course of their illness; and (c) in families that have more than one 
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member affected by OCD, the clinical subtype is frequently different. Heterogeneity on the 
basis of symptom subtypes is dismissed by Rasmussen and Eisen (1991), who instead suggest 
a different type of heterogeneity, based on what they term the 'core features' of the disorder. 
These 'core features' are: - 
Abnormal risk assessment 
Pathological doubt 
Need for Certainty or Completeness 
Rasmussen and Eisen's conceptualisation of the heterogeneity of OCD can be seen in Figure 
9.2. 
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Figure 9.2. Heterogeneity and comorbidity in OCD: Relationship to core features 
and developmental antecedents (Rasmussen and Eisen, 1991; p. 35). 
Other sub-groups have been suggested. Baer (1994) conducted a factor analysis of 
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symptom subtypes of OCD according to the responses of 107 patients with OCD on the Yale 
Brown Obsessive Compulsive Scale (YBOCS; Goodman et al. 1989). 
9.4. Why Heterogeneity is Important 
Identification of subgroups within OCD is important for a variety of reasons. 
Primarily, it may be that different sorts of treatments will work better for different subgroups. 
Chapter 5 showed that exaggerated perceived responsibility characterised people with 
checking compulsions more than those with cleaning compulsions. Therefore, any cognitive 
therapy based on targeting cognitions concerning unrealistic appraisals of responsibility is 
predicted to be more effective for checkers than cleaners. Similarly, there is some evidence 
that checkers are slower to respond to treatment than cleaners (Foa and Goldstein, 1978). 
However, it is important not to create subgroups, merely on the basis of differential 
response to treatment without a clear theoretical foundation. Response to treatment may be 
one method of obtaining validity for suggestions of subgroups, but it is circular to argue that 
subgroups exist because they predict differential response to treatment, when differential 
treatment response has been used to formulate the original subgroups. Other reasons why it 
is important to identify homogeneous subgroups include: - 
" Refinement in the understanding of the aetiology of the disorder (including genetics) 
0 Improvement of predictions about the course of the disorder, 
An increased awareness of the connections between both subgroups and major groups 
such as OCD and tic disorders. 
Even if groups are similar in terms of phenomenology, if there is no utility in considering one 
disorder as a subgroup of another in terms of improving treatment, understanding or 
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prognosis, it is suggested that such a re-classification could be at worst, confusing and, at 
best, pointless. 
9.5. Cautions: Heterogeneity and Redefinition 
Salkovskis (1995) has cautioned against the current trend to redefine OCD on the 
basis of hypothesised homogeneous subgroups. He argues that OCD and other problems can 
appear similar on a superficial level, and repetitive behaviours such as tics are suggested to 
fall within this category. Alternatively, psychological processes may be shared between 
disorders; for example, both OCD and hypochondriasis may be characterised by the belief that 
some feared catastrophe will occur at some future time. Although common processes may 
occur in different combinations across the range of disorders, there is no reason, according 
to Salkovskis, to abandon the concept of OCD as a distinct disorder characterised by a clearly 
identifiable pattern of thinking and behaviour. 
9.6. The Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
'A fundamental divide in the literature appears to be between those who consider OCD 
to be a neurological problem, and those who consider it to be a psychological problem' 
(Tallis, 1995). 
The current hypothesis of heterogeneity refers to heterogeneity in terms of 
neurologicaUneuropsychiatric impairment and in terms of cognitive-behavioural impairment. 
Specifically, the hypothesis being tested is: - 
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This is shown diagrammatically in Figure 9.3. 
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Figure 9.3. Diagram of the Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
The suggestion that there will be a group with neurological/ neuropsychological 
impairments stems from the 'basal ganglia' dysfunction model of OCD (see chapter 7 for a 
review of the model). A group with high levels of anxiety, guilt and responsibility stems from 
the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD (see chapter 2 for a review of the model). 
Whilst other types of heterogeneity may exist within the obsessional population (e. g. 
checkers and cleaners), the current heterogeneity hypothesis was made for a variety of 
reasons. Firstly, and perhaps most strikingly, the literature on the 'basal ganglia' hypothesis 
of OCD (eg Rapoport and Wise, 1989) makes no reference to the cognitive-behavioural 
model of OCD and little mention of the fact that (BCD is classified as an anxiety disorder-. 
It was noted that 'clinically, a great deal of information appears to be inconsistent with our 
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'basal ganglia hypothesis' of OCD' (Wise and Rapoport, 1989, p. 340). The 'basal ganglia' 
model of OCD is a deficit model (Salkovskis, 1995) in which the normal functioning of a 
system has been disrupted. However, this fails to take into account the work on 'abnormal 
and normal' obsessions which has shown that unwanted, intrusive thoughts occur in the 
majority of the population (Rachman and de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis and Harrison, 1984), and 
work by Sher et al., (1983) showing that the normal population experiences 'compulsions'. 
The pioneering work of Rachman and Hodgson (1980), and their wealth of clinical and 
empirical data on the nature of OCD, are ignored by the basal ganglia model. Notably, the 
model fails to account for the efficacy of behavioural therapy for OCD, its time course and 
behavioural specificity (Wise and Rapoport, 1989). 
However, the cognitive-behaviourists, until recently, have not addressed the issue of 
the data in support of the basal ganglia deficit model (Salkovskis, Rachman and Shafran, 
1995). Data from neuroimaging, neuropsychological deficits, and comorbidity with other 
'neurological' disorders such as Tourette's Disorder have all been ignored by the cognitive- 
behavioural model. Salkovskis (1995) has suggested that such deficits may be secondary to 
the psychopathology of OCD or non-existent and, whilst acknowledging that all cognitions 
and behaviours have a biological substrate, a distinction is drawn between a biological 
substrate underlying behaviour and a deficit in a neurological system causing deviant 
behaviour. 
It is possible that: - 
0 Both models are true and OCD is a heterogeneous disorder 
0 One model is true, and the other is false 
0 Both models are partial accounts of all patients 
Both models are false 
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(Bolton, 1995; personal communication). 
At the start of the research for this thesis, there had been no attempt to integrate both 
of the approaches i. e. to test the first point, whether both models are true. In North America, 
there is an assumption among psychiatrists that the disorder is neurological. Given the 
evidence for both the basal ganglia deficit model and the cognitive-behavioural model of 
OCD, it was hypothesised that for some patients, their OCD would be characterised by 
neurological and neuropsychological dysfunction, whereas other people may have a disorder 
characterised by the features described by the cognitive-behavioural model, namely high levels 
of anxiety, guilt and responsibility. 
9.7. Testing for Homogeneity within sub-groups 
As the heterogeneity hypothesis stands, two separate groups of dysfunctions are 
suggested to exist. Within each group, however, dysfunctions are assumed to cluster together 
i. e. neurological and neuropsychological dysfunctions are assumed to form one cluster, and 
high levels of anxiety, guilt and responsibility are suggested to form another. Each cluster is 
assumed to form a homogeneous sub-group. The reason for the first cluster is that both 
neurological and neuropsychological deficits are considered to reflect basal ganglia 
dysfunction (or disruption in the frontal loop connected to the basal ganglia). The reason for 
the second cluster is that anxiety, guilt and responsibility are all considered to result from 
placing special significance on intrusive thoughts. 
In order to test the heterogeneity hypothesis, it is first necessary to test that there are 
two groups which are themselves homogeneous. For the groups to be homogeneous, the 
following criteria must be met: - 
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GROUP 1 
Subjects in this group must show neuropsychological test performance deficits and an 
abnormally high number of neurological soft signs. It is expected that neuropsychological test 
performance deficits and the number of neurological soft signs will be postively correlated. 
GROUP 2 
Subjects in this group must show higher levels of anxiety, responsibility and guilt than the 
normal population. It is therefore expected that these variables will be inter-correlated. 
9.7.1. Testing whether performance on neuropsychological tests are inter-correlated 
In the studies reviewed in chapter 8, no data were reported on the inter-correlations 
between different neuropsychological assessments. On occasion, it was noted that people 
with OCD had a deficit on one test and not another (Trail making Tests A and B, Aronowitz 
et at, 1995) and it is possible to deduce from this that it is unlikely that there will be a strong 
positive association between performances on these two measures. The lack of data reported 
may indicate that inter-correlations between measures are not significant. 
The data generated in chapter 8 were used to test whether performance on 
neuropsychological tests were inter-correlated. Pearson's product moment correlation 
coefficient was calculated to determine the association between neuropsychological variables. 
The inter-correlation matrix is shown in Table 9.1. (n=47) 
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Table 9.1. Inter-Correlations between Neuropsychological Variables 
BLOCK BRIXTON HAYLING HAYLING HAYLING HAYLING 
A TOTAL B TOTAL DIFFERENCE B-ERRORS 
BLOCK 1.0000 . 0280 -. 
0199 -. 1508 -. 1789 -. 1836 
BRIXTON . 0280 1.0000 -. 1256 . 1299 . 
2029 -. 0952 
HAYLING A -. 0199 -. 1256 1.0000 . 
5239** -. 0104 . 1000 
TOTAL 
HAYLING -. 1508 . 1299 . 
5239** 1.0000 . 8359** . 
3689* 
B TOTAL 
HAYLING -. 1789 . 2029 -. 
0104 . 
8359** 1.0000 . 
4029** 
DIFFERENCE 
HAYLING -. 1836 -. 0952 . 1000 
B-ERRORS 
MONEY -. 3430* . 4054* -. 1182 -. 
1269 -. 0415 
ERRORS 
VERBAL -. 0951 -. 0108 -. 4295** -. 3612* -. 1588 
FLUENCY 
WCST 
CATEGOREIS -. 0248 -. 2875 
CORRECT 
. 1105 -. 2983* 
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Table 9.1. cntd.. Inter-Correlations between Neuropsychological Variables 
MONEY VERBAL WCST 
ERRORS FLUENCY CATEGORIES CORRECT PESEVERATIV E SPEED 
AVERAGE ERRORS AVERAGE 
BLOCK -. 3430* -. 0951 -. 0248 . 
1105 -. 0990 -. 2447 
BRIXTON . 4054* -. 0108 -. 2875 -. 2983* . 
2905 . 0269 
HAYLING A -. 1182 -. 4295** . 1382 . 0054 . 
0304 -. 0049 
TOTAL 
HAYLING B -. 1269 -. 3612* . 1326 . 0908 . 
1445 . 0583 
TOTAL 
HAYLING -. 0415 -. 1588 . 
0719 . 1151 . 
1623 . 0330 
DIFFERENCE 
HAYLING . 0872 -. 2999* -. 1082 -. 1279 . 2431 -. 2257 
B-ERRORS 
MONEY 1.0000 -. 0850 -. 1823 -. 3532* . 
3309* -. 2590 
ERRORS 
VERBAL -. 0850 1.0000 . 
0932 . 2586 -. 
2775 . 0070 
FLUENCY AVE RAGE 
WCST 
CATEGORIES -. 1823 . 0932 1.0000 . 8670** -. 
6143** . 
0045 
CORRECT -. 3532* . 2586 . 8670** 1.0000 -. 
6971** . 0015 
PERSEVERATIVE. 3309* -. 2775 -. 6143** -. 6971** 1.0000- . 0873 
ERRORS 
Given the multiple number of comparisons, tests were only considered to inter-correlate 
significantly if p<0.01 (**). 
Aside from tests correlating within themselves (eg number of categories completed 
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on the WCST was highly associated with the number of perseverative errors in a negative 
direction), none of the psychological tests were highly inter-correlated. Although there was 
a trend for errors on the Money to be negatively correlated with performance on the block 
design, this did not reach significance, despite the tests being designed to assess the same 
abilities (Lezak, 1983). 
9.7.2. Testing whether scores on neuropsychological tests are correlated with 
neurological soft signs 
Hollander et at. (1990) examined the relationship between number of neurological soft 
signs and neuropsychological test performance. He found a significant association between 
neurological soft signs and a measure of visual memory retention (Benton's Visual Retention 
Test; Benton, 1974), but not between neurological soft signs and the Matching Familiar 
Figures Test, a test of visual recognition and matching (Kagan et al., 1964). 
Associations between performance on neuropsychological measures and neurological 
soft signs were tested using data described in chapter 8. Pearson's product moment 
correlation coefficient was calculated to determine the association between 
neuropsychological variables and total number of neurological soft signs. The inter- 
correlation matrix is shown in Table 9.2. (n=24) 
The significance level was set at p<0.01 owing to the large number of inter- 
correlations. Of note, the total number of Neurological Soft Signs was significantly associated 
only with performance on the speed task. Performance on the speed task was related to the 
number of sensory and reflex soft signs in particular. The number of errors on the Hayling 
part B was strongly associated with the number of hard neurological signs. There was a trend 
for the number of correct categories on the WCST to be positively associated with the number 
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of signs of suppression, with the number of perseverative responses being negatively 
associated with this type of neurological soft sign. 
Table 9.2. Correlations between Neuropsychological Test Performance and NSS 
NEUROLOGICAL SOFT SIGNS 
TOTAL HARDSIGN MOTOR SENSORY REFLEX DYSKIN 
BLOCK -. 2196 -. 0802 -. 2084 -. 0303 -. 0875 -. 0495 
BRIXTON . 
0848 -. 1071 . 2422 -. 0656 -. 
2967 -. 0874 
HAYLING -. 0855 . 1794 . 
1139 -. 3783 . 0008 . 
0299 
A TOTAL 
HAYLING . 1239 . 3157 . 1168 . 
0219 . 0549 -. 
0243 
B TOTAL 
HAYLING . 2058 . 2645 . 
0532 . 3016 . 
0553 -. 0614 
DIFFERENCE 
HAYLING . 2922 . 7042** . 1719 . 
1240 . 0340 . 
2079 
ERRORS B 
MONEY . 1987 -. 1356 . 
3100 -. 1365 . 
0620 . 3015 
ERRORS 
SPEED . 4796* . 0447 . 
2447 . 4854* . 
5169* -. 1399 
AVERAGE 
VERBAL . 0072 -. 0963 . 0008 . 
0718 -. 2642 . 0472 
FLUENCY AVERAGE 
WCST 
CATEGORIES . 0836 . 0152 -. 0229 -. 0597 . 
2121 -. 0964 
CORRECT -. 0027 -. 1085 -. 0421 -. 0927 . 0439 -. 
2127 
PERSEVER. -. 0468 . 0624 . 0878 -. 0748 -. 
1746 . 2011 
ERRORS 
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Table 9.2 continued.. 
PARKIN 
BLOCK -. 1977 
BRIXTON 
. 3856 
HAYLING -. 2360 
A TOTAL 






HAYLING -. 1740 
ERRORS B 
MONEY . 0489 
ERRORS 














-. 1578 . 2612 
-. 2120 -. 0317 
-. 1342 -. 0924 
. 0163 -. 2124 
. 
1059 -. 2064 
. 
3660 -. 1932 
-. 0096 . 0359 
. 2084 -. 1219 
. 0417 -. 1006 
. 4991* -. 1166 
. 
3916 -. 1338 
-. 4252* . 1093 
9.7.3. Testing whether anxiety, guilt and responsibility are inter-correlated 
This was tested using data described in chapters 3-5. Data on the relationship between 
guilt and responsibility were reported in chapter 5 and a significant association was found 
between these variables in a large, obsessional population. Since this assumption was being 
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tested with a view to testing the overall heterogeneity hypothesis, subjects were only included 
in the analysis if neuropsychological data had also been collected. Although 47 subjects had 
had a neuropsychological assessment, the responsibility scale was a somewhat late addition 
to the questionnaire measures. Therefore, unfortunately, only 28 subjects received and 
completed a neuropsychological assessment, a responsibility scale, and assessments of guilt 
and anxiety. A Pearson's product-moment correlation coefficient was calculated to determine 
the association between anxiety, guilt and responsibility. The inter-correlation matrices are 
shown in Tables 9.3 and 9.4. Owing to the large number of correlations, significance levels 
were set at p<O. 01. 
Table 9.3. Inter-correlations between measures of anxiety and measures of guilt and 
responsibility. 
Beck Four Systems Anxiety Sensitivity 
Anxiety Anxiety Total Index 
Responsibility 
. 4326* . 5679** . 
4513* 
total 
Guilt total . 2804 . 5790** . 
3630 
Guilt standards -. 4480* -. 1303 . 0599 
Guilt trait . 3423 . 5608** . 2748 
Guilt State . 
5110** 
. 5892** . 
4123* 
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Table 9.4. Inter-correlation between measures of measures of guilt and responsibility. 
GUILT 
Total Standards Trait State 






The correlational analysis showed that anxiety, as measured by the FSAQ, was 
associated significantly with responsibility and with total guilt, trait guilt and state guilt, but 
not guilt standards. There was a tendency for anxiety as measured by the BAI to be 
associated with the same measures of guilt, but owing to the small sample size, these 
correlations did not reach significance. Responsibility was significantly associated with trait 
guilt, but again, owing to the small sample size, strong correlations between state guilt and 
total guilt did not reach statistical significance. 
9.7.4. Summary of tests of Homogeneity 
The analyses indicated that homogeneous sub-groups did not exist in the general 
manner suggested by the heterogeneity hypothesis. There was no significant association 
between the majority of the neuropsychological test measures, nor between 
neuropsychological test performance and neurological soft signs. A strong relationship 
between anxiety, guilt and responsibility indicated that there may be a homogeneous group 
characterised by these variables. 
9.8. Revisions to the Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
Based on the tests for homogeneity, the heterogeneity hypothesis was revised to take 
account of the analysis showing that people with neurological soft signs and 
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neuropsychological impairments did not form a homogeneous subgroup. 
Either: 
(1) There will be two separate, identifiable subgroups within the sample of OCD patients. 
One of these groups will be characterised by neurological impairments (NSS), the other 
will be characterised by high levels of anxiety, guilt (and responsibility. ) 
Or: 
(2) There will be two separate, identifiable subgroups within the sample of OCD patients. 
One of these groups will be characterised by errors on the Money Road Map Tests and 
poor performance on the block design, the other will be characterised by high levels of 
anxiety, guilt and responsibility. 
9.8.1. Analysis to investigate the Revised Heterogeneity Hypothesis (1) 
The revised heterogeneity hypothesis was based on the principle that some subjects 
with OCD may have a basal ganglia dysfunction characterised by neurological soft signs, and 
others would have cognitive-behavioural disturbances characterised by anxiety, guilt and 
responsibility. A cluster analysis was conducted to determine whether these two separate 
groups existed. 
Since only 24 subjects underwent a neurological soft signs examination, the numbers 
in this analysis are rather small. Given that some of these subjects did not receive the 
responsibility questionnaire, rather than lose data, the clusters suggested were those with 
neurological soft signs, and those with high levels of anxiety and guilt. Any missing values 
for these variables were replaced with the series mean values of that variable, again to prevent 
any data being lost owing to missing data points. Demographic details can be found in 
chapter 7. 
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A hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted and the results are shown in Figure 9.4. 
The Ventrical icicle plot for the variables shows graphically that when two clusters are 
specified, one cluster comprises NSS, anxiety sensitivity scores, and Beck Anxiety Inventory 
scores whilst the other comprises guilt totals and the total on the FSAQ. There is no evidence 
to indicate therefore, that two clusters corresponding to (i) neurological impairment (NSS) 
and (ii) anxiety/guilt. The large coefficients in the agglomeration schedule indicate that 
clusters containing quite dissimilar members are being combined. 
Figure 9.4. Cluster Analysis to test the Revised Heterogeneity Hypothesis (1) 
Y y. i ++ awZf1H. TIE+ t++ ++ w. +++ 
Data Information 
24 unweighted cases accepted. 
0 cases rejected because of missing value. 
Squared Euclidean measure used. 
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Agglomeration Schedule using Average Linkage (Between Groups) 
Clusters (`umbined Stage Cluster 1st Appears Next 
Stagg `luster i sau. ter _ C'uefficient Cluster 1 Cluster 
'Itage 
14 928.000000 00 
25 8716.250000 104 
34 9076.843750 004 
z_? 585574.43750 2 .30 
******HIERARCHICALCLUSTERANALYSIS 
Cluster Membership of Cases using Average Linkage (Between Groups) 
Number of Clusters 
Label Case 4 3 2 
ASI Total 1 1 1 1 
BAI 2 1 1 1 
FSAQ Total 3 2 2 2 
GUILT Total 4 3 3 2 




Vertical Icicle Plot using Average Linkage (Between Groups) 
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9.8.2. Analysis to investigate the Revised Heterogeneity Hypothesis (2) 
The revised heterogeneity hypothesis was based on the principle that some subjects 
with OCD may have a basal ganglia dysfunction characterised by neuropsychological deficits 
of errors on the Money Road Map Test and Block Design, and others would have cognitive- 
behavioural disturbances characterised by anxiety, guilt and responsibility. A cluster analysis 
was conducted to determine whether these two separate groups existed. 
Given that some of the 47 subjects who received a neuropsychological assessment did 
not receive the responsibility questionnaire, rather than lose data, the clusters suggested were 
those with neuropsychological impairments, and those with high levels of anxiety and guilt. 
Any missing values for these variables were replaced with the series mean values of that 
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variable, again to prevent any data being lost owing to missing data points. Demographic 
details of these subjects are found in chapters 3,4,5 and 8. 
A hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted and the results are shown in Figure 9.5. 
The Ventrical icicle plot for the variables shows graphically that when two clusters are 
specified, one cluster comprises scores on the Block design, Money errors, anxiety sensitivity 
scores, and Beck Anxiety Inventory scores whilst the other comprises guilt totals and the total 
on the FSAQ. There is no evidence to indicate therefore, that two clusters corresponding to 
(i) neuropsychological impairment (Block design and Money errors) and (ii) anxiety/guilt. 
The large coefficients in the agglomeration schedule indicate that clusters containing quite 
dissimilar members are being combined. 
Figure 9.5. Cluster Analysis to test the Revised Heterogeneity Hypothesis (2) 
**************PR0XIMITIES***** 
Data Information 
47 unweighted cases accepted. 
0 cases rejected because of missing value. 
Squared Euclidean measure used. 
******HIERARCHICALCLUSTER ANALYSIS****** 
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Agglomeration Schedule using Average Linkage (Between Groups) 
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Cluster Membership of Cases using Average Linkage (Between Groups) 
Number of Clusters 
Label Case 5 4 3 2 
BAI 1 1 1 1 1 
FSAQ Total 2 2 2 2 2 
GUILT Total 3 3 3 3 2 
ASI Total 4 1 1 1 1 
BLOCK 5 4 1 1 1 
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9.9. Summary 
The original heterogeneity hypothesis could not be tested, as one of the two suggested 
sub-groups was not homogeneous. Testing two revised theories of heterogeneity did not fulfil 
the hypothesis that separate sub-groups existed within OCD, one characterised by a basal 
ganglia deficit, and the other characterised by cognitive-behavioural dysfunctions 
9.10. Discussion: the heterogeneity of heterogeneity 
As stated in section 9.1, different types of heterogeneity may exist. This study would 
seem to exclude homogeneous sub-groups based on deficits suggested to reflect basal ganglia 
dysfunction and characteristics of anxiety and guilt. However, it may be that heterogeneity 
of this sort does exist, but that this study failed to detect it. Failure to determine two distinct 
sub-groups may have arisen for a number of reasons. Firstly, the sample sizes were small 
for cluster analyses of this sort. Ideally, hundreds of subjects with neurological soft sign 
assessments, neuropsychological and psychological assessments would have been included in 
the study. Since only Senior Neurologists are able to carry out neurological soft signs 
assessments (and few neurologists have the time to devote to projects on a disorder which is 
not characterised by obvious neurological impairment), this is impractical. Alternatively, 
given the problem that neither neurological soft signs, nor neuropsychological assessments 
can act as 'lesion detectors', it may be that the assessments failed to detect basal ganglia 
dysfunction. nMRI or PET scanning would overcome this problem, although given the high 
pressure for these machines, and the expense, it is unlikely that the high number of subjects 
needed to test the heterogeneity hypothesis would be able to have such a scan at present. 
Another possible reason that heterogeneity was not found could be a bias in 
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recruitment of subjects. Many of the subjects were recruited through self-help groups and 
advertisements in women's magazines. It may be that people who had problems with anxiety 
were more likely to attend such a group and respond to an advertisement. However, an 
attempt was also made to recruit subjects through the Tourette's Syndrome Society, but no 
subjects were suitable for the study (i. e. had OCD, were relatives of Tourette's probands but 
had no tics themselves). Therefore, whilst this study does not categorically exclude the 
possibility that two heterogeneous sub-groups of the type hypothesised do exist, no support 
for this hypothesis was found. 
Other types of heterogeneity such as phenomenological heterogeneity may exist. This 
type of heterogeneity has been referred to implicitly throughout this thesis. It would seem, 
for example, that excessive responsibility is more closely associated with checking behaviour 
than washing behaviour (see chapter 5). Similarly, guilt and thought-action fusion appear to 
be more closely related to checking than washing behaviour. Differences between checkers 
and washers were reviewed and the data from this thesis appear to support a distinction 
between them. However, less research has been done on people with other, more unusual, 
obsessional difficulties such as compulsions of symmetry and hoarding. It may be that people 
with hoarding difficulties are more akin to checkers than washers. 
Alternatively, rather than viewing sub-groups as distinct categories, Hollander (1993) 
and Tallis (1995) suggest that a dimensional approach may be more appropriate. Given the 
continuum between normal and abnormal obsessions (Rachman and de Silva, 1978; Salkovskis 
and Harrison, 1984), this approach would seem more appropriate. Hollander's dimensional 
aspects can be seen in Figure 9.6. It should be noted that this dimensional approach of risk- 
aversive to risk-seeking behaviours is not considered incompatible with the spectrum 
organisation shown in Figure 9.1. Other dimensions suggested by Hollander include 
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dimensions from cognitive to motor behaviours (obsessional ruminations falling at one end 
of the spectrum, Tourette's falling at the other), and from uncertainty to certainty (OCD at 
the 'uncertainty' end, Body dysmorphic disorder at the 'certainty' end. ) 
Compulsive impulsive 




Figure 9.6. Dimensional aspects of the obsessive-compulsive-related disorder 
spectrum (Hollander, 1993): risk-aversive/risk-seeking dimension. This dimension, from 
left to right, goes from, 'compulsive (risk aversive) disorders' to 'mixed compulsive-impulsive 
disorders' to 'impulsive (risk-seeking) disorders' as follows: obsessive-compulsive disorder 
(OCD), hypochondriasis (HYP), body dysmorphic disorder (BDD), anorexia nervosa (AN), 
depersonalization disorder (DEP), Tourette's syndrome (TS), trichotillomania (Trich), 
pathological gambling (PG), sexual compulsions (Sexual Comp), and borderline and 
antisocial personality disorders (Borderline PD). 
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The dimensions suggested by Hollander are interesting, but are poorly integrated with 
each other, and with his conceptualisation of the spectrum's distinct but overlapping subgroup 
shown in Figure 9.1. Clinical features, age at onset, clinical course, family history, and 
comordidity are all suggested to be common to OCD and its 'related' disorders and the 
aetiology is presumed, in all cases, to be 'biology and neurology' (p. 4). The absence of 
depression and anxiety disorders as belonging to the same dimension is astonishing given the 
finding that 80% of OCD patients are depressed according to Beck's depression inventory and 
that 30% have received a lifetime diagnosis of comorbid major depression (Rasmussen and 
Eisen, 1991). 
Talfis (1995) has made an attempt to integrate the neurological literature on OCD with 
the psychological literature, also using a continuum. It is suggested that OCD which is 
characterised by neurological impairment forms one end of a continuum (rather than a 
homogeneous subgroup) and that people whose compulsive behaviour is associated with 
learning experiences, idiosyncratic beliefs and appraisals are at the other end. The majority 
of OCD patients are considered to 'occupy the middle ground. That is, their symptoms are 
the product of both biological and experiential factors in equal or differential measures'. Tallis 
regards the need to think of OCD in terms of distinct sub-groups as limiting and impoverishing 
our understanding of such a complex disorder. 
The model of the control of thought and action (Norman and Shallice, 1980) is 
suggested by Talfis to integrate the neurological and cognitive-behavioural theories of OCD. 
The model is based on the position that cognition and action depend on the operation of 
highly specialised programmes or schemas, each of which produces a specific output for a 
range of inputs. Perceptual information and output from other schemata, trigger the schemata 
to control a specific overlearned action. Owing to space limitations, this model will not be 
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described in more detail. In brief (and simplifying), Talfis (1995) suggests that a negative 
intrusive thought is appraised by someone with OCD in terms of danger. This 'danger 
appraisal' results in the interruption of ongoing behaviour by a 'supervisory attentional system' 
(SAS). The SAS controls reparative or preventative behaviour which, for OCD patients, 
takes the form of compulsions. Appraisals and beliefs affect the salience of intrusive thoughts 
which are considered, in turn, to affect the SAS (via 'contention scheduling'). However, 
'biological' factors are considered to affect 'contention scheduling' and the SAS . 
This is an interesting hypothesis and, in essence, suggests that there are different 
pathways to the aetiology of OCD. One of the difficulties with this hypothesis is that it is not 
readily testable, but some predictions do arise from the model, for example, manipulating the 
salience of the intrusion should lead to changes in compulsive activity. 
In summary, the hypothesised type of 'heterogeneity' was not supported in this data 
set, and it may be better to return to a symptom-based investigation of heterogeneity. What 
is agreed, however, is that it is unlikely that there will be a single, simple cause of a disorder 
as complex as OCD. 
'It may be most parsimonious to think of OCD as a disorder involving several 
etiologies that share a common route of expression' (Winslow and Insel, 1991). 
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CHAPTER 10 
Discussion and Conclusions 
10.1. Introduction 
This chapter summarises the main findings of the studies on anxiety, guilt, religion, 
responsibility, thought-action fusion (TAF), neurological soft signs, neuropsychological 
assessment and the heterogeneity hypothesis. The current status of the cognitive-behavioural 
model, the neurological deficit model and the heterogeneity hypothesis are considered. A 
number of theoretic developments of the cognitive-behavioural model are discussed, including 
the refinement of perceived responsibility for threat, the suggestion of two different types of 
guilt, the improved understanding of the bias of TAF, and predictions concerning the 
relationship among TAF, responsibility, guilt and obsessional phenomenology. A model of 
the suggested relationships among these variables is given. The clinical implications of some 
of the findings from the thesis are reviewed. Future work - both theory and clinically oriented 
- is suggested. The thesis ends with a final paragraph which draws some overall conclusions 
from the studies undertaken. 
10.2. Brief Summary of Main Findings 
10.2.1. Anxiety 
Anxiety is at the core of the behavioural model of OCD. An investigation into anxiety 
in OCD patients found elevated levels of anxiety in this population, compared with non- 
clinical populations. OCD patients scored higher on all subscales of the Four Systems Anxiety 
Questionnaire than data published for the normal population, and showed significantly more 
'fear of fear'. There was a relationship between anxiety and some, but not all, measures of 
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obsessionality. 
10.2.2. Religion and Guilt 
Guilt plays an important role in the cognitive-behavioural model of OCD and is part 
of the clinical presentation of the disorder. However, research in this area has produced 
conflicting findings. In this questionnaire study, obsessional subjects had higher trait and state 
guilt than published norms, although they did not have higher moral standards. Trait and state 
guilt were found to be associated with OCD symptomatology, but moral standards were not. 
The associations of trait and state guilt with OCD symptomatology were altered after 
controlling for the effects of depression and anxiety. Trait guilt, depression and anxiety 
continued to predict scores on measures of obsessionality. There were no differences in 
reported guilt between people with washing compulsions and those with checking difficulties. 
One possible reason for elevated guilt in OCD may concern religion, and clinically the 
role of religion appears to be important to some obsessional difficulties. Religious beliefs and 
religious morality may be a means by which normal intrusive thoughts are given special 
significance. A questionnaire study into the role of religion in OCD found that the level of 
religion was not associated with OCD symptoms, but the conflict between obsessional 
symptoms and the moral code of the religion was associated with OCD symptomatology. 
10.2.3. Responsibility 
The role of perceived responsibility is fundamental to the cognitive-behavioural theory 
of OCD. Three studies investigated the role of responsibility in OCD. In the first study, an 
association was found between pathological responsibility and obsessionality, depression and 
anxiety. The association between pathological responsibility and checking and rumination was 
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maintained when the effects of anxiety were partialled out of the correlational analyses. The 
next study aimed to develop a questionnaire of general responsibility. No significant 
relationship between obsessional behaviour and responsibility for harm, social responsibility 
or positive responsibility was found. However, a significant relationship was found between 
the subscale of thought-action fusion and obsessional symptoms. This subscale was related 
to depression, state guilt and trait guilt. There was a significant negative association between 
positive responsibility, and trait guilt and depression scores, and between responsibility for 
harm and guilt standards. No relationship was found between responsibility for harm or social 
responsibility subscales, and scores of depression, state guilt and trait guilt. 
The final study involved an indirect manipulation of responsibility by varying the 
presence of the experimenter. In summary, the manipulation was successful. In the high 
responsibility condition (subject alone) exposure + response prevention led to a stronger urge 
to neutralise, more discomfort and increased estimates of the probability of threat compared 
to the low responsibility condition (subject + experimenter). There were no differences 
between perceived control over threat and perceived responsibility for thoughts between the 
two conditions. There were also no differences between the experience of fear cognitions and 
body sensations between the two conditions. 
10.2.4. Thought-Action Fusion 
Thought-Action fusion (TAF) was suggested to be a cognitive bias that could serve 
to influence the significance of intrusive thoughts. A highly reliable questionnaire was 
designed to assess TAF. The factor solution for TAF was broadly similar in both a student 
and obsessional population and identified both likelihood and moral TAF. However, the 
factor solutions differed when a 3-factor solution was extracted. There was a positive 
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association between TAF and measures of obsessionality in both the student and obsessional 
populations. TAF was particularly associated with checking behaviour, responses to 
unwanted images and impulses, and responses to a negative thought. Likelihood TAF was 
stronger in those with checking behaviours than those with washing compulsions. 
10.2.5. Neurological Soft Signs 
Neurological soft signs have been used to detect areas of the brain which may have 
a lesion. There is considerable debate as to whether neurological soft signs have this 
'localising' ability. In the study carried out, patients with OCD had more neurological soft 
signs than groups of normal subjects (published data), particularly signs of impaired sensory 
integration and motor co-ordination. OCD subjects had fewer neurological soft signs than 
groups of people with schizophrenia whose data have been published. It is important to have 
anxiety control groups in order to determine the specificity of NSS in psychiatric disorders. 
10.2.6. Neuropsychological Deficits 
Neuropsychological deficits have again been used as 'lesion detectors', even though 
data from neuropsychological tests cannot inform about areas of dysfunction. No 
neuropsychological deficits were found in tests of visuo-spatial or executive function, once 
the effects of anxiety, intelligence and speed were taken into account. 
10.2.7. The Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
It was suggested that there may be two homogeneous sub-groups within OCD, one 
characterised by neurological dysfunction, and the other characterised by excessive anxiety, 
responsibility and guilt as indicated by the cognitive-behavioural model. Correlational 
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analyses did not support the hypothesis that neurological soft signs and neuropsychological 
test performance formed a homogenous sub-group, as there was no significant relationship 
found between these measures, suggested to indicate basal ganglia dysfunction. The 
heterogeneity hypothesis was revised, but cluster analyses did not support the hypothesis that 
two distinct sub-groups existed, one characterised by neurological soft signs OR 
neuropsychological deficits, the other by anxiety and guilt. It was concluded that, although 
different types of heterogeneity may exist, there was no evidence for the heterogeneity 
hypothesis defined in this thesis. 
10.3. Current Status of the Neurological and Cognitive-Behavioural Models, and the 
Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
10.3.1. Current Status of the Neurological Model 
This thesis investigated the neurological model of OCD by examining the neurological 
soft signs and neuropsychological deficits present in patients with the disorder. These 
investigations are by no means comprehensive, and are unable to distinguish between the types 
of basal ganglia/frontal loop deficits suggested by Wise and Rapoport (1989, Modell (1987) 
and Baxter (1990). Furthermore, neither of these techniques enjoys a 1: 1 relationship with 
the presence of specific basal ganglia dysfunction and deficits on these tests may arise for a 
number of reasons, including symptoms of OCD. 
Nevertheless, if anything, the difficulties with the investigative tools would lead to a 
false positive identification of deficits, rather than a false negative. In this study, no 
neuropsychological deficits were found, once important variables such as speed, intelligence 
and anxiety were considered. Although neurological soft signs were more prevalent in this 
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group than data published for groups with no psychiatric history, these signs were not 
associated with OCD symptomatology. In this study, people with OCD were significantly 
slower on a speed task. Hence whilst the investigations cannot rule out the possibility that 
basal ganglia dysfunction is present in OCD, it is equally plausible to suggest that the 
symptoms of OCD are themselves leading to an increase in the number of neurological soft 
signs present. Future studies in this area should employ a control group of patients with 
anxiety disorder. 
In summary, the methods used in this study did not find any evidence to support the 
basal ganglia model of OCD. 
10.3.2. The Status of the Cognitive-Behavioural Model of OCD 
This thesis provided findings which not only tested the cognitive-behavioural model 
of OCD, but may have elucidated some of the mechanisms by which intrusive thoughts attain 
'special significance'. Unsurprisingly, anxiety was found to characterise the disorder, but 
data were provided showing the importance of guilt in relation particularly to checking. 
Religiosity' per se did not seem to be associated with obsessional symptoms, but the degree 
of conflict between obsessional problems and the moral code provided by one's religion was 
associated with obsessional symptomatology. 
This conflict is in keeping with Salkovskis's cognitive-behavioural formulation of 
OCD, in which intrusive thoughts, which occur to the majority of the population, assume 
overwhelming importance to some people (Salkovskis, 1985). It may be that a personal 
interpretation of a violation of a religious code by an intrusive thought leads to guilt, anxiety 
and the need to 'set matters right' via neutralisation. This maybe a reason why the level of 
morality, as assessed by the moral standards sub-scale of the 'Guilt Inventory' (Kugler and 
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Jones, 1992, ) is not related to obsessionality. It may be the violation of moral codes, not the 
absolute strictness of them, that is important in the aetiology and maintenance of OCD. 
The investigation of perceived responsibility in OCD was particularly fruitful, both 
from the point of view of positive and negative findings. The general measure of 
responsibility, developed in Vancouver, did not appear to be associated strongly with 
obsessional symptoms in a normal population. This indicated that the model may have to 
specify more closely the types of inflated responsibility that may be present in this group. A 
more specific, pathological, measure of responsibility was closely associated with obsessional 
symptoms, and with guilt; these associations could not be accounted for in terms of anxiety 
or depression. One of the most interesting findings from the earlier 'failed' general measure 
of responsibility was that one subscale did appear to be related to obsessional symptoms. 
This subscale was developed and led to the 'Thought-Action Fusion' questionnaire. 
The work on TAF has perhaps been the most exciting of the thesis, as it is new area. 
Not all people with OCD have this bias, but the study indicated that some people with OCD 
believe that thinking something makes it more likely to happen, and that thinking something 
is the moral equivalent (almost) as doing it. TAF may be a mechanism by which thoughts are 
given 'special significance', leading to increased responsibility. 
One of the difficulties in presenting the work of the thesis in separate chapters is that 
all the variables - guilt, anxiety, responsibility and TAF- are linked together. Section 6.10 
draws together the findings to present a cognitive-behavioural mechanism that could lead to 
and maintain OCD. 
In summary, the data supported the cognitive-behavioural modification of OCD, with 
further modifications concerning the generality of perceived excessive responsibility. 
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10.3.4. The Status of the Heterogeneity Hypothesis 
The findings did not support the heterogeneity hypothesis in either its original or 
revised form. It is probably not worth pursuing this particular form of heterogeneity without 
the use of brain scans to facilitate the localisation of dysfunction in the basal ganglia or frontal 
loop. However, it is vital in studies of this sort to have adequate anxiety control subjects in 
order to control for the effects of anxiety and other OCD symptoms on cerebral blood flow. 
Other types of heterogeneity, based on symptoms, may be more profitably investigated. 
10.4. Developments of the Cognitive-Behavioural Model 
10.4.1. Theoretical Developments 
The findings of the thesis have contributed to the theoretical development of the 
cognitive-behavioural model. The three most important contributions may be: 
(i) The refinement of perceived responsibility for threat; 
(ii) The suggestion of two different types of guilt - depressive and obsessional - and the 
relationship between different types of guilt, obsessional phenomenology and 
depression (see chapter 5); 
(iii) The improved understanding of the bias of thought-action fusion; 
(iv) Predictions concerning the relationship among TAF, responsibility, guilt and 
obsessional phenomenology 
10.4.1.1. Refinement of Perceived Responsibility for Threat 
The cognitive-behavioural model places responsibility for threat at the heart of 
obsessional difficulties. However, a questionnaire study (chapter 5) did not identify a 
relationship between obsessional difficulties and general responsibility for harm and social 
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responsibility. The conclusion of the study was that the current role of responsibility in the 
model is too broad and is untenable. The situations in which people with obsessional 
difficulties appear to have excessive perceived responsibility threat are typical obsessional 
situations such as checking the doors to make sure they are locked and thus prevent a 
burglary; checking to make sure that no-one has been knocked over etc. However, the 
suggestion that these people would also feel that it was their responsibility to protect everyone 
from harm (as opposed to loved ones) in all potentially harmful situations was not supported. 
It may also turn out to be the case that, whilst a person feels excessively responsible one day 
for a particular threat (perhaps owing to an intrusive thought), the person may not feel the 
same degree of responsibility on a different day (perhaps when he/she have not had such an 
intrusion). The change in overt obsessional behaviours with changes in covert mental states 
when situations are apparently stable has been noted elsewhere (Shafran and Thordarson, 
1995). 
10.4.1.2. Guilt, obsessions and depression 
One of the interesting findings from the studies on guilt and responsibility was that, 
although guilt levels did not differ between people with checking and people with cleaning 
compulsions, perceived responsibility for threat was*higher in the former population. Since 
guilt is suggested to arise from a negative event for which a person feels responsible (see 
chapter 3), it may be that the instrument used (the Guilt Inventory; Kugler and Jones, 1992) 
was not sensitive enough to detect differences in the types of guilt experienced by those with 
checking and those with cleaning compulsions. It was suggested that the former may have 
obsessional guilt resulting from perceived responsibility for a negative event, while those with 
cleaning compulsions experience guilt for failing to live up to moral (or other standards). This 
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hypothesis is testable. Another prediction is that someone with checking compulsions would 
develop washing compulsions after an episode of depression, and a person with washing 
compulsions may develop checking difficulties if perceived responsibility for a negative event 
were elevated in some way. 
10.4.1.3. The improved understanding of the bias of thought-action fusion 
This bias was first identified by Jack Rachman in 1993 and had not been open to 
empirical investigation before the studies reported in this thesis. The two types of TAF - 
moral and likelihood - may have different influences, depending on the obsessional difficulties. 
As in the work on responsibility, the suggestion that all people with obsessional difficulties 
have this type of bias was not supported by the research. Rather, some people in some 
situations may show this tendency. The moral type of TAF was equally associated with 
washing and checking compulsions, but the likelihood TAF was more strongly associated with 
checking difficulties. This is consistent with the work on responsibility: it is plausible that the 
greater the likelihood TAF, the greater the perceived responsibility for the event. If perceived 
responsibility for threat is primarily associated with checking as opposed to washing 
compulsions, there will be a stronger relationship between likelihood TAF (via perceived 
responsibility for threat) and checking behaviour than likelihood TAF and washing 
compulsions. 
The identification of likelihood TAF implies that both Carr's (1974) analysis and 
Salkovskis's (1985,1989) analysis can be considered to apply to obsessional difficulties. Carr 
(1974) suggested that people with OCD over-estimate the possible risk of threat, whereas 
Salkovskis suggested that the problem lies not with risk estimation for threat, but with an 
over-estimation of the probability of being responsible for threat. If a person had the bias of 
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TAF, this would lead to both an over-estimation of the probability of risk (e. g. thinking 
something makes it more likely to happen; I have thought it, it is therefore more likely to 
happen) and an over-estimate of the probability of being responsible for threat (e. g. I have 
thought it and therefore if the threat materialisers, it will be my fault). 
10.4.1.4. Predictions concerning the relationship among TAF, responsibility, guilt 
and obsessional phenomenology 
A variety of predictions have been made concerning the relationship between TAF, 
responsibility, guilt and obsessional complaints. For example, cleaners/washers with high 
perceived responsibility for threat will be concerned about contaminating others as well as 
themselves, and are more likely to have checking compulsions than those with low perceived 
responsibility for threat (see chapter 5). It has also been suggested that depression can act as 
a 'conductor' facilitating the development of checking compulsions in someone who has 
cleaning difficulties (especially if that person has high perceived responsibility for threat). A 
model which summarises the relationship between these variables is shown in figure 10.2 and 
gives rise to these testable predictions. 
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Figure 10.2. TAF, responsibility, guilt, depression and obsessional difficulties: a model of 
their inter-relationships. 
10.4.2. Clinical Implications 
There are direct clinical implications deriving from the suggested model, and the work 
done during the thesis. The work on anxiety implies that treatment of anxiety within OCD 
should focus on all types of anxiety - cognitive, behavioural, feelings and somatic. The sort 
of guilt that a person may be experiencing - obsessional or depressive, state or trait - may also 
have implications for treatment. It may be that an exposure and response prevention 
programme should incorporate prevention of restorative action when a person feels guilty in 
a variety of situations. It may be that, for some people, the motivation to perform the 
compulsion is to alleviate (or prevent) guilt rather than anxiety, and that feelings of guilt may 
be subject to the same process of habituation as anxiety. If this is the case, then a graded 
hierarchy of exposure with response prevention relating to guilt, as opposed to anxiety, could 
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be implemented. It may be that a person does not find it too guilt provoking, for example, to 
shut the door in the face of the therapist without apologising; however, shutting the door in 
the face of a child or elderly person without apologising may cause more guilt/anxiety but this 
may decline naturally in the course of time, in a similar manner to the habituation of anxiety 
(see Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). 
The work on the conflict between obsessional difficulties and the moral code of the 
religion also has therapeutic implications. It may be that exploring beliefs about the nature 
of the conflict and the violation caused by obsessional difficulties would reveal a belief system 
which is maintaining the obsessional difficulties. 
Perhaps the most important clinical implications arise from the work on responsibility. 
Although a group behavioural treatment approach may be helpful to people with washing 
compulsions, such a treatment may be less beneficial to those who check compulsively, since 
it is likely to be more difficult to obtain the degree of anxiety necessary for exposure + 
response prevention in a setting with such highly responsible people! Similarly, behavioural 
treatment for people with checking compulsions is best done in the absence of the 
experimenter in a situation (such as the home) where the person feels most responsibility. 
Asking a patient about feelings of responsibility and guilt has been found to be therapeutic in 
several cases (Rachman, 1993; personal communication). 
Identification of TAF has important clinical implications. One of the reasons that 
cognitive therapy for OCD has been less effective than predicted by the model (see James and 
Blackburn, 1995, for a review) may be that the cognitive theory has been insufficiently 
developed. A person may carry a range of specific TAF beliefs in obsessional situations that 
are not being tapped by traditional cognitive therapy in which general beliefs about 
responsibility, self, world and others are being addressed. The outcome of cognitive- 
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behavioural therapy may be improved for some patients by identifying and challenging beliefs 
about TAF. 
10.5. Future Work 
The thesis has given rise to a series of speculations and suggestions which should be 
tested empirically. An important target is the identification of the specificity of both excessive 
perceived responsibility for negative events and TAF. Although questionnaire studies are an 
important first step to identifying and measuring beliefs, experimental analyses are needed to 
extend and elaborate the concepts. Ethically, it is difficult to manipulate perceived 
responsibility for threat in non-clinical and clinical populations. Similarly, experiments in 
which subjects think or write down 'I hope that my mother dies in a car crash tonight' may 
evoke the required degree of anxiety and may give rise to neutralising behaviours, but are not 
ethical. 
One experimental study that has been designed jointly between myself and the 
Rachman research team and is currently being conducted in Vancouver investigates further 
the cognitive biases in a normal population. The study aims to assess cognitive biases 
concerning the relationships among responsibility for an event, thoughts about the event, the 
probability of the event occurring and the extent of control over the event. TAF is 
investigated under situations of high responsibility, and low responsibility. The experimental 
procedure is as follows: - 
Normal subjects who show TAF in at least one situation (as assessed by the TAF 
questionnaire) will be asked to write a sentence stating that they hope a second researcher has 
fallen down the stairs and hurt herself This sentence is written under three conditions: high 
responsibility for the event, low responsibility for the event, and a control condition in which 
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responsibility is not changed. Manipulation of responsibility occurs by means of a contract. 
Questions about responsibility, probability and control will be asked before and after the 
responsibility manipulation. It is predicted that in the high responsibility condition, likelihood 
TAF will be stronger than in the low responsibility condition. At the end of the experiment, 
it is emphasised that subjects are no longer responsible for any events that may happen to the 
second researcher. The contracts are destroyed in front of the subject, as is the written 
sentence. 
Future experiments will aim to determine the fear-evoking properties of TAF, and will 
be comparable with earlier experiments designed to explore the nature of compulsive 
behaviour (see Rachman and Hodgson, 1980). Neutralising behaviour will be used as an 
objective, overt behavioural measure of the effects of manipulating TAF. Experiments will 
investigate the effects on neutralising a TAF statement with 
0 'mental' vs 'physical' neutralising 
41 a time delay 
0 thought suppression 
0 transferring responsibility for a negative outcome 
" transferring responsibility for neutralising 
The experimental findings concerning transference of responsibility and the effects of 
delay, thought suppression and type of neutralising will be extended to the clinic. Cognitive 
strategies based on the empirical data will be developed with the aim of improving cognitive 
therapy for OCD and reducing the neutralising behaviour in a clinical population. 
Some possible translation to the clinic are: - 
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40 Reduction of neutralising behaviour 
" Changing neutralising behaviour so that it is effective but benign 
0 Separation of thoughts from actions 
0 Reduction of responsibility 
Funding has been obtained in the form of a Killam Fellowship and this future work 
will be conducted in collaboration with Professor Rachman at the University of British 
Columbia. 
10.6. Overall Conclusions 
The work in the thesis has provided a mixture of positive and negative findings. 
The original aims were to test and expand the cognitive-behavioural model , and to try to 
find 
a way that of reconciling it with a neurological deficit model via a hypothesis of 
'heterogeneity. The investigations of the cognitive-behavioural model have been particularly 
fruitful, but there was no evidence to support the heterogeneity hypothesis and the two 
theories thus remain unreconciled. The divide between the psychological and neurological 
aspects of OCD in the literature holds strong, with a recent book on 'Current Insights into 
Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder' (Hollander et al., 1994) failing to mention cognitive, 
behavioural or any other psychological theory despite a chapter on leucotomy. 
Acknowledgment of the different approaches is the first step that is required for integration, 
if the evidence supporting both models continues to flourish. Alternatively, it may be that 
cumulative evidence will support one model in preference to the other. Studies examining 




"I would just like to say how pleased I am about the work you are doing with OCD. I have 
had OCD for about 21 years and have been hoping for further research for years. You really 
are giving people like me hope for a more normal life" (JW). 
7 will gladly help with your research because I understand I am not the only one who needs 
help from this imprisonment. I cannot live the rest of my life like this.. I would do anything 
to be normal and free of the daily hell of it" (KW). 
"I thought I would write and thank everyone at the Psychiatric Department for your hard 
work and research into OCD... When I arrived at the meeting and saw all of the people who 
are like me and have OCD it was such a relief. It was just like meeting a family I knew I had, 
but had never met before this day. Throughout the day I fell many emotions: I laughed, I 
cried, but most of all, I felt safe for the first time in years. When I feel isolated or frightened, 
I will look back on the memory of meeting 'my family' and treasure the feeling and gain 
comfort from this... Thankyou for researching OCD" (DC). 
"Thankyou for taking an interest in this life-restricting fixation" (GB). 
'My thanks to all you wonderful people who are working so hard to help us" (JP). 
"Thank you for taking time to read my letter" (KG). 
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Appendix 1 An Investigation into the structure of Obsessional Symptoms 
Aim 
The primary aim of the current investigation was to determine the structure of 
Obsessional symptoms in a community obsessional sample in the United Kingdom, in order 
to identify possible sub-groups of patients with OCD with different symptom profiles. 
The Padua Inventory 
For this study, Obsessional symptoms were assessed using the Padua Inventory 
(Sanavio, 1988). This inventory is more comprehensive than the Maudsley Obsessional 
Compulsive Inventory (MOCI, Hodgson and Rachman, 1977) and is simpler to administer and 
more cost-effective than the Y-BOCS (Goodman et al. 1994). In addition, the study by Baer 
had already investigated the factor analysis of symptom subtypes of OCD and the factors 
identified were not compatible with studies documenting the phenomenology of the disorder. 
The original Padua Inventory consists of 60 items "describing common obsessional 
and compulsive behaviour" (Sanavio, 1988, p. 169). It "allows investigation of the topogrpahy 
of such problems in normal and clinical subjects" (p. 169). The questionnaire was developed 
on a sample of 967 healthy Italians. Two compulsion factors, and two obsessional factors 
were identified (Sanavio, 1988). These factors were: - 
1. Impaired control of mental activities. This factor represents a lower ability to remove 
undesirable thoughts, difficulties in coping with straightforward decisions and doubts, 
uncertainty and concern over responsibility for some negative events. 
2. Becoming contaminated. This factor represents excessive hand-washing activities, 
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stereotyped cleaning behaviours and excessive concern with dirt. 
3. Checking behaviours. This factor represents the repeated checking of a variety of 
different items including electrical items, letters and money. 
4. Urges and worries of losing control over motor behaviours. This factor represents 
fear of obsessional impulses to harm oneself or others, or to commit other 
unacceptable acts. 
These four factors accounted for 32.3% of the total variance (reported in van Oppen, 
1992). Sternberger and Burns (1990) replicated this factor structure in healthy American 
students. The same factor solution was found in a healthy Dutch sample (van Oppen, 1992) 
and, most recently, in a healthy sample of British subjects (McDonald, 1994, personal 
communication or thesis? ). 
However, there has been little work on the nature of obsessional symptoms in an 
obsessional population, although during the course of the thesis, van Oppen has published a 
study investigating the both the criterion validity of the Padua Inventory and its factor 
structure in a Dutch sample of Obsessionals (van Oppen, 1995c). The Dutch study used 206 
Obsessional subjects who had been referred to Dutch clinics for out-patient treatment of their 
disorder, and compared them with 430 non-clinical controls and 222 patients with other 
anxiety disorders. This study suggested a revision of the PI into a 41-item scale with 5 
factors: - 
1. Impulses (corresponding to original Factor 4). 
2. Washing (corresponding to original Factor 2). 
3. Checking (corresponding to original Factor 3) 
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4. Rumination (corresponding to original Factor 1). 
5. Precision (items regarding rituals/order which had in normal samples been spread 
along the other 4 factors, in particular the 'checking' factor). 
This excellent study provided data on the reliability, discriminant validity and construct 
validity of the PI-R, although the data used to construct the revisions were also used to 
conduct the analyses to determine its reliability and validity. The study showed that the OCD 
group scored significantly more highly on the PI-R than the anxiety or healthy controls. 
The Padua Inventory has not been administered to a British sample of people with 
obsessional difficulties, nor to obsessionals in the community. Examining the symptom profile 
of a community sample of obsessionals may improve future investigations of heterogeneity 
based on symptom sub-types. 
Hypothesis and Prediction 
Hypothesis: The structure of Obsessionals symptoms in a community obsessional sample 
in the United Kingdom will resemble that of the Dutch OCD Sample. 




Obsessional subjects were recruited from two sources. The first group (n=39) 
comprised subjects who had participated in the previous study. The all met DSM-II-R 
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criteria for OCD. A further 116 subjects responded to an advertisement for help with 
OCD, had a score of 11 or more on the MOCI, completed the questionnaire fully (ie no 
missing data) and 2/3 of these subjects reported receiving a diagnosis of OCD by another 
Clinician. Given that 2/49 subjects in the previous study who had been given the screening 
questionnaire and scored above 11 on the MOCI did not have OCD, it is likely that 
approximately 4% of the sample were included erroneously as having OCD. ' However, 
as there were no significant differences on the MOCI scores between the 39 who had 
received a diagnosis according to DSM-III-R and the remaining 116 subjects (t= 
p>0.05), the two groups were considered as one group labelled ' Obsessionals' . 
The normal sample was recruited by A. MacDonald (n =1958) who kindly allowed 
her data to be compared with that from the obsessional sample in order to fulfill the third 
aim of the study. The age of the normal sample ranged from 15-75 and 27%were male 
(511). 
Subject Characteristics 
All the subjects in the obsessional group had many obsessional symptoms (MOCI > =11) 
and 96% would have been expected to receive a diagnosis of OCD. 120 (84%) were 
23 
female, were male. The mean age of the sample was 36.49 years with a range from 16- 
70. 
'Of the top 2% of scores of the normal population on the MOCI, 91% can be correctly 
classified as having OCD. (Burns et at, 1995). 
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Measures 
Padua Inventory: (P I; Sanavio, 1988; van Oppen, 1995c). This is a 60-item list of 
common obsessional thoughts and compulsive behaviours (see Appendix 2). It has been 
revised to form a revised 41-item list (PI-Revised). Each of the items is rated on a five- 
point scale in terms of the frequency with which they are experienced. Data are reported 
which correspond to the original PI in order that comparisons can be made with published 




The data are presented in Tables 4 and 5. 
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Table 4: Comparison of PI scores ('score') and number of items rated 'very much 
disturbing' ('obsessions') of Obsessional Scores in current study using 
Original P. I. 
Males Females 
N Score Obsessions N Score Obsessions 
Obsessionals 23 95.2 11.04 120 96.6 13.2 
(Present study) (40.3) (10.0) (41.0) (10.4) 
Obsessive-Compulsives 35 83.6 7.5 40 98.6 11.3 
(from Sanavio, 1988) (34.8) (7.6) (32.3) (9.2) 
'Neurotics' 35 50.2 1.8 40 66.5 3.6 
(Sanavio, 1988) (28.9) (2.9) (32.4) (4.6) 
Normal controls 489 53.6 Not 478 62.5 Not 
(Sanavio, 1988) (27.7) reported (29.2) reported 
Normal British Controls 511 30.6 Not 1447 22.7 Not 
(MacDonald, 1994) (24.6) reported (23.5) reported 
There is no reason to conduct ANOVAs as Sanavio (1988) found significant 
differences between normals, neurotics and obsessionals. 
An Independent T-test showed no significant difference between the total score or 
number of items rated 'very much disturbing' for the Obsessionals and the published data from 
Sanavio (1988) for either males (t=1.17 and t=1.53 respectively; p>0.05) or females (t=0.3. 
t=l. 03 respectively; p>0.05). The scores of the obsessional group were significantly higher 
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than the published scores for 'neurotics' or for normal controls in the Italian or British studies 
(all p>0.05). 
In summary, the data provided a replication of the findings from Sanavio (1988) using 
a British sample of community Obsessionals. 
Table 5: Comparison of subscales of the PI-R and of the total scale (41-items) 
between Current study and Dutch Study (van Oppen, 1995c). 
Scale Impulses Washing Checking Rumination Precision Total 
7-items 10-items 7-items 11-items 6-items 41 -items 
Obsessionals 7.2 15.6 15.2 25.4 8.9 72.3 
(Current study). (6.6) (12.6) (7.9) (10.5) (6.9) (29.0) 
N=143 
OCD (Van 5.1 13.1 15.4 24.7 8.2 66.6 
Oppen, 1995c). (5.7) (11.1) (7.7) (9.2) (6.1) (24.3) 
N=206 
Panic Disorder 4.4 4.8 8.2 17.1 3.4 37.8 
(Van Oppen, (4.6) (6.3) (6.2) (8.5) (3.7) (21.5) 
1995c). N=122 
Normals 1.3 4.3 5.1 8.5 2.6 21.6 
(van Oppen, (2.1) (4.8) (4.8) (6.4) (3.2) (15.9) 
1995c). N=430. 
Group variances were not homogeneous and there is no reason to conduct a Mann- 
Whitney U-test as van Oppen (1995c) found a highly significant effect of diagnosis on the 
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subscales and total scale of the PI for almost all comparisons. 
An Independent T-test showed significant differences in the total score between the 
current Obsessional sample and the normals or those with Panic Disorder (t=23.3 and t= 
10.8, p<0.01 respectively). There was a trend for the current sample to score more highly on 
the total score than the published data for OCD patients from the Dutch study (t=1.98, 
p=0.05). There were no significant differences on the subscale scores for the current 
obsessional group and the published data of the Dutch OCD group (p>0.05) with the 
exception of the subscale of impulses which was significantly higher in the current sample 
(t=3.18; p<0.01). 
In summary, the Obsessional group scored more highly than published data for 
normals or anxious controls. The study provided a good replication of the majority of 
findings from van Oppen (1995c) ) using a British sample of community Obsessionals, with 
the exception of the total score for the PI-R and for the subscale of 'impulses'. 
Factor Analysis 
A principal components analysis with iterations was used, followed by a varimax 
rotation in order to determine the structure of the Obsessional symptoms in the current 
sample. The analysis was conducted using the 41-items suggested by van Oppen (the PI-R) 
rather than the 60-item original PI in order that the current factor solution could be compared 
with the structure of obsessional symptoms in the Dutch study. 
The 5 factor solution accounted for 59% of the variance. The factor structure is 
shown in Table 6. . 
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Table The Factor Structure of the PI-R in a British sample of Obsessionals 
compared to a Dutch sample. 
Factor 1: Contamination (van Oppen Factor 2) Current Dutch 
4 1 find it difficult to touch garbage or dirty things . 87 . 
78 
9 If I touch something I think is contaminated, I immediately . 
85 . 
83 
have to wash or clean myself 
3 I find it difficult to touch an object when I know it has been . 
85 . 
83 
touched by strangers or by certain people 
7 I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary . 
85 . 
78 
8 I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I . 
84 . 
82 
think I may be dirty or 'contaminated' 




1 I feel my hands are dirty when I touch money . 80 . 
74 
10 If an animal touches me, I feel dirty and immediately have to . 78 . 
75 
wash or clean myself 




2 I think even slight contact with bodily secretions (perspiration, . 76 . 
62 
saliva, urine etc) may contaminate my clothes or somehow 
harm me. 
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Factor 2: Rumination (van Oppen's Factor 4) Current Dutch 
32 When I start thinking of certain things, I become obsessed with . 81 . 
74 
them 
33 Unpleasant thoughts come into my mind against my will and I . 80 . 68 
cannot get rid of them 
31 I invent doubts and problems about most of the things I do . 73 . 
68 




attend to what is going on around me 
44 When a thought or doubt comes into my mind I have to . 
61 . 
60 
examine it from all points of view and cannot stop until I have 
done so 
29 After doing something carefully I still have the impression I . 60 . 64 
have either done it badly or not finished it 




mindedness or minor errors which I make 
45 In certain situations I am afraid of losing my self-control and . 
48 <. 40 
doing embarrassing things 
26 I find it difficult to take decisions, even about unimportant . 48 . 59 
matters 









clearly, especially when talking about important matters that 
involve me 
11 When doubts and worries come into my mind, I cannot rest . 
37 . 
50 
until I have talked them over with a reassuring person 
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Factor 3: Checking (van Oppen Factor 3) Current Dutch 
20 I check and recheck the gas and water taps and light switches 





25 I check letters carefully many times before posting them . 80 . 
76 
22 1 keep on checking forms, documents, cheques etc. in detail to 





21 I return home to check doors, windows, drawers etc to make 










19 I tend to keep on checking things more often than necessary . 
70 . 
77 
24 When I handle money, I count and recount it several times . 
56 . 
56 
Factor 4: Impulses (van Oppen Factor 1) Current Dutch 
47 When I see a train approaching, I sometimes think I could . 84 . 
74 
throw myself under its wheels 
46 When I look down from a bridge or very high window, I feel . 
79 . 
68 
an impulse to throw myself into space 




49 While driving I sometimes feel an impulse to drive the car into . 
73 . 60 
someone or something 






Factor 4: Impulses (van Oppen Factor 1) cntd.. Current Dutch 




other pointed objects 




doing embarrassing things 
Factor 5: Precision (van Oppen Factor 5) Current Dutch 




14 I feel obliged to follow a particular order in dressing, 
undressing and washing myself 
. 75 . 
72 


















The factor structure of the PI-R in a British community sample of Obsessionals is 
remarkably similar to that of the Dutch study. In both cases, a five-factor solution was 
preferred and all the items (except for item 45) loaded on the same factor in both samples. 
The internal consistency (Cronbach's alpha) for the total score in the current OCD 
sample was 0.92 (excellent); Nunnally, 1978 from van Oppen, 1995c. 
DISCUSSION 
The prediction was fulfilled and the hypothesis supported. Five factors were identified 
in this population - impulses, contamination, checking, rumination and precision. It was 
unexpected that item 45 loaded on the 'rumination' factor as well as the 'impulses' factor. It 
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is possible that for some people, the fear of embarrassing oneself is associated with 'becoming 
obsessed by things' and not being able to allay concerns whereas for others, the nature of the 
obsession is more akin to the fear of acting on obsessions. 
In a normal population, four factors are found. This corresponds to the items in the 
factor 'precision' or order being spread around the other four factors. However, if a factor 
analysis is conducted in which the number of factors are restricted to four, the resultant factor 
solution does not correspond to the four factors found in the normal population (with the 
items from the 'precision' factor being spread amongst the others). Rather, the 'precision' 
factor is maintained but the 'impulses' and 'checking' factors merge together. These findings 
suggest that the qualitative nature of 'ordering' is a distinguishing feature between the normal 
obsessions and compulsions experienced by the majority of the population (Rachman and de 
Silva, 1978; Harrison and Salkovskis, 1984) and those experienced by an obsessional 
population (MacDonald, 1994). 
The structure of obsessional symptoms is important if future research on the 
heterogeneity of OCD is reliant on symptom-subtypes. The findings from data on the Padua 
Inventory indicate a very different symptom profile from that obtained on the Y-BOCS which 
identified three factors of'hoarding/symmetry', 'contamination/cleaning' and 'pure obsessions'. 
Before investigations can take place to determine whether aetiological, management or 
treatment factors differ between groups of patients with different symptoms, it is important 
to identify homogeneous sub-groups with similar symptom profiles. Given the contradiction 
between sub-groups identified according to different measures, it may be some considerable 




Analyses using the Padua-Inventory indicated 5 factors may be present - impulses, 
contamination, checking, rumination, and precision. It is possible that patients with different 
symptoms form unique homogeneous sub-groups, and that prognosis is different for these 
groups. However, at present, there is a debate as to the symptom profiles that may 
characterise these groups. Future work on the symptom heterogeneity of OCD should focus 
on reaching a consensus as to the sub-groups that comprise the disorder. 
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Appendix 2- Questionnaires Used 
CONSENT FORM 
Background Information: - Obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) is a relatively common 
psychological disorder affecting up to 1 million people in the U. K. Obsessive-compulsive 
disorder can significantly interfere with daily functioning. Our research aims to find out more 
about this problem. 
Procedure: - After you have completed these questionnaires, you will receive an analysis of 
your responses. This analysis may take approximately sex to twelve weeks to arrive. Please 
be patient, we have had an overwhelming response to our request for help. You will then 
receive a larger questionnaire package to complete and a thorough explanation of the research 
project. In addition, depending on where you live and your responses to the questionnaires, 
you may be invited to participate in the second stage of the study. You will receive details 
about the next stage which involves personal assessments. Please indicate below if you would 
be willing to travel to the Institute of Psychiatry, if requested. All travelling expenses can be 
reimbursed. 
You are under no obligation to complete these questionnaires. If you do not wish to 
complete your questionnaires, please return them blank in the envelope provided. This 
will not affect any treatment that you may receive now or in the future. 
Potential risks: - There are no risks to your health associated with participating 
in this 
study. The larger questionnaire package may take between 1 and 3 hours to complete. 
Potential benefits: - If you do wish to complete the questionnaires, you will 
be helping us to 
better understand OCD. Hopefully this will eventually lead to an improvement in the 
treatment available to sufferers. You will receive an analysis of your individual responses and 
be given an opportunity to obtain information about OCD from experts in the area. In 
addition, you may be invited to participate in the second stage of the study in which you will 
receive a detailed psychological assessment. 
Please sign below to acknowledge understanding of the explanation of the study, entering into 
the study, and receiving a copy of the consent form. 
Name: 
Signature: Date: 
Are you willing to receive a larger questionnaire package? 
YES/NO (please circle as applicable) 
Are you willing to travel to the Institute of Psychiatry for a personal assessment? 
YES/NO (please circle as applicable). 
PLEASE RETURN THIS FORM AND THE QUESTIONNAIRES IN THE 
ENVELOPE PROVIDED. THANK YOU. 
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TIM Mstucislcy Obsessional Compulsive Inventoiy (MOCI; Hodgson and Rachinan, 
1977). 
Please answer eäch question b`y putting -a-'circle around the "TRUE" or the "FALSE" following the question. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick questions. Work quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the questions. 
1" I avoid using public telephones because of possible contamination. TRUE FALSE 
2. I frequently get nasty thoughts and have difficulty in getting rid of them. TRUE FALSE 
3. I am more concerned than most people about honesty. TRUE FALSE 
4" I am often late because I can't seem to get through everything on time. TRUE FALSE 
5. I don't worry unduly about contamination if I touch an animal. TRUE FALSE 
6. 1 frequently have to check things (e. g. gas or water taps, doors, etc. ) TRUE FALSE 
several times. 
7. 1 have a very strict conscience. TRUE FALSE 
8. I find that almost every day I am upset by unpleasant thoughts that come TRUE FALSE Into my mind against my will. 
9. I do not worry unduly if I accidently bump into somebody. TRUE FALSE 
10. I usually have serious doubts about the simple everyday things I do. TRUE FALSE 
H. Neither of my parents was very strict during my childhood. TRUE FALSE 
12. 1 tend to get behind in my work because I repeat things over and over TRUE FALSE 
again. 
13. I use only an average amount of soap. TRUE FALSE 
14. Some numbers are extremely unlucky. TRUE FALSE 
15. I ado not check letters over and over again before posting them. TRUE FALSE 
16. 1 do not take a long time to dress in a morning. TRUE FALSE 
17. I am not excessively concerned about cleanliness. TRUE FALSE 
18. One of my major problems is that I pay too much attention to detail. TRUE FALSE 
19. I can use well-kept toilets without any hesitation. TRUE FALSE 
20. - My major problem is repeated checking. TRUE FALSE 
21. I am not unduly concerned about germs and diseases. TRUE FALSE 
22. I do not tend to check things More than once. TRUE FALSE 
23. 1 do not stick to a very strict routine when doing ordinary things. TRUE FALSE 
24. My hands do not feel dirty after touching money. TRUE FALSE 
25. I do not usually count when doing a routine task. TRUE FALSE 
26. I take rather a long time to complete my washing in the morning. TRUE FALSE 
27. 1 do not use a great deal of antiseptics. TRUE FALSE 
28. I spend a lot of time every day checking things over and over again. TRUE FALSE 
29. Hanging and folding my clothes at night does not take up a lot of time. TRUE FALSE 
30. EVen when I do something very carefully I often feel that It Is not quite TRUE FALSE 
right. 
Please write your AGE: and SEX: 
+ 
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The Padua Inventory 
_., 
Instructions: The following statements refer to thoughts and behaviours which may occur to everyone 
in everyday life. For each statement, choose the reply which best seems to fit you and the degree of 
disturbance which such thoughts or behaviours may create. Rate your replies as follows: 
0- not at all 
I-a little 
2- quite a lot 
3 -a lot 
4- very much 
Name .............................................. Date........ 
0 1 2 3 4 
1. I feel my hands are dirty when I (ouch money ........................ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
2. I think even slight contact with bodily secretions (perspirations, 
saliva, urine etc. ) may contaminate my clothes or somehow harm me ..... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
3.1 find It difficult to touch an object when I know It has been touched by 
strangers or by certain people .................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
4.1 find it difficult to touch rubbish or dirty things ........................ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
5. I avoid using public toilets because I am afraid of disease and contamination .. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
6. I avoid using public telephones because I am afraid of contagion and disease .. Q Q Q Q Q 
7. I wash my hands more often and longer than necessary ................. 
Q QQ Q Q 
8. I sometimes have to wash or clean myself simply because I think 
I may be dirty or 'contaminated' .........................:....... 
Q QQ Q Q 
9. If I touch something I think Is 'contaminated' I Immediately have to wash 
or clean myself ............................................. 
Q QQ Q Q 
10. If an animal touches me, I feel dirty and immediately have to wash 
myself or change my clothing .................................. 
Q QQ Q Q 
11. When doubts and worries come to my mind, I cannot rest until I have 
talked them over with a reassuring person ......................... 
Q QQ Q Q 
12. When I talk I tend to repeat the same things and the same sentences 
several times .............................................. Q QQ Q Q 
-- --ý ý-- 
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0 t... 2 3 4 
13. I tend to ask people to repeat the same things to me several limes 
consecutively. even though I did understand what they said the first time ... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
14. I feel obliged to follow a particular order In dressing, undressing and 
washing myself ............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
15. Before going to sleep I have to do certain things In a certain order ......... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
16. Before going to bed I have to hang up or fold my clothes In 
a special way .............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
17. I feel I have to repeat certain numbers for no reason ................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
18.1 have to do things several times before I think they are properly done ...... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
19. I tend to keep on checking things more often than necessary ............. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
20. I check and recheck gas and water taps and light switches after 
turning them off ............................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
21. I return home to check doors, windows, drawers etc., to make sure they 
are properly shut ............................................ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
22. I keep on checking forms, documents, cheques etc. In detail, to make sure 
1 have filled them in correctly ................................... 
QQ0QQ 
23.1 keep on going back to see that matches, cigarettes etc. are properly 
extinguished ............................................... 
0 Q Q Q Q 
24. When I handle money I count and recount it several times ............... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
25.1 check letters carefully many times before posting them ................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
26. I find lt difficult to take decisions, even about unimportant matters .......... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
27. Sometimes I am not sure I have done things which In fact I know 
I have done ............................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
28.1 have the impression that I will never be able to explain things clearly, 
especially when talking about important matters that involve me ......... 
QQQQQ 
29. After doing something carefully, I still have the impression I have either 
done it badly or not finished it .................................. 
QQQQ0 
30.1 am sometimes late because I keep on doing certain things more often than 
necessary ................................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
31.1 invent doubts and problems about most of the things I do ............... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
32. When I start thinking of certain things, I become obsessed with them ....... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
33. Unpleasant thoughts come into my mind against my will and I cannot 
get rid of them ............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
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34. Obscene or dirty words come into my mind and I cannot get rid of them .... .Q 
Q Q Q Q 
35. My brain constantly goes its own way and I find It difficult to attend to 
what is happening round me ................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
36.1 Imagine catastrophic consequences as a result of absent-mindedness or 
minor errors which l make.. ** . *. .* 40 . *.. ** ... 6 ........ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
37.1 think or worry at length about having hurt someone without knowing it ..... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
38. When I hear about a disaster. I think it is somehow my fault .............. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
39. I sometimes worry at length for no reason that I have hurt myself or 
have some disease ........................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
40. I sometimes start counting objects for no reason ...................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
41.1 feel I have to remember completely unimportant numbers ............... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
42. When I read I have the Impression I have missed something Important and 
must go back and reread the passage at least two or three times ........ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
. 43.1 worry about remembering completely unimportant things and make an effort 
not to forget them ........................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
44. When a thought or doubt comes Into my mind. I have to examine it from all 
points of view and cannot stop until I have done so .................. 
Q QQ Q Q 
45. In certain situations i am afraid of losing my self-control and doing 
embarrassing things ......................................... 
QQQQQ 
46. When t look down from a bridge or a very high window, I feel an impulse to 
throw myself into space ....................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
47. When I see a train approaching I sometimes think I could throw myself 
under its wheels ............................................. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
48. At certain moments i am tempted to tear off my clothes in public .......... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
49. While driving I sometimes feel an impulse to drive the car into 
someone or something ....................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
" 50. Seeing weapons excites me and makes me think violent thoughts.... *** .. 
Q Q Q Q Q 
51.1 get upset and worried at the sight of knives, daggers and other 
pointed objects ............................................. 
QQQQQ 
52.1 sometimes feel something inside me which makes me do things which are 
really senseless and which I do nöt want to do ...................... 
QQQQQ 
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54. I sometimes have an Impulse to steal other people's belongings. even if 
they are of no use to me ...................................... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
55.1 am sometimes almost Irresistibly tempted to steal something from the 
supermarket ...................................:........... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
56. t sometimes have an impulse to hurt defenceless children or animals ....... 
Q Q Q Q Q 
57. t feel I have to make special gestures'or walk in a certain way ............ 
Q Q Q Q Q 
58. In certain situations I feet an impulse to eat too much, even if 
am then III ............................................... Q Q Q Q Q 
59. When I hear about a suicide or a crime, I am upset for a long time and 
find it difficult to stop thinking about it ............................. 
QQQQQ 
60.1 invent useless worries about germs and diseases .................... 
QQQQQ 
OSanavio, 1988. From 'Obsessions and compulsions: the Padua inventory'. Behaviour Research and Therapy 
26,169-77. Reproduced by kind permission of the author and Pergamon Press plc, Oxford. 
This measure is part of Assessment: A Mental Health Portfolio, edited by Derek Wine. Once the Invoice 
has been paid. It may be photocopied for use within the purchasing Institution only. Published by Tho 
NFER-NELSON Publishing Company Ltd, Darvilie House, 2 Oxford Road East, Windsor, Derkshire $L4 I DF. UK. 
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The Checking Questionnaire Basgd on, Sher et at., 1993) .., Checking Questionnaire 
1. I repeatedly check to make sure I have my wallet or purse. 
2.1 repeatedly check to make sure that I have my keys 
3. I repeatedly check to make sure that my car or house door is 
locked 
4.1 repeatedly check my clothing (e. g., to see if my zipper or 
buttons are undone) 
5. I repeatedly check gas or electrical appliances to make sure 
that they are turned off . 
6. I repeatedly check water faucets to make sure that they are 
turned off 
7. I repeatedly check my alarm clock before going to bed to 
make sure it is set properly 
8. I repeatedly check the address on a letter and its envelope to 
make sure that it is the same 
9. Whenever I work with numbers, I repeatedly check my 
calculations 
10. I repeatedly check in my mirror to see if I have accidentally 
knocked someone over while driving 
11. Before buying food, I repeatedly check over it 
12. When reading I repeatedly go back over what I have already 
read 
13. I repeatedly check that I have put sharp instruments such as 
knives away safely 
14. I telephone my family repeatedly to check that they are all 
right 
15. I repeatedly check my work 
16. I repeatedly check before I put a letter in the mailbox 
17. I repeatedly check to make sure I have not left any belongings 
behind 
18. When walking outside, I repeatedly check the ground for dirt 
19. I repeatedly check to make sure I look okay 
20.1 repeatedly check the floor to make sure there is no 
splintered glass 
21. I repeatedly check appliances/light sv, k6n. a to make sure they 
are off 
22. I repeatedly check my thoughts to make sure that they are 
acceptable 
23.1 repeatedly check my body for symptoms of illness 
Not at Infreq- Some. Often Very 
All neatly timcs Often 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 I 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 "2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
0 1 2 3 4 
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'e Inventory of Beliefs Related to Obsessions (IBRO; Freeston et a1,,, 1993) 
f ief Inventory 
The statements below describe the attitudes people may have towards their own 
thoughts. Please mark the space next to each statement according to bow strongly you 
believe that it is true or false for you. Please mark every one. 
6: I believe strongly that this statement is true, 
5: 1 believe that this statement is true, 
4: 1 believe that this statement is probably true, at least more true than false, 
3: I believe that this statement is probably false, at least more false than true, 
2: I believe that this statement is false, 
1: 1 believe strongly that this statement is false. 
I. Thoughts are in themselves harmless. 
ý. 
2. Uncertainty should not disturb. 
3. It is unforgivable to be responsible for an error that makes oneself look bad 
,..., 
4. Guilt is an appropriate response to unacceptable thoughts. 
5. Danger is always a terrible. thing. 
..,.. 
6. If one believes that there is even the slightest possibility of having caused harm, then one 
must act so as not to be blamed. 
.... 
7. One should avoid at any price any activity that runs the possibility of being held personally 
responsible for a loss. 
.,. _ 
8. Loss is always a terrible thing. 
9. One should feel guilty if thoughts are not controlled. 
...., 
10. Not being able to control thoughts wW harm no one. 
H. Enduring unpleasant thoughts without doing anything is dangerous for the person who has 
them. 
12. Generally speaking it is preferable to carry responsibility alone. 
13. Punishing oneself for errors that may have been made will enable future errors to be avoided. 
. 
14. Enduring unpleasant thoughts without doing anything can lead to their disappearance. 
15. A responsible person does not let unpleasant thoughts happen without trying to control them. 
16. The loss of someone dear is always unbearable. 
17. One is to blame if something happens that one has thought about. 
.., _ 
18. To be uncertain about having caused possible harm is unbearable even if the possibility is 
very unlikely. 
..... 
19. Uncertainty is a source for concern. 
20. One should feel very guilty if #h«. dis the slightest possibility that one is responsible for an 
unfortunate event. 
English Imaslation of 17nventairc & ocr yan Irccts i6cs "ux obsessions. (M. H. Frocs1oo. R. Ldouceur, N. 71iWau, & F. 
Soon, 1991). 0 All rights reserved. Marls H. Frocston, Ecole de psycbologie, UniversitE Lval, Qu! bec, 01K 7P4.1991. 
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On this questionnaire are groups of statements. Please read each group of statements carefully. Then pick out the one statement in 
each VOW that bat desaibes the way you have been feeling during the PAST WEEK. INCLUDING TODAY. 0mM the number be. 
side the statement you picked. if several statements in the group seem to apply equally Yell. circle each one. Be tune to read all the 
statements in each group before making your choice. 
L0 Ido na rkd sad 
II feel IM 2I am sad all do time and 1 can't snap out of it 
31 am so sad of unhappy that I can't stand it 
12.0 1 have not lost interest in of er people 
II am less interested in other people than I used to be 
people 21 have lost most of my interest in other 
31 have lost all my interest in other people 
2.0 I am not particu! ady discouraged about the future 
1I feel discouraged about the future 
21 feel I have nothing to look forward to 
31 feel that the future is hopeless and that things 
cannot improve 
3.0 Ido not feel Eke a failure 
1I feel that I have failed more than the average person 
2 As I look back on my life, all I can tee is a lot of 
failures 
31 fed I am a complete kilure as a perroon 
4.0 I get as much satisfaction out of things as I used to 
II don't enjoy things the way 1 used to 
21 don't get teal satisfaction out of anything anymore 
31 am dissatisfied or bored 'with everything 
" S. 01 don't fed particularly guilty 
. 1I feel guilty a good put of the time 
21 feel quite guilty most of the time 
31 feel guilty all of the time 
6.0 I don't feel I am beingpuýný shed 
1-I feel I may be punished 
2I expect to be punished 
31 fee! 1 am being punished 
7.0 I doa't feel disappointed in myself 
1I am disappointed i7-myself 
21 am disgusted in myself 
31 hate myself 
a. 01 don't WI am any . ºc than anybody else iI am «i4cal of myself for . knete or mistakes 21 blý myself an the amea my faults 31 blame myself for everything bad that happens 
9.0 1 don't have any t oughts of killing myself 
1I have thoughts of lulling myself. but I mould not 
easy them out 
2I would like to kill myse1f 
31 mould kill myself if I had the chance 
10.0 I don't ay any more than usual 
1I cry more than I used to 2l cry all the time now 3I used to be able to cry. but now I can't cry even 
though I want to 
IL 0I am no more initated now than 1 ever am 1I get annoyed or irritated more easily than I used to 
21 feel irritated all the time now 31 don't get irritated at all by the things that used to 
irritate me 
13.0 1 make decisi«is about as wae11 as I ever could 
1 Iput off raaking decisions more than I used to 
21 have greaser ditT cuky in making decisions than 
before 
31 can't make docisions at a! l any mote 
It 0I don't feel I look any worse than I used to 
1I am worried that I am looking old or unamract ve 
21 feel that their an pumanea t changes in my 
appearance that make me look unattractive 
31 believe I look ugly 
IS. 01 can wv t about as well as befort 
1 It takes an extra effort to get started at doing 
something 
21 have to push myself very hard to do anything 
31 can't do any wort at all 
16 01 can sleep u well as usual 
II don't sleep as wdl as I used to 
2I walte up 1.2 bouts earlier than usual and find it 
hard to get back to sleep 
31 wake up several hours earlier than I used to and 
cannot get back t4 sleep 
17.0 1 don't get more fired than usual 
1I get tirod mom easily than I used to 
21 get tired from doing almost anything 
31 am too dyed to do anything 
Ia. 0 My appetite is no morse than usual 
1 My appetite is aöt as Eood As it used to be 
2 My appetite is much wamse now 
31 halve no Appetite at all anymore 
19.0 1 haven't lost much *tight, if any. lately 
11 We host more than 5 pounds 
21 have lost more than 10 pounds 
31 have lot mope than 15 pounds 
19b. I am purpowly trying to lose w gbt by 
eating ksx YES _ 
NO 
20.0 1 am no mom worried about my health than usual 
11 am worded about physical problems such as aches 
and pains. or upset stomach. or constipation 
21 am very wvmed about physical problems and it's 
hard to think of much else 
31 am so worded about my physical problems that I 
cannot think about anything else 
21.0 1 have not notked any recent change in my interest in 
. seat 1I am less intemsed in sex than I used to be 
21 am much less interested in sex now 
31 have lost interest in sex completely 
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The Beck Anxiety Inventory (Beck et al., 1988) 
DATE: 
Below is a list of common symptoms of anxiety. Please read each item in this 
list care fully. Please mark the appropriate space in the column next to each 
symptom to indicate the extent to which you have been bothered by the 








It was very 
unpleasant 






1. Tingling or numbness 
2. Feeling hot 
3. Wobbly legs 
4. Unable to relax 
5. Fear of the worst 
happening 
6. Dizzy or light-headed 





11. Choking feelings 
12. Trembling hands 
13. Shaky 
14. Fear of losing control 
15. Trouble breathing 
16. Fear of dying 
17. Scared 
18. Indigestion or 
discomfort in abdomen 
19. Faint 
20. Flushed face 
21. Sweating (not because 
of heat) 
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The Four Systems Anxiety Questionnaire (Koksal and Powers, 1991) 
This questionnaire contains sixty (60) items concerning difficulties that most people 
experience from time to time. Read each item carefully. 
IF YOU HAVE experienced any of the thoughts, feelings, physical symptoms or behaviours 
in the manner indicated by any of the items then put a tick (f into the space under column 
the column headed YES 
IE YOU HAVE NOT, put a tick (/5 in the space under the column headed MQ 
Please make sure that none of the items are omitted. 
There are no right or wrong answers. Do not spend too much time over any question, we 
are interested in your first reaction, not a deeply considered response. 
Thank you for your participation. 
YES NO 
1.1 blush easily 
2. I often feel so helpless, and desperate that life becomes a 
source of suffering for me 
3. Poor sleep is one of my biggest problems 
4. I often avoid talking to people in a train or bus 
5. I tend to avoid going out 
6. I often have a headache 
7. I often experience the feeling of embarrassment 
8. A jittery feeling has become part of my life 
9. I often have dizzy attacks 
10. I sometimes cannot think of anything except for my worries 
11. I seldom experience chest pains 
12. I seldom feel on edge 
13. I cannot concentrate on a task because of disruption by 
uncontrolled thoughts 
14. I rarely feel joyful 
15. I have persistent disturbing thoughts 
16. I definitely avoid going to any kind of place again, where I 
previously had a difficult time (for example a social gathering 
or a shop etc) 
408 
YES NO 
17. I sometimes think of myself as an inefficient person 
18. My feelings dominate my personality so much that I have no 
control over them 
19. I worry a lot when I think of possible disapproval from others 
20. I often experience the feeling of excitement 
21. I rarely try to steer clear of challenging jobs 
22. I rarely have disturbed sleep 
23. I sometimes feel upset 
24. My muscles are quite tense throughout the day 
25. When at home, I usually try not to stay alone at night 
26. I sometimes get easily tired even when I am not working hard 
27. I rarely worry about unimportant events 
28. I seldom laugh freely 
29. I usually worry that I will not be able to cope with difficulties in 
my life 
30. I tend to avoid talking to someone who is important such as my 
boss 
31. I rarely find myself lost in worrying 
32. Wherever I go, or whatever I do, I always have a feeling of 
discomfort 
33. I sometimes avoid participating in discussions even though I know 
the topic well 
34. My hands rarely shake 
35. I sometimes feel extremely self-conscious 
36. I am worried that others may misunderstand me 
37. I occasionally experience a tingling sensation around my body 
38. I rarely try to keep away from social gatherings 
39. I sometimes feel happy but it easily fades away 
40. Even if everything is going well, my mind is occupied by 
imaginary upsetting ideas 
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YES NO 
41. I seldom have palpitations 
42. I cannot think clearly about anything because disturbing thoughts 
keep occurring in my mind 
43. There seems to be a lump in my throat much of the time 
44. I cannot feel relaxed, even though I am not in a hurry 
45. I seldom avoid speaking at social occasions 
46. Even if it is necessary, I will sometimes avoid asking other people 
questions 
47. I very rarely imagine myself being unpopular with my friends 
48. I have diarrhoea once a month or more 
49. I often find myself thinking about embarrassing situations 
50. I usually feel quite insecure in my life 
51. I have a tight sensation in my neck 
52.1 usually avoid getting involved in social activity 
53. My uneasy feelings can flare up at any moment 
54. I usually try to avoid walking in crowded streets 
55. I always feel irritable 
56. I hardly ever tell jokes 
57. I am concerned about how others view me 
58. I sometimes have stomach problems 
59. Half my thoughts are related to some kinds of worries 
60. I try to avoid standing up to other people even if they have taken 
advantage of me 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR PARTICIPATION 
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The Anxiety Sensitivity Index (Taylor et ah., 1992) 
.i 
DATE: 
Please rate the extent to which you agree with each item by selecting one of the points below. 
0= very little 
1= slightly 
2= moderately 
3= quite a lot 
4= very much 
1. It is important to me not to appear nervous. 01234 
2. When I cannot keep my mind on a task, I worry that 01234 
I might be going crazy. 
3. It scares me when I feel "shaky" (trembling). 01234 
4. It scares me when I feel faint. 01234 
5. It is important to stay in control of my emotions. 01234 
6. It scares me when my heart beats rapidly. 01234 
7. It embarrasses me when my stomach growls. 01234 
8. It scares me when I am nauseous. 01234 
9. When I notice that my heart is beating rapidly, 01234 
I worry that I might have a heart attack. 
10. It scares me when I am short of breath. 01234 
11. When my stomach is upset, I worry that I might be seriously ill. 01234 
12. It scares me when I am unable to keep my mind on a task. 01234 
13. Other people notice when I feel shaky. 01234 
14. Unusual body sensations scare me. 01234 
16. It scares me when I am nervous. 01234 
THANK YOU VERY MUCii 
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Religious Beliefs Questionnaire (based on Joughlin etal., 1992)"Do 
you have a religion? Yes/NoIfyeswhatIS i t? 
Does (did) your mother have a religion Yes / No. If yes what 
is (was) it? 
Does (did) your father have a religion Yes / No. If yes what 
is (was) it? 
Please place a mark anywhere along the line below to indicate the extent to which the statement is true 
for you. 
Example: I am religious 
Not at all Very 
1" How important to you are your religious beliefs 
Not at all Very 
2. How do you feel your problem with obessions/compulsions has affected your religious 
belief? 
Weakened it strengthened it 
3. Do you feel that your religion offers you a clear set of moral guidelines? 
Not at all Very much so 
4. Has your obsessive-compulsive probdim conflicted with the moral guidelines and code of conduct of your 
religion? 
Not at all Very much so 
S. How strong were your religious beliefs as a child. 
Not at all Very strong 
ý" How important to your father are (were) his religious beliefs? 
Not at all 
Very 
7" How important to your mother are (were) hier religious beliefs? 
Not at all Very 
8. Do (did) your parents' religious beliefs provide a clear set of moral guidelines for your 
family? 
Not at all Very much so 
THANK YOU FOR COMPLETING THIS OUESTIONNAIRF 
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The Guilt Inventory (Kugler and Jones, 1992). 
1-he Guilt inventory: for this section of the questionnaire please answer the questions using the response fonrt 
presented below: 
S= Very true of we or strongty 
agree 
6s True of we or agree 
Ss Sometimes true sometimes not or undecided 
2= Not true of me or disagree 
i= Very untrue of me or stror+91y 
disagree 
1.1 believe in a strict interpretation of right and wrong. 
, _ý 
2.1 have shade a lot of mistakes in ey life. 
__ 
3.1 have always believed strongly in a firm set of morat"ethicat principles. 
.. Lately, I have felt good about myself and what I have done. 
5. If I could do certain things over again a great burden would be lifted form my shoulders. 
6.1 have never felt great remorse or quilt. 
7. My goal in life is to enjoy it rather than to live up to some abstract set of moral principles. 
8. There is something in my past that I deeply regret. 
9. Frequently, I just hate myself for something I have done. 
10. My parents wgre very strict with one. 
11. There are only a few things I would never do. 
12.1 often feel "not right" with myself because of something I have done. 
13. My ideas of right and wrong are quite flexible. 
14. If I could live my life over again there are a lot of things I would do differently. 
1S. There are many things I would just never do because I believe they are wrong. 
16.1 have recently done something that I deeply regret. 
. __.. 
17. Lately, it hasn't been easy being ne. 
_. _18" 
Morality is not as "black and white" as many people would suggest. 
Lately, l have been calm and worry-free. 
. __20. Guilt and remorse have been a part of my life for as long as I can recall. 
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--ý21" Sometimes, when I think about certain things 1 have don 1 almost get sick. 
22" In certain circunstances, there is almost nothing I wouldn't do. 
x_23" I do not believe that I have made a lot of mistakes in my life. 
`.., _24" 
1 would rather die than coanit a serious act of wrongdoing. 
1 feel a strong need to live up to my moral values. 
_ß. 
26.1 often have a strong sense of regret. 
____27.1 worry a lot about things 1 have done in the past. 
1 believe that you can't judge whether something is right or wrong without knowing the motives of the 
people involved and the situation in which they are acting. 
_29. 
There are few things in my life that I regret having done. 
_. ____30. 
If 1 could relive the last few weeks or months, there is absolutely nothing I have done that I would 
change. 
_31.1 sometimes have trouble eating because of things I have done 
in the past. 
ý32.1 never worry about what I do; I believe life will take care of itself. 
. ý33. 
At the manent, I don't feet particularly guilty about anything I have done. 
Sometimes I can't stop myself from thinking about things I have done which I consider to be wrong. 
1 never have trouble sleeping. 
1 would give anything if, somehow, I could go back and rectify some things I have recently done wrong. 
_, __37. 
There is at least one thing in ar recent past that I would like to change. 
__38. I aas immediately aware of it when I have done something morally wrong. 
__39. What is right or wrong depends on the situation. 
_ -40. 
Guilt Is not a particular problem for aye. 
41. There is nothing in my past that I deeply regret. 
42.1 believe that moral values are absolute. 
43. Recently, ey life would have been such better if only I hadn't done what I did. 
__.. _.. 
U. If I had my life to begin over again, 1 would change very little, if anything. 
45.1 have been worried and distressed lately. 
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The R-Scale (Salkvoskis, Gledhill and Reynolds, 1995) 
This questionnaire lists different attitudes or beliefs which people sometimes hold. Read 
each statement carefully and decide how much you agree or disagree with it. 
For each of the attitudes, show your answer by putting a circle round the words which 
BEST DESCRIBE HOW YOU THINK. Be sure to choose only one answer for each 
attitude. Because people are different, there is no right answer or wrong answer to these 
statements. 
To decide whether a given attitude is typical of your way of looking at things, simply 
keep in mind what you are like MOST OF THE TIME. 
I often feel responsible for things which go wrong. 
TO'T'ALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY RUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HOCH DISAGREE 
If I can have any influence on things going wrong, then i aast act to prevent it. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY XDCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUCH DISAGREE 
If I don't act when I can foresee danger, then I am to blare for any consequences if it happens. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY KOCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUCH DISAGREE 
I as too sensitive to feeling responsible for things going wrong. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY KDCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUGE DISAGREE 
My sins will find re out. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY HUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY XUCE DISAGREE 
If I Think bad things, this is as bad as JQJU bad things. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY HUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HDCH DISAGREE 
I often cause barn. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY HOCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KOCH DISAGREE 
I worry a great deal about the effects of things Which I do or don't do. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUGH DISAGREE 
To ne, not acting to prevent disaster is as bad as faking disaster happen. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE 
for ne, carelessness is inexcusable when it might affect aber people. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HUCH DISAGREE 
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'Inactivity can cause as rich harn as deliberate bad intentions. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISACYEE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY KDCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY XUCE DISAGREE 
If I b'ow that barn is possible, I should always try to prevent It, however unlikely it seems. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY x0(E SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY DEFY IN® DISAGREE 
Once I have caused barg, I can't forgive nyself. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGUE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY XU® DISAGREE 
I rust always think through the consequences of even the stallest actions. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY EUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY ! DCB DISAGREE 
I have done zany things which night have barred others. 
TOTALLY AGUE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY DEFY KOCH DISAGREE 
Other people are generally too careless. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISMEE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY 1! UGH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY XL1 DISAGREE 
I often take responsibility for things which other people don't think are ny fault. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTILLY 
AGREE VERY KDCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUCE DISAGREE 
Everything I do can cause serious probleas. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY IIDCS SLIGHTLY irwmt SLIGHTLY VERY EDGE DISAGREE 
It's no good ve trying to put things right once they have gone wrong. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY NUCE SLIGETLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY XOCB DISAGREE 
I have to fake sure other people are protected fror things I do. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY SDCS SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY XUC6 DISAGREE 
I an often close to causing barn. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY XDCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY RUGS DISAGREE 
I must protect others fror barm. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE MOLLY 
AGREE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE 
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I should never cause even the slightest ban to others. 
TOTALLY 1GBEE 1G2EE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTILLY 
AGREE VERY XU SLIGHTLY KEUML SLIGHTLY VERY XUCB DISAGREE 
Other people should not trust ie in case I fail thee. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY KDC8 SLIGHTLY YBOTBAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUCK DISAGREE 
I will be condeined for ny actions. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY NOCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY XUCB DISAGREE 
Accidents are always preventable if I take sufficient care. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY na SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KUGH DISAGREE 
Bad things can easily happen as a result of ay carelessness. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY EUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE 
If I can have even a slight influence on things going wrong, than I rust act to prevent it. 
TOTILLLY ACREEE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY EUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY EUCH DISAGREE 
I need to be careful because I say often be close to causing ban. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY DOCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY AUCH DISAGREE 
I worry a great deal about the bad effects of things which I do or don't do. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY XDCS SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY HOCH DISAGREE 
To se, not acting where disaster is a slight possibility Is as bad as taking that disaster happen. 
TOTALLY AGREE 1GBEE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY XDCS SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY XUCH DISAGREE 
For me, even slight carelessness is inexcusable when it light affect other people. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY na SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY NUC8 DISAGREE 
In all kinds of daily situations, ry inactivity can cause as zach ban as deliberate bad intentions. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY RUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY NOCH DISAGREE 
Even if ban is a very unlikely possibility, I should always try to prevent it at any cost. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY NOCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY 1(DC9 DISAGREE 
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once I think it is possible that I have caused Darn, I can't forgive myself. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY AUGE SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE 
Nany of my past actions have been intended to prevent bars to others. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY NUGH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY IDOS DISAGREE 
It's no good re trying to put things right once they have gone wrong. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY NUGH SLIGHTLY HEUTAL SLIGHTLY VERY Na DISAGREE 
I have to sake sure other people are protected fror all of the consequences of things I do. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY AUGE SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY ADLE DISAGREE 
I must constantly be aware of the need to protect others fron any possibility of barm. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISIGREE =11Y 
AGREE VERY KOCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY RUGS DISAGREE 
Other people should not rely on. ay judgenent. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY KDCS SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY NOCE DISAGREE 
If I cannot be Certain I at blaneless, I feel that I an to blaze. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY MUCH DISAGREE 
If I take sufficient care then I can prevent any harafui accidents. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY XD SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY XDCH DISAGREE 
I often think that bad things will happen if I ai not careful enough. 
TOTALLY AGREE AGREE DISAGREE DISAGREE TOTALLY 
AGREE VERY MUCH SLIGHTLY NEUTRAL SLIGHTLY VERY KOCH DISAGREE 
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The Responsibility Appraisal Questionnaire (18 items - questions 1,3-19) 
(Rachman et al., 1995) 
Please place a »umher fron 1 to 6 in the space beside each question to indicate how much you agree or 
disagree with each statement about yourself. Please answer all the questions using the scale below: - 
6 = Absolutely agree 
5 = Mostly agree 
4= Somewhat agree 
3= Somewhat disagree 
2= Mostly disagree 
1= Absolutely disagree 
1. When I am in a restaurant with friends, it is up to me to personally ensure that we have left 
a sufficiently large tip. 
2. It is up to me to protect other people from harm. 
3. I would take special care when driving near a playground. 
4. It is important to me to fulfil my social obligations. 
5.1 would inform the manager if I smelled smoke in a store. 
6. I would welcome the opportunity to take on new responsibilities. 
7. My mean thoughts wishing a person harm can increase the chance that something 
harmful will happen to him/her. 
8. I would carry passengers in the car when road conditions were dangerous. 
9.1 would be obliged to lend a friend money if asked. 
10. If my car were making an unusual noise, I would continue to drive it. 
I1" For me, having a mean thought is almost as bad as doing something mean. 
12. I would welcome the opportunity to take the lead in team projects/events. 
13. I would remember to send a card or call a friend on his/her birthday. 
14. 
- 
If I have a thought about something horrible happening to an acquaintance, it may bring 
them bad luck. 
15.1 would welcome the opportunity of being entrusted with other people's belongings. 
16. 
_____ 




be able to turn down an invitation from a friend. 
18" My mean thoughts can have the same consequences as my mean actions. 
19. I would welcome the opportunity to be put in charge of the safety of buildings. 
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Questions asked in the Responsibility Manipulation 
Subject I. D. 
THE THOUGHT IS 
THE THREAT IS 
THE BEHAVIOUR IS 
Condition Order: 
notes 
SCALE 0= NOT AT ALL 





Urge to perform behaviour 
Discomfort / anxiety 
Perceived responsibility for threat 
Perceived responsibility for thoughts 
Likelihood of threat 
Control over threat 
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Table 20 
Are you experiencing any of the following feelings. If so, how strong they? 
0= Not experience the feeling at all 






Pressure in chest 
Numbness in arms or legs 
Numbness in another part of body 
feeling short of breath 
dizziness 
blurred or distorted vision 
nausea 
Butterflies in stomach 
Knot in stomach 
Lump in throat 
Wobbly or rubber legs 
Sweating 
Dry throat 
feeling disoriented and confused 




Table 3 bl% 
Are you experiencing any of the following thoughts? If so, how strong are they? 
0= Not experiencing the thought 






I am going to throw up 
I am going to pass out 
I must have a brain tumour 
I will have a heart attack 
I will choke to death 
I am going to act foolish 
I am going blind 
I will not be able to control myself 
I will hurt someone 
I am going to have a stroke 
I am going to go crazy 
I am going to scream 
I am going to babble or talk funny 
I will be paralysed by fear. 
Other (give details) 
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Thought-Action Fusion Scale (Rachman et al., 1995) 




1. If I think of a friend failing a test, this increases the risk that 
he/she will fail a tat 0 1 2 3 4 
2. Thinking about hitting someone is as unacceptable to me as 
actually doing it 0 1 2 3 4 
3. If I think of myself losing my job, this increases the risk that I 
will lose my job 0 1 2 3 4 
4. If I think of myself failing a test, this increases the risk that I 
Kea tat 0 1 2 3 4 
5. If I think of a friend passing a test, this increases the chance 
that he/she will pass the test .0 
1 2 3 4 
6. If I think of a relative/friend losing her job, this increases the 
risk that he/she will lose her job 0 1 2 3 4 
7. If I think of a relative/friend being in a car accident, this 
increases the risk that b lshe will have a car accident 0 1 2 3 4 
8. If I think of harm coming to myself, this increases the risk that 
I will come to harm 0 
1 2 3 4 
9. Thinking about making an obscene gesture to someone else is 
almost as bad as doing it 0 1 2 3 4 
10. If I think of harm coming to a close relative/friend, this 
increases the risk that belshe will come to harm 0 1 2 3 4 
U. Having a jealous thought is almost the same as making a 
jealous remark 0 1 2 3 4 
12. Thinking of cheating in a personal relationship is almost as 
unacceptable to me as actually cheating 0 1 2 3 4 
13. If I think of myself obtaining a desirable job, this increases the 
chance that I will obtain a desirable job 0 1 2 3 4 
14. If I think of myself winning the lottery, this increases the 
chance that I will win 0 1 2 3 4 
15. If I think of a relati` e/friend winning the lottery, this increases 
the chance that he will win .0 1 
2 3 4 
16. If I think of myself inheriting a lot of money, this increases the 
chance that I will inherit a lot of money 0 1 2 3 4 
17. Wishing harm on someone else is almost as bad as doing harm 0 1 2 3 4 
18. if I think of myself falling ill, this Increases the risk that I will 
fa11 ill 0 1 2 3 4 
19. If I think of a rclative/friend falling ill this increases the risk 
that he/she will fall ill 0 1 2 3 4 
. ti 
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Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Agree 
Strongly Strong 
20. If I think of a friend's relationship ending, this increases the 
risk that his/her relationship will end. 01234 
21. Having violent thoughts is almost as unacceptable to me as 
viol . 01 .234 
22. If I think of a friendlrelative obtaining a desirable job, this 
increases the chance that he/she will obtain a desirable job 01234 
23. Thinking unkindly about a friend is almost as disloyal as doing 
an unkind act 01234 
24. If I think of a friendhelative inheriting a lot of money, this 
increases the chance that he/she will inherit a lot of money 01234 
25. Having a nasty thought about someone else is almost as bad as 
carrying out a nasty action 01234 
26. Thinking of making an extremely critical remark to a friend is 
almost as unacceptable as actually saying it 01234 
27. Thinking about making an obscene remark or Zest= in 
church is almost as sinful as actually doing it 01234 
28. Having obscene thoughts in a church is unacceptable to me 01234 
29. Thinking about swearing at someone else is almost as 
unacceptable to me as actually swearing 01234 
30. If I think of myself passing a test, this increases the chance that 
I will pass a test 01234 
31. If I think of myself being in a car accident, this increases the 
risk that I will have a car accident.. 01234 
32. If I think of a friend/relative being injured in a fall, this 
increases the risk that he/she will have a fall and be injured 01234 
33. Having a blasphemous thought is almost as sinful as a 
blasphemous action 01234 
34. If I think of myself being injured in a fall, this increases the 







Not A Some Much Ver 
At All Little Muc 
1. I try to avoid walking close to busy roads 0 1 2 3 4 
2. I try to avoid driving when alone 0 1 2 3 4 
3. If I have an unwanted urge, I try to counter it by a thought or 
action 0 1 2 3 4 
4. I try to avoid being alone with young children 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I try to avoid driving on freeways 0 1 2 3 4 
6. If I have an unwanted urge, I try to leave the situation 
somehow 0 1 2 3 4 
7. I have to check things over and over. 0 1 2 3 4 
8. If I have an unwanted urge, I try to neutralize it 0 1 2 3 4 
9. I try to avoid school playgrounds 0 1 2 3 4 
10. I try to avoid public parks 0 1 2 3 4 
11. I try to avoid walking over bridges 0 1 2 3 4 
12. If I have an unwanted urge, I feel that I should correct it some 
, way or other 0 1 2 3 4 
13. I try to avoid driving over bridges 0 1 2 3 4 
14. If I have an unwanted urge, I feel that I must cancel it out 
somehow. 0 1 2 3 4 
15. I repeatedly seek reassurance from others 0 1 2 3 4 
16. I try to avoid driving through tunnels. 0 1 2 3 4 
17. If I have an unwanted urge, I try somehow to put matters 
right 0 1 2 3 4 
18. I try to avoid seeing or using-sharp instruments 0 1 2 3 4 
19. I try to avoid having medicine lying around my house 0 1 2 3 4 
20. I try to avoid high places 0 1 2 3 4 
21. If I have an unwanted urge, I try to balance it with a desired 
thought or action 0 1 2 3 4 
22. 1 try to avoid being alone with elderly people 0 1 2 3 4 
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Images and Images Behaviour Scale 
DO YOU FIND THAT CERTAIN UNWANTED IMAGES, "PICTURES IN THE 
MIND, " KEEP COMING INTO YOUR HEAD AGAINST YOUR WILL? 
Never Infreq- Some- Often Verb 
uently times OfteI 
1. 1 experience the same unwanted image about being trapped 0 1 2 3 4 
2. I experience the same unwanted image about illness 0 1 2 3 4 
3. 1 experience the same unwanted image about being chased 0 1 2 3 4 
4. I experience the same unwanted image about losing control 0 1 2 3 4 
5. I experience the same unwanted image about suffocating 0 1 2 3 4 
6. I experience the same unwanted image about an accident 0 1 2 3 4 
7. 1 experience the same unwanted image about falling 0 1 2 3 4 
8. 1 experience the same unwanted image about being 
abandoned 0 1 2 3 4 
9. I experience the same unwanted image about a natural 
disaster 0 1 2 3 4 
10. I experience the same unwanted image about blood 0 1 2 3 4 
11. I experience the same unwanted image about being physically 
restricted 0 1 2 3 4 
12. I experience the same unwanted image about a fire 0 1 2 3 4 
13. I experience the same unwanted image about death 0 1 2 3 4 
14. I e. erience the same unwanted image about being injured 0 1 2 3 4 
15. If I have an unwanted image, I feel that I should balance it 
with a pleasant image 0 1 2 3 4 
16. If I have an unwanted image, I feel that I should try to correct 
it in some way or other 0 1 2 3 4 
17. If I have an unwanted image, I try to neutralize it. 0 1 2 3 4 
18. If I have an unwanted image, I try somehow to put matters 
right, 0 1 2 3 4 
JO uoU- ir" oC' 
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Response to Thoughts scale 
HA` ING A NASTY THOUGHT ABOUT SOMEONE ELSE MAKES ME ... 
Not . A Some Much 
Ver 
at All Little Muc 
1...... .... feel that I must 
keep it secret 0 1 2 3 4 
2.......... feel that I should balance it with a pleasant thought 0 1 2 3 4 
3.......... feel that I have a very mean streak in me 0 1 2 3 4 
4.......... feel ashamed 0 1 2 3 4 
5.......... feel that I should try to correct it in some way or other 0 1 2 3 4 
6.......... feel that I am a dangerous person 0 1 2 3 4 
7.......... feel that I am losing control 0 1 2 3 4 
8.......... feel that deep down I really wish to be mean 0 1 2 3 4 
9.......... feel that I cannot trust myself 0 1 2 3 4 
10........ feel sad 0 1 2 3 4 
11........ feel that I lack self-control 0 1 2 3 4 
12........ feel that I am a bad person 0 1 2 3 4 
13........ feel embarrassed 0 1 2 3 4 
14........ feel that I should be punished 0 1 2 3 4 
15........ fecl guilty 0 1 2 3 4 
16........ feel that I am a freak 0 1 2 3 4 
17........ feel that I must somehow cancel out the thought 0 1 2 3 4 
18........ feel that I am a dishonest person 0 1 2 3 4 
19........ feel that I am unlike other people 0 1 2 3 4 
20........ feel angry 0 1 2 3 4 
21........ feel that I am to blame 0 1 2 3 4 
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Neurological Soft Signs Score Sheet (Chen et al., 1995) 
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Sample of the Brixton (Burgess and Shallice, 1994a) 
moo omowo 
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samples: a) The wealthy child attended a private " 
b) The crime rate has gone up this 
VVVv.. V{ ß.. 11G 1GVV... a 
In the f' st space enter our 
The old house will be torn 
It hard to admit when one is 
Her 'ob was easy most of the 
When ov o to bed, turn off the 
Te ame was stopped when it started to 
He scra ed the cold food from his 
The dis ute was settled by a third 
Three eo le were killed in a major motorwa 
he bab cried and u set her 
Geor e could not believe that his son had stolen a 
He cre ti to the room without a 
Bill hit his sister on the 
-Too m;; nv mm n nrc% nut of 
malous Completion: 
mples: a) London is a very busy 




ýýr' ý; Fýý 







, he Captain wane- tr --tams with the sinking 
